The basic principle underlying Latvia’s development of its NATO Membership Action Plan

During the April ’99 Washington NATO Summit, Latvia was named as one of the NATO candidate nations. As a result of this Summit, each candidate country received a unique opportunity—develop a Membership Action Plan for joining NATO. This plan requires a clear national security strategy, as realistic control mechanism, as well as a political will for its implementation. This is a national plan and it reflects the nation’s strengths and its realities. The mere planning and execution of this plan is a major event that provides a new stimulus and a clear goal to every candidate nation as well as an effective evaluation of their abilities to function within the structure of the North Atlantic Alliance. We welcome the challenge!

Latvia presented its Membership Action Plan (MAP) to the NATO Assistant General Secretary P.K. Kleibern in September 1999. We are confident that the plan is thorough, realistic, achievable, and consequently, could serve as a basis in NATO’s political decision making to invite Latvia to join the Alliance. Thus, the MAP focuses Latvia’s short term and long term defence development objectives toward interoperability with NATO.

Latvia’s Approach towards Developing the MAP

The Alliance during its Washington Summit, presented documents to the candidate countries that broadly outlined NATO requirements to be accomplished in order to qualify for consideration as a member nation. As a candidate country, Latvia had a chance to instil its individual national character in developing a realistic MAP and spelling out the specific requirements that will clearly and confidently guide it toward membership in NATO.

The basic groundwork had already been done the previous year with Latvia’s development of a NATO Integration Plan. The MAP is merely a continuation of that planning process that targets the solidification of actions and focuses on the plan’s execution. The MAP has been presented to and approved by the Cabinet, and the Latvian Parliament, thus ensuring its highest government support.
Latvia’s MAP takes into account NATO requirements as well as the US. 1998 Department of Defence prepared “Latvian Defence Assessment” report. The plan is focused, and it is achievable! It is also tightly controlled and closely tied to the year 2000 budget and to the 4-year plan.

The Plan also reflects the government’s declaration, that it plans to systematically raise Latvia’s Defence Budget to 2% of the Gross National Product (GNP) by the year 2003. The Latvian Parliament is scheduled to vote on this proposal in January 2000. The table below reflects the budget projection through the year 2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% from GDP</th>
<th>Defence budget Ls (M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>24.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>33.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>44.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>66.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>84.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>104.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>114.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Latvia’s MAP consists of two basic parts. The basic plan reflects Latvia’s political, economic and military goals and priorities. The second part consists of Annexes that reflect the activities to be performed, resources, target dates and responsible departments. The Plan is administered and controlled through an established computer software program. In its makeup, the plan was designed to be simplistic and informative. From the public point of view, it emphasises and assures easy understanding of the plan’s requirements and describes the necessary actions to complete the plan.

**Political and Economic Issues**

Since its regained freedom in 1991, Latvia’s main national security and foreign policy goal has been to be part of NATO and the European Community. This goal was re-emphasised by the Parliament in 1995 and was made a part of Latvia’s National Security concept in 1997. Without being a part of the Euroatlantic security umbrella, Latvia cannot assure long-term stability and security for its people.

Latvia’s MAP characterises its democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights, a market economy with a programmed, long term economic growth, an even regional distribution of resources, and a democratic control of its Armed Forces. The plan further reflects Latvia’s co-operation with countries in the Baltic region and stresses its desire for peaceful co-existence with its neighbours.

The successful implementation of the Plan depends on a sound public relations program, both at home and abroad. In order to gain the necessary support for NATO membership and to raise the public image of the Armed Forces, the plan contains an information strategy for educating and informing the entire population, but concentrating on the younger generations. Recent public opinion polls indicate a positive change in the support of the Armed Forces, as shown in the chart below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NBS</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td>+23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z/S</td>
<td>+2.3</td>
<td>+25</td>
<td>+37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Military Issues

From Latvia’s military point of view, there are two basic principles that it must achieve in order to be eligible for NATO membership. First - enhance the military ability to protect the nation’s sovereignty, and second - be able to fully integrate its military operations with NATO. These two principles are closely related and they provide the necessary impetus for Latvia to develop its Armed Forces according to NATO standards.

The MAP also outlines the mission of Latvia’s Armed Forces:
1. Protect the nation’s sovereignty
2. Be able to function within the NATO structure
3. Be able to contribute to the security system of the Alliance at the time of acceptance.

Of particular importance is a responsive planning and administrative control mechanism. The effort of planning and programming a budget, and monitoring and controlling the progress of the plan’s implementation, is a considerable investment for Latvia to gain NATO membership. The preliminary planning phase at the Ministry of Defence was completed in March ’99, and the plans were updated in the fall of ’99. Subsequent MOD planning will be accomplished in the following sequence:

• **Phase I** – Complete long term (12 yr.) planning process by the end of 1999.
• **Phase II** – Complete long term budgeting cycle by the end of 2000.
• **Phase III** – Complete and implement defence plan control system

Latvia’s defence planning system is based on a long-term (12 yr.) plan, a mid-range (4yr.) plan, and the short term plan (1yr). The long-term plans are general in nature and set out long term military goals, capabilities and requirements that are based on the Total National Defence concept. One such long-term goal is to be able to mobilise 50,000 men for the Armed Forces of which 90% are land forces.

The Mid-term plans are based on the broad guidelines found in the long term plans, but differ in the sense that they are more specific, are resource based, and deal with specific issues in areas such as: armament, supply, mobilisation resources, communications, transportation, etc. To gain a better understanding of the planning requirements, it is worth while to examine the following Latvian National Armed Forces (LNAF) four-year plan defence concepts/requirements:

• Develop a Total Defence Force concept
• Conform to NATO command, control and communications (C3) requirements
• Form and equip three Mobile Reserve battalions
• Develop a NATO compatible logistics system
• Develop a quick-reaction force by year 2003
• Develop two training centres and raise the professional level of its soldiers.

The short-term plans are driven by the annual budget, are very specific, precise, deal with programs to be completed in that year, and are closely controlled.
As mentioned before, the NATO Membership Action Plan has to be realistic and within our capabilities. Consequently, the resources assigned to NATO integration have been divided into the following categories (investments, logistics and facilities development) and also cover financial controls and multilateral relations.

It should be noted that in 1999 Latvia was able to raise its Defence Budget sufficiently enough to be able to increase the salaries of the Armed Forces and improve their quality of life for the average soldier. It was also able to repair a number of existing facilities, and begin development of armament and individual soldier equipment acquisition programs. In comparison to the 1999 budget, the planned year 2000 budget foresees a 32.53% increase.

Parallel to the personnel expenses, Ls9.7M in 2000 investments form that part of the defence budget that ensures future development of the defence system. The year 2000 investments budget will be spent in the following areas (chart below).

Along with the task of ensuring that the Defence Budget will continue to grow, a great deal of attention is also focused on the efficient usage of allocated resources. As a result, the main emphases is being placed on achieving the maximum results based on currently existing plans. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence is seriously working on improving its audit capabilities, financial control structures, as well as increasing the required staffing in these critical areas. Latvia is also closely co-operating with experts from the United States, Great Britain and Denmark to establish a Planning, Programming and Budgeting System that would permit it to establish the required mechanisms, directives and train the personnel necessary to reach established goals.

### Information Security

At present, Latvia has developed majority of the required laws and directives designed to ensure its own information security and satisfy NATO security information requirements. This is the conclusion reached by our experts based on analysis of the existing laws and directives. However, in 1999 NATO certifies only

| Development of infrastructure (facilities) | 2.293 Ls M |
| Communications network for LNAF | 0.079 Ls M |
| Development of the Baltic Air Surveillance (BALTNET) | 0.14 Ls M |
| Development of the Baltic Squadron (BALTRON) | 0.158 Ls M |
| Development of a Combined Mil. Pers. System (BALTPERS) | 0.097 Ls M |
| Individual soldier equipment and arms procurement | 4.386 Ls M |
| **TOTAL** | **7.9 Ls M** |
the State Protection Bureau as the only agency meeting its stringent security requirements. Current plans call for the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to establish the required personnel and organisational security measures in order to receive NATO certification. It is estimated that both ministries, as well as the Latvian National Armed Forces Staff (LNAF), will complete the personnel security checks by the end of the year 2000.

Although Military Counterintelligence functions were already performed in earlier years, this service was not fully functional until 1999. Currently work is being done to train personnel in information security requirements. The Constitutional Protection Bureau, who is charged with developing security measures, has begun to establish the course requirements and prepare the necessary training programs designed to meet those requirements.

In order to ensure effective co-operation with NATO, the Alliance members and partner nations, Latvia plans to sign the necessary information security protection treaties with all NATO and European Union members. Such treaties already exist with NATO, Germany, United States, and the Czech Republic. Planned treaties with Estonia and Lithuania are being coordinated prior to final acceptance.

Information security issues constitute a new field of security concerns for Latvia. This is a highly technical requirement and demands particularly careful consideration, a qualitative approach and a high degree of expertise, consequently, much remains to be done in the coming years.

Judicial Questions

Laws and judicial questions constitute an important part in Latvia’s efforts to full NATO membership. Today’s laws must meet today’s realities, and they should not hinder Latvia’s participation in NATO activities that take place in conjunction with NATO treaties and international peace keeping operations.

In our preparation for possible NATO membership, we must also take into consideration the fact that Latvia can not fully incorporate the required judicial changes until such time that Latvia becomes a full, legal (de jure) member of the NATO Alliance. Nevertheless, Latvia already must make the necessary preparations for such an eventuality. Current plans call for various laws to reflect NATO requirements and treaty demands. As a result, once Latvia is asked to join NATO, it would have to begin the formalities required to implement the earlier prepared laws.

As a further preparation for the required judicial changes, it is important to closely analyse those NATO requirements that affect our laws and directives. Latvia plans to fully consult with NATO member nations regarding their experiences in this regard. Particular attention will be paid in the following areas: the legalities of joining NATO and use of military power, restrictions and prohibitions that would affect Latvia, the use of Latvian National Armed Forces outside of Latvia, stationing of NATO forces in Latvia, and the implementation of STANAG standards.
MAP Implementation Control Procedures

The Latvian Ministry of Defence has established an implementation control process for the purpose of closely following the MAP implementation. The Latvian NATO Integration Plan, which was prepared in 1998, already had established a framework and identified the organisations responsible for tracking the plan’s implementation. As a result, a great deal of the MAP 2000 implementation control structures and procedures are based on the earlier model.

Implementation of MAP 2000 involves a large number of Latvian government institutions. The leadership responsible for the Plan’s implementation is divided between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the Constitutional Protection Bureau playing a major role in the area of information security management. The political leadership responsible for the Plan’s implementation rests with the Latvian NATO Integration Council chaired by the Premier. This procedure was already established in October 1998 and the Council meets no less than once a quarter. The next lower level of control is the NATO Integration Senior Government Officials Committee that is chaired by the Ministry of Defence NATO Integration Executive Secretary. The Senior Officials Committee represents the key ministries involved in NATO integration and provides broad guidance, and receives regular progress reports.

The Ministry of Defence and the LNAF have established a monthly MAP action review process that is being handled by the MAP Action Group and individuals have been identified that will be responsible for the implementation of the 22 sections of the MAP 2000.

Development Concept

It should be noted that during the MAP preparation process Latvia consulted with the following NATO member nations: USA, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Norway and the other Baltic countries, which in itself speaks well of its co-operation with other NATO nations. Latvia hopes to continue its consultations with NATO member and partner nations and during the MAP implementation process.

In October 1999 Latvia participated in its first meeting with NATO member nations where detailed, specific questions were asked regarding the Plan. This meeting dealt principally with the first section of the Plan, namely political and economic questions. Meeting with the representatives of the NATO member nations was a clear indication how seriously and deliberately NATO members are analysing the implementation and control features of the MAP. Today Latvia is carefully reviewing areas of the MAP where further meetings with NATO members (19+1) may be required.

Since the MAP is still in its formative stages, the NATO scheduled review process, as well as the various member nation consultations have provided Latvia with a great learning experience regarding MAP development. As a result of this gained experience, and the fact that more
time will be available for the preparation of next year’s plan, it should be even more accurate and precise than the current plan.

NATO ability to co-ordinate MAP action plans, procedures and accountability with existing member nation will also play a major role in MAP implementation. According to currently scheduled NATO procedures, Latvia’s review of its NATO integration plan will take place at the end of year 2000. At the same time, Latvia will also be responsible for developing its PARP action plan and the individual country co-operation programs. In order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and data, Latvia is very interested in participating in future NATO planning sessions that may deal with document planning and submission questions. Hopefully, this type of co-ordination will take place in year 2000.

Development of the MAP, and the co-ordination between Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, once again illustrated the excellent co-operation that exists between the Baltic countries. Projects such as the MAP, encompassing broad areas of military and political issues, further illustrates the willingness and the ability of the Baltic countries to work together on regional security issues, in the spirit of co-operation and mutual trust.

The NATO Washington Summit gave candidate country status to a number of states, including Latvia. This is a unique opportunity for Latvia to demonstrate to the world that it is a dependable, democratic, educated and peaceful country, on its way to transforming itself into an Euroatlantic nation with common security concerns.
Introduction

The Washington Summit came up with a series of decisions to better prepare NATO for the security challenges it may be confronted with in the future. Perhaps NATO decisions taken on the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership (EMOP) and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) were the awaited by partner nations. The latter was understood as one of the most challenging and important outcomes of the Summit.

At the same time the “new” initiative – MAP - received a majority of the comments: there were a lot of discussions on whether it would be appropriate to identify and reflect all the expectations of aspirant countries seeking NATO membership. Will it really help aspirants to prepare for possible future NATO obligations? Will the promised NATO feedback be sufficient and will it work in real practical terms?

However, the majority of these questions will not be explored and answered in this article due to their complexity and vagueness. The basic aim of this article is rather less ambitious – I will try briefly to define the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in general and Lithuania’s understanding and in particular, implementation. The major theme of this article is that MAP was not a completely new initiative. However, it has compelled aspiring countries to review and put all the existing programs together, thus in this way, harmonizing them and developing additional ones. Therefore, it is also stated, that in Lithuania’s case, the developed annual National NATO Integration Program (NNIP) was based on existing plans and programs in the field of defense and resources, that were complemented with additional plans, not military in nature, i.e. public relations, legal and security issues.

Membership Action Plan: Practical results from Washington Summit

Ms. Jurate Petrauskaite*

Washington Summit outcomes: What is MAP?

At the Washington Summit, the Alliance reaffirmed its commitment to the
“open door policy”:
“NATO is an open community, not a closed shop...”

This commitment in the way it was understood by NATO received the form of the MAP initiative proposed and launched in Washington with the basic aim to assist aspiring Partners to prepare for future membership in the Alliance. The Alliance expressed its readiness to provide advice, assistance and practical support.

There are several features of particular importance found in the MAP. Firstly, NATO’s promised feedback mechanism is the most challenging and important one in the eyes of countries seeking NATO membership. This is, what in general gives such important meaning and significance to the whole document. However there exist different approaches between NATO countries on what is really meant by the term “feedback mechanism” and how it should work. Due to this reason, the concerns of the aspirants about the possibilities to have a real dialogue instead of a monologue, that was found to take place in the individual dialogue format, can be understandable. Without the “feedback mechanism”, the whole idea of MAP would definitely lose its sense and uniqueness.

Secondly, MAP is also a document where the Alliance clearly stressed and defined the importance of the broader approach to the co-operation and accession issues by asking aspirants to develop their plans and to provide information not only on pure defense/military issues but also on general political and economics, resources, security as well as legal issues directly or indirectly related to the membership in the Alliance. Therefore the aspirant countries are asked to start to approach the membership issue not only in the narrow sense of the membership requirements and commitments.

“We want them to look at the entirety of issues. Joining this place is not just about defense issues. There are a whole host of other things they have to address”.2

However, from another point of view, the signs of such an understanding from NATO’s side can be found already in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement and in the subsequent cooperation mechanisms such as Partnership Working Program (PWP). Thus, it is not as new as one might think.

Thirdly, if one would take a look for example at the Defense/Military Issues of NATO developed MAP document, you will find that practically there are no new initiatives proposed, only the requirement to put the existing programs together. The major value is that aspirant countries basically are requested to harmonize the existing programs between themselves and especially to define/set common priorities for all the programs, to prioritize these programs according to the needs and necessities of particular aspirant country for the preparation for membership requirements. The same can be said about the harmonization of the different issues discussed in the separate chapters of the document. There is no doubt that perhaps the most challenging task was to base the plans and programs defined in Aspirants’ MAP on the resources available. Thus, MAP can be evaluated as the mechanism encouraging aspirants to develop ambitious, but at the same time, more realistic and more
economy based plans of the development of their Armed Forces and NATO integration. How they manage to solve this difficult task will be clear after the first NATO assessment on progress made in the implementation of their MAPs.

Fourthly, despite NATO efforts to clearly define the schedule/mechanism of evaluation and implementation process, there still exists some vagueness, e.g. how it is supposed to synchronize MAP with other PfP mechanisms such as PARP or IPP, how to avoid the duplication between them.

Finally, according to the MAP “...Any decision to invite an aspirant to begin accession talks with the Alliance will be made on a case-by-case basis by Allies...Membership Action Plan, which would be on the basis of self-differentiation, does not imply any timeframe for any such decision nor guarantee of eventual membership. The program can not be considered as a list of criteria for membership...The list of issues identified for discussion does not constitute a criteria for membership and is intended to encompass those issues which the aspirant countries themselves have identified as matters which they wish to address”.

The only positive side of this paragraph is that MAP, one more time emphasizes the self-differentiation process and leaves some room for “individuality” of each aspirant. However, NATO has been very careful not to raise hopes about membership and trying to avoid a roadmap concept, thus partly detracting the importance of the whole document. This also means that despite the best efforts by aspirant countries, NATO decision on the membership will be based not only on the progress made in the implementation of MAP mechanisms, but also on political realities and aspirants’ skillful lobbying in the capitals of the 19 NATO members.

Lithuania’s understanding and position on MAP

Lithuania, as the majority of partner nations, welcomed the Washington Summit decisions to recognize explicitly aspirant members’ progress towards NATO membership and to adopt a Membership Action Plan (MAP) as well as, to review the enlargement process at the next Summit which should take place not later than 2002.

Lithuania considers MAP not as a completely new initiative, but rather an effort to put all existing initiatives and programs proposed by NATO together. The feedback on and the evaluation of partners’ participation in the MAP, i.e. the preparation for NATO membership, are seen as extremely important for the country. It is thought that feedback will allow both the Alliance and Lithuania to keep track of progress made. However, it is also understood that an active and continued participation in PfP and EAPC mechanisms remain essential to further deepen involvement in the work of the Alliance, as the ability to contribute to collective defense and to the Alliance’s new missions and willingness to commit to gradual improvements in military capabilities will be clearly factors which will be considered in determining our suitability for NATO membership.
Mechanism established to deal with the MAP initiative

At the end of April, the Government of Lithuania, taking into account the results of the 23-25 April 1999 meeting in Washington, decided to establish the Coordinating Council for Lithuania’s integration into the NATO.

The main tasks for the Coordinating Council were defined:

1. To prepare a plan of action for Lithuania’s preparation for NATO membership, to encompass and co-ordinate the work of all of the institutions of Lithuania that address the issue of co-operation with NATO and present it for consideration and approval to the Lithuanian Government;

2. To co-ordinate the execution of the Lithuanian Government’s approved plan of action for preparation for NATO membership and constantly update it, to co-ordinate the work of the different state institutions involved in co-operating with NATO and the integration process into this organization;

3. To regularly report to the Government about execution of the preparatory plans for NATO membership as well as to give suggestions related to the implementation of the plans.

The Coordinating Council is an inter-governmental institution with the Minister of Foreign Affairs as the head and the Minister of Defense as his deputy. The members of the Coordinating Council are the vice-ministers of almost all the Ministries and other institutions. The Coordinating Council forms different working groups according the areas of integration to prepare and implement action-plan for preparing for NATO membership, decides the tasks and regulations of the groups.

Taking into account the tasks given to Coordinating Council, six working groups were established to prepare the final NNIP document. The working groups dealt with five areas identified in MAP plus public information program.

During the NNIP preparation, significant contribution was received from Danish, Polish, US, and especially from Czech experts. Close co-ordination with Estonia and Latvia was also seen as a necessary part of the preparatory process.

The NNIP was prepared, approved and presented to the Government of Lithuania by the Lithuanian NATO Integration Commission in early September and submitted to NATO on 8 September.

NNIP

Lithuanian NNIP defines objectives and sets forth targets for Lithuania’s membership preparations.

Political and Economic Issues

During NNIP preparation phase were the lead was taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was thought the chapter on political and economic issues shall provide information on Lithuania’s achievements in the political/economic area and substantiate Lithuania’s readiness to assume
obligations and commitments under the Washington Treaty and the relevant provisions of the Study on NATO Enlargement. This chapter also identifies issues for consultations and feedback with NATO.

In this chapter political and economic reforms pursued by the Government of Lithuania are defined, i.e. the legal adoption and implementation of basic principles of democracy, individual liberty, democratic civilian control of the armed forces, and free-market system. The insurance of democratic civilian control of the armed forces is thought as of high priority. The President of Lithuania is the Supreme Commander of the Lithuanian armed forces. Legal mechanisms to guarantee civilian control of Lithuania’s armed forces are established and maintained.

Lithuania’s primary foreign and security policy priorities as stated in NNIP are to integrate into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, as well as pursue good relations with neighboring countries. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the primary organization capable of guaranteeing political and military security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Lithuania committed itself not only to share but also to defend the values enshrined in the Washington Treaty. All Lithuania’s parliamentary parties and a majority of the population support the country’s membership in NATO.

Lithuania’s aim to join NATO is based on the firm conviction that European security is indivisible. It has undergone a series of intensified dialogues with NATO and continues to work closely with the Alliance at all levels as a means of strengthening the bond between them. Lithuania’s continuous participation in NATO-led operations including IFOR, SFOR, AFOR and KFOR is a clear message that it is willing to contribute to the security order as well as to become a full member of the Alliance.

Lithuania endorses the purposes and declarations specified in the Alliance’s revised Strategic Concept. It understands the approach to security outlined in NATO’s Strategic Concept as a basis for its legal and strategic documents. It shares the aim of achieving a more prominent European role in security and defence policy including the Alliance’s strong commitment in the continued development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.

Lithuania acknowledges the importance in overcoming divisions and disagreements that could lead to instability and conflict. Therefore the good neighborly relations are understood of utmost importance. In accordance with OSCE principles, Lithuania signed treaties regulating relations with all neighboring countries. Most notably, it has signed border demarcation treaties with all of its neighbors, including Russia and Belarus. It has no territorial or ethnic disputes with any bordering state. As part of its emphasis on maintaining good neighborly relations, Lithuania pursues an active political, pragmatic and issue-oriented co-operation with Russia and Belarus. Lithuania recognizes the importance of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Ukraine Charter and welcomes the Alliance’s partnership with both of these countries.

In the chapter on economic issues it is stated that the growth of Lithuania’s
Economy, which since 1995 has been marked by a rather high growth rate of GDP (7.3% in 1997 and 5.1% in 1998) was considerably slowed down at the end of 1998, largely under the influence of the financial and economic crisis in Russia. The analysis of Lithuania’s economic development in 1999 shows that the real GDP growth this year will amount to only 0.3–1.3%. At the same time, the impact of the economic crisis in Russia has, on the one hand, shown a degree of economic openness, flexibility of economic agents and provided a further impetus to the restructuring and reorientation of the market activities. On the other hand, it has exposed the vulnerable aspects of the Lithuanian economy and indicated the directions for further policy measures and urgent reforms.

Lithuania is consistently increasing its defence expenditures. In 1999, the Lithuanian Parliament passed a Law on the strategy of financing the national defence system. 1999 defence expenditures should reached 1.51% of GDP, and, according to the above-mentioned law, will increase to 1.70-1.75% of GDP in 2000 and 1.95-2% of GDP in 2001. Lithuania is approaching the level of defence spending recommended for NATO members.

**Defence/Military Issues**

The Ministry of National Defence had the lead in the preparation of Defence/Military Issues and Resources Issues. These two parts encompass the main principles of the Lithuanian defence system, describing the current situation and more importantly highlighting our future armed forces development plan, which is aimed at NATO membership. Therefore, the NNIP is very much inter-related and interconnected to earlier developed programs and plans, such as our Long-range Defence Enhancement Program, PARP and IPP. The new NATO Strategic Concept and the Study on NATO Enlargement also served as guidelines the development of the NNIP.

The Defence/Military Issues Chapter can be approached as consisting of three main parts: the definition of defence and co-operation with NATO policies; plans for 2000 and long-ranged plans (until 2008) of the development of the armed forces and means of enhancement the interoperability with NATO; and an outline of direct current and future co-operation with NATO.

Defence policy and doctrine is focused upon the establishment of a security environment that will ensure the maintenance of state independence and sovereignty. Lithuania is creating national armed forces, based on conscription and mobilisation, which are capable of providing a suitable degree of defensive capability. It will continue to seek membership in international organisations stressing the defence of democratic ideals, regional stability, and co-operation among states. The defence planning process continues to be fine-tuned and is increasingly becoming an effective management tool.

Lithuania is developing a framework of national documents to support the national security effort. Both the National Security Strategy and a detailed National Military Strategy are near completion. A linkage between the desired security ends,
policy ways, and political-military means is being established. These documents will articulate the government’s security responsibilities to the population and describe the military’s role in the national security strategy, the military’s missions derived from this and the type, size, and shape of the force required to accomplish these missions.

The long-term defence plan outlines both quantitative and qualitative aspects for developing defence capabilities. The basic principles for combat forces are readiness, mobility, sustainability, survivability, flexibility and interoperability with NATO. The long-term priorities include: C3, the adoption of a new force structure, systemized education and training system, logistics, quality of life improvement, development of infrastructure, armament and equipment procurement, and air defence. The emphasis on quality of life, good quality infrastructure and educational opportunities will ensure that the military attracts and retains the best personnel available. The development of the NCO corps and improved training will strengthen the professional cadre.

In the Defence/Military Chapter there is a statement that as a NATO member Lithuania will participate fully in the NATO integrated military structure. Its participation will correspond to the needs of the Alliance and to the capabilities of Lithuania. In preparation, Lithuania will seek to identify qualified personnel and prepare them for work within the NATO Military Structures.

Lithuanian co-operation with and participation in NATO organisations and structures, provides an opportunity to improve national defence capabilities and interoperability. This participation in NATO organisations is a further step in the development of the working relationship with NATO.

Lithuania will continue to gain NATO defence planning experience and expertise by participating in the expanded and adapted PARP and through familiarization with the DPQ. Lithuania will attempt to use the next PARP planning cycle to further integrate aspects of the DPQ into Lithuanian’s PARP Survey Response. PARP is understood as an effective tool in the country’s preparation for NATO membership, especially for the participation in the Alliance’s collective defence planning and the development of credible national self-defence capabilities.

Lithuania is actively pursuing NATO standardization, i.e. operational, material and administrative. As a minimum, it desires to achieve commonality in doctrines and procedures, interoperability of command, control and communications and major weapons systems and interchangeability of ammunition and primary combat supplies.

Lithuania continues to view PfP as an instrument to prepare for NATO membership and as a key element in Euro-Atlantic security. It has been an active participant in the PfP and will remain fully involved in the enhanced PfP during its accession to NATO and beyond. The development of co-operative relations with other Partners will remain a key area and Lithuania will continue to pursue mutually reinforcing objectives in its external military contacts.
Thus, Lithuania is establishing a solid Defence/Military foundation by developing the overall capabilities of its armed forces and enhancing interoperability. This will enable the country to defend its sovereignty and protect its democratic values, while simultaneously contributing to the effectiveness of the Alliance. The Lithuanian NNIP places great emphasis on the need to prepare force structures to contribute militarily to collective defence and to the Alliance’s new missions. Lithuania has adopted a firm commitment to a progressive ten-year modernization and procurement program to improve its military capabilities. It is also fully prepared to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits and burdens of common security and collective defence; and to subscribe to the Strategic Concept and other Ministerial statements.

**Resource Issues**

During the preparation of the Resource Issues chapter the main emphasis was placed on Lithuania’s financial capabilities, strength of personnel and its preparedness to implement both its national self-defence requirements and upon accession all Alliance commitments, roles and responsibilities. It is stated that the Government has undertaken a comprehensive review of its defence budget and allocations in accordance with declared national security priorities and those of NATO to evaluate the effectiveness of current and future defence budget expenditures in meeting its objectives. The commitment to allocate 2% of GDP for defence in 2001 remains steadfast and is the central developmental objective of our overall plans.

Information on defence expenditures is provided. Approved defence expenditures, excluding the Border Guard, for 1998 were 538 million Litas (US$ 134.4 million) and 716 million Litas (US$ 179 million) for 1999. Defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 1.31% in 1998, with an increase to 1.5% forecast in 1999.

The defence budget issues are widely discussed in Resources Chapter. It is stated that defence budget is based upon the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security and other legal acts, on the Government Program for 1997-2000, and State Defence Council and Government decisions. Within the strategic planning process, the overall priorities for developing Lithuanian military capabilities are set out in the “Long Range Programs” which are approved by the Seimas. Defence budget priorities are established by the Minister of Defence and, where appropriate, also approved by the Government, the State Defence Council and the Seimas. Advice on priorities is provided through an integrated MoD branch structure and a Defence Resources Board. Defence programs will cover each type of military capability necessary to fulfill the Lithuanian National Military Strategy, in a structure that is compatible with the Service Categories used in the NATO Defence Planning process.

The defence budget has been compiled on the basis of expenditure programs since 1996. Presently, the defence budget covers 13 different programs. These programs and investment projects are based upon objectives that specify the required
outcome and how defence capability will be improved. The Ministries of Finance and National Economy have crucial roles in the construction of the defence budget.

The Resource Issues chapter also covers the issues related to a commenced major program of reforms to transform planning and resource management. The steps being taken at both the Government level and within the MoD are complimentary and have four main aims:

- To improve performance throughout the Government and at all levels within the Defence System;
- To obtain the best value for money from limited public resources;
- To improve transparency and subject annual budget estimates to public scrutiny;
- To facilitate European integration and NATO membership.

Attempts to calculate direct and indirect costs of future NATO membership were made. However, it was difficult to make exact calculations, as Lithuania could not fully estimate all possible NATO requirements. Therefore, such estimations can only be used as planning targets. Lithuania accepts the principles of common-funding and cost-sharing which applies throughout the Alliance, and is prepared to participate in the Alliance’s common-funded activities, at an agreed cost sharing level, based on Lithuania’s ability to pay, in relation to its relative economic capacity (GDP) and/or purchasing power parities.

Lithuania will also commit sufficient budgetary resources and fully participate, where appropriate, in all of the Alliance structures, to include permanent and military representation at NATO HQ, military representation in the NATO command and participation in the key NATO committees, organisations and agencies, to meet membership obligations.

Security Issues

The Security Issues chapter was prepared by the working group led by State Security Department. The main emphasis in this chapter was placed on Lithuania’s active measures undertaken to ensure that, upon its accession to the Alliance, it will have in place sufficient safeguards and procedures to protect NATO and the state’s most sensitive information. It is mentioned that the Government is pursuing these actions in accordance with NATO security policy to guarantee the security of classified information as well as to protect important military, political, economic, and other information whose loss would harm NATO and/or Lithuanian State interests.

Legal Issues

A special working group for the preparation of the Legal Issues Chapter, led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, identified several major points. It is said that Lithuania expects, upon accession, to have a legal system interoperable with NATO legal system. In accordance with the terms outlined in the MAP, Lithuania has started a review of its domestic legislation and agreements, which regulates the defence/military field and governs wide-ranging cooperation with NATO and its members.
A preliminary analysis of three NATO documents was performed by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice and National Defence. No constitutional or other legal issues were found in Lithuanian domestic law to inhibit the country’s accession to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, the 1951 Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International Staff, and the 1994 Agreement on Status of Missions and Representatives of Third States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Accession to these treaties does not constitute the necessity to change existing laws. Analysis led to the conclusion that Lithuania’s domestic legislation provides an effective legal mechanism for the implementation of international agreements stated above.

**NNIP implementation**

Lithuania has already had two “feedback” type meetings, one with the NATO Team and the other at 19 with the SPC(R). Both focused on the NNIP Political and Economic Issues. However, during the second meeting, discussions were extended and covered almost all themes found in the NNIP and especially on Defence/Military and Resources Issues. Lithuania found these meetings extremely productive and useful for the further development of our NNIP. Taking into account the quality of the questions, remarks and proposals given by NATO Allies and representatives, the conclusion can be made that NATO is also seeking to keep its commitments.
under the MAP mechanism by providing aspirant countries real and more important practical feedback. Currently, Lithuania is making every effort to update and improve its NNIP in accordance with the comments received from NATO.

Domestically, the Government of Lithuania updated its Government Action Program for the years 1999-2000 taking into account the commitments identified in the NNIP document.

Lithuania has already prepared and presented to NATO its tailored IPP for the years 2000-2001. It is projected that the number of IPP activities in 2000 will be about 130 of which 60% will be directly related to the implementation of MAP and PARP commitments. IPP is considered as one of the most important tools in implementing the objectives identified in the NNIP. Lithuania sees PARP as another more practical tool in implementing its annual program and thus to better achieve NATO interoperability. Currently, PARP IPGs are being studied and an implementation started should be complete by June 2000. Furthermore, in order to achieve all NNIP objectives, Lithuania is also seeking to use the new initiatives found under the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership (EMOP).

**Conclusions**

To conclude, it can be noticed that the aspirant countries have gone through the first steps of a long-term process of MAP implementation, preparing and presenting their national plans and programs for the integration into NATO as well as beginning initial discussions on membership related issues. The preparation of such plans/programs appeared at first to be a difficult and resources intensive task. However, even more challenging will be the implementation process of these integration plans and the follow-up NATO assessment on the progress made. It should also be mentioned that up until now, the MAP implementation process is everything that NATO promised, i.e. focused and candid feedback with technical advice.

Currently Lithuania is implementing its NNIP, already taking into account advice provided by NATO. There is now a general understanding that the whole country, not only the Armed Forces, should make every effort to implement, in the best possible way, all objectives and tasks found in the NNIP. In order to ensure the continuity of this national integration process, the Co-ordination Council will remain a vital link to the successfully implementation of its NNIP.

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Note: The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Ministry of National Defence or the Lithuanian government.

Decisions taken by NATO leaders during the Washington Summit will have significant impact on the development of the European and transatlantic security architecture in the next millennium. The NATO Summit confirmed and developed further principles of inclusive and co-operative security policy, which had already started in 1994 with the launch of the PfP programme and had shown its political and also very practical values, especially during peace operations conducted together by allies and partners.

In Washington, NATO’s “open door” policy was solidly confirmed and nine possible candidates for future enlargement, among them Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, were named. For the aspirant countries, the launch of the Membership Action Plan, a new and an important initiative in the NATO enlargement process, was certainly one of the most important results of the Washington Summit.

The acceptance of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic into the Alliance has ultimately redefined the European security landscape. Simultaneously, we are witnessing the growing importance of NATO in guaranteeing stability in the entire transatlantic security area. It has been and will continue to be Estonia’s aim to enhance European security and stability through co-operation, integration and taking equal responsibility.

Accession to NATO is Estonia’s main security and defence policy priority. Estonia welcomes the new dimensions of extensive co-operation with NATO, as expressed in the Membership Action Plan. The MAP is the next and logical step in developing the co-operation and integration process between allies and partners. Estonia highly appreciates the possibility given to the aspirant countries to decide, on the basis of self-differentiation, the scope of their individual participation in MAP for themselves. Estonia considers the Membership Action Plan as a kind of roadmap into NATO. At the same time, Estonia recognizes that further NATO enlargement will be based on a political decision.
It is obvious that increasing the resources allocated to national defence is the first step to further develop the defence system and take advantage of new co-operation mechanisms opened to aspirants through MAP. Therefore, the Estonian government decided to gradually increase defence expenditures up to 2% of the GDP by 2002. Such an increase will enable Estonia to effectively realize its medium-term plan for the defence forces and, simultaneously, fully participate the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. The Estonian government’s NATO integration policy has broad political support. All major political parties have agreed to achieve the readiness for Alliance membership by the year 2002.

**Estonia’s First Steps After the Launch of MAP**

In an effort to successfully take part in the MAP process and improve inter-institutional NATO integration co-operation, NATO Integration Commissions have been established by the Estonian government. It is a two-level co-ordination mechanism, which consists of a Government Commission (chaired by the Prime Minister) at the political level and an Experts Commission which had an initial and immediate task of preparing the ANP, at the inter-institutional level. Designing the ANP was a new initiative, and thus, it was largely up to the participating countries to create a format for the document. Estonia has set pragmatism and clarity of stated plans and goals as the guiding principles for the composition of the ANP document.

On September 27, 1999, Estonia submitted its first Annual National Programme (ANP) to NATO. The Estonian ANP was drawn up according to the framework suggested within the Membership Action Plan. Although this plan bares the title ‘annual’ (this title comes directly from the MAP basic document), it encompasses much more. The ANP is the most extensive and comprehensive defence related planning document approved by the Estonian government so far. The ANP will serve as one of the main guiding and planning documents for the next few years and will form a guiding framework for the preparation of Estonian defence structures for NATO membership. Due to the document’s content and structure, it closely relates security and foreign policy goals, development of defence structures, allocation of resources, security and legal issues, all under the same umbrella.

MAP gave an impetus to review our plans in the entire field of security and defence. The new initiatives of the Washington Summit — the New Strategic Concept, the Defence Capabilities Initiative and the Enhanced and More Operational PfP — had to be considered within the limited time frame.

Joining the MAP process has already created some very positive developments for Estonia’s national defence. Finding solutions to many questions that had arisen, as well as surfacing questions previously not addressed, was one of the benefits of drafting the ANP. Yet another positive experience has been effective co-operation among the various governmental departments involved.
**Future Developments**

The implementation of the national programme will remain our priority for the next few years. The ANP established many goals and targets in various areas. Thereby, working out concrete implementation plans covered by human, material and financial resources and establishing tasks and duties for relevant institutions are in the focus today. The objectives described in the ANP vary. Not every goal needs huge material resources at first – in some cases, especially tasks related to the second chapter of the ANP, primarily need intellectual efforts. In some fields conceptual questions should be answered first, then practical implementation will follow in 2001. In order to guarantee a continuous and transparent implementation process, special review procedures at the governmental level have been established.

The next activity within the MAP framework is the composition of the tailored Individual Partnership Programme (IPP), which will be based on plans and goals stated in this year’s ANP. A strong connection between the goals stated in the ANP and activities of the IPP, as well as Partnership Goals established by the Planning and Review Process (PARP), is unavoidable. While preparing the implementation of goals set in the ANP, we enjoyed support from NATO and non-NATO nations in the form of bilateral co-operation and shared experiences.

The first high-level meetings discussing political-economical issues within the MAP framework have already occurred. Intense dialogue with NATO will continue at various political and working levels. The entire process provides the necessary feedback on the progress achieved and establishes the basis for regular review of the ANP.

Participation in the MAP process and implementation of the ANP objectives is a priority for the Estonian Defence Forces, as well as for the Republic of Estonia. This position includes not only ANP but also other NATO-Estonia co-operation frameworks, such as PfP, PARP, IPP and bilateral co-operation.

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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**ESTONIAN ANNUAL NATIONAL PROGRAMME**

The aim of the Estonian Annual National Programme (ANP) is to present Estonia’s adherence to the democratic principles and common values of the Alliance and to highlight Estonia’s contributions to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. In this document, Estonia provides information about its fundamental aims and principles for accession to NATO. In the ANP Estonia’s present situation is linked with its future...
aspirations and its ability to assume, upon accession to NATO, all membership commitments and obligations. In fulfilling these commitments and providing all necessary practical steps with the appropriate resources, the Estonian Government has decided to raise the defence expenditures to 2% of the GDP by the year 2002.

Accession to NATO is Estonia’s main security and defence policy priority. Estonia’s security policy, in accordance with its goals, principles and the existing security environment, follows a policy of integration and co-operation with European and transatlantic security, political and economic structures (NATO, the European Union, the WEU). It includes the continuation and further development of good-neighbourly relations and co-operation with all states in the European and transatlantic region; the development of a national defence system; the strengthening of the rule of law and a liberal market economy; and the strengthening of internal security.

Relations with neighbours are based on the development of co-operation and friendship. Estonia actively co-operates with its neighbours in order to secure stability and prosperity throughout the entire Baltic Sea region. Defence-related Baltic co-operation with Latvia and Lithuania is aimed at enhancing self-defence capabilities and contributes to the NATO integration process. Baltic defence-related co-operation is based on defence co-operation agreements and a set of joint defence co-operation projects. In addition, the three countries participate actively in the Baltic Security Assistance (BALTSEA) framework together with many NATO, EU and other countries. Estonia has good and intensive relations with the Nordic countries, who have all promoted economic development and helped strengthen Estonia’s defence capability.

There have been remarkable positive developments in relations with the Russian Federation. In recent years, they have reached a new level of maturity and stability and can be characterised as normal working relations. The current focus of these relations is on solving practical issues and negotiating concrete agreements.

Estonia has participated in the “Partnership for Peace” ( PfP) programme since 1994, and considers the continuation of its participation in the programme of crucial importance. At the beginning of 1995, Estonia joined the PfP Planning and Review Process ( PARP).

Participation in humanitarian and peace support operations is an inseparable part of Estonia’s security policy. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Estonian units have participated in the NATO-led peace operation IFOR and currently participate in the SFOR operation. Estonia also participates in the KFOR mission in Kosovo. Estonia has provided troops for the UN peacekeeping missions UNPROFOR and UNIFIL and participates in the UNTSO observer mission. In the year 2000, Estonia will participate in SFOR and KFOR and in the UNTSO mission.

Membership in the OSCE has provided Estonia with opportunities to participate in the wider European co-operative security framework. Estonia participates in a variety of OSCE missions, including election supervision and monitoring missions.
Estonia has adhered to all major human rights conventions of the Council of Europe and the United Nations. Since the restoration of independence, one of the important tasks of the Estonian authorities has been to establish a legislative framework for integrating non-citizens, which defines their legal status and preserves their human rights. The cornerstone of Estonia’s integration policy is the development and implementation of the National Integration Programme.

The principles of democratic control of the armed forces are defined in the Estonian Constitution and other legal acts concerning National Defence. These principles are guaranteed through defining the rights, duties and responsibilities of the Parliament, the President and the Government of the Republic in the organisation of National Defence.

The remarkably successful macroeconomic and structural reform in Estonia was recognized when the decision was made to include Estonia in the first group of countries to be invited to start EU membership negotiations in 1997. Estonia’s successful economic development has been a result of a set of firm economic policy principles and actions. Estonia exercises a very liberal and open external economic policy, a firm monetary policy, and a fast and open privatisation policy.

The transatlantic link is important to European security. Estonia considers the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) an important aspect in the preservation and strengthening of this relationship.

Within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) co-operation framework, Estonia is considering the possibility of sharing its reform experiences with other EAPC countries.

The basic principles of Estonia’s defence policy are deterrence, territorial defence, the strengthening of security and stability in the region, co-operation with and integration into the European and transatlantic institutions. These principles are in concert with the Alliance’s Strategic Concept.

Estonia’s defence policy has two main goals:

- The development and maintenance of an indigenous and credible national defence capable of defending the nation’s vital interests;
- The development of the EDF in a way that ensures their interoperability with the armed forces of NATO and WEU member states and their capability to participate in Peace Support Operations.

PfP has added an international dimension to the build-up of the EDF; thus, in addition to being an extremely important tool in Estonia’s quest for NATO membership, it has proven to be valuable in its own right. Specifically, it has provided experience, knowledge and information to the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF). Estonia is reaching the stage of being able to provide more to the partnership and foresees an increase of benefits from the implementation of the Enhanced and More Operational PfP.

Estonia has intensive defence-related bilateral co-operation with more than 20 countries. In the area of multilateral co-operation the Baltic defence projects have been especially successful (BALTBAT,
The continuation of these relations are important to the EDF.

The development of the Estonian Defence Forces, including issues connected with integration with NATO, is based on the draft five-year development plan (2000-2005) of the EDF.

National plans for the progress of the EDF for the period of 2000 to 2005 are aimed at: a) the development and maintenance of a peacetime force structure that is capable of forming and maintaining a planned wartime force structure and; b) the improvement of defence readiness through the development of combat readiness and rapid reaction capabilities.

In particular, the EDF’s development goals for the period between 2000 - 2005 are:
- An increase in the EDF wartime size to 25-30 000;
- The formation of 3 light infantry reserve brigades;
- The development of airspace surveillance capabilities;
- The further development of mine warfare capabilities;
- The development of rapid reaction capabilities;
- The standardization of education;
- The concentration of officer and NCO basic training in Estonia;
- The improvement of working conditions and social guarantees of military personnel;
- The development and reorganisation of the current mobilisation and readiness system;
- The development of the Logistic Concept of the EDF;
- The modernisation of the existing warehouse system (incl. a system for storing mobilisation supplies).

The main short-term defence policy and planning goals of Estonia are:

To develop a comprehensive national military strategy, which assesses the security environment, clarifies the military’s role in security policy and updates the missions of the EDF (this will be accomplished as the National Defence Plan (NDP) takes shape);

To integrate the defence planning and budgeting system into the overall state budgeting process aimed at increasing the defence budget to 2% of the GDP by 2002;

In order to improve the command and control structure of the EDF, the General Staff of the Estonian Defence Forces (GSEDF) will be transformed into a joint staff responsible for the strategic planning and development, C3 and general personnel matters of the EDF. Additionally, an Army Department within the GSEDF will be established.

In the coming years, the procurement of major equipment will concentrate on communication and air surveillance, air defence, anti-tank defence and naval mine warfare.

Estonia’s personnel, training and education policy will be guided by the following principles: the annual number of conscripts will not exceed 3000; the reservists will be trained as complete units, instead of individuals; and the proportion of the professional military person-
Estonia is adjusting its budget preparations to meet the needs for participating in the Alliance structures. Accordingly, the Government of Estonia has decided to raise the defence expenditures to 2% of the GDP by the year 2002. The schedule for increasing Estonian defence expenditures is the following: 1.6% in 2000, 1.8% in 2001 and 2% in 2002. The increase within the MoD budget will be focused toward the establishment of an adequate military infrastructure in the area of military training and the quality of life of personnel. The overall objective of budget planning is to ensure complete transparency between the resources needed, political guidance and the planned goals.

The development of Estonia’s state security system, its current safeguards and procedures to ensure the security of classified information in Estonia will be enhanced with the clear goal of achieving NATO standards. The basis for the protection of classified information is provided in the Estonian Parliament’s “State Secrets Act” (in Estonian Riigisaladuse seadus). The Estonian National Security Authority (NSA) is the Bureau of the National Security Co-ordinator at the State Chancellery (in Estonian Riigikantselei Koordinatsioonibüroo). The security agreement between NATO and the Government of Estonia was signed on 29.08.1994.

A draft Security Institutions Act will be prepared; it will clearly define the legal tasks and the appropriate authorities of the different Security Institutions in Estonia. Additionally, the completion of the Information Security Act will establish the regulation of Electronic Information Security and address standardization and implementation. Estonia foresees the need to review the Government regulation Protection Procedure for State Secrets with a NATO Legal Advisor. Upon review, and if deemed necessary, the Government regulation Procedures Protection for State Secrets and Issue Procedures for State Secrets Access Permit regarding NATO standards, which deal with document control and administration, will be refined accordingly.

Concerning the legal and constitutional issues related to NATO accession, there are no constitutional barriers in the present system in regard to accession to
the North Atlantic Treaty nor for making forces available for Article 5 and Non-article 5 operations as a full Alliance member.

In order to provide an effective legal framework for national defence plans, domestic legislation, and its development in particular should be concentrated on. Mid-term goals for the next few years include: clarifying the definition of civil-military relations, developing a legal framework for rendering host nation support and participating in international peace support operations. A relevant practice for drafting and changing domestic legislation concerning the international obligations deriving from NATO membership will be introduced. Accordingly, an amended Peacetime National Defence Act and other statutory acts will be adopted.
The implementation of the NATO Membership Action Plans is going to accelerate and focus the development of the defence structures of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, it is only the latest phase in the continuous effort that they have made since 1991 to compensate for their very difficult starting position. The countries had devastated economies. They took over a poor quality military infrastructure then pillaged by the departing Colonial Power. The military cadre was small and rather useless, divided by the past. In the three countries normal personal relationships with loyalty and solidarity as well as interaction between bureaucracies interaction and solidarity had been destroyed by the Soviet society. There were great difficulties to make a sufficient number of politicians understand that it was feasible to build meaningful and credible defence forces.

The three countries have all made impressive progress in the development of their defence forces in the past eight years. They have been helped by an increasing number of other states shifting from lukewarm and ineffective support to dynamic and comprehensive assistance. All three countries have decided that they will aim at the quality they see in the West. They do not have the illusion that they can succeed in their objectives by limiting themselves to making adjustments to structures inherited from the Socialist Era. In this they may differ from other East European states.

I shall try to describe the developments of recent years on the way to democrati-
cally controlled an accountable, well-ad-
ministered, well-led and adequately
equipped self-defence forces, built on con-
scription, mobilisation, and total defence
of the North European model. The
progress in these broader fields is less well
known than the three countries’ now well
developed capability to participate in in-
ternational peace support operations.

The three countries are different and
their developments have been different,
even if their initial situation was nearly
the same. This short article will not try a
detailed comparison of the progress made
by the Baltic States. It will describe the
advances made by the country or coun-
tries that are furthest ahead in each field.

Management basis
and structure

The Defence Concept and
Follow-up Legislation

All three countries now have a fairly
comprehensive picture of where they want
to go in relation to the mission and or-
ganisation of their forces. Both Estonia
and Lithuania had their general defence
concepts approved in 1996. In a couple
of important areas Lithuania is ahead in
the development of the legislation required
to implement the concepts.

Main Staff – Ministry of Defence
Co-operation and Division of
Responsibilities

Both Latvia and Lithuania have estab-
lished a system of responsibilities that is
similar to the systems in most NATO and
other Western States. In both countries
the development of close cooperation has
been assisted by the co-location of the two
institutions in neighbouring buildings.
In Latvia the offices of the Minister of
Defence and the Commander of the
Armed Forces are only 30 meters apart in
the same corridor.

Estonia is working hard to develop a
clear and suitable division of responsi-
bilities within the constraints of the ex-
isting basic legislation.

In all states hard work is being done
to compensate for the very limited avail-
ability of well-trained general staff offic-
ers who could develop solid input in the
dialogue with political decision-makers.

Staff and Management Structures
in Peacetime, Crisis, and War

The ideal situation would probably be
to have a commander in overall command
of the national defence forces being fully
responsible for providing professional
advice to the civilian political leadership
in peace, crisis, and war. His main staff
would be responsible for joint force plan-
ning and development as well as for any
necessary joint centralised administration
of resources (personnel, finance, logistics,
and infrastructure). Operational com-
mand of all defence forces in crisis and
war would, in this model, be delegated to
an Operational Commander with a rela-
tively small joint Headquarters. The serv-
ices (land forces, navy, air) would be re-
sponsible for the training and routine
administration of their forces in peace-
time. The land force HQ would be responsible for the training and administration of regular as well as reserve and volunteer forces. In crisis and war the Naval and Air Force Headquarters would assume operational control and tactical command of most of their forces. The land force HQ would lose most roles (and staff personnel) in crisis and war as control would be delegated to military regions that may also have direct command of local naval and air defence assets.

All three states are constrained in their immediate options by very limited resources, the most pressing problem being the limited number of officers with both practical experience and relevant staff officer training. All three countries intend to make their central staffs joint, but development is delayed by lack of navy and air force officers for staff positions.

Lithuania, leading, is very close to filling the post of Commander of the Operational Forces. Latvia is considering having a joint operational Headquarters for crisis and war.

Latvia already has given one land force headquarters responsibility for regular, mobilisation, and volunteer land units.

Both Estonia and Lithuania have well-developed concepts for the role of the military regions. In Lithuania, the first territorial brigade (region) has been established.

### Development of high quality manpower for peace and war

#### Creating a Corps of Regular Career Officers

Both Lithuania and Latvia have the necessary legal framework in place, and Estonia is very close to passing the key legislation.

Rotation of career officers between different types of post has taken place in Estonia for several years. During the last couple of years it has also started in Lithuania. Estonia has for years been working to develop or purchase the officer accommodation needed to make rotation work with a minimum of friction.

Estonia has now started a good, modern two years long basic officer education where cadets are selected through the selection of leaders in the 12 months long conscript training. The instructors in the Army Academy (“Military Education Establishment”) are good, dynamic, and young officers with practical service in the battalions behind them. Many of them had basic officer education in Finland. Estonia is also about to start the first - two year long - advanced officer course.

Latvia, too, has reformed its officer education from the previous long, very theoretical course to a shorter, practical oriented, basic officer education. Latvia is also about to start its first advanced officer course.

All three states use the Baltic Defence College as the main place for the training of their General Staff officers.

#### Creating a Corps of Regular and Reserve NCOs

Young Estonian officers educated in Finland created the first effective junior
NCO training in the three states in the mid-90s in the Battle School in Võru. Later they made a similar good quality course for regular NCOs.

Lithuania had already been running rather theoretical NCO-courses for several years, when an effective instructor-NCO course was created in 1998-99 with British help. The British are now involved in the reform of the entire NCO-training system.

The Latvian volunteer defence force (“National Guard”) has had short section commanders courses since 1992. It will be expanded into a full NCO-course in the spring of year 2000.

Only the Estonian NCOs and the Latvian National Guard section commanders have a designated function in established reserve units.

The laws of all three states now recognize that conscripts should only be used in the defence (or civil defence) structures. In Latvia, no conscripts are serving in the Interior Ministry paramilitaries. In Estonia, the Border Guard is still using a small number, but this will stop when sufficient regular personnel have been recruited.

Estonia is using a relatively high percentage of the annual class, and the percentage is increasing.

The exemptions and rights of privileged groups (e.g. students) are being reduced especially in Estonia.

All three countries have chosen Swedish support in the development of a good conscript screening system. It is already effective in Lithuania and on the way to becoming so in Latvia.

Previously the use of the conscript’s time was clearly best in Estonia. They got a tough, field oriented, training and had the necessary training ammunition. However, with the reforms of the three months’ basic training in both Latvia and Lithuania, the situation is becoming satisfactory in all three states. The intense and well-organised basic training in the Lithuanian Training Regiment in Rukla is up to the best North European standard.

Estonia is moving to a normal North European standard in its organised use of conscripts in the reserve.
Developing the Military Infrastructure

One of the biggest challenges has been to redevelop poor quality, worn down, and pillaged facilities taken over from the Russians into attractive – or adequate – infrastructure. It is rightly seen as a key element in the development of the defence forces as it improves the quality of life for military personnel.

Estonia has tried to repair or reconstruct old infrastructure in a steady effort for 7-8 years. Latvia and Lithuania started their own programmes in 1994 to create national centres for the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion.

However, it is only the total reconstruction and building new facilities which started in 1998 that has created the first international quality infrastructure: In Lithuania initially for the Training Regiment in Rukla and for the Panevezys and Klaipeda battalions. In Estonia in the Šmari Airbase, in Tartu with the Baltic Defence College and the national officers academy, in the Paldiski Training Centre, and for the Pärnu and Signal Battalions.

Development of a capable land self-defence force

Training Facilities

The creation of training facilities has been a difficult process in all states. With the Soviet State’s misuse of all resources it has proved difficult to get access to areas that could be used as central training areas and ranges.

In Latvia, however, the immediate requirement is now covered by the full availability of the Adazi training and range area. In Lithuania the land forces can use the areas in Pabrade and Rukla. In the latter area, the present access to use the area is too limited to fulfil all the needs of an expanding army. This can be easily be solved, however, by allowing full use of the Interwar Independence period army Rukla training area, which is available, as no squatter settlement has been established. The main Estonian training area near Tapa has been identified.

All three countries have started setting up specialists’ training centres. Estonia is training artillery specialists in the artillery school at the artillery battalion in Tapa. The country has further plans to establish engineer and signal schools. Lithuania has created an engineer school at the Independent Engineer Battalion in Kaunas. Latvia has had small Signals training centres in Ogre and Sigulda for many years. Latvia will develop Adazi as the national training centre in all other fields.

Mobilising and Controlling Total Defence Assets

Lithuania is leading in this field by having established an inter-governmental department under a dynamic leader responsible for the subject.

All three countries are in the process of creating a system of military regions
well suited to participate as the military component in a decentralised total defence planning and management.

All the three countries are implementing a Swedish developed computer-based management system well suited to total defence requirements to administer reserve personnel. Latvia and Lithuania started earlier than Estonia.

### The Peace- and Wartime Logistic Systems

All three states have started the process of developing their logistic structures and organisations. All are creating secure storage sites, and Estonia and Lithuania are in the process of developing logistic units.

Estonia has a proven routine for the implementation of equipment programmes.

The development of wartime logistics structures depends on the firm definition of wartime force structures as well as on the creation of central and regional total defence structures. All three countries are aware of this.

### The Army – Volunteer Defence Force Relationship

The relationship between the different elements of the land forces is crucial for force effectiveness. The development of a positive relationship has, however, been a complex social and political process. The voluntary defence organisations had their roots in the resistance movements against the Soviets. They were, to a high degree, led by highly motivated amateurs. The evolving regular forces had a cadre of diploma-equipped military specialists with a Soviet background. Integrating the two has not always been easy.

However, the problems are close to being overcome in all three states. In Estonia cross-posting of officers started very early, and it is also effective now in Lithuania. In Latvia all land forces are now under command of one headquarters. In Estonia the unified local command of deployed defence forces has been standard for five years now.

### The Creation of an Effective Mobilisation Force

Estonia is some years ahead in this area. This is due to decisions made very early after independence and to the fact that it is natural for Estonia to seek inspiration from Finland that has a system proven in war.

To be effective at mobilisation, a unit must be trained together in peace or – as a minimum – receive demanding refresher training with soldiers and cadres together very early after initial conscription training. Estonia is keeping units trained together as units in the reserve. Estonia has been doing refresher cadre and unit training for some years now.

To have effective combat forces, ready a short time after mobilisation, the units and staffs must have a mix of well-trained regular and properly trained reserve officers. Estonia has copied the Finnish system of letting a peacetime battalion commander be responsible for the mobilisation and command in war of a tactical
group consisting of a few battalions. The peacetime company commanders are reserve battalion commanders, and their peacetime platoon leaders are company commanders.

The reserve officers for the mobilised Estonian platoons are now selected for reserve officer training amongst those junior NCO-trainees with the best leadership capabilities. After the reserve officer course they gain experience and prove themselves by leading their platoon before they may receive their reserve commissions.

For years, Estonia has aimed its procurement programmes at equipping their mobilised forces.

### Equipment Level in the Land Forces

The early Estonian and Lithuanian purchase of modern Israeli or Russian equipment respectively is now being supplemented with large quantities of weapons from several supporting states in all three states. The largest donors are USA, Sweden and Germany. All three states will soon have land forces with a good supply of light infantry and relatively light anti-tank weapons for both regular and reserve forces. All either have already some older point air defence artillery weapons or are in the process of getting some. All have heavy mortars. In Estonia and Lithuania they are integrated into battalions. Estonia has created its first light artillery battalion and Lithuania is close to getting guns for three such units.

All the countries are aware of the need for modern point and area air defence weapons, medium antitank weapons, and signal equipment for both regular and reserve units. All three states are trying to find funds for equipping the higher priority units.

The largest problem area is unit transport. It is very difficult to train and run units with a mixture of worn-out vehicles from many states without spare-parts. Lithuania has started building up a vehicle fleet. However, the task is going to be very demanding in the present economic situation.

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The Navies

A small coastal state can save money in peacetime by having one unified state navy with responsibilities for all the maritime tasks of the state. It will also gain an easy transition to handling the requirements in crisis and war. The navy of any state should mirror the maritime problems and geography of the state. It should develop suitable ways of developing the cadre and use civilian maritime academies and facilities to the maximum. It should limit its infrastructure to that which is absolutely necessary.

Latvia and Lithuania have succeeded, to a high degree, in fighting off attempts by other state agencies to build up new, additional state navies. There is now a very high likelihood that there will be progress towards the development of one unified Estonian state navy. All three state navies
are moving towards a suitable combination of smaller surface combatants, mine warfare vessels, and a coast guard with a good surveillance system.

Latvia has developed a naval training centre that could be used for specialist naval cadre training for all three states. Latvia and Lithuania, very early on, made the correct decision to concentrate on ship and crew development first and use a minimum base structure rather than start to create a major naval base.

**Air Force**

Developing small air forces should probably always concentrate on developing and maintaining expertise in operating air surveillance structures, running training, and supporting, and operating aviation that is meeting peace-time requirements (Search-and-Rescue, Air Transport by fixed wing a/c and helicopter, support of police). Eventually a limited capacity to police the air space (identification of intruders) by light fighter aircraft should be developed. Other air defence missions should be carried out by ground based air defence systems. Base structures should be limited to the minimum, and where possible, be run jointly with civilian aviation authorities. There should only be one airforce.

Lithuania has kept and continuously developed and used its core of aviation and air-surveillance specialist by maximum use of existing equipment – instead of waiting for the best before starting practice. The continuous and impressive development of the Lithuanian military air surveillance network, in good co-operation with the civilian aviation authorities, has formed the basis of the soon to be operational Baltic system, “BALTNET”.

Lithuania is already using one base jointly with civilian authorities, the Latvian Air Force is preparing to move part of its activities to part of Riga International Airport, and Estonia plans investments to develop its Ämari Airbase as a joint military-civilian airport.

Lithuania is now concentrating its air force aviation activities in the above mentioned peacetime activities. It is maintain-

Estonia already operates anti-aircraft artillery units, and – with Swedish support – Latvia and Lithuania are close to having the first such operational units.

In the development of a unified or integrated military and paramilitary aviation, Latvia has now taken the lead with concrete plans for the partial integration of the National Guard Air Wing with the regular air force. Development in Estonia in merging the Border Guard aviation unit with the air force is likely to be linked to a parallel development in relation to the navy and the Border Guard maritime units.
The Baltic Battalion five years on

Cornerstone of Baltic Military Co-operation or expensive white elephant?

Janis Kazocins, Colonel*

Introduction

The Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) is described by the author of a paper about NATO and the Baltic States, produced at the UK’s Conflict Studies Research Centre earlier this year¹, as:

“. . . not a battalion for the purpose of defending the Baltic States and certainly not the embryonic stage of any army. It is a multinational effort of symbolic and political importance, otherwise BALTBAT is militarily useless.”

He goes on to say that:

“. . . there is much that the Baltic States can do to improve their own defence . . . and in the process improve their chances of NATO membership. . . . The credibility of the Baltic States as applicant states for NATO will be enhanced if . . . they are able to defend themselves, even if it is only for a limited period of time.”

Five years have passed since the Baltic States signed an agreement on the formation of BALTBAT in September 1994. Yet despite its considerable success, the value of BALTBAT is still questioned in the Baltic States and elsewhere. Some see it as a too big burden for Baltic defence budgets and others as a distraction from the main task of developing modern, NATO compatible defence forces.

It is the aim of this article to examine whether BALTBAT has outlived its usefulness or whether it remains an important cornerstone of military co-operation in the Baltic region, contributing to the development of real self-defence capabilities for the Baltic States.

The Situation

It is not intended to rehearse the history of the Battalion. Although it is worthy of note that it remains one of the most successful examples of military cooperation in the Baltic region and serves as a good example of what can be done, given the necessary will and determination. In a little over five years a vague
idea proposed by three Chiefs of Defence has been turned into a functioning unit with operational experience at most levels. It will soon have the training and equipment to carry out the tasks of a peace support operation rather better than many units that are actually deployed on such missions. Of course it has weaknesses which continue to be addressed but the change from a “peacekeeping” unit to an infantry battalion is almost cosmetic when compared to what has been achieved: the training of several hundred professionals from different backgrounds into a single unit with common (western) doctrine and ethos.

Before an assessment can be made regarding BALTBAT’s future value, it is useful to examine the reasons behind its creation and confirm their validity today and in the future.

The Beginning

The purpose for establishing BALTBAT was defined clearly in 1994:\cite{footnote2}: “...in order to exercise mandates given by the UN and/or CSCE [later OSCE] for peacekeeping, also cooperating with NATO and WEU in the field of peacekeeping. The BALTBAT shall be organized in accordance with internationally recognised military and peacekeeping principles.” Underlying the BALTBAT concept were two generally accepted convictions: that the new Baltic national defence forces must be based upon the foundation of western democratic practice; and that regional security can only be achieved through the close co-operation of all three Baltic States. But the project served another important purpose: to provide the Baltic States with a means to play a serious part in international peacekeeping, thus demonstrating their willingness to share international responsibilities – to contribute as well as to benefit from international security.

The BALTBAT offered the opportunity to receive western military training and even equipment aid in an uncontentious way – who could complain about military support for the formation of a UN peacekeeping battalion? BALTBAT gave a significant boost to the development of common Baltic training methods and operating procedures, all with a decidedly western orientation, and was a practical demonstration of the ability to co-operate in the military field without which regional security could be problematic and future membership of NATO questionable. It is worth digressing briefly to discuss the benefits of military co-operation.

The Utility of Military Co-operation from a NATO Perspective

The principle of military co-operation has been axiomatic to the success of NATO since the Alliance’s creation. At the political level it is a commitment for member states to come to each other’s assistance if attacked; at the practical level this manifests itself in the form of combined formations, most recently in the Balkans. It is worthy of note that co-operation at times has taken priority over military effectiveness. Thus during the period of the Cold War the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) [AMF(L)] was perceived by some to be of questionable
military value against a determined Warsaw Pact attack. Its importance lay in the commitment the many participating countries were making to the defence of the vulnerable flanks of NATO – any attacker would know that he had to deal with the Alliance as a whole and would be unable to deal separately with an individual, vulnerable country. By way of contrast, in 1940 all three Baltic States had substantial and developed armed forces yet Stalin’s Soviet Union was able to annex them one at a time without military resistance.

The Baltic Background

When the three Baltic States declared independence during 1918 they faced two, at times simultaneous, threats: German colonialists on the one hand and the Bolsheviks on the other. The history of that period is very complex but it is clear that military co-operation was crucial in making a reality of this fragile independence.

The Estonians were first to build their armed forces and, with some outside assistance, were able to free their country of Bolsheviks by February 1919. The Latvians established the main element of their national forces in Estonia which, under Estonian command, helped to free northern Latvia from the Germans. Later Riga was liberated with assistance from British and French naval gunfire while Latvian and Lithuanian forces co-operated in driving the Germans further out of the Baltics. Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian forces created a common front against the Bolsheviks from the Polish border to Narva. The Bolsheviks were finally driven from Latvia by a combined Latvian-Polish force.

During the next 20 years the Baltic armed forces shared friendly relations sending officers to each other’s military academies. Some diplomats attempted to organise a Baltic military alliance but strained relations between Lithuania and Poland over the Vilnius question proved to be an obstacle. Latvia signed an alliance with Estonia, but a small combined exercise only took place once. The Presidents of Estonia and Latvia met twice in 20 years, but neither of them visited Lithuania; nor did the President of Lithuania visit Estonia or Latvia. At the beginning of the Second World War each of the three states stood alone and vulnerable.

History suggests that any possible threat to one Baltic State is likely to have a significant impact on them all, so it is in the interests of all three States to act together. This may not always be easy during a crisis but its importance has been recognized by the emphasis placed on the co-ordination of security and defence issues within the tasks of the Baltic Council of Ministers. Close military co-operation, of which BALTBAT is a notable practical expression, can help to reinforce this cohesion.

Baltic Aspirations for NATO Membership and Single Country Entry

Given the quality and quantity of outside assistance that BALTBAT has received and the excellent start it has made, some Balts are concerned that failure to man-
age and develop the project could cast a question mark over their ability to undertake the consistent level of military co-operation expected of NATO members. Hence the strong commitment to the project though there may be some private misgivings about the proportion of Baltic defence resources it consumes.

Another concern is that effective Baltic military co-operation might in some way be regarded as an alternative to NATO membership and therefore act as a brake. Even worse, were one country (for instance Lithuania) to feel more advanced in the process of joining NATO (as Estonia might be in terms of EU membership) projects such as BALTBAT involving close links with less successful countries could be thought to act as a hindrance.

These concerns do not stand up to scrutiny. Within NATO there are many multinational projects and groupings which are beneficial to the Alliance’s aims. Furthermore, the launch in early 1999 of the Lithuanian-Polish Peacekeeping Battalion (LITPOLBAT) shows that entry into NATO is no hindrance to constructive military co-operation with countries outside the Alliance. The benefits of international co-operation in the Balkans through IFOR, SFOR and KFOR are self-evident. So, having seen that there are no fundamental obstacles to the development of BALTBAT, it is time to take a fresh look at the original objectives.

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**Are the Original Aims Still Relevant?**

The political and security climate in the Baltic States has changed substantially since the project was launched. From a Baltic perspective, participation in international, particularly NATO-led operations remains important, though the willingness to play their part has both been demonstrated and recognized. The failure to find a battalion deployment for BALTBAT has given rise to questions about its utility for international operations and over its contribution towards the development of the three armed forces. A time may come when BALTBAT loses its relative importance as the main vehicle for the provision of military training and may be eclipsed by more effective bilateral and other multi-lateral programmes. In particular, the resource burden the current BALTBAT programme places both on Baltic and on supporting states must be justified in proportion to the benefits it brings. The question is whether BALTBAT is cost-effective.

Both these concerns about value for money and a change in emphasis are evident in the Political Guidance on the development of BALTBAT signed by all three Baltic Defence Ministers in April 1999. This timely Guidance, which deserves wider circulation, contains a commitment to the ultimate success of the project along with a clear redefinition of Baltic priorities for the BALTBAT project:

- “To enhance the development of the national forces of the Baltic States and raise their operational self-defence capabilities;
- To promote the Baltic States integration process into NATO by developing NATO interoperability and compatibility;
- To contribute to the promotion of peaceful development and regional stability by establish-
ing a peace support capacity suitable for international peace support operations;

• To optimise the use of resources.”

The key changes from the original objectives are the clear definition of a role for BALTBAT within the context of developing Baltic national self-defence capabilities and the emphasis placed on wise use of limited resources. Another change is the reduced importance placed on the deployment of the Battalion on a mission – instead there is a more loose reference to a peace support capability. Later in the Guidance an acknowledgement of the need for ‘Baltification’ is given in full light of the considerable difficulties this is likely to entail.

From a supporting states’ perspective these changes should be warmly welcomed. They represent a responsible approach to a difficult issue; in truth it would be easier for Balts to forego the BALTBAT project and pursue simpler bilateral programmes where no difficult reciprocal demands are made. But it also demonstrates maturity in defence planning which demands the best use of resources in light of long-term objectives rather than short-term material or political benefits. This is a significant development from 1994 and is the kind of responsible defence management required of potential NATO members. Before examining how the supporting states reacted to this important change of emphasis it is worth touching on the issue of BALTBAT deployability.

**Is BALTBAT Deployable?**

Is it realistic or even reasonable to think in terms of deploying BALTBAT as a complete unit, particularly for a protracted period; and indeed does this really matter as far as the project is concerned? First of all, it matters a great deal for the Baltic States to participate in international operations: there are both political and military benefits to be gained. Participation demonstrates a commitment to contribute to international security, upon which their own future so evidently depends, but it is also a useful vehicle for interoperability training and deployment co-operation with NATO countries as well as adding credibility in a self-defence context.

Yet it is not necessary for BALTBAT to deploy as a full battalion in order to make a Baltic contribution to an international force. That is exactly what the BALTBAT Company Group Contingents for SFOR (BALTCONs) are doing at present in Bosnia, and it will be a long time before each individual state is in a position to offer its own complete battalion for such operations. Should Baltic governments decide that extreme circumstances required a major (one-off) commitment, they could make available the resources to deploy the whole BALTBAT if appropriate contingency planning had been done. In 1997 Danish experts passed it fit for peacekeeping duties as a stand-alone battalion and, in due course, it will be able to take on the full range of peace support operations if and when required. This seems to be exactly in line with Ministerial Guidance: to provide a capability. But this could only be achieved if the necessary logistic support required for such a deployment had previously been put in place.
The deployment of smaller elements at company group or lower level can continue in order to maintain the Baltic contribution to international operations. BALTBAT is an excellent vehicle for the preparation of such contingents. It has both the resident Baltic expertise and, if the contingents have a tri-national element as in the case of the BALTCOOns, can help maintain the contribution of all three states without each incurring the continuous high costs involved in even a small deployment. In the meantime BALTBAT could turn its attention to its new primary role: the development of national self-defence forces.

A Change in Emphasis

The Guidance firmly set out by Baltic Ministers is extremely helpful. There have been times in the past five years when BALTBAT has seemed to lack such clear direction. There now exists the opportunity to combine Baltification with better value for money from small Baltic defence budgets. Properly handled BALTBAT can deliver both by opening the door for more coherent practice in Baltic participation in international operations as well as communicating BALTBAT training and ethical values to greater parts of their national armed forces.

The role of the BALTBAT Training Team (BTT) is particularly worthy of review. The substantial resources it requires are being used to improve the BALTBAT by small increments; but the BTT could be so much more effective if used more broadly to bring basic BALTBAT standards to a wider section of the armed forces. The BALTBAT Headquarters is less than perfect but it is arguably more competent than the headquarters of most other battalions in the Baltic States and, building on its strengths, should take on the main responsibility for BALTBAT itself.

A Baltic Brigade for the New Millennium

Now that BALTBAT is well established, the time may have come to advance the concept by an order of magnitude from a Baltic Battalion into a Baltic Brigade in preference to the pursuit of perfection in BALTBAT alone. Such a brigade need not be a formal, standing structure but rather the capability Baltic Ministers were referring to. It could consist of the BALTBAT and the three national peace support battalions, all trained and eventually equipped to BALTBAT standards. Each battalion headquarters should, in time, be able to function to the standards of the BALTBAT Headquarters and be capable of taking under command for exercises or operations company groups from the other battalions, both in a regional self-defence context, if that were
required, or on an international operation. While the role of the BTT should include the training of the three national battalions, it should also take account of the need to prepare officers and NCOs for service in the Baltic Brigade battalions. The BTT could make an appropriate contribution to training in academies and on specialist courses. Logistic support must also be developed further, in the context of Baltification, if a full battalion deployment is to become a realistic capability.

The BALTBAT Headquarters should continue to train with the rotational high readiness company groups of each national battalion, which would have been assigned to BALTBAT for that purpose. It could continue to mount international operations on behalf of the Baltic States in order to maintain the important Baltic contribution and expertise in this field, while delivering this on an efficient, tri-lateral basis. At the same time the BALTBAT Headquarters could be helped to develop into the nucleus of a Brigade Headquarters capable of taking all three or four battalions under command within a regional security context. Such a system, if put in place, would have four major benefits:

• the operational self-defence capability of the Baltic States would have been raised in line with Ministerial Guidance;
• the standards and ethos of the BALTBAT would be transferred to more of the national armed forces;
• in due course, when each of the Baltic Brigade battalions had reached the required standard and the necessary logistics had been put in place, the Baltic States would have developed the capability of continuous high readiness for international operations at battalion level. The battalion headquarters could take turns on stand-by together with the high readiness companies of the three national battalions and, if necessary, a longer operation could be sustained by rotating equally well-trained battalion headquarters and companies;
• external assistance would be used in the most cost-effective manner, benefitting a much larger portion of the armed forces than at present.

In Summary

• The original ideas upon which BALTBAT was founded are still valid - international deployments are most important for the Baltic States and it makes sense for them to co-operate. BALTBAT sets common Western standards and provides training for NATO membership. But the time has come to take the project a step further: from a battalion to a brigade.
• BALTBAT should continue to deliver what it is best suited to provide: well-designed military training and the preparation for international deployments. The BALTBAT structure should be developed as the mounting agency for all Baltic units deploying on international missions.
• The Baltic and supporting states’ sponsored structures supporting BALTBAT should broaden their responsibilities to include the development of national forces in a regional self-defence context but with particular emphasis on
the international operations capability of units of the Baltic Brigade, including the necessary logistic support. In particular the BTT, which provides a degree of continuity that STTTs can never achieve, could have a role in the co-ordination of bilateral assistance in the most cost-effective way, where appropriate.

The BALTBAT project has been a great success during its first five years. If it is to avoid stagnation in the future, a new sense of purpose is required. The direction it should go has been identified in clear Ministerial Guidance. It is now necessary to put this into a military context: the expansion of the single battalion into a more mature capability – a Baltic Brigade. In this way the BALTBAT project will continue to fulfil a crucial role as one of the cornerstones of military co-operation in the Baltic region at the start of the new Millennium.

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1 NATO Expansion and the Baltic States, Daniel F C Austin, February 1999.
3 For instance the highly successful UK/NL Amphibious Force.
4 Such as the current tri-national commitment to SFOR.
5 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of the BALTBAT, signed by Baltic Defence Ministers in April 1999.
BALTBAT and development of Baltic Defence Forces

By Robertas Sapronas, the Head of the Multilateral Projects' Section in the International Relations Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence

Introduction

The aim of this article is not to once again repeat the history of the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT). The project should be rather well known for those who have an interest in the Baltic security affairs. BALTBAT is often mentioned when discussion takes place on successful examples of regional defence co-operation in the post-Cold War Europe and also whenever the major developments in the defence forces of the three Baltic States are presented.

In the simple www.altavista.com query “BALTBAT” received 324 hits. This is a clear illustration to the international prominence that the BALTBAT project has received since its official start in September 1994, when the Governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania concluded a tri-national Agreement on the establishment of a joint peacekeeping unit. Soon after that a number of Western countries led by Denmark have offered support to the undertaking, thereby turning it into a multilateral project.

This article will have a special focus on the role that the Baltic Battalion has played or, in some aspects, was expected to play, in the development of the armed forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In particular, I would like to discuss some of the rather unique features of BALTBAT both as a military unit and as a multinational project and the ways in which BALTBAT has contributed to the establishment of defence structures in the three Baltic States. Also, I will briefly describe the status of the Baltic battalion project (Autumn 1999) and the dilemmas that the Baltic and the Supporting states are facing when trying to define the future direction for the battalion.

This article is based on the personal experience of the author gained during the last several years through the participation in BALTBAT Steering Group meetings and being responsible for the co-ordination of development of Baltic
defence co-operation projects at the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Lithuanian MND.

**Context**

The Baltic Battalion is a unique project in several important aspects. The format in which it was developed and the objectives that were pursued by the Baltic and the Supporting countries can be fully understood only within the broader international context of late 1993 and early 1994. During this period BALTBAT project was developed from a vague concept into a viable project of great visibility and political significance for the three Baltic countries.

In the Baltic States, this was the time when the Soviet troops had completed their withdrawal from Lithuania and were about to complete it from Latvia and Estonia. The armed forces in the three states were at the initial stage of creation. This process was led on the one hand by volunteers, who had little expertise to offer but had plenty of good will and determination, and, on the other, by the former Soviet Army officers who decided to support the establishment of armed forces in their newly independent countries. Even if the latter group were in many cases distrusted by the political leadership, they were the only military experts in the countries. The defence budgets were minuscule in each of the three states, while significant defence assistance could hardly be expected from the Western countries. In their judgement, this could undermine the difficult process of involving Russia into closer defence co-operation with the West. In general, before January 1994, the Baltic States had only very limited and ad hoc external defence co-operation.

For NATO this was a period of finalising its strategies towards its former adversaries in the East, first and foremost - Russia. With respect to the Baltic States, NATO has well understood Russia’s message that they had certain “sensitivities” as well as special interests in the Baltic region. Therefore, in their rhetoric towards the Baltic States, representatives of NATO and its member countries would always choose careful wording and support only those practical co-operation activities that would be non-provocative to Moscow.

Significant and comprehensive change came with the Brussels Ministerial meeting in January 1994 when NATO has launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme - a set of co-operation activities for the new Europe. Training for multinational peacekeeping operations under UN mandates became an objective that all PfP countries, including Russia, found possible to agree. Multinational peacekeeping exercises became the major part of PfP field training activities and were generously sponsored by NATO and the United States.

**Challenges**

The architects of the BALTBAT project fully took into account the context of the PfP world of its early days. The Baltic battalion was a *multinational unit trained*
for UN peacekeeping purposes and established in the former Eastern Bloc. The combination of these features was making the BALTBAT project more than a politically correct undertaking. BALTBAT has embraced the main concepts of the Partnership for Peace ideology and therefore was a kind of test case for the PfP itself.

The four Nordic countries, led by Denmark, were with the BALTBAT project from its early days. Without their sincere interest and commitment to support the project, the Baltic States would not have been able to start it. The Nordic countries have also done very much in order to promote the BALTBAT project internationally and soon the US, Great Britain, Germany, France and a number of other Western nations decided to join the group of supporters of BALTBAT. This was certainly a very encouraging beginning. The wide multinational framework in which BALTBAT found itself was helpful not only for wider distribution of the financial burden related to the establishment of the Baltic Battalion. It has turned BALTBAT into internationally known and highly visible project. The Battalion has become a symbolic expression of the determination of the Baltic States to anchor their security in the democratic Europe. At the same time, the political engagement and practical support rendered by the Western countries to BALTBAT was perceived in the Baltics as a clear indication of their earnest commitment to support the Baltic nations in this endeavour.

Stakes were also high on the side of the supporting states. Many of them have invested a significant amount of resources into the BALTBAT project. Some apparently had to go through an intense internal debate before concluding that security of the Baltic States in general and the BALTBAT project in particular was worth spending money on. Furthermore, having become the most visible part of Western security engagement in the Baltic region, the progress in the development of the BALTBAT project became important indicator as to the success of the Western countries in their security co-operation with the Baltic States in general. Therefore, both successes and failures of the BALTBAT project were perceived to have much wider implications.

There was, however, another side to BALTBAT than that widely exposed by the mass media. In reality, the establishment of a modern Western-type multinational battalion from scratch in the countries that basically had no regular armed forces, was a truly Herculean task. Looking back to the early days of the project, one tends to conclude that even those who understood the complexities and difficulties involved in the project tended to underestimate them. Otherwise they probably would not have started the project at all.

Difficulties that were arising in the process of project implementation were multiple and some of the problems have remained there for years. Their analysis is beyond the scope of this article but a few observations should help the reader to understand the nature of the problems faced by those who were responsible for the implementation of the BALTBAT project.
First of all, the militaries in the three Baltic States initially regarded the BALTBAT project as a purely political creature with exclusively political objectives. For them participation in UN peacekeeping operations could hardly be seen a priority task, given the threats, challenges and financial limitations they were facing in the establishment of defence forces in their respective countries. Therefore the BALTBAT project for the military leadership in the Baltic countries primarily associated with a drain of their very scarce financial and human resources. They tended to underestimate the potential of the BALTBAT project to contribute to the development of the national defences. In Lithuania, a separate division of the defence staff was responsible for the coordination of the BALTBAT project, thereby further contributing to the isolation of BALTBAT from the rest of the defence forces.

Secondly, with all political will and determination to ensure success of the BALTBAT project, the Baltic nations could not render adequate support to BALTBAT until national base for such support was established. In other words, the support which the Baltic States were providing to BALTBAT, be it in terms of personnel training or logistic supplies, could not be much better than the general level in the national forces and in most cases was below the level required in BALTBAT. Therefore the development of the project was depending on external assistance in almost every aspect starting with English language training and provision with personal munitions, to deployment and supplies in the mission area.

Thirdly, activities of BALTBAT were exposed to the lack or inadequacy of the legal base and administrative procedures in the three Baltic countries. It was the first multinational unit in the Baltic States. It included outside support with arms transfers as well as frequent border crossings of military vehicles and soldiers with weapons. Many things in the implementation of the BALTBAT project were happening in the Baltic States for the first time and therefore often there were no established procedures, regulations and routines. Those often had to be created and adopted on a very short notice.

These are only the more general sources of the problems faced by both the Baltic and Supporting countries in the process of establishment of the Baltic battalion. The nature of these problems suggests that the start of the project could be somewhat premature and that many of the practical problems could be made less complicated if the Baltic States had more experience of international defence cooperation and international peacekeeping at the start of the project. On the other hand, BALTBAT could also be regarded as a “shock therapy”, which has suddenly exposed the three Baltic defence establishments to all the complexities involved in international defence co-operation, forcing them to address a whole set of problems in a very short period of time.

Looking retrospectively, the question that arises is “was it worth going through all this in order to establish a UN peacekeeping unit, which could hardly be considered as a real priority for the security of the Baltic States?”
Beyond Peacekeeping

Indeed, those arguing that BALTBAT as a military unit has little direct military value for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have a point. As argued above, BALTBAT was masterminded as a politically uncontroversial project and its form was more shaped by the security environment than by the security needs of the Baltic countries. At the same time, and this is extremely important, the BALTBAT project always had a much broader meaning for its designers than merely the establishment of a tri-national peacekeeping unit. Even though an operational peacekeeping battalion had to be the final outcome of the endeavour, the most valuable result of the BALTBAT project had to be its spill over to the national defence forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. At the same time, and this is extremely important, the BALTBAT project always had a much broader meaning for its designers than merely the establishment of a tri-national peacekeeping unit. Even though an operational peacekeeping battalion had to be the final outcome of the endeavour, the most valuable result of the BALTBAT project had to be its spill over to the national defence forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Below is a description of direct and indirect side effects which the BALTBAT project was expected to have on the national defence forces of the three Baltic States.

1. “Westernization” of the fledgling defence forces of the Baltic countries. This concept encompasses a wide range of issues such as introduction of tactical manuals and operating procedures of defence forces of the Western countries in the daily training, spread of English language knowledge, replacing Soviet traditions with Western military culture in its broadest sense, etc. It was expected that BALTBAT soldiers, after a period in the Baltic Battalion, would return to key positions in the national military systems and start changing the old habits and traditions mostly coming from the Soviet army. Thereby BALTBAT would become an important factor in the process of building Western type, NATO interoperable armed forces in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

2. Provision of military support to the Baltic States in a manner non-provocative to other countries. Western countries have different national policies, priorities and different sensitivities when rendering defence related support of the Baltic States. However, most of them find it politically easier and more attractive to support joint projects like BALTBAT than to render direct military assistance to the national armed forces of the Baltic countries. This can be easily explained. Support rendered to the development of peacekeeping capabilities for UN missions and other operations in the “spirit of PfP” could hardly be considered a controversial issue by anyone. On the other hand direct transfers of military hardware and provision of combat training of Baltic military units were likely to raise eyebrows in the East. It seems that this consideration...
and initial success of the BALTBAT project were the major incentives for the Baltic countries to launch the other Baltic projects: the Baltic Naval Squadron - BALTRON, the Baltic Air Surveillance Network - BALTNET, the Baltic Defence College - BALTDEFCOL.

3. Development of Baltic defence co-operation. With their important differences notwithstanding, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians would admit that their countries are of comparable size, have similar recent history, and share the same threats to their security. Looking from outside, the differences become even less visible, while the similarities prompt the Western states to regard and treat the three Baltic countries as a single geopolitical unit. Close Baltic defence co-operation is therefore a priori considered in the West as a highly positive and even natural state of affairs. On the other hand disagreements, which unavoidably occur in the process, are regarded as irresponsible behaviour on the part of the Balts and therefore usually come under sharp criticism from the Supporting States. Because of this image in the West and also because this makes matters so much more simple, the Western states are readier to deal with all three Baltic countries simultaneously rather than on the individual basis. Therefore one could easily make a claim that it was the attitude of the Supporting countries rather than anything else that promoted defence co-operation Baltic States to the present level.

The BALTBAT project also has a remarkable multinational management structure, which was later copied by the other Baltic initiatives. The co-ordination of the assistance and general management of the project takes place through the regular meetings of multinational BALTBAT Steering and BALTBAT Military Working Groups, chaired by Denmark. A majority of the participants are signatories to a Memorandum of Understanding concerning support to BALTBAT. Such a formal commitment made by a group of Western countries, which includes both NATO and non-aligned states, to support a specific project in the Baltics, is important not so much for the potential it brought to the project as for making a strong political signal. It is certainly an important factor, contributing to self-confidence of the Baltic countries vis-à-vis potential threats in the East.

Deploying BALTBAT

Though the BALTBAT project was highly visible, its political benefits were undeniable, some other expectations related to the project have not materialised to a full extent. In particular, BALTBAT’s influence on the national forces was rather limited. Apart from the fact that the project was developed in relative isolation from the rest of the armed forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, many officers in the Baltic States judged BALTBAT training and experience being irrelevant to the defence needs of the Baltic countries. In its worst, BALTBAT was seen as an artificial elite unit where the main motivation of the soldiers was financial benefit related to service abroad and therefore they could hardly have any positive influence on the national forces.
These allegations had at least some ground. Soldiers and officers serving in BALTBAT Headquarters in Adaži, Latvia, and especially when deployed to an international peacekeeping mission, were considerably better than their colleagues in the military units in the home countries were. Also, at some point in 1995-1996, the original idea of the BALTBAT as a project that in many ways could contribute to the development of the national defence forces appeared to become subordinated at the project steering level to a need to find a suitable deployment. A primary objective of the project was to send the Battalion out for a mission soon after the end of the training programme in 1997. Some of the Supporting States saw BALTBAT’s deployment to a mission as being necessary in order to substantiate the success of the project and as a justification to the resources contributed to its development. The consolidation of training and the development of mission experience, which could then be fed back into the Battalion (and into the national forces) was a further motivation.

This shift in priorities required the Baltic States to further concentrate on the quality of personnel and resources for a possible deployment of BALTBAT rather than to think about spreading the BALTBAT experience into their national units. As a result, the national defence systems were continuously working for the BALTBAT purposes rather than vice versa. Deployment to a mission became the main criterion of success of the project and finding a mission for BALTBAT was a major task of the BALTBAT Steering Group throughout 1997 and first half of 1998.

Finding a deployment area for BALTBAT was not an easy task considering several important factors that had to be taken into account and this limited the number of possibilities. Firstly, BALTBAT was trained, equipped and structured to perform classical UN operations. Therefore independent deployment of BALTBAT to SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was rather peace enforcement than peacekeeping operation, was not acceptable due to the insufficient armour, fire support and logistical capabilities of the Battalion. Also, nobody wanted to take greater risks than necessary. BALTBAT’s deployment had to be a success and SFOR seemed to be more risky than most of the UN operations.

Secondly, the size of BALTBAT at the time was about 700 military (authorised strength 724), which also limited the number of options among the existing UN peacekeeping operations. In most of them smaller size battalions were used, and therefore it would be difficult to find a unit that the BALTBAT could replace. But even if a place for BALTBAT deployment was found, the UN would have to approve BALTBAT participation while another nation would have to agree to withdraw its forces to provide space for BALTBAT. All this suggested a rather lengthy and cumbersome procedure.

Last but not least, the UN had to agree to deploy BALTBAT only for six months, as there was no other unit in the Baltic States that could replace BALTBAT after its six-month turn. This meant that the Baltic States were not in a position to
provide for a sustained deployment, which was one of important preconditions set by the UN. On the top of that, preliminary financial estimates of what would take for the Baltic States to deploy full BALTBAT and to supply it with necessary logistics were rather speaking against this option.

A detailed study prepared by the BALTBAT Military Working Group in summer 1998 on the possible deployment of BALTBAT to UNIFIL in Lebanon has highlighted those concerns. The solution that was found was probably optimal in this situation. It was decided to rotate BALTBAT contingents (national company plus staff element) within the Danish Battalion (DANBAT) in the SFOR operation in Bosnia. This option took care of all the major problems mentioned above. Besides, co-operation with the Danes in peace operations had a relatively long history (starting in 1994 for the Lithuanians and 1995 for the Estonians and Latvians and including a tour of duty for the Lithuanian BALTBAT infantry company in IFOR). SFOR was also politically more attractive to the Baltic States than the UNIFIL as this was a NATO-led operation.

**Current Developments**

Where are we now with the BALTBAT project 5 years after its beginning? Several developments have to be discussed in this chapter.

First of all, since the end of 1997, BALTBAT is no longer trained for the classical UN peacekeeping operations but is under development into a light infantry battalion, ready for all types of peace operations. This stage of development has to be completed by the end of 2000. By that time BALTBAT will acquire anti-tank and fire support capabilities, while NATO rules and procedures will be used whenever applicable in the daily work of the battalion.

The Baltic States welcomed this step from the UN peacekeeping to more robust capabilities. Both for political and practical reasons, the priority in the Baltic States is given to participation in NATO-led operations. This development was also due to the UNPROFOR/IFOR/SFOR lessons, which clearly showed that modern peacekeeping requires more mobile and better armed forces. Also, since 1994 there has been clear development in the attitudes of the Supporting countries towards the Baltic States, making it politically easier for many of them to support the development of defence capabilities beyond UN peacekeeping.

Furthermore, in early 1999, the Baltic States agreed to assign Initial Partnership Goals (IPG’s) to their national subunits in the BALTBAT as a part of their national contributions to the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). This commitment requires that those subunits be developed in accordance with the requirements set by NATO and become fully NATO interoperable. Thereby BALTBAT is entering the mainstream of national efforts towards achieving NATO interoperability of the national armed forces of the three Baltic States.
A second important aspect is a gradual decentralisation of the project and its anchoring within the national defence structures. This development indicates a return to the original ideas about the role of the BALTBAT project, i.e. BALTBAT and support that is rendered to it by Western countries should be used for the development of the national defence forces in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In accordance with the Political Guidance issued by the Baltic Defence Ministers in April 1999, in each of the three states national battalion size units will be established and will be responsible for military training up to the company level in accordance with BALTBAT standards. They will also take over English language training and specialist training. The BALTBAT staff will remain in Adazi and will be responsible for training at the battalion level and also for ensuring the co-ordination and compatibility of training in the national centres. Thus, along with the implementation of the plan of reorganisation of BALTBAT into a light infantry battalion the Baltic States are working on the establishment of the national battalions, which will act as feeder units for BALTBAT. Those national BALTBAT units will establish a clear relationship between the BALTBAT project and the development of the national forces, changing the image of the Baltic Battalion as an isolated elitist unit. They will also allow the Baltic States to ensure sustainability of BALTBAT in a deployment. Therefore the outside support to the project should also gradually become decentralised with focus to the national battalions.

The third tendency, which is important not only in the BALTBAT but also in the other Baltic projects, is the so-called baltification process. In its essence, baltification means gradual reduction of external support and eventual transfer of full responsibility for running the projects for the Baltic States themselves. It is natural that the Supporting countries would like to establish some kind of timeline after which the Baltic States could continue the projects without outside support. This interest of the supporting countries is especially relevant in the case of BALTBAT, which has already celebrated its fifth anniversary and is perhaps the largest consumer of outside assistance. There is a general view among the Supporting States that the Baltic States should by now have suitable structures to manage and support the Battalion. Besides releasing available funding for other assistance projects, a fully nationally supported, effective and deployable BALTBAT is also seen by them as a valuable political and military signal of Baltic development and co-operation to send to the wider international community.

Way Ahead

Where are these tendencies leading the BALTBAT project? What kind of BALTBAT will we have in another five or ten years? These are the questions that will be addressed in the final section of this article.

The topic “Way ahead for BALTBAT” has become almost a permanent agenda item in BALTBAT Steering Group meet-
ings in recent years. The ultimate answer of what BALTBAT should look like in the future should be coming from the Baltic States themselves. There have been numerous discussions held on the subject, a number of agreements have been achieved and several important documents have been signed. However, there is still (Dec. 1999) no single coherent plan, which would show how the political agreements and objectives set for the Baltic battalion could be implemented after the expiry of the present Memorandum of Understanding (end of 2000). The Supporting states that are willing to continue rendering assistance to the BALTBAT project would also like to know in advance what kind BALTBAT they are being asked to support. Therefore the urgent task for the Baltic States is to prepare a BALTBAT development plan giving a clear indication as to the expected end-result of the project.

For the sake of having a more structural debate on the future of the BALTBAT, this article will elaborate on two possible models of the Baltic battalion in the future - BALTBAT as a peace operations unit and BALTBAT as a training unit. The first option indicates the focus of BALTBAT activities on deployment of the battalion or its subunits to international operations, while the second on the anchoring of the BALTBAT training standards into the national defence forces.

This separation hinges on the argument that if a decision is taken to sustain BALTBAT in an international mission or to keep BALTBAT as a high readiness battalion, this will shape the BALTBAT development plan in all areas. This includes assignment and rotation of personnel, development of logistic capabilities, and requirements for outside support. Conversely, if training of Baltic military personnel is chosen as a primary objective, the approaches in those areas will have to be different. The two concepts can be combined only to a limited extent as each suggests different focus of efforts and different success criteria. Some of the specific implications of each choice are summarised in Table 1 and commented on below.

Those two approaches are more theoretical in their character. None of them could be implemented to the full extent as certain ramifications are imposed by the already existing agreements between the three Baltic countries and also between each of them and NATO in the form of IPGs agreed for BALTBAT subunits. Therefore the final outcome of the BALTBAT development plan will have to be somewhere in between those two extremes. Some explanations may be useful for better understanding of the nature of the choice.

**BALTBAT as a Peace Operations Unit**

The argument of this article is that if permanent participation in peace operations becomes one of the objectives of BALTBAT, it is very likely to become the main one (especially if such participation is not supported by adequate training structures at home). There are several reasons for other objectives being subordinated to it:
## IMPLICATIONS OF BALTBAT DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BALTBAT as a Peace Operations Unit</th>
<th>BALTBAT as a Training Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUCCESS CRITERIA</strong></td>
<td>Unit coherence;</td>
<td>Professional growth of officers, NCOs and soldiers;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deployment readiness;</td>
<td>Maximum number of officers, NCOs and soldiers having completed BALTBAT training programme;</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Successful participation in peace operations;</td>
<td>Widest and deepest possible spread of BALTBAT standards into the national forces;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Implementation of PARP IPGs;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Independent deployment of battalion size unit;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT</strong></td>
<td>Normal assignment 4-5 years;</td>
<td>Normal assignment 2 years;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unification of the national personnel policies with respect to BALTBAT;</td>
<td>Allows for better integration of the national differences within national and specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entry level requirements: high (ready for deployment after relatively short period of pre-mission</td>
<td>COYs (but not in BALTBAT HQ);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>training);</td>
<td>Entry level requirements: low (ready for deployment after completion of BALTBAT training</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>programme plus pre-mission training);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAINING</strong></td>
<td>Mission oriented, no standard annual routine;</td>
<td>Standard annual infantry training programme in accordance with BALTBAT standards;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>BALTBAT HQ focus: training of national contingents, mission planning;</td>
<td>BALTBAT HQ focus: training of staff officers in HQ, assistance to the training activities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pre-deployment training requirements: low;</td>
<td>national BALTBAT units;</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-deployment training requirements: standard;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOGISTICS</strong></td>
<td>Priority: development of deployment oriented logistics;</td>
<td>Priority: improvement of the national logistic support systems;</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OUTSIDE SUPPORT</strong></td>
<td>Requirement: high</td>
<td>Requirement: lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Priorities:</td>
<td>Priorities:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ELT;</td>
<td>National battalions and training programmes,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-mission training;</td>
<td>including provision of equipment for training purposes;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment for training and independent deployment;</td>
<td>Development of national logistics system and sustainability at home;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of sustainability in a mission, including logistical support;</td>
<td>Further development of in-country ELT capabilities;</td>
</tr>
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**TABLE 1**
• Firstly, in each of the Baltic States financial rewards for participation in an international peace operation are still considerably higher than for service in home-based units. This difference is likely to turn participation in a mission and financial benefits related to it into the main motive for joining BALTBAT (as it often was until now).

• Secondly, sending a unit into an international operation is a highly demanding task, which involves considerable risks and has high international exposure. For NATO aspirants like the three Baltic nations, failures in this area would be least wanted. Therefore, priority in the BALTBAT project would always be given to ensuring successful participation, even if this requires taking resources (be it human or financial) from other areas. Remarkable in this respect is the fact that inadequate performance of BALTBAT soldiers is likely to have a much greater negative resonance than that of a standard national unit, because the project is widely known and praised.

• Thirdly, in a development plan for BALTBAT as a peace operations unit, one would see an increase of the level and quality of participation in such operations as its paramount objective. A (largely) self-supported deployment for the whole BALTBAT seems to be a natural objective to aspire to. However, this can realistically be implemented only in a very long term. The ambition to do that in the shortest possible time (which would be natural if BALTBAT is primarily a peace operations unit) will require that the three Baltic countries concentrate their efforts on the achievement of this task. It would have to happen, even if that has to be done at the expense of other objectives of the project.

As was mentioned above, the decision as to whether to have BALTBAT as a peace operations or training unit will have implications on all key areas of the development of the project. Most importantly, it will automatically establish the criteria for evaluating success of the project. In the first case, those will be the readiness of the battalion for being sent out to an international mission, performance of BALTBAT subunits in a mission and, ultimately, sustained deployment of the entire battalion.

In order to be successful in this endeavour, BALTBAT’s training programme should be shaped in such a manner that the personnel and national subunits assigned to BALTBAT already have sufficient skills to be deployed right after a short period of pre-mission training. As the number of such trained officers and NCOs is very limited, it will be wise to keep the trained personnel for longer periods in order to sustain the high level of preparedness of the battalion and its subunits. In that case, personnel for the main positions in BALTBAT should be assigned for approximately 4-5 years. Longer assignments coupled with better quality of training and several turns in a mission may match well with the motivation of the soldiers joining BALTBAT.

The greatest challenge if this option is exercised is to set tasks for BALTBAT HQ. For as long as the Baltic States are not in a position to sustain battalion-level deployment, BALTBAT HQ will have little
role to play, since training of the infantry companies and specialist subunits will be done nationally and in co-operation with the nation providing foster unit in the mission area. Moreover, the HQ may become the only part of the battalion, which will not be deployed and this can make the service in the HQ less attractive. Alternatively, the HQ will be preoccupied with other tasks than the rest of BALTBAT.

Another important implication of this choice is in the field of international support. The highest priority will be support in one or another way related to deployment. Since the ultimate objective of this option is identified as sustainability of a battalion level deployment in a mission, the BALTBAT development plan should concentrate on the achievement of this objective. Naturally, outside support will be most required to ensure sustainability in a mission and therefore may prove to be rather significant. Some indications of the areas where external support will be most required are identified within the Table 1.

The last point to be made here is that, deploying BALTBAT as a permanent participant of an international peace operation, makes it almost impossible for the Baltic countries to give mission experience to the other national units. Even in a longer perspective, none of the Baltic States could realistically sustain more than one deployment of this size.

**BALTBAT as a Training Unit**

An alternative model to BATBAT as a peace operations unit could be to have BALTBAT as a training unit. Whereas for deployment to a mission area multinationality at the battalion or lower level may inhibit its efficiency and even become a risk factor, it is an asset for the purposes of cadre training, in particular, for the officers working in BALTBAT HQ. Indeed, the main difference of the two options is that BALTBAT as peace operations unit has its main emphasis on a unit and its ability to act as a unit in a hostile environment. BALTBAT as a training unit focuses on people - soldiers, NCOs and officers - who are working in it. The success of the project in this case is measured not by the level of readiness of the unit but by the number of officers and NCOs trained in accordance with the BALTBAT standards and rotated back to the national forces.

In this model Baltic personnel from the other national military units would be assigned to BALTBAT for a relatively short, one-two year, period. With the help of BALTBAT Training Team (BTT), they would undergo there an intense training programme within the multinational environment in BALTBAT HQ and would return to continue service in the same, or higher, position in their national units. The main task of the BTT in this case would be to assist the professional development of officers and NCOs assigned to BALTBAT.

In this way BALTBAT could make a direct and very significant contribution to the defence forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as it would set the training standards. Every year it would deliver a large number of well trained military and would involve significant parts of the ar-
mies of the three states into Baltic co-operation. In general, this option would move the project closer to some of the original ideas behind the BALTBAT initiative.

**Finding a Right Balance**

As was indicated above, the development plan for the BALTBAT project will have to combine the two options. It is clear that the Baltic States will be careful not to put too much emphasis on participation in international operations, which could make BALTBAT too different and too isolated from the rest of the national armed forces. On the other, they will seek to maximise the benefits of the strenuous national efforts and the generous outside support, which has made BALTBAT the most capable unit in the Baltic States for participation in international missions.

The critical issues that BALTBAT development plan has to address are the following:

- level of centralisation of the project;
- the role of BALTBAT HQ and BSG;
- level and mode of participation in peace operations (in the mid-term period);
- the role of BALTBAT HQ and BSG.

Below there is the author’s perception of how these crucial issues can be managed to the advantage of each of the countries and participants involved in the project.

First of all, there are good arguments in favour of making the project much more decentralised. One of the imperatives for greater degree of decentralisation is different national approaches to the development of the national forces in each of the Baltic States and the role which BALTBAT is expected to play in this process. For example, Latvia plans to have its national BALTBAT unit consisting of professional soldiers, enlisted for a relatively long period; Lithuania would like this battalion to be just like other national battalions i.e. with significant portion of conscripts in it; Estonia seems have taken yet another approach. This indicates that the level of preparedness and the needs for training may vary significantly between the participating nations. An exercise programme that is very challenging for conscripts may be of little additional value for experienced professionals. For this reason, tri-national field training activities of the BALTBAT will require great efforts to make them reasonably useful for all the participants. But even if certain joint activities are agreed, most of the training will have to done nationally. The multinational dimension of the project will first and foremost be ensured through BALTBAT Headquarters and Baltic Support Group located in Adazi as well as through the project co-ordination and management mechanisms established by the three Baltic States.

In the view of decentralisation of the project, BALTBAT HQ will have to place more emphasis of the individual training and development of staff officers appointed to the HQ. Another major task of the HQ will be issuing of training standards to the national companies and specialist units and supervise their implementation. Also, BALTBAT HQ could usefully assist the preparation of various staff and field training activities in the national BALTBAT units. BALTBAT HQ.
being relatively small and mobile unit, could easily travel between the three nations assisting the national BALTBAT unit commanders in accordance with their needs and could get direct impression of the quality of the training activities. Quite importantly, the national differences in the approach towards the establishment of the “feeder” battalions may be an advantage in terms of providing different type of experience to the personnel in BALTBAT HQ and thereby contributing to the development of officers serving in the HQ. Provided that each nation develops some kind of standard training routine for its national BALTBAT units, BALTBAT HQ could also work in accordance with a standard annual training programme. This programme could be tailored in such a way that upon completion it would provide the officers serving in BALTBAT HQ with a certain range of experience and skills, first of all in terms of mastering operational English language and learning to work in accordance with NATO staff procedures. Thereby, in a relatively short period of time, the officers from BALTBAT HQ would become the most valuable assets for national forces.

What is said above on the role of BALTBAT HQ is based on the assumption that in the mid-term period BALTBAT will not participate in a mission on the battalion level. The experience of recent deployments suggests that at the moment the Baltic States should be able to send in turn their national companies to an international mission without pressing too much the national defence establishments. This level of participation in a mission should not be increased until the Baltic States are fully prepared for a long-term deployment of the whole battalion, unless NATO calls for a Baltic contribution in accordance with the agreed NATO IPGs. Instead the focus should be on the establishment of the three national BALTBAT units. The readiness requirements set within the IPGs should not be a real problem to meet provided that the national BALTBAT units established in each state. If needed those could also be reinforced with officers, NCOs and soldiers trained in accordance with BALTBAT standards and serving in other national units.

To summarise the above, BALTBAT should best meet the expectations related to the project if:

- the main focus of the project in the mid-term is on the establishment of one BALTBAT standard infantry battalion in each of the Baltic States;
- BALTBAT HQ concentrates on training and professional development of staff officers assigned to serve in the HQ and assists in the implementation of the training programmes in the three national units;
- the Baltic nations rotate one infantry company and a few staff officers in an international mission.

This option calls for outside support to BALTBAT being centred on such areas as introduction of BALTBAT standard training in the three national battalions; provision of equipment to the national feeder units of the same or similar type as currently in BALTBAT and support to the establishment of a maintenance base; long-term deployment of a company size
unit from the Baltic States to an international mission. Baltification of the project should be carried out gradually, starting with taking over all the training activities, establishment for a maintenance base for the donated equipment, later taking full responsibility for project sustainability at home, including procurement of the necessary equipment and weapons. This should be possible to achieve in a four-five year period. Participation in international operations and, in particular, logistic support in a mission area seems to be the only area where the Baltic States may have to look for additional support also in a longer perspective.

Conclusion

This article reflects the author’s perception of the role BALTBAT project has played in the development of the armed forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania since the project was launched in September 1994. The current stage of the project should be completed by the end of the year 2000, when BALTBAT will become reorganised from a classical peacekeeping unit to an infantry battalion. Current debate in the Baltic States is about the future of the project, i.e. its development beyond the year 2000. This article seeks to make a contribution to this debate by highlighting some of the main issues that have to be addressed or taken into consideration in the discussion on the future of the BALTBAT project.

This article argues that the project has a great potential to contribute to the development of the defence forces in the Baltic States in accordance with the Western standards. The precondition for that is, and therefore the most important task after the year 2000 should be, the anchoring of the BALTBAT project in the national defence forces of the Baltic States. At the same time, BALTBAT is probably the most capable unit in the Baltic States for participation in peace operations. Therefore in its development plan after the year 2000 BALTBAT should reflect the determination of the Baltic States to participate in international peace operations.

As a result, some kind balance should be found between the two objectives, which as the article argues, are not entirely compatible. This author suggests one of the possible options for such a balance. The option requires that the main objective of the next stage of the BALTBAT development plan is establishment of an infantry battalion (national BALTBAT unit) in each of the Baltic States. The role of BALTBAT HQ should be redefined, tasking it to concentrate on training of officers assigned to HQ and assistance to training of the national BALTBAT units. Participation in international operations should be kept at the present - i.e. company level.

1 The author is most familiar with the situation in the Lithuanian armed forces, but many of the concerns expressed in this article were shared by the militaries in Estonia and Latvia.
In New Year’s Eve 1994 a large Russian force tried to storm Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. The attempt failed and a drawn out urban battle raged until the Russians claimed to be in control of the city two months later. That, however, was premature. One year later a Chechen force entered the city for a few days, and in August 1996 the Chechens retook Grozny in an offensive which paved the way for the Khasavyurt Peace Agreement which lead to the withdrawal of the Russian forces from Chechnya.

The purpose of the following is to give a brief outline of the battles of Grozny and discuss why the numerically and materially superior Russian forces had such difficulties in conquering and holding a medium size city.

1. The Setting

In November 1991 the Chechen President, Dzhokhar Dudayev declared Chechnya to be independent. Russian President Boris Yeltsin reacted by sending Interior Ministry troops to Grozny, but the mission failed due to opposition from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and the Russian Supreme Soviet. One year later, Russian troops deployed to contain the North Ossetian/Ingusjetian conflict moved towards the Chechen border, but stopped when Dudayev mobilised his troops for defence of Chechnya.

Then followed a period of half-hearted Russian economic blockade of Chechnya and a power-struggle in Moscow between Yeltsin and the Russian Supreme Soviet, which more or less left the Chechens to themselves. However, the Duma elections in December 1993 strengthened the nationalists and communists in Russian politics and Yeltsin moved politically in a more nationalistic as well as authoritarian direction.

Yeltsin appointed a number of ministers and advisers with a hawkish and decidedly anti-Chechen attitude to influential positions. At the same time Chechnya became increasingly isolated, and domestic Chechen politics degenerated into violent confrontations between Dudayev and a number of armed opposition groups. Furthermore, the international game about how oil from the Azerbaijani fields in the Caspian Sea should be transported...
to the international market made the Russian government anxious to get full control over the Baku-Novorossysk pipeline, which runs through Chechnya.

Originally, the Russian leadership thought it could gain control over Chechnya by supporting the pro-Russian opposition to Dudayev with money and weapons, or at least that the opposition—with covert Russian support—could create a military stall-mate, legitimating a Russian “peacekeeping” intervention like the one in the North Ossetian/Ingusjetian conflict in 1992.²

However, the opposition’s attack on Grozny in late November 1994 failed miserably, and it was revealed that Russian soldiers, secretly hired by the security service, the FSK, had taken part in the attack and some of them been taken prisoners by Dudayev. Russia and the Russian army had been humiliated. In that situation Yeltsin quickly decided to make a full-scale military intervention in Chechnya in order to “re-establish constitutional order” as it was officially said.³

On Sunday December 11, 1994 at 07.00 the Russian forces commenced their attack which the secretary of the Russian Security Council, Oleg Lobov, expected to be “a small victorious war”. It lasted for 21 months and ended in a complete military failure for Russia.

To the extend that there was a plan for the conquering of Chechnya, it had four phases:⁴

1. Border troops should surround Chechnya while the air force surveyed and controlled the air space over the republic. On the ground three groups of army and Interior Ministry troops should move in from North West, West and East towards Grozny and surround the city leaving an opening towards the South through which the Chechen forces can leave the city. Grozny was not to be stormed. This phase was expected to take three days.

2. Securing of Grozny through occupation of presidential palace, other government buildings, television and radio stations and “other important objects”. This phase was expected to take four days.

3. Clearing the lowlands through pushing the Dudayev forces into the southern mountains while establishing a pro-Russian government in the “liberated” areas. This phase was expected to take between five and ten days.

4. Elimination of pockets of resistance in the southern mountains. It was expected that this phase could be quite long.

The Chechen plan was to avoid set battle with the advancing Russian troops in the open terrain but to slow down their advance through pinpoint and ambush attacks in forests and hilly terrain primarily against the Russian rear and MVD troops. A first set battle was planned to take place a few kilometres outside Grozny. However, this should not be a drawn-out battle either. The purpose was to delay the Russian advance in order to gain time for preparing the defence of Grozny, where the Chechens planned for the decisive confrontation.⁵

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2. Order of Battle

It is extremely difficult to give a precise account of the forces involved in the
Russian-Chechen war. Not only the sources are problematic and contradictory. Most of the Russian units were composite units and even so not always fully manned. Terms such as regiment, brigade etc. should not necessarily be understood as full units. Even greater difficulties are connected with getting a reasonable picture of the rather casually organised Chechen units with impressive names.

According to Defence Minister Pavel Grachev the original Russian force consisted of 23,800 men – approximately 19,000 from the Army and 4,700 from the Ministry of the Interior. The force had 80 battle tanks, 208 APCs and 182 artillery pieces. However, during the following weeks reinforcements were brought in from all Russian military districts until the number reached 58,000 in March 1995.6

Most of the air assets came from the 4th Air Army in the North Caucasian Military Districts but were supplemented with aircrafts from other parts of Russia. The total number of air-crafts is unknown, but it was very large. The Army Aviation provided 55 helicopters during the initial phase of the war.7

Although it is difficult to give a precise picture of the Russian order of battle, it is nothing compared to the difficulties in describing the Chechen forces. The sources give all kinds of figures from 1,000 to 45,000 men. One of the reasons is, that there were relatively few organised military units. At the same time a considerable number of Chechen men took up arms when Russian troops moved into their local area, but went back to their daily chores, when the Russians left the area.

Another difficulty is, that besides the organised forces of the Dudayev regime, there were the forces of the non-Russian financed opposition to Dudayev. Almost all of them joined in fighting the Russians as soon as the war began.

Finally there is the uncertainty about the number of non-Chechens from abroad who came and fought on the Chechen side. Several Russian sources have fanciful reports about thousands of mujaheddins from Afghanistan and female snipers in white tights from the Baltic countries. In fact there were relatively few mujaheddins in Chechnya and no western journalist ever saw any of the amazons from the Baltic States.

At the time of the invasion the organised Chechen units were probably only the following:8

- President Dudayevs National Guard consisting of about 120 men.
- Shamil Basayev’s so-called Abkhasian Battalion of around 350 men.
- A tank unit (called regiment) with between 12 and 15 working tanks (T-54, T-62)
- An artillery unit of approximately 80 men and 30 light and medium heavy artillery pieces.
- A motorised “Commando Battalion” of approximately 250 men and lead by Ruslan Galayev.
- And finally, the Chechen MVD force of maybe 200 men.
- The Chechen air force consisted of about 15 L-29 or L-39 trainers all of which were destroyed on the ground in the first hours of the war.
These figures about the Chechen forces are not only uncertain but also highly controversial. Russian sources generally give much higher figures for Chechen tanks, APCs, and - particularly - airplanes. Thus, for example, the chief of the Russian Airforce, Colonel General Petr Denykin, claimed that his forces had destroyed 266 Chechen planes. Although it is true, that the Chechens had more than the approximately 15 trainers mentioned above, the planes had not been maintained and the Chechens had only a handful of pilots.

What was important, was the huge amount of light arms and ammunition possessed by the Chechens. A considerable part of that dated back to the chaotic withdrawal of the Russian forces from Chechnya in June 1992. Some claim that the Chechens forced the Russians to leave their stocks, others that they were handed over to the Chechens as part of a formal or tacit agreement between Defence Minister Pavel Gratyov and President Dudayev.10

### 3. The Invasion

The Russian invasion force consisted of three groups. The Northern group advanced from Mozdok, the Western group from Vladikavkas and Beslan through Ingusjetia, and finally, the eastern group moved in from Dagestan. The troops advanced in columns with the airborne troops first, then followed the other army units and in the rear the MVD units. From the air the advancing troops were supported by Mi-24 helicopters and SU-25 close support planes.11

Even before they reached the Chechen border they were met with civilian resistance in Ingusjetia and Dagestan which confused and delayed the troops. Once inside Chechnya they met sporadic armed opposition - even in the areas north of the Terek River, which traditionally is the most pro-Russian part of Chechnya. Finally bad weather hampered the advance and limited the air support. It was not before the last days of December that the Russian forces reached the outskirts of Grozny.

The air campaign started before the ground invasion on December 11. In the period from November 29 to December 2 Russian planes had attacked the two airports in Grozny with the purpose of eliminating all Chechen airplanes. In parallel with the ground invasion, the air force attacked other Chechen airfields, bridges, and major roads, a tank repair facility and the television tower in Grozny. Also several towns were attacked in this phase among them Shali and Urus Martan, which incidentally had been political bases of non-Russian financed opposition to President Dudayev.

With no Chechen air force and only limited Chechen air defence, the Russians had from the start of the war total air superiority which was used in an indiscriminate bombing campaign, which particularly in Grozny took a heavy toll among the civilians - including the many Russians - living there.

The military invasion, and the indiscriminate air campaign in particular, quickly changed the nature of the war from the declared disarming of illegal
formations into a total war on the population of Chechnya. This undoubtedly strengthened the Chechens’ will to resist and was thus an important factor determining the nature of the war.

4. The New Year’s Offensive

The Chechen forces did not leave Grozny through the opening towards the south as foreseen in the Russian plan. On the contrary, they used the opening for bringing in reinforcements to the city.

On December 26 Yeltsin decided in a meeting of the Russian Security Council that Grozny should be stormed immediately even if the military leaders wanted another two weeks to prepare the attack. Since the invasion the Russian forces had been reinforced with units from the Leningrad, Volga and Ural Military Districts. The total strength had now reached 38,000 men, 230 battle tanks, 353 APCs and 388 artillery pieces. According to a hastily composed plan the attack should take place along four axis converging on the city centre while two Spetsnaz groups deployed by helicopters should disturb the Chechen rear south of the city.12

The Chechen defence of Grozny was lead by the Chechen Chief of Staff, Aslan Maskhadov, from the basement of the so-called presidential palace. An important role was played by “field commander” Shamil Basayev and his Abkhas Battalion. Other units as well as a large number of smaller groups joined them.

The defence was organised district by district and each district had a number of groups, which operated quite independently. A typical group could consist of 8 to 10 men armed with one or two anti-tank weapons, a light machine-gun, one or two sniper rifles and the rest of the men equipped with Kalashnikovs. Some groups, however, were smaller. The Chechens knew the city and were very mobile – moving through passages, back alleys and even sewers. They communicated by cellular phones.13

The attack commenced on December 31, but again the Russian plans fell to pieces when confronted with reality. The advancing Russian troops met with unexpected opposition. The advancing tanks and APCs were not protected by dismounted infantry and thus became easy targets for the Chechens who were able to attack with their anti-tank weapons from prepared positions in the buildings and ruins of the city.

The Chechen leadership decided to let the Russian forces move into the build-up areas of the city and fight them there, where the individual units could be surrounded, isolated and were without effective artillery or air support. The isolated tanks and APCs would then be attacked with anti-tank weapons in quick hit-and-run actions. In several cases the Russian columns were lured into narrow streets where first the front and rear vehicles were destroyed and then the rest of the column thus caught in an ambush from which they could not escape.

Of the advancing Russian groups it was only the northern under the leadership of general Lev Rokhlin, which reached the centre a few hundred meters from the presidential palace, where the Chechens had their headquarters. The 131st Inde-
Independent Motorised Infantry Brigade (the Maikop Brigade) took the railway station. The other groups from east and west reached the centre nearer. In the following battle around the railway station almost the whole 131st Brigade was wiped out. It lost 20 of its 26 tanks and 102 of its 120 APCs. Its commander, Colonel Ivan Savin and almost 1000 officers and men died and 74 were taken prisoners. As for the two Spetsnaz groups from south of the city, they surrendered to the Chechens after having tried to survive without food for several days.

The storming of Grozny had utterly failed and the failure forced the Russians to withdraw, re-evaluate their opponent and change operational plans and tactics. This was one of the most critical phases for the Russian forces during the whole war. The soldiers’ moral was near to collapse and large parts of the officers’ corps on the verge of disobeying orders.

In the meantime new reinforcements were sent to Chechnya, including marines from the Pacific, the Northern and the Baltic fleets as well as Spetsnaz and MVD units. The forces were regrouped into storm groups at battalion and lower levels and a new offensive commenced on January 3.

Now the battle of Grozny became a systematic offensive similar to the Soviet Army’s conquering of cities during the Second World War. The city was taken sector by sector after initial artillery, air bombardment and infantry battles from house to house. The Russian civilians still left in the city again took some of the heaviest casualties. Although President Yeltsin again ordered one of his stops for air bombardments of the city - this time from midnight between January 4 and 5 - the pause lasted only a few days.

The Chechens put up an impressive resistance but were gradually pressed out of the city. In one of the few examples of Russian precision bombing two concrete-piercing bombs hit the presidential palace and destroyed several floors. On the night between January 18 and 19 Maskhadov moved his staff from the base ment of the presidential palace to a hospital on the south side of the Sunzha River a few kilometres further to south-east. The following day the Russian forces stormed the presidential palace. However, already during the New Year’s battle President Dudayev had moved his headquarters to Shali, 25 kilometres south of Grozny.

On the day when the Russian forces took the presidential palace, President Yeltsin declared that the military phase of the operations in Chechnya was almost completed and that responsibility for establishing law and order in Chechnya was transferred to the Ministry of Interior. Deputy Minister of the Interior, Colonel General Anatoly Kulikov, was appointed commander of the combined federal forces in Chechnya.

Three days later the Russian forces managed to close the “hole” in the southern part of central Grozny and thus preventing the Chechens from reinforcing the city. The Chechens established a new front along the Sunzha River in the southeastern part of Grozny and for a while there was again a front in the war.
The Russian forces commenced with heavy air and artillery bombardment of the Chechen positions on the south side of the Sunzha River, which made the Chechens give up this last part of Grozny. Shamil Basayev withdrew almost all of his men from the city and on March 7 the Russians could finally declare full control over Grozny. That, however, proved to be wishful thinking.

The battle of Grozny had been exceptionally costly, and it was the civilian population, which had taken the majority of the casualties. Sergej Kovalev, the Russian Duma’s commissioner for human rights and President Yeltsin’s adviser on human rights, who had been in Grozny during part of the fighting, estimated the number of dead to 27,000. At the same time the Federal Migration Service put the number of displaced persons at 268,000. The official Russian figures for soldiers lost in the battle of Grozny during part of the fighting, estimated the number of dead to 27,000. At the same time the Federal Migration Service put the number of displaced persons at 268,000. The official Russian figures for soldiers lost in the battle of Grozny was 1,376 killed and 408 missing. The actual figure could very well be higher. The Chechen losses are not known.

After the fall of Grozny the war turned to the lowlands and other cities and towns. That part of the war is outside the topic of this article. However, Russian control of Grozny was far from complete. Violent episodes continued, particularly at night. The pro-Russian governments – first under Salambek Khadiyev and later under Doku Zavgayev – lived almost under siege in Grozny. The Zavgayev government had – during later Chechen attacks - to take refuge at the Russian headquarters at the Khankala air base, which gave him the nickname: “Doku Aeroportovich”.

5. Retaking Grozny

During the early months of 1966 the Russian forces - under the programme called “peace and concord” - conducted a very violent campaign against Chechen towns and villages trying to shell them into submission and – often – payments to the local Russian commanders.

Then on March 6 between 1,500 and 2,000 Chechen fighters who had infiltrated into Grozny, launched an attack. Some of the fighters just arrived on the morning train from Gudermes dressed up as militiamen. Several members of Zavgayev’s militia joined them. The fighters gained control over a considerable part of the city – some sources say one-third, other three-quarters. That, however, is not important.

The aim was not to conquer and hold the city, but to demonstrate that neither Zavgayev nor the Russians were in control. It took the Russians two days to assemble the necessary air borne troops, tanks and artillery to initiate a counter-offensive. On the third day the Chechen fighters withdrew carrying with them a number of captured weapons. The Chechen fighters simply “melted away” after having proved their political point.

“This sustained attack on Grozny from several directions with that size of forces has brought about a new dimension in the Russian-Chechen conflict” wrote the OSCE Assistance Group in Grozny in its situation report.
The action humiliated the Russian forces and Zavyagin’s government. It was probably no coincidence that the attack took place shortly after Defence Minister Grachev had been on an inspection in Grozny and immediately before a scheduled meeting in the Russian Security Council to discuss the situation in Chechnya.

Together with President Yeltsin’s problematic standing in the public opinion surveys, here only three months before the presidential elections, the Chechen storm on Grozny undoubtedly influenced Yeltsin’s decision to launch a so-called peace initiative on March 31. It led to a more or less rigorously observed cease-fire in the run-up to the election. The Russian, however, took up fighting again as soon as Yeltsin’s re-election was secured.

But then on August 6 1996, three days before Yeltsin were to be inaugurated for his second term as president; the Chechens launched a new attack on Grozny. Again more than 1.500 Chechen fighters – lead by Shamil Basayev - moved in by trucks and cars in a carefully orchestrated assault. Some took up positions on the approaching roads, guarding against Russian counter-attacks, while more fighters worked their way on foot towards the centre of the city.

Within hours they had overrun the key districts, laying siege to the Russian posts and base and advancing on the government compound in the centre, in spite of the fact, that the Russians had about 12.000 troops in and around Grozny. Russian troops in Argun and Gudermes were also surrounded in their garrisons. To a Moscow radio station Maskhadov said: “The actions in Grozny have a single aim - to show that the war in Chechnya is not over yet”.

The immediate Russian reaction was to fire from tanks and mortars outside the centre of the city and from helicopters hovering over it on buildings where the Chechens were thought to take cover. Chechen fire brought down four helicopters. It was not before the morning of the second day that the Russian commander organised a column of tanks and APCs to move into the city in an attempt to rescue the Russian units which were trapped by the Chechens. Another column was sent in the following day. But as had been the case during the New Year’s offensive 19 months before, they ran into ambushes and the Chechens blew up many tanks and APCs.

On the fifth day 900 men of the 276th regiment tried to take the centre of the city. In two days they lost 150 dead and 300 wounded. It looked as if the Russians had learned nothing.

The following day, Aleksandr Lebed, secretary of the Russian Security Council, flew to Dagestan and drove into Chechnya where he met Maskhadov. Their talks lead to a cease-fire, and further talks to the Khasavyurt Agreement, which ended the war and lead to a total withdrawal of the Russian troops from Chechnya. On January 27, 1997 Maskhadov was elected president of Chechnya in an election which the OSCE declared to be “free and fair”.

It is that election as well as the Khasavyurt Agreement Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin recently has declared illegal.
6. Explanations

In spite of overwhelming superiority in men and material, it took the Russians almost three months to gain military control over Grozny - a city, a little smaller than Tallinn - and the degree of Russian control was not, as has been shown, all that definitive.

The central question to ask is thus: Why did the armed forces of the former superpower have such great difficulties with conquering Grozny? That question is, of course, part of the larger question: Why did Russia lose the 1994-96 war against Chechnya?

Explaining Russian failures one could start with a quote from Leo Trotsky: “The Army is a mirror of society and suffers form all its ills – usually at higher temperatures”. Explanations for Russia’s failures in Chechnya have to be found at all levels from the political decision-making in the Kremlin via military planning to the lack of motivation and moral among the troops.

The decision to start the military campaign was taken hastily, without the necessary analysis and planning. President Yeltsin and a small group of “power ministers” and advisers took it. Likewise, the decision to storm Grozny on New Year’s Night 1994 was taken by the same political leadership in spite of the fact that the army wanted another two weeks to prepare for the attack.

The military leadership was divided. Many officers were opposed to the war – including Boris Gromov, Deputy Minister of Defence, and Aleksandr Lebed. Less publicly even the Chief of the General Staff, Mikhail Kolyesnikov, was sceptical. The Commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Colonel General Aleksey Mityukin, and the second in command of the land forces, Colonel General Eduard Vorobev, refused to take command of the Chechen Campaign.

Yeltsin signed the new Russian military doctrine in early November 1993. According to the doctrine the most immediate danger of war came from “social, territorial, religious, national-ethnic and other conflicts”. However, the military doctrine gave no specific guidelines for how this threat should influence Russian military planning and training. There was much talk about the need for military reform, but almost nothing was done in practice.

Many problems of the Russian armed forces were due to the increasing mismatch between structure and economy. Thus the equipment was not maintained, training and exercises not conducted and officers and men not paid on time. During the initial march towards Grozny 2 out of every 10 tanks could not keep up with their columns due to mechanical failure. Helicopters could not navigate in bad weather due to obsolete navigation instruments. Since 1992 there had been no exercises at division level. Many pilots had only had 20 to 30 flying-hours per year. And so on.

Manpower was another crippling problem. There were not enough conscripts to fill the units. Younger age cohorts and increased possibility for avoiding military service as well as plain desertion meant...
that most units were undermanned – some were only cadre units. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies no combat units were above 75 per cent of their nominal strength. About 70 divisions were on less than 50 per cent of their nominal strength.¹⁴

This meant that the units to be used in Chechnya had to be composed by combining parts of different units. Thus many units were sent into battle without ever having trained together. Furthermore, many of the privates were recruits, who had not yet finished their basic military education. Some did not even know how to handle their personal weapon.

All these problems meant that co-ordination between the Russian troops in Chechnya was extremely poor. This was the case not only in relations between army, air force and MVD-troops in general; it was also the case in relations between single units in the field.

The troops had been told that they were in Chechnya in order to “disarm illegal armed formations” and “re-establish constitutional order”. They did not, however, have clear “rules of engagement” in the sense that this term is used in the West. Many officers and soldiers simply thought that they had come to liberate the population from an oppressive dictatorship. The resistance they met, not only from Dudaev’s forces but from civilians as well, thus surprised them. As one Russian general put it: “Everyone from the generals to the privates were psychologically, organisational and tactically unprepared for battle on their own territory and against an enemy of unclear identity”.²⁵

One of the most damaging Russian problems was lack of intelligence (in the sense of militarily relevant information!). The Russian leaders had no understanding of Chechen society. They had no understanding of the popular support for Chechen independence. They did not understand that as soon as Russian troops crossed into the republic the majority of Chechens would put their internal disagreements aside and fight under Dudaev as their symbol of national independence. At the operational and tactical levels intelligence was just as bad. That was often due to the most banal problems, such as for example lack of maps of the area of operations.²⁶

Again and again the Russians were taken by surprise. Just to give an example: The second-in-command of the 131ⁿ Motorises Infantry Brigade has told that the security service (FSK) informed him, that it did not expect strong opposition during the New Year offensive in Grozny.²⁷

The timing of the operation was also bad. The weather was cold in Chechnya in the December-February period and often overcasts made the effective use of helicopters and close air support planes difficult. More fundamentally, however, it was an asymmetrical war between regular and irregular forces. But the Russian planning had not taken sufficiently account of that. Later in the war, the southern mountains served as bases for the Chechen fighters in the same way as they had done for Imam Shamil during the Russian conquest in the 19ᵗʰ century. The guerrilla war outside Grozny, in the lowlands, in the foothills and in the mountains is, however, outside the scope of this article.
When looking at the battles of Grozny in particular, the Russians made many fundamental errors. To what extent this was due to political pressure for a quick solution, a catastrophic underestimation of the opponent or sheer military incompetence is difficult to say. But it is surprising when considering that there probably is no army in the world, which has as much experiences in urban combat as the Russian army.

According to Russian doctrine there are two ways how to take a city: If it is only weakly defended it can be taken by surprise through a quick entry and occupation of strategic positions. If, on the other hand, it is heavily defended, a much more systematic approach is required. Then the conquering forces have to be organised in storm groups and storm detachments and the ground troops are only to be brought into action in close co-ordination with artillery and air bombardment.

It the New Year attempt to take Grozny, the Russian commanders were either under the misperception that it was only a weakly defended city and that it could be taken by surprise or – as seems most likely – under strong political pressure to move before they were ready.

Particularly about the New Year’s offensive in Grozny one must emphasise the following failures:

- poor tactical intelligence;
- great problems of command, communication and control which lead to lack of co-ordination between the units;
- no infantry cover for the tanks moving into the city or, when such cover existed, it got separated from the tanks;
- lack of combat engineers to break through Chechen barricades;
- troops without prior training in urban combat.

It was only after the catastrophic failure of the New Year offensive, that the Russians switched to the other approach. But even so, they had great difficulties. This was partly due to the fact, that most of the troops had no training for this type of combat.

Irrespective of all the other factors mentioned, the crucial factors, however, were moral, motivation and discipline. That was what made the determining difference between the Russian and the Chechen forces.

Turning to Chechen successes, they are, of course, in many cases just the other side of the coin. The main strength of the Chechen fighters was their high moral and motivation. Contrary to the Russian soldiers, the Chechens knew why they were fighting and what they were fighting for. And that – combined with fearlessness and a pre-modern concept of honour – was undoubtedly their greatest asset.

Other Chechen advantages are also the opposite side of the coin of Russian weaknesses. The popular support, the terrain and the intimate knowledge of the local geography were crucial factors. The Chechens fought a guerrilla war where the fighters could – to borrow a phrase from Mao Zedong – swim like fish in the sea of the population. The Chechens throughout the war exploited the fact that the Russians had great difficulties in differentiating between Dudayev’s fighters and non-combatants. Areas, which the Russians
claimed to have conquered, were soon to be re-infiltrated by Chechen fighters.

The Chechens also knew their Russian enemy from many years of experience. President Dudayev had been a Soviet air force general, and Aslan Maskhadov had been a colonel in the Soviet artillery. Many Chechen fighters had got their military education as conscripts in the Soviet Army.

Where both strategic and tactical intelligence was a problem for the Russian forces, the Chechens often seemed to have perfect tactical intelligence. In many cases the Chechens were also able to listen in on Russian communications and occasionally also sending false orders to the Russians. In several instances this interfered in the communication between Russian units and for example in communication between forward air controllers and pilots.

7. A New Russian-Chechen War

At the time of writing a new Russian-Chechen War is being fought and a new and very different battle of Grozny is ranging. The Russian political and military leadership clearly wants revenge for the humiliating defeat in the 1994-96 war. And they clearly want to avoid a repetition of the failures of the earlier attempt to take Grozny, but the exact nature of their plans has not yet been revealed.

The Russians have brought far more troops to the area than during the earlier war. The estimates say about 100,000. That is four times as many as when they intervened in December 1994 and almost twice as many as when the Russian troop strength, in the spring of 1995, reached its peak in the earlier war. In the initial phase they took control over the lowlands north of the Terek River. From there they gradually moved in on Grozny while heavy bombings by airplanes, helicopters and artillery was brought to bear not only on Grozny but on a large number of towns and villages, claimed to be harbouring “international terrorists”.

It seems as if Grozny is to be completely destroyed and the defenders worn down before Russian troops will move in. Russian Defence Minister, Igor Sergeyev, has stated that he expects to take Grozny by the middle of December, i.e. after six to seven weeks of continuous bombardment. Other Russian officers have said that Grozny should not be rebuilt after the war, thus indicating a wish to see the city completely destroyed.

However, according to official Russian figures, by mid November there were still 5000 Chechen fighters left in Grozny, and even if the city is reduced to rubble, it is far from certain that the Russians will be able to gain full control of it. The only certain conclusions which can be drawn at this time is, that the second Russian-Chechen war in the 1990s will be extremely costly in lives as well as in materiel resources, and that the Russian-Chechen conflict will not be solved by military means. On the contrary, the new war will only further embitter and prolong the conflict.

1 Lecture at Baltic Defence College, November 1st, 1999
5 Interview with Usman Fersauli, July 1996.
8 Fersauli, op. cit.
12 Ibid.; Felgenhauer, op. cit.
13 Fersauli, op. cit.
17 Gall and de Wall, op. cit., p. 337.
18 “Situation Report, Friday March 8, 12:00”. Telefax from OSCE AG to CiO, March 8, 1996.
19 Gall and de Wall, op. cit., pp. 331-334.
20 Ibid.
22 Krasnaja svesda, 19 November 1993.
27 Celestan, op. cit., p. 9.
29 Ibid.; Finch, op. cit.; For an official Russian military explanation, see Colonel General A. Kvasjin in Krasnaja svesda, 2 March 1995.
On October 9, 1999 Krasnaya Zvezda published a draft of a new Russian Military Doctrine.

The draft was submitted from the Ministry of Defence to the Security Council who in turn have forwarded it to the Duma for consideration.

The aim with the article is not to provide an in-depth analysis of the draft provisional doctrine but to start a much needed debate on the current changes in the Russian security concepts and strategies. The article will first of all bring a translation of the draft as it appeared in Krasnaya Zvezda from October 9, 1999. Secondly it will provide some comments and observations on the new doctrine. The Baltic Defence Review hopes to see a broad debate not least in the Baltic States on the matter and invites contributions in the form of articles or comments.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation

Introduction

The military doctrine of the Russian Federation represents a systemised aggregate of fundamental official views concentrated in a single document, on preventing wars and armed conflicts, on the nature and methods of waging them, and on organising the activities of the state, society and citizens to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies. The military doctrine is a document made in a period of transition, of establishing democratic state institutions and of a multi-structured economy, of reorganisation of the Russian Federation military organisation, and of a dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. The provisions of the military doctrine are a component part of the set of regulatory legal, conceptual and political programme documents regulating and organising military security activities. The provisions are binding on all bodies of executive authority and management, enterprises, establishments and organisations to which Russian Federation legislation has assigned responsibility, within the scope of their obligations and powers, for organising...
and accomplishing military organisational development and performing missions of defence and security of the Russian Federation and its allies. The military doctrine builds on the 1993 “Basic Provisions of the Russian Federation Military doctrine” and, as applied to the military sphere, specifies the guidelines of the Russian Federation National Security Concept. It is based on a comprehensive assessment of the status of the military-political situation, on a strategic forecast of its development, on a scientifically substantiated determination of current and future missions, objective requirements and real capabilities to ensure the Russian Federation’s military security. It is further based on conclusions from a systemic analysis of the content and nature of modern wars and armed conflicts and of the domestic and foreign experience of military organisational development.

The Russian Federation military doctrine is strictly defensive, which is predestined by integrally combining in its content a consistent adherence to peace with firm resolve to defend national interests and guarantee the military security of the Russian Federation and that of its allies. The structure of the military doctrine includes three interrelated parts:

Military-political principles, military-strategic principles and military-economic principles of the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

The military-political principles are determined with respect of other parts of the military doctrine. The legal basis of the military doctrine consists of the Russian Federation Constitution, federal laws and other regulatory legal instruments of the Russian Federation, as well as the Russian Federation’s international obligations in military security. The military doctrine is to be implemented by unified, centralised state and military management and by co-ordinated activities, within the scope of their competence, of all branches and bodies of state authority, public associations and citizens for accomplishing a variety of political-diplomatic, economic, social, information, legal, military and other measures aimed at securing the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

1. Military-political principles

The Military-political Situation

1.1. The status and dynamic prospects of the present military-political situation are determined by two contradictory trends. On the one hand, a trend towards establishing a unipolar world based on the domination of one superpower and on the use of military force to resolve key problems of world policy. And on the other hand, a trend towards forming a multipolar world based on the equal rights of peoples and nations, on consideration for and assurance of a balance of the national interests of states, and on implementation of fundamental rules of international law. The Russian Federation proceeds from the assumption that social progress, stability and international security can be secured only within the framework of a multipolar world, and it will contribute to its formation in every way possible.
1.2. Basic features of the military-political situation are:
• still lower threats of initiation of a world war, including a nuclear war;
• devising instruments for maintaining international peace and security on a global and regional level;
• strengthening of regional centres of power;
• national-ethnic and religious extremism;
• separatism;
• local wars and armed conflicts;
• a regional arms race;
• nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems;
• information war;
• a widening in scale and deepening of the transnational nature of organised crime, terrorism, and the illegal weapons and drugs trade.

1.3. Basic destabilising factors of the military-political situation:
• extremist national-ethnic, religious separatist, and terrorist movements, organisations and structures;
• the use of information technology and other (including non-traditional) means and technologies for achieving destructive military-political goals;
• a decreasing effectiveness of the existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and OSCE;
• practice of applying military force in circumvention of generally recognized principles and rules of international law without UN Security Council sanction;
• destruction of the system of international treaties and agreements in the arms limitation and disarmament area.

Basic Threats to Military Security

1.4. Under present conditions the threat of direct military aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies in traditional forms is being averted by following an active foreign-policy course and by maintaining a sufficient level of Russian military potential, including the potential of nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, a number of potential (including large-scale) external and internal threats to the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies remain and are strengthening in a number of directions.

1.5. Basic external threats:
• territorial claims on the Russian Federation;
• intrusion into Russian Federation internal affairs;
• attempts to ignore (or infringe on) Russian Federation interests in resolving international security problems and to oppose strengthening of the Russian Federation as one of the influential centres of a multipolar world;
• centres of armed conflicts, above all near borders of the Russian Federation and its allies;
• creation (build-up) of groupings of troops (forces) leading to a disturbance of the existing balance of forces near borders of the Russian Federation and of its allies and in seas adjoining their territory;
• expansion of military blocks and alliances to the detriment of military security of the Russian Federation and its allies;
• introduction of foreign troops (without UN Security Council sanction) to the territory of contiguous states friendly to the Russian Federation;
  • establishment, equipment, support and training of armed units and groups on the territory of other states with the goal of redeploying them for operations on the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies;
  • armed provocations against Russian Federation military installations located on the territory of foreign states as well as against installations and structures on the Russian Federation State Border and on the borders of its allies;
  • actions aimed at undermining global and regional stability, including hindering the operation of Russian state and military command and control systems, systems supporting the functioning and combat stability of strategic nuclear forces, and missile attack warning, ABM defence, and space surveillance systems, as well as hindering the operation of nuclear munitions storage facilities, installations of atomic power engineering and of the atomic and chemical industry, and other potentially dangerous installations;
  • information-technical, information-psychological, etc. operations hostile toward the Russian Federation and its allies;
  • discrimination against and suppression of rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian Federation citizens in foreign states;
  • international terrorism.

1.6. Basic internal threats:
  • attempts to violently overthrow of the constitutional system;
  • unlawful activities of extremist national-ethnic, religious separatist and terrorist movements, organisations and structures aimed at disrupting state unity and territorial integrity and at destabilising the internal situation in the Russian Federation;
  • preparation and accomplishment of actions to disrupt and disorganise the functioning of the bodies of state authority and management, and of attacks on state, national economic, military, life support and information infrastructure installations;
  • equipping, training and functioning of unlawful armed units;
  • illegal proliferation (circulation) on Russian Federation territory of weapons, ammunition, explosives and other means which can be used for carrying out sabotage, terrorist acts, and other unlawful actions;
  • organised crime, terrorism, smuggling and other unlawful activity on a scale threatening Russian Federation military security.

**Ensuring Military Security**

1.7. Ensuring the Russian Federation’s military security is a most important direction of state activity.

The main purpose of ensuring military security is to create favourable external conditions for the existence and progress of the Russian Federation and to prevent military aggression by maintaining the state’s military might at a level guaranteeing an adequate response to existing and potential military threats to the
national interests and security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

The Russian Federation views assurance of its military security within the context of building a democratic state governed by law; carrying out socio-economic reforms; affirming the principles of equitable partnership, mutual advantage and good-neighbourliness in international relations; consistently forming a general, comprehensive system of international security; and preserving and strengthening universal peace.

The Russian Federation:

• is committed to the immutability of the system of generally recognised principles and rules of international law and steadfastly follows provisions of the UN Charter, the 1975 and 1992 Helsinki Agreements, the 1990 Paris Charter, and other international treaties and agreements to which it is a party;

• will not be the first to begin military operations against a state (or a group or coalition of states) if it (or its allies) are not subjected to armed aggression;

• secures its nuclear power status for deterring (preventing) aggression against it or its allies;

• gives priority importance to strengthening the collective security system within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States based on the development and strengthening of the Collective Security Treaty;

• regards as partners all states whose policy is not detrimental to its national interests and security and does not contradict the UN Charter;

• gives preference to political-diplomatic and other non-military means of preventing, containing and neutralising military threats within the framework of systems of general and comprehensive collective security at regional levels and at a global level;

• complies with existing treaties in arms limitation, reduction and elimination area and assists in implementing them and ensuring the regime specified by them;

• fulfils its interrelated obligations on strategic offensive arms and ABM defence and, on a bilateral basis with the United States and on a multilateral basis with other nuclear states, is prepared for a further reduction of its nuclear weapons to minimal levels meeting requirements of strategic stability and preservation of the balance of strategic arms as a guarantee against a return to a global confrontation of force and to the arms race, on condition of the adherence to these goals of other states as well, above all the United States, and of the preservation and strengthening of the 1972 ABM Treaty:

• acts to make the non-proliferation regime universal, for a halt and comprehensive ban on tests and, as the ultimate goal in the future, for the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

• supports every possible expansion of military confidence-building measures, including a mutual exchange of military information and the co-ordination of military doctrines, military organisational development plans and measures, and military activities.

1.8. The Russian Federation’s military security is ensured by the sum total of forces, means and resources at its disposal.

1.9. Basic principles for ensuring military security:
• combination of firm, centralised leadership of the state’s military organisation with civilian control over its activities;
  • efficiency in forecasting and timely discovering and classifying military threats, and adequacy of the response to them;
  • rational use of forces, means and resources necessary for ensuring military security;
  • conformity of the level of readiness, training and support of the state’s military organisation to military security needs;
  • no causing of detriment to international security and to the national security of other countries.

1. 10. Basic tasks for ensuring military security:
   a) In peacetime:
  • making and implementing a unified state policy for military security;
  • establishing and upgrading a system of defence of the Russian Federation and its allies;
  • ensuring security and protection of Russian Federation citizens;
  • creating favourable foreign policy conditions;
  • establishing, maintaining and strengthening friendly, good-neighbour, partner (allied) relations with neighbouring and other states;
  • preventing (deterring, including through nuclear deterrence) aggression or the threat of aggression on any scale against the Russian Federation and its allies by any state or group of states;
  • securing (if necessary) Russian Federation political actions by taking appropriate military measures and achieving a naval presence;
  • ensuring foreign states’ fulfilment of their arms-limitation obligations in the area of arms limitation, preservation and elimination and of strengthening confidence building measures;
  • thorough supporting and qualitatively improving the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other components of the state military organisation, and maintaining their readiness for co-ordinated actions to prevent, repel and stop external and internal threats;
  • improving the economic, technological and defence-industrial base; increasing the mobilisation readiness of the economy;
  • organising preparation of bodies of state authority and management, enterprises, establishments, organisations, and the population of the country to perform tasks of ensuring military security and conducting territorial and civil defence;
  • supporting internal political stability and protecting the constitutional system and the integrity and inviolability of Russian Federation territory;
  • defending Russian Federation installations and structures in the world seas, in outer space and on the territory of foreign states, and shipping, fishing and other forms of activity in the contiguous sea zone and distant areas of the World Ocean;
  • securing and defending the Russian Federation State Border, within limits of border territory, airspace and below the water surface, and the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and their natural resources;
  • developing the necessary military infrastructure;
• organising and accomplishing society’s active support of measures for ensuring military security;
• ensuring the readiness for participation and participating in peacekeeping activities,
b) during a time of threat and at the beginning of war (armed conflict):
• timely declaration of a state of war; introducing martial law or a state of emergency in the country or in individual areas; conducting full or partial strategic deployment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities (or a portion of them); and placing them in readiness to perform missions;
• suspension of the fulfilment of Russian Federation obligations to comply with international treaties on arms limitation, reduction and elimination;
• co-ordination of actions of bodies of state authority and management, institutions of local government, public organisations and citizens to repel and stop aggression and to achieve the goals of war (or armed conflict);

• organising and conducting armed, political-diplomatic, information, economic and other kinds of warfare on a co-ordinated basis;
• putting in force regulatory legal instruments of wartime; adopting and implementing decisions for preparing and conducting military operations;
• transfer of the economy of the country or of its individual sectors or organisations, and transportation and lines of communication onto a war footing;
• organising and accomplishing territorial and civil defence measures;
• securing assistance to Russian Federation allies and mobilising their capacities for achieving joint goals in war (or armed conflict);
• preventing the involvement of other states in the war (or armed conflict) on the side of the aggressor;
• using the capabilities of the United Nations and other international organisations to compel an aggressor to terminate a war (or armed conflict) at the earliest possible stage and to restore international stability, security and peace.

1.11. The qualitative improvement in the means, forms and methods of warfare, the increase in their geographical scope and seriousness of its consequences, extension into new areas of activity, and the possibility of achieving military-political goals by indirect, non-contact actions predetermine the special danger of modern wars to peoples and states and to international stability in the world, and make it vital to take exhaustive steps for their prevention and for peaceful settlement of contradictions at early stages of their appearance and development.

**Leadership in Ensuring Military Security**

1.12. Activity to ensure the Russian Federation’s military security is headed by the president of the Russian Federation/Supreme Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces,

1.13. The Russian Federation government directs the activity of subordinate federal executive authorities for ensuring
1.14. Other federal bodies of state authority as well as bodies of state authority of Russian Federation components and institutions of local government, within the scope of their rights, duties and powers specified by Russian Federation federal legislation, organise and bear local responsibility for the fulfilment of missions assigned to them for ensuring military security. Enterprises, establishments, organisations, public associations and citizens of the Russian Federation participate in ensuring military security.

1.15. Command and control of the Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities of the Russian Federation is exercised by the heads of corresponding federal executive authorities.

1.16. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defence co-ordinates the activity of federal executive authorities in matters of defence, the development of the concepts of organisational development and evolution of components of the state military organisation, and orders for arms and military equipment for them; and it develops a federal state programme of armaments and of the development of military equipment, as well as proposals for the state defence procurements.

1.17. The Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff is the basic entity for operational command and control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces; it coordinates the development of plans for organisational development and employment of components of the state military organisation and their operational and mobilisation training; it organises and accomplishes strategic planning for employment of the Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities, operational preparation of Russian Federation territory in the interests of defence, and co-ordination in fulfilling tasks of ensuring military security.

1.18. Headquarters of military districts (operational-strategic commands) exercise command and control of cross-service groupings of general-purpose troops (forces) as well as of other troops, military units and entities within their areas of responsibility and with consideration of a unified system of military-administrative division of Russian Federation territory.

1.19. Appropriate unified military command and control entities are established for command and control of coalition groupings of troops (forces) by a co-ordinated decision of supreme bodies of state authority of coalition member countries.

1.20. For centralised leadership in ensuring the Russian Federation’s military security, it is necessary to have a unified strategic and operational planning of the organisational development and employment of the Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities in the interests
of defence, as well as planning which envisages the development of long-term (10-15 years), medium-term (4-5 years) and short-term (1-2 years) documents based on a specific programme approach.

1.21. The procedures for organising leadership of the activities to ensure the country’s military security in a special period, and the creation and functioning of wartime bodies of state and military command and control are regulated by appropriate legislative and other regulatory legal instruments of the Russian Federation.

1.22. The Russian Federation establishes a state military organisation to ensure its military security. The state military organisation includes the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities which, in accordance with the Russian Federation Constitution, federal laws and other regulatory legal instruments of the Russian Federation, are intended for performing missions to ensure military security by military means and methods, and it also includes structures for command and control of them.

1.23. The Russian Federation Armed Forces are the nucleus of the state military organisation and the foundation for ensuring military security.

1.24. The Russian Federation Armed Forces are equipped with nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons to be an effective factor of deterrence against aggression, a factor ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, and a factor of maintaining international stability and peace. The Russian Federation proceeds from the need to possess a nuclear deterrent capable of ensuring beyond doubt, infliction of intended damage on any aggressor state or coalition of states under any conditions. The Russian Federation will not employ nuclear weapons against states parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that do not possess nuclear weapons, except in case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its Armed Forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state with which it has a security obligation, carried out or supported by a state that does not possess nuclear weapons together with or in the presence of allied obligations with a state possessing nuclear weapons.

The Russian Federation retains for itself the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction against it and its allies, and in response to wide-scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

Organisational Development and Training of the State Military Organisation

1.25. The main goal of organisational development and training of the state military organisation is to ensure guaranteed defence of the national interests
1.26. Basic principles of organisational development and training of the state military organisation:

- adequately drawing conclusions from analysis of present and forecast of future military-political trends;
- centralising of command and control;
- carrying out command on a legal basis only;
- correspondence between the level of combat and mobilisation readiness and training of military command and control entities and of troops (forces), of their structure, order of battle and numerical strength of the trained reserve, and of stockpiles of material and resources to missions of ensuring military security;
- unity of training and education;
- implementation of general civic political rights and rights of freedom and assurance of servicemen’s social status and standard of living. Organisational development and training of components of the state military organisation - the Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities - are accomplished in accordance with legal instruments regulating their activity and under co-ordinated and agreed programmes and plans.

1.27. The main programmes of organisational development and training of the state military organisation:

- preparation and improvement of a unified system of command and control of the military organisation;
- development and improvement of troops (forces) ensuring strategic deterrence (including nuclear);
- bringing up to strength, equipping, comprehensively supporting and training of permanent-combat-readiness formations and units of general-purpose forces for performing deterrence missions and conducting combat operations in local wars and armed conflicts.

1.28. The main directions of organisational development and training of the state military organisation:

- determining scope and content of missions of the state military organisation and bringing the structure, composition and numerical strength of its components into line with the real needs for ensuring military security;
- accomplishing and improving the qualitative level and effectiveness of the system of state and military command and control;
- accomplishing military-economic support;
- accomplishing strategic planning;
- improving the effectiveness of systems for personnel training, military education, operational and combat training, servicemen’s education, all kinds of support, and military science;
- accomplishing the system of manning (based on a composite contract-draft principle, with a consistent increase in the proportion of servicemen performing contract military service as necessary socio-economic conditions are created);
- improving the effectiveness of the system for maintaining and repairing arms and military equipment;
• strengthening orderlines, law and order, and military discipline;
• implementing an active state policy for strengthening the prestige of military service and preparing citizens for it;
• developing international military (military-political) and military-technical co-operation;
• accomplishing the regulatory legal base of organisational development, evolution and employment of the military organisation and its legal relations with civilian society and the state.

1.29. Radical changes in the military-political situation, in the content of missions, and in conditions for ensuring military security of the Russian Federation determine the basic content of comprehensive military reform - a component part and a priority mission of the present stage of military organisational development. An interrelated, co-ordinated reform of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other components of the state military organisation is carried out within the scope of military reform.

2. Military-strategic principles

2.1. The Russian Federation maintains readiness to wage wars and armed conflicts exclusively to prevent, repel and stop aggression; to protect independence, sovereignty, state and territorial integrity; and to ensure military security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

2.2. The nature of modern wars is determined by their military-political goals, the means of achieving these goals, and the scale of military operations. In accordance with this, a modern war can be as follows:

• pursuing military-political goals - just (for the side subjected to aggression); unjust (for the side which undertook aggression);
• in terms of the means used - nuclear (with use of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction); conventional (with use only of conventional weapons);
• in terms of scale - local; regional; global.

2.3. Basic general features of modern war:

• inflicts on all spheres of mankind’s vital activities and existence;
• wide use of indirect strategic operations (political-diplomatic efforts to prevent wars and aimed conflicts);
• economic sanctions; means of information warfare; sea, air and land blockade of communications routes; show of force etc.);
• massive information preparation (information blockade, expansion, aggression) and the confusion of public opinion of certain states and of the world community as a whole;
• disorganisation of the system of state and military command and control;
• blocking (disabling) of command and control and fire control systems;
• use of non-contact and other forms and methods of operations (including
non-traditional), and of long-range fire and electronic engagement;

- employment of the newest highly effective systems of arms and military equipment (including those based on new physical principles);
- catastrophic consequences of damage (destruction) to power engineering enterprises (above all atomic), of chemical and other dangerous industries, of the infrastructure, of lines of communication and of life support facilities;
- high probability of the involvement of new states, of the escalation of warfare, and of an expansion in the scale and spectrum of means being used;
- participation of irregular (including unlawful) armed units along with regular ones.

2.4. A world war can result from an escalation of an armed conflict or of a local or regional war, and from the involvement in them of a considerable number (or the majority) of states from different regions of the world. A conventional world war will be characterised by a high probability of escalating into a nuclear war with the inevitable mass victims and destruction and with disastrous consequences for civilization and for the foundations of mankind’s vital activities and existence. In a world war, nuclear as well as conventional, the sides will set radical military-political goals. It will require total mobilisation of all material and mental resources of the states involved. The Russian Federation consistently and firmly strives to achieve the creation of an effective system of political-legal, organisational-technical and other international safeguards for preventing a new world war in any of its forms.

2.5. A regional war can be waged with the participation of two or more states (groups of states) of a region by national or coalition armed forces using conventional as well as nuclear weapons. A regional war can result from an escalation of a local war or armed conflict or it may be preceded by a period of threat. Military operations in a conventional regional war can be characterised by:

- decisiveness in the parties’ operational-strategic goals;
- conduct of armed operations in all spheres;
- actions of groupings in a coalition makeup;
- massive use of variously based precision weapons and of means of electronic warfare and other modern kinds of warfare;
- defeat of troops (forces), rear and economic installations, and lines of communication throughout the territory of opposing sides;
- execution of air operation, during which strategic missions will be executed capable of determining the course and outcome of the war.

A conventional regional war, if nuclear states or their allies participate in it, will be characterised by the constant threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In a regional war the sides will pursue important military-political goals. It will require total strategic deployment of the armed forces and the economy and a high exertion of mental forces of the main states involved.

2.6. The goals of a world (regional) war can be achieved, and their outcome pre-
determined, within the scope of the initial period.

The basic content of the initial period of war will be an intensive armed struggle with the goal of repelling (or stopping) aggression, and also a struggle to seize the strategic initiative, to preserve stable state and military command and control, to achieve superiority in the information sphere, and to win (maintain) air superiority.

2.7. A conventional world (regional) war can be protracted. In this case its goals will be achieved in subsequent and concluding periods.

2.8. A local war can be waged by a grouping of troops (forces) deployed in the conflict area, reinforced if necessary by the redeployment of troops, forces and assets from other axes and by a partial strategic deployment. In a local war the sides will pursue limited military-political goals.

2.9. A local war is characterised by:
• the parties’ limited forces and assets;
• operations within the boundaries of opposing states;
• diverse combat operations;
• strong information opposition.

2.10. An armed conflict can result from attempts to resolve national-ethnic, religious and other non-vital contradictions using means of warfare, as a rule without carrying out a strategic deployment.

An armed conflict can arise in the forms of an armed incident, armed action, and other armed clashes on a limited scale. A border conflict is a special form of armed conflict. An armed conflict can be international (with the participation of two or more states) or non-international and internal (with the conduct of armed opposition within the boundaries of one state’s territory).

In an armed conflict the parties pursue local military-political goals.

2.11. An armed conflict is characterised by:
• a high degree of involvement and vulnerability of the local population;
• wide use of irregular units;
• wide use of sabotage and terrorist actions;
• blocking and disruption of lines of communication;
• deterioration of morale and the psychological atmosphere among troops;
• diversion of considerable forces and assets to ensure security of movement routes and of disposition areas and locations of troops (forces);
• risk of escalation into a local war (international armed conflict) or civil war (internal armed conflict).

Provisional unified groupings of troops (forces) from different departments and entities for command and control of them may be established for performing missions in an internal armed conflict.

Principles of Employing the Armed Forces and Other Troops

2.12. The Russian Federation considers legitimate the use of the Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities (of the Armed Forces and other troops) and of all components of the state’s military organisation, and the use of all forces and assets at its disposal, including nuclear (with consideration of the nature
and scale of the military threat) to repel and stop aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. The Armed Forces and other troops can also be employed for containing and neutralising anti-constitutional actions and unlawful armed violence that threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity and state unity of the Russian Federation, and for performing missions in conducting peacekeeping operations in accordance with UN Security Council decisions and international obligations of the Russian Federation.

2.13. The Armed Forces and other troops are employed within the framework of unified strategic planning.

2.14. The goal of employing the Armed Forces and other troops is as follows:

- in a conventional world war (regional), in case of its escalating into a wider interstate war (groupings, coalitions) – to protect the independence and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies, repulse and stop aggression, defeat the aggressor and to force him to cease military operations on conditions favourable to the Russian Federation and its allies;
- in a nuclear war, if the aggressor has not been successfully held back and if preventing an escalation from a conventional or regional war has been unsuccessful - to guarantee the fulfilment of the task to inflict losses on the enemy in all circumstances;
- in a local war and armed conflicts - to localise the centre of the actions, to neutralise the aggressor at the earliest possible stage, to prevent an escalation of the military operations, to establish the necessary preconditions for stopping the war and to regulate the conflict on conditions corresponding to the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies;
- in internal armed conflicts – to defeat and eliminate unlawful armed units and bandit or terrorist groups and organisations, restore law and order, ensure public safety and stability, provide necessary assistance to the population and create conditions for a full-scale settlement based on the Russian Federation’s Constitution and Russian Federation legislation in force.

2.15. Basic forms of employing the Armed Forces and other troops:

- strategic operations, operations, and combat operations - in a world war and regional wars;
- operations and combat operations - in local wars and armed conflicts;
- peacekeeping operations.

2.16. The Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation must be ready to repel an attack, inflict damage on the aggressor, and conduct active operations, both defensive as well as offensive, with any variation of the initiation and conduct of wars and armed conflicts and under conditions of massive enemy use of modern and advanced weapons, including weapons of mass destruction in all their varieties.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces must be capable, with the peacetime order of battle, of ensuring reliable protection for the country against air attack, the performance, along with other troops, of missions to repel aggression in a local war (armed conflict), and the deployment of a grouping of troops (forces) for per-
performing missions in a regional war. At the same time, the Russian Federation Armed Forces must ensure the Russian Federation’s accomplishment of peacekeeping activities both independently as well as in the makeup of international organisations.

In the interests of ensuring national security, the Russian Federation may station limited military contingents (military bases) on a treaty basis in strategically important regions of the world to ensure the readiness to perform its obligations, assist in forming and maintaining a stable military-strategic balance of forces, and react adequately to the appearance of crisis situations in their initial stage.

**Missions of the Armed Forces and Other Troops**

2.17. Basic missions for ensuring military security;

- effective and strict direction of staffs and troops (forces);
- timely disclosure of a threatening development of the military-political situation and of the preparation of armed attack on the Russian Federation and its allies;
  - ensuring the composition, status, combat and mobilisation readiness, and training of strategic nuclear forces, of forces and assets supporting their functioning and employment, and of command and control systems at a level guaranteeing the infliction of intended damage on an aggressor under any conditions;
  - ensuring the combat potential, combat and mobilisation readiness and training of peacetime general-purpose groupings of troops (forces) at a level ensuring repulse of aggression on a local scale;
  - maintaining arms, military (special) equipment and supplies in readiness for combat use;
  - fulfilling the tasks of alert duty (combat patrol duty) missions by dedicated (assigned) troops, forces and assets;
  - full and quality fulfilment of plans and programs of operational, combat and mobilisation training and education of troops (forces);
- securing readiness for strategic deployment within the scope of state measures for transferring the country from peacetime to wartime footing;
  - protecting the State Border;
- establishing and maintaining the conditions for security of the economic activities of the Russian Federation in the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone as well as in distant areas of the World Ocean;
  - protecting important state installations;
  - preventing and stopping sabotage and terrorist acts;
  - warning and liquidating emergency situations and their consequences;
  - organising civil and territorial defence;
  - ensuring facility repair, security and defence and the restoration of lines of communication;
- ensuring information security.
2.18. Basic missions of repelling (stopping) armed attack (aggression) on the Russian Federation and its allies:

- partial or total strategic deployment;
- conducting strategic operations, operations and combat operations (including joint ones with allied states) to rout invaders and destroy groupings of aggressor troops (forces) that have been established (or are being established) in their base and concentration areas and on lines of communication;
- maintain readiness for employment and employ the potential of nuclear deterrence (in instances envisaged by military doctrine and according to prescribed procedure) neutralise armed border conflicts;
- localization and neutralization of armed border conflicts;
- support a regime of martial law (state of emergency);
- protect population and installations of the economy and infrastructure against the effect of enemy weapons;
- fulfil allied obligations.

The performance of missions to repel (stop) an armed attack (aggression) is organised and accomplished in accordance with the Plan for Employment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Russian Federation Armed Forces Mobilisation Plan, Russian Federation presidential edicts, orders and directives of the Supreme Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and other regulatory legal, planning and directive documents.

2.19. Basic missions in peacekeeping operations:

- separate armed groupings between the sides in conflict;
- ensure conditions for delivery of humanitarian aid to the civilian population and for its evacuation from the conflict zone;
- containment of the conflict area with the aim of ensuring fulfilment of sanctions adopted by the international community;
- establish preconditions for a political settlement.

Performance of missions in peacekeeping operations is assigned to the Russian Federation Armed Forces with the involvement of other troops, military units and entities if necessary, specially assigned formations and units are detailed to prepare for these missions. Along with training for employment for their immediate purpose, they train under a special programme, The Russian Federation provides logistic and technical support, training, preparation, planning and operational command and control of Russian contingents in accordance with standards and procedures of the United Nations, OSCE and CIS.

2.20. Basic missions in internal armed conflicts:

- defeat and eliminate unlawful armed units, bandit or terrorist groups and organisations, and their bases, training centres, depots and lines of communication;
- reinstall law and order;
- ensure public safety and stability;
- support a legal regime of a state of emergency in the conflict area;
- localize and seal off a conflict area;
• stop armed clashes and separate opposing sides;
• reinforce measures to disarm (confiscate weapons from) the population in a conflict area;
• the protection of public order and safety in areas adjoining the conflict area.

Performance of missions to avert, stop, localize, and seal off areas of internal armed conflicts and destroy unlawful armed units, bands and terrorist groups is assigned to unified groupings of troops (forces) (from different departments) and entities for their command and control established on a provisional basis.

2.21. Forces and assets of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation may be enlisted to assist bodies of state authority or institutions of local government and the population in relief operations following accidents, disasters and natural disasters.

2.22. Groupings of troops (forces) on Russian Federation territory are established to perform missions assigned to the Armed Forces and other troops with consideration of the following:
• the levels of potential military danger on specific strategic axes;
• the character of mutual relations of the Russian Federation with contiguous states;
• the location of industrial areas, areas of strategic resources and especially important installations vital to the Russian Federation;
• the possibilities of strategic deployment on threatened axes with a maximum decrease in volumes of movements, as well as the possibility of an interregional manoeuvre;
• the possibilities of a timely withdrawal of troops (forces) and logistic and technical support reserves from areas under probable missile/air strikes;
• the possibilities for support to vital activities of troops and for resolving social and everyday problems;
• the conditions and status of a base for mobilisation deployment;
• the conditions of quartering and securing the living standards of the troops as well as to solve social and welfare problems;
• the availability and condition of mobilisation bases.
• the socio-political situation in specific regions.

2.23. The Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation may be stationed outside its territory as part of joint or Russian groupings and of separate bases (installations). The conditions for such stationing are defined by international law documents.

2.24. When composite military units of the Commonwealth of Independent States are established, they are manned by servicemen of member states in accordance with their national legislation and agreements adopted among the states. Servicemen who are Russian Federation citizens are sent to man such units on a contract basis as a rule, Russian Federation Armed Forces units located on the territory of foreign states, regardless of the conditions of stationing, are part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and act in accordance with the procedure established in them, with consideration of requirements of the UN Charter, UN Secu-
2.25. Operational preparation of the territory of the Russian Federation is accomplished under the direction of the Russian Federation government and on the basis of the Federal State Programme for establishing and developing the state’s military infrastructure to support strategic deployment, the conduct of military operations and the manoeuvre of forces and assets by the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, and a timely transfer of the economy from peacetime to wartime in the interests of defence.

2.26. The stockpiling and maintenance of supplies are organised by the Russian Federation government under plans approved by the Russian Federation president for establishing a state reserve and mobilisation reserves.

In accordance with federal legislation, in peacetime the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, as well as bodies of state management stockpile, echelon, accommodate and maintain supplies supporting mobilisation and deployment of troops (forces) and their combat operations in the initial period of war (and for a more lengthy period for certain kinds of supplies), and the formation, preparation, redisposition and use of strategic reserves.

The Russian Federation Ministry of Defence plans the stockpiling, echelonment and accommodation of operational supplies and their maintenance for Troops of other federal executive authorities operationally subordinated in a special period to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence.

2.27. Planning for training citizens for military service and for accumulating the necessary number of militarily trained resources in reserve, and their registration, are accomplished under the overall direction of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff.

2.28. The population receives purposeful training for territorial and civil defence both in peacetime as well as wartime, and a set of measures is carried out to increase the functioning stability of installations of the economy, transportation and lines of communication and to ensure readiness to conduct emergency rescue and other operations in stricken areas and areas of accidents, disasters and natural disasters.

3. Military-economic principles

**Military-economic Support to Military Security**

3.1. The main goal of military-economic support is to provide financial and material support to the state’s military organisation and its equipment with effective armament systems, military and special equipment, property, and other materiel resources in quantities necessary for assurance of the Russian Federation’s military security.

3.2. Basic missions of military-economic support:
- securing the needs of the state’s mili-
tary organisation for financial and materiel resources;
• forming and developing a logistic and technical support base of combat and mobilisation readiness of the Armed Forces and other troops;
• co-ordinating the military-economic activities and meet needs of the state’s military organisation for materiel resources;
• developing the scientific and technical, technological and production base of the state’s military organisation and of the military infrastructure;
• establishing and upgrading the system of armaments and of military and special equipment and property, equipping the state’s military organisation with it, and providing for day-to-day maintenance, repair and modernisation;
• establishing a scientific and technical, designing and producing reserve of achievements for creating a highly effective system of new-generation arms and for the subsequent scheduled re-equipment of the military organisation;
• raising the level of social support of the state’s military organisation and the level of everyday material conditions of servicemen’s vital activities;
• securing the functioning and upgrading of systems for mobilisation readiness and mobilisation preparation of the economy and population of the country;
• carrying out mutually advantageous international military and military-technical co-operation;
• fulfilling international obligations in the military-economic sphere.

3.3. Priority missions of military-economic support:
• support the war and mobilisation readiness of the Armed Forces and other troops;
• ensure a quality upgrade of the strategic arms complex;
• produce highly effective systems of command and control, armament, communications, electronic warfare, strategic warning, mobile non-nuclear weapons and information support;
• unify and reduce the number of types and nomenclature of arms and military equipment;
• raise the standard of living and implement social guarantees prescribed by legislation for servicemen and their families.

3.4. Basic principles of military-economic support:
• correspondence between the level of military-economic support and the needs of military security;
• scientific and technical, technological information and resource independence in the development and production of basic kinds of military products;
• concentration of financial, logistic and intellectual resources on performing key missions of ensuring military security.

3.5. Basic directions of military-economic support:
• optimising the systems of state management of the defence industrial complex;
• restructuring and converting the military industrial complex (without detriment to the development of new technologies and scientific and technical capabilities);
• ensuring guaranteed financial and logistic resources for the work of creating
arms, military and special equipment, and military property, and for the development of technologies for their development and production;

- incultation of a system of economic incentives in state regulation of price formation in the development and production of military and dual-purpose products at enterprises of all forms of ownership;
- state support of enterprises (industries) and organisations (establishments) that determine the military-technical and technological stability of the military industrial complex, and of closed administrative-territorial formations and city-forming enterprises;
- securing and developing a system of national economic installations necessary for stable functioning of the national economy and for life support of the population in wartime;
- optimising and creating new mobilisation capacities and installations and replenishing state reserves;
- organising and conducting basic, exploratory and applied research and advanced scientific and technical and technological developments, including advanced competitive and import-replacing technologies;
- developing a scientific and technical and experimental base of defence sectors of industry and their scientific research and experimental design establishments and organisations;
- implementing the contractual and competitive principles in the system of orders and of the development and production of military products;
- making use of the international production co-operation and military-technical co-operation in joint research, development, testing and experimental works with foreign countries to increase the Russian Federation’s military-economic potential;
- widen the export of science-intensive military and civilian products of enterprises of the defence industrial complex;
- fulfil international obligations for reducing and limiting armed forces and arms and for maintaining international security and peace;
- ensure patent and other legal protection for objects of intellectual property contained in military products and in the technologies of their development and production;
- secure social protection for workers being laid off in connection with restructuring of the defence industrial complex, and keeping highly skilled personnel in the defence sector.

3.6. Basic directions of mobilisation preparation of the economy:
- preparing the systems of management of the economy for stable functioning in a period of transition to operation under conditions of wartime and in wartime;
- ensuring the establishing, upgrading and effective functioning of the system of mobilisation preparation of bodies of state authority and management at all levels, and of organisations and enterprises having mobilisation assignments;
- optimising and developing mobilisation capacities and facilities;
- establishing, stockpiling, preserving...
International military and military-technical co-operation is the prerogative of the state.

3.8. The Russian Federation accomplishes international military co-operation based on principles of equal rights, mutual advantage and good-neighbourliness and in the interests of international stability and national, regional and global security.

3.9. The Russian Federation organises and accomplishes international military-technical co-operation based on foreign policy and economic advisability, strictly taking into account the interests of military security of the Russian Federation and its allies on the basis of strict compliance with laws and other legal norms of the Russian Federation and with its international obligations.

3.10. The Russian Federation attaches priority importance to the development of military and military-technical co-operation with states parties to the CIS Collective Security Treaty, based on the need to consolidate efforts to establish a unified defence space and ensure collective military security.

3.11. Basic directions of international military and military-technical co-operation:
- fortification of the Russian Federation’s military-political positions in various regions of the world;
- expansion of the influx of currency proceeds for state needs, for development of military production, for conversion, for eliminating and recycling arms and military equipment, and for structural reorganisation of enterprises in the military industrial complex;
- securing the country’s export potential in the area of conventional arms and military equipment at the necessary level.

**Conclusion**

The Russian Federation guarantees the consistent, firm fulfilment of its military doctrine in compliance with the UN Charter and generally recognised norms and principles of international law.

The Russian Federation affirms the strictly defensive direction of its activities for ensuring military security, its
fundamental adherence to the goal of preventing wars and armed conflicts as well as to eliminating them from the life of mankind, of comprehensive disarmament, and of eliminating military blocs, and its resolve to achieve the creation of regional systems and a global system of general and comprehensive security and the formation of a balanced, equitable and multipolar world.

**Comment**

**The Background**

On November 4, 1999 Security Council Secretary Yuri Baturin held a conference to follow up on the publication of the draft for a new Russian Military Doctrine and to explain the background to the ongoing revision of it. In his presentation he stressed the importance of the new military doctrine as a foundation for the ongoing military reform and general military development in Russia. He further emphasised that the new doctrine should be seen not just as a political manifestation, but also as the basis for practical work on tactical, operational and strategic actions.

At the conference, which was attended by representatives from the power ministries, the ministries of economy, foreign affairs and defence industries, the Academy of Sciences, the government and the security council, it was pointed out that the former military doctrine first adopted in 1993 and the national security concept from 1997 had been made obsolete by events and in the national and international developments. Three areas were Headlined as areas where developments had been most unfavourable for Russia:

1. Russia’s geo-political situation, it was stated, is strongly influenced by the potential for expansion of NATO to the east, which directly threatens Russian security. Moreover, Russia sees a certain opposition to the integration process within the CIS and some states’ attempts to limit Russian influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

2. New real military dangers have surfaced and tensions on Russia’s borders and in conflict zones near the borders have grown over the past three years.

3. The socio-economic situation in Russia has deteriorated forcing a change in the structures of the power ministries and a review of their qualitative parameters. The border guards have further been reinforced as has the ministry for emergency situations. Moreover, the combat readiness and ability of the armed forces have dwindle owing to insufficient financing.

Mr. Baturin, in his presentation, further gave special attention to the division of functions of the power departments and the federal services in repelling external aggression and in settling internal conflicts. And lastly, he stated that the military doctrine cannot be fully implemented for a long time and must hence be made provisional. This is not least due to the fact that measures must be carefully defined to make up for Russia’s diminishing military might. The time of operation of the provisional military doctrine must hence be used to define the foundations of a future military policy.
It is, not least from above, quite apparent that the need for devising a new military doctrine rests on five pillars:

1. Russia’s deep social and economic crisis, which has badly damaged the military both in terms of structure and ability as well as the morale of the troops.

2. Russia’s profound identity crisis. The Russian political leadership is caught in the dilemma between major power ambitions and insufficient resources coupled with impotent political structures. This is reflected in the strong Russian unwillingness to accept a uni-polarisation of the world. Russia’s, in many respects irrational, attempt to seize Pristina airport in the early stages of deploying KFOR to Kosovo demonstrates this dilemma. The apparently total internal confusion between the ministry of defence and the ministry of foreign affairs in terms of the aim, scope and extent of supporting operations adds to this picture.

The opposition to a uni-polarisation is not new. It builds on the foreign policy doctrine of multi-polarity worked out by former foreign minister Primakov re-emphasising Russia’s orientation to other poles of power than the West, such as China, India, Iran, Iraq and other states.4

3. NATO’s New Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington Summit, which by Russia was seen as having been worked out without any consideration for Russia’s security interests and position. It is obvious in this context that Russia failed completely to make use of the special Russia-NATO institutions, i.e. the Permanent Joint Council, to influence the elaboration of the New Strategic Concept thus contributing to the view on Russia as a very ineffectual actor.

4. The NATO campaign in Kosovo without a UN or OSCE mandate5, which the Russian government so strongly advocated against. It is obvious that Russia was marginalized, or rather marginalized itself, in the management of the Kosovo crisis demonstrating without qualification that Russia is not regarded by NATO or the USA as being an equal partner in the handling of European security problems. It is also of interest that Russia, following the first NATO airstrikes against Serbia, withdrew from all organs of co-operation with NATO without, however, causing much worry inside the Western Alliance.

5. The Russians ill fated attempts to establish a trustworthy collective defence alliance through the CIS. The establishment of GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) with an intended collective security mechanism has essentially left Russia with a weakened sphere of influence. Russia’s claim for a Russian prerogative in defining security in the “near abroad” is quite simply not substantiated. Georgia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan’s refusal to renew the CIS security treaty was indeed the last straws to break the camel’s back.

When viewing the content of the above draft it is interesting to see the perceived security threats listed in paragraph 1.4 through 1.6. Both the former national security concept of 1997 and the former military doctrine of 1993 reflected the assessment that a major actor threat was...
unlikely and that the risk of a major scale war involving Russia was estimated as low. The former doctrine and security concept therefore focused very much on internal concerns and emphasised the threats arising from internal socio-economic crises and local armed conflicts along Russia’s borders. The new draft shifts the focus to emphasise external military threats, however, without assessing the risk as being imminent. As a second priority threat, the draft mentions intervention in the internal affairs of Russia. This is a clear reference to Kosovo and reflects the Russian fear of seeing the West-Phalian order with its unqualified protection of the internal affairs of the state being compromised. The sovereignty of Serbia was violated gravely by NATO and Russia rejects a general development in the direction of armed humanitarian interventions becoming an accepted norm in international law. For the same reason Russia is very eager to reject any foreign role in playing down the second Chechen war.

The new draft also emphasises Russia’s rejection of a unipolar world order. As a priority three threat the draft lists attempts to ignore or infringe on Russia’s interests in resolving international security problems and to oppose the strengthening of Russia as one of the influential power centres in the world. The marginalization of Russia by NATO and USA is regarded as a major strategic problem. Russia is, and has been ever since the end of the Cold War, the junior partner to USA, the EU and NATO. A part of Russia’s security strategy was to make the OSCE develop towards an all-European collective security system thereby bringing NATO under some degree of control from an umbrella organisation, where Russia would at least formally be an equal partner. This strategy has obviously failed, and this was clearly demonstrated at the OSCE Istanbul summit in November this year. The security charter adopted at the Summit has very few significant innovations, the most robust of them being the creation of rapid expert assistance and cooperation teams (REACT-teams) consisting of civilian and unarmed observers. The charter agreements on streamlining co-operation with and between other international organisations on security issues are so vaguely worded and non-operational in their content that they must be regarded merely as a manifestation of the good faith and noble intentions of the 54 participating states. The Summit declaration adds to the impression of Russia being regarded as part of the problem rather than part of the solution to European security problems. Much of the declaration is concentrated on Russia’s war in Chechnya, withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova, limitation of Russian troop presence in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It was even found necessary in the declaration to reassure Russia of its territorial integrity.

As it appears from the list of external threats in paragraph 1.5 the doctrine in its essence is far more anti-western than the previous one. It is noteworthy that the Russian denouncement of the nuclear no-first-use policy that was first made in the 1993 doctrine is reaffirmed in the new draft. No-first-use is no longer, not even at the declamatory level a part of the
Russian doctrine. The former no-first-use policy adopted by Leonid Brezhnev never had much military validity, but it did indeed serve as re-assuring political purpose. With the new strongly anti-western doctrine the definitive denouncement of no-first-use must be regarded as an implicit instrument of deterrence, which can best be understood against the background of Russia’s apparent shortcomings in the conventional fields. It can also be understood against the background of Russia’s fear for the future of the ABM regime. Russia’s fundamental view is that the 1972 treaty is the basis of all international nuclear regimes and that a ballistic missile defence system would corrupt all agreements and force a new nuclear arms race. Russia would not, the argument goes, in the foreseeable future be able to develop an ABM system itself and would hence be forced to secure sufficient quantities of nuclear ballistic missiles to ensure the ability to penetrate a defence system. American reassurance that such a system would only be protective against rogue states does little to calm the Russian fear of it being aimed at Russia⁹. The new doctrine mentions this as a specific security threat, which must be intended as a strong political signal to the USA. In this context the wording of paragraph 1.24 stipulating the use of nuclear arms is very difficult. It qualifies the reassuring formulation in the former doctrine¹⁰ that nuclear weapons would never be used against states party to the Non-proliferation Treaty and not possessing nuclear weapons (unless participating in an alliance aggression against Russia involving states with nuclear weapons). With the wording of the new doctrine nuclear weapons can be used in a large variety of situations, including as a response to a conventional aggression in situations critical to the security of Russia or its allies. That there is political will to substantiate this new concept was seen in late June 99 during exercise “Zapad 99” (“West 99”), where nuclear weapons were indeed used as a response to a conventional aggression in situations critical to the security of Russia or its allies. The exercise was meant as a warning to the West following the Kosovo campaign as well as a manifestation of Russia’s military might as a major power. The exercise included, for the first time in more than a decade, five military districts and three fleets as well as a combined Russian-Belarussian group of forces. The exercise was clearly directed against the West responding to a cruise missile attack from an unspecified military alliance against Belarus and the Western part of Russia¹². While the exercise demonstrated that the Russian Strategic Aviation Force and the Strategic Missile Forces are still operable and operative, it also clearly demonstrated the major shortcomings of the Russian military in terms of command, control and communications as well as the urgent need for upgrading much of the materiel ¹³.

In a further interpretation of the content of the draft doctrine from a Baltic perspective it is noteworthy that Russia intends to put pressure on the Baltic Three in general and on Estonia and Latvia in particular. The list of basic external threats listed in paragraph 1.5 thus includes “disturbance of the existing balance of forces near the borders of the Russian Federa-
tion.” As the following paragraph warns against NATO expansion in general, this paragraph must be interpreted as a specific warning against Baltic membership of NATO in particular. Further down in the same paragraph one sees that Russia considers as an external military threat discrimination against Russian citizens in foreign states. This must be interpreted as a strong warning to Estonia and Latvia, that Russia might take military steps to secure the “rights, freedoms and lawful interests” of the Russian minorities in the two countries. Whereas this at the declamatory level apparently is intended to protect the interest of the Russian minorities it might just have the opposite effect. Such wording might do little to calm Estonian and Latvian fears that the Russian minorities could be a fifth column serving the interests of a hostile neighbour.

**Conclusion**

There can be little doubt that the draft of a new military doctrine should be seen as a political attempt to re-establish Russia as a major actor in both European and global security. In spite of Mr. Baturin’s assurance cited above that the new doctrine is not just a political manifestation, one is tempted to conclude that it is exactly that. Whereas the exercise “Zapad 99” was clearly intended to substantiate the content of the later published new doctrine and give credibility to it in terms of strategic and tactical capability, it did in fact the opposite. The exercise used up a full year’s allotment of fuel and demonstrated the major technological shortcomings of the Russian military. The draft’s many intended political signals of an anti-Western and indeed anti-Baltic nature supports this conclusion.

It is also interesting that Russia in its new doctrine puts so much emphasis on nuclear weapons at a time when all other major powers seem to be toning down the military importance of nuclear forces as theatre weapons. This must be regarded as a result of Russia’s deep identity crisis as well as politico-military and socio-economic crisis, because of which the nuclear status is the last and only remedy to help Russia identify itself as a major power. It is in this respect thought provoking to see how much attention the Russian president gives to the possession of the so-called “nuclear suitcase” containing the code keys to release nuclear weapons. It has almost become a talisman symbolising political control of the Russian State.

The draft for a new military doctrine is in many respects, as it appears from the above, not a well-formulated platform from which Russia can devise a long-term military security strategy. The wording is often so difficult that the content is almost cryptic. Hence the draft must be concluded to have the character of an improvised short-term response to Russia’s deep crisis in almost all spheres of politics and economy both domestically and on the international scene. Thus the doctrine contains a large number of strong political messages intended for the international scene. But it does also have an internal political function intending to send clear and strong messages to the Russian voters that the political leader-
ship is performing with strength and ability. The timing of the publication of the draft supports this argument with the Duma elections coming up in December and coinciding with the likely start of the presidential campaign for next year's election.

1 Krasnaya Zvezda, October 9th, pp. 4-6.
2 Power in Russia no. 46/November 27th: “Russia Needs a Provisional Military Doctrine.
3 Power in Russia no. 46/November 27th: “Russia Needs a Provisional Military Doctrine, p.2.
5 BBC Summary of World Broadcast, 12 March 1999: Kvashnin discusses Kosovo at NATO HQ.
6 Aleksandr Sergounin: “Russian Foreign Policy Thinking: Redefining Conceptions”, Center for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen 1994, p. 3 ff.
7 Berlingske Tidende November 20th, p.13/www.osce.org (“summit documents”)
8 Military News Bulletin no. 11/November 1993, pp. 2.
9 Herald Tribune, November 17th, p. 8.
10 Military News Bulletin no. 11/November 1993, pp. 2.
Intentions and reality: Latvian–Finnish military co-operation in the 1920s and 30s

Valters Šeerbinskis

Co-operation and Military Policy

After Latvia and Finland had declared their independence, relations between the two countries developed mainly within the frame of the proposed Baltic League. Latvia cherished the hope of a regional alliance that would provide firm foundation for military co-operation, while Finland was much more reticent with regard to the Baltic countries, including Latvia. Following the Baltic States Conferences in 1920, Finnish interest in Latvian security issues seemed to increase a little. At Bulduri on September 4, 1920 the Military Policy Commission of the Baltic States Conference passed a resolution that permitted the governments of the participant states to use the ports of other parties for rest and repair of warships, as well as complete freedom of movement in territorial waters. The resolution was affirmed by the government of Estonia on October 31, 1924, and correspondence relating to Latvia’s position on this question revealed that the Ministry of War had assumed all the time that the resolution was already in force¹. However, the navies of the Baltic States were very small, their visits even to neighbouring countries were very few. Even between the allies Latvia and Estonia military co-operation was weakly developed and this resolution served no practical purpose. Cooperation in the first half of the 1920s took the form of various meetings to exchange information, usually of a declarative character. On August 3 a meeting in Tallinn between military experts from Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland was held. However, attention was given mainly not to military co-operation, but to the formation of an opinion regarding the proposal from the Soviet Union for proportional reduction
of armed forces in the region. The participants of the meeting concluded that the Soviet side, experiencing economic problems, had initiated this as a campaign with aim of restoring an advantageous ratio of forces on its western border. The participants deemed these proposals unacceptable, since the armed forces of the countries of the Baltic region were already reduced to the minimum that “they consider absolutely essential for ensuring defence of their territory against Russia.” In order to demonstrate their peaceful intentions, participating countries were ready to provide mutual declarations of non-aggression and mutually pledge to disarm in line with the decisions of the League of Nations. The mid- to late-1920s saw a stabilisation of the international situation in Europe. There were no immediate military threats to the Baltic countries. Also, many of the Baltic States Conferences held with participation of Finland were unsuccessful. Finland was increasingly distancing itself from its southern neighbours, and hopes for a close political agreement – and thus also a military one – were all the time fading. However, in spite of cooling of relations between the two countries, meetings of various military departments and politicians still went on as a matter of course.

Characteristic of such activities were military conferences in Riga and Warsaw in 1925 that included Latvia and Finland (as an observer), along with Estonia, Poland and Romania. The main topics of discussion were disarmament and trade in armament. The questions considered in Riga were of a very general nature, while in Warsaw they were narrowly specialised. To begin with, the conferences were intended as secret meetings between representatives of potential allies. However, gross oversights were revealed in their organisation. As Latvian Foreign Ministry officials later testified, it was obvious from the outset that “the Poles have no intention of keeping this event secret, but quite contrary: they have informed everybody who cared or did not care to know. Like the Romanian delegate, they arrived in Riga in full uniform; their military attaché informed the advisor at the German Embassy, and he, in turn, informed the Soviet chargé d’affaires of everything that had taken place, so that in the end there was no other choice but to make an official announcement about the meeting.” Since the conferences were being organised by the military, even the foreign ministries of the respective countries were not aware of it in advance. The meetings were characterised by information leaks. Military contacts (particularly between Poland and Finland) became known straight away to Germany and to the USSR, and they did not hesitate to protest at this supposed meeting of border states. For example, when an officer of the Finnish general staff acquired diplomatic passport for his confidential visit to Riga and then Warsaw on April 20, 1925, the Soviet Embassy was already aware of it in advance and immediately protested to the Finnish Foreign Ministry about the “aggressive” intentions of the Baltic States towards the “peace-loving” USSR. The Foreign Minister had no choice but to deny that such a visit was taking place, and in the end it was cancelled. In Hel-
sinki and in Riga the view was that Warsaw was to blame for the leaks. The Latvian envoy in Warsaw reported to the Foreign Minister Felikss Cielčns that “the participants at the time did not pay much attention to exchanging views”.

In order to foster the development of military relations, military attachés were appointed in both countries. The question of military attachés was discussed already in the early 1920s. Hoping for the possible rapprochement of Finland to the Baltic States, in January 1922 the Latvian envoy K. Zarinš wrote that such an appointment would be important, and that “it is not necessary for him to be a gallant and fine soldier, but rather attention should be given to the social standing and abilities of the candidate”. However, due to financial limitations, the Latvian military attaché to Finland lived in Tallinn. In March 1926 the envoy in Estonia Jānis Seskis wrote to the administrator of the Foreign Ministry Hermanis Albats that Estonia had no military representative in Helsinki either, because the Finnish attitude had been “without any serious prospects”. J. Seskis emphasised that up to now attaché Captain Herberts Tepfers had been present in Finland in name only, because he arrived there from Tallinn only a few times a year for a few days, and therefore was unable to establish closer contacts. The formal reason for this was the limited Foreign Ministry budget and life in Finland in comparison with Latvia being expensive. More important, however, were the political reasons that inhibited Latvia from wasting funds for such a seemingly unimportant task.

From time to time the attitude towards potential cooperation with the Baltic military establishments could be felt against the background of disagreement within the Finnish army. This is sharply reflected in reports by the Latvian envoy in Finland K. Zarinš. “The Finns are not doing well at all in organising their army. Right from 1918 onwards there is no agreement among their officers. The jääkäri (friends of the Germans) hate those officers who have served in the Russian army. The latter, of course, reply with the same. It is said that in officers’ clubs of several regiments the jääkäri and their colleagues (the former Russian officers) don’t even sit at the same table. It would not be so bad, were it only a case of disagreement among the officers; but I am told that officers often show this hatred and contempt among soldiers, too. As is known, former Russian officers cannot go on the attack, since they know that they have nothing to be proud of in front of masses. Thus they are slightly more acquiescent and at most pursue a defensive policy. In view of this there has long been talk of reorganising the Finnish army, or more precisely the army leader-
ship...politics were also drawn into the officers’ unrest, i.e. fascism.” The envoy described “the opposition by the ultrapatriotic jääkäri to the army commanders serving up to now, the former Russian officers,” as a “strike”, which was followed by a reorganisation of the army with significant staff changes. However, the question inevitably arose of how to ensure change and reorganisation, since apart from the former Tsarist Russian officers, the Finns had virtually no other specialists. The jääkäri were still young and lacking in necessary education and experience, and Finnish military and political circles discussed the possibility of an orientation towards one of the great military powers and towards invitation of foreign experts. In the view of K. Zarinš “the jääkäri would probably prefer these to come from Germany.” Since France was unacceptable to the Finns for political reasons, Italy and Belgium were not rated highly from the military point of view, only Britain remained.

Changes in the Finnish army led to a series of developments in the organisation of military cooperation with the Baltic States. The Finnish general staff gave more attention to planning the activities of the armed forces and to defence policy. No active assistance was expected from Latvia or Estonia in the event of an aggression, and the Finns concentrated on particular aspects of military cooperation. In first place there was a concern with defence of the Gulf of Finland and their improvement of it on Estonian coast. Heavy bombardment by coastal artillery would prevent the potential attacker - the Soviet Union - from sending its Baltic fleet into the Baltic Sea and seriously threatening Finland’s southern and southwestern shores. In cooperation with the Estonian armed forces, Finland began from 1932 to fortify particular strategically important islands. In the view of Finnish military experts, these were the strongest and best-armed long artillery positions in the world. Estonia was very forthcoming to the Finns, providing secret documentation of coastal defence. In the early 1930s, co-operation developed between the navies of the two countries, with joint exercises and training for naval officers.

At the same time Finnish defence planners were constantly aware that Estonia
and Latvia might be occupied by the USSR. In the second half of the 1930s, with Finland increasingly orienting itself towards Scandinavia, less and less attention was given to the co-operation with the Baltic States. However, in spite of the cooling of political relations, a degree of practical cooperation could exist between the Baltic and Finnish military leaderships.

In October 1938 the head of the Finnish general staff General Lennart Oesch visited Tallinn. There was considerable interest in Latvia concerning this visit, but the Latvian envoy in Helsinki J. Tepfers reported that no specific questions had been discussed. At this time Latvia also received news of increased activity among foreign intelligence services.

On December 4, 1939 the USSR launched its attack on Finland, leading to the Winter War. Although Soviet bases had already been established in Latvia and the government was concerned to not aggravate relations with the USSR, the mood in the Latvian army was markedly favourable for the Finns. It was impossible to provide official assistance to Finland, but unofficially the radio reconnaissance service provided the Finns with intercepted Soviet radio information through the Finnish military ambassador in Riga. It was General Krišjānis Berkis, commander of the Latvian army, who played a major role in this bold venture, his sympathy towards Finland being generally known. However, it is logical that with weakening of political ties between the two countries, the basis for potential military co-operation gradually disappeared.

The Practical Results of Relations

From 1918 right up to the spring of 1920 the Independence War was continuing in Latvia. In the beginning the forces of Latvian provisional government consisted of a small number of volunteers, and the government began to seek assistance from abroad at the critical period of late 1918 and early 1919. One idea was the formation of a mercenary army from Nordic volunteers. However, insecure position of the new state, lack of comprehension of provisional government’s policy and concern about involvement in a possible conflict with Soviet Russia made Denmark, Sweden and Finland reticent. However, Estonia did succeed in involving Nordic units, and Danish company and Finnish units took part in the liberation of Latvia. A unit commanded by Finnish Colonel Hans Kalm liberated the town of Valka and helped to liberate Alūksne and other places in northern Latvia. However, the Finns were not familiar with the Latvians and the Latvian state. Moreover, many of them had been German army jaegers, and could not understand why they should be fighting against the Germans under von der Goltz who had helped during the Finnish Civil War. In northern Latvia it was mainly Latvian units of the Red Army that were fighting against volunteer forces. The Estonian general staff did not involve Finnish units in further military operations in Latvia.

Procurement of munitions. Along with the unsuccessful recruitment of volunteers in
Finland, the provisional government tried already in 1919 to obtain financial and material assistance. It was seeking the most advantageous sources for armaments and army equipment. In the wake of the First World War all countries wanted to sell as profitably as possible their excess and out-of-date armaments. However, already in 1919 procurement of such supplies was limited by mistrust to the Latvian provisional government and its ability to ensure stability and a desirable political stance. Finland was one such country. On November 11, 1919 the Armaments Administration asked Latvian diplomatic representative to establish contact with the French mission in Helsinki, which would pay 800,000 Finnish marks for ammunition to be bought in Finland. The Finnish government was not willing to associate itself in any way with Latvia, then in a very insecure situation and with its fate still undecided. Certainly it was not ready to sign any agreements to supply ammunition. However, the Finns did not decline the opportunity to earn money, and were paid unofficially. The Ministry of War concluded that Finland “is reluctant to deal with us”.

Issues of armaments supply and exchange were discussed in the coming years, too. Thus, in 1934, representatives of the Finnish military arrived at the Main Artillery Store and Arsenal of the Latvian Army to inspect Russian rifles that the
Finns wanted to obtain in an exchange. In January 1935 Latvia procured 10 000 kg of smokeless nitrocellulose powder in Finland. In 1937 mine-sweeper Viesturs brought 7 tonnes of explosives from Finland. In 1938 a procedure was initiated for buying 60 Finnish mortars and 5 500 light mortar shells with the right to manufacture them in Latvia. In August 1939 the Latvian government gave permission for three 3” guns to be overhauled in Finnish factories. As late as 11th June 1940 at a Cabinet meeting the Ministry of War was permitted to buy 1900 submachine guns from Finland. However, these arms purchases were relatively small and became almost impossible on the eve of the Second World War.

Exchange of information and military training. Information about one another was very important in order for military contacts to develop between the two countries. It is clear that already in the early 1920s the military establishments of both countries began to form channels for information exchange at various levels. Very important work was done by envoys and later by military attachés. The Latvian envoys in Finland provided a significant amount of information about military policy and the mood in the army, particularly in the early period of relations. Unfortunately, very scanty information is to be found in the archives concerning the activities of military representatives and military co-operation. Also, there is a lack of sources on joint meetings of army staffs. Quite friendly and comparatively close contacts had developed between particular military structures in the 1930s, but these did not play a leading role in military policy. A good example is co-operation in the military press. In the 1930s the Finnish army publication “Suomen Sotilas” devoted a whole issue to Latvia.

Visits by Finnish warships to Latvia had a certain role in promoting information and contacts. Already on October 14, 1920 the Finnish coastal cruisers “Karjala” and “Klas Horn” first arrived in Riga. Such trips, however, should not be over-emphasised: to a large degree they served purposes of representation. Such visits were mutual and also included other armed services. Various military experts travelled to Finland and Latvia several times each year to gain experience.

From the mid-1920s an officer exchange system was created with Finland as with other neighbouring countries. This provided an opportunity to become acquainted with the other country’s army, add to one’s stock of knowledge and promote friendly relations between officers of the two countries. Such exchange, though, was hampered by the difficulty of learning another language. In Latvia the training of Latvian officers in neighbouring countries was seen more as an affirmation of friendly relations. The only exception was the Finnish skill of operating in harsh winter conditions.

A particular emphasis: the national guard. The origins of the Latvian volunteer Aizsargi (national guard) organisation are to be sought in 1921. The Finnish Suojeluskunta (national guard) corps had been formed during the Civil War in 1918. Already at that time the organisation showed itself as an important military force supporting right-wing sections...
of society. The Latvian envoy in Finland, K. Zarinš, though he is known to have held right-wing political views, saw the Finnish national guard as a destabilising factor in democratic Finland. From time to time the militant and categorical attitude of the corps towards the forces of the left who had lost the Civil War gave rise to the possibility of internal conflict. The Finnish national guard attracted the attention of the Latvian mission as soon as a diplomatic representative arrived in Helsinki. K. Zarinš considered the national guard corps as an influential force. Interestingly, as early as 1919 the Head of the District Aizsargi Section Janis Berzinš held up the Finnish Suojeluskunta as an example for the fight against crime and the communists. From his Latvian viewpoint, particularly in the early 1920s, the envoy was acutely critical of the germanophile tendency that was so widespread in Finnish conservative circles including the Suojeluskunta. Describing candidates for the post of Corps Commander in 1921, K. Zarinš wrote that the former president Peer Svinhufvud “has never been a soldier, but is well known as a definite germanophile and a real reactionary”, while Lauri Malmber, who was to become Corps Commander “is said to be a good artilleryman, but politically he is also as black as the bottom of a pot.” The other candidates were, in the eyes of the diplomat, little known in society, but “all devotees of Mannerheim.” K. Zarinš considered that a “firm hand” was required to reorganise the Suojeluskunta, which he viewed as undemocratic and a “den of monarchists”. But the military capability of the corps he viewed highly, even above that of the regular army. In case of danger it would be very important, but the political consequence of this are another matter, wrote Zarinš.

In later years Latvian representatives in Helsinki often discussed various questions relating to the Suojeluskunta corps in their reports. Their assessment of the organisation was not always flattering to the Finns, but with the mid-1920s a more cautious approach can be seen, since a similar organisation existed in Latvia, too. Particularly after the establishment of the first contacts with Latvian Aizsargi, the tone of diplomats became more cautious and tempered when discussing the paramilitary organisation.

The year 1924 saw the first visit by Aizsargi to Finland (Helsinki and Viipuri). It was organised by Latvian Defence Society. In August representatives from the Suojeluskunta’s Viipuri Region made a return visit. In coming years such exchange visits became a regular occurrence. In late 1920s, such relations came to form more and more a part of the organisation’s official activities. In the Latvian press, particularly in the magazine Aizsargs and the newspaper “Interior Ministry News” (Iekšlietu Ministrijas Vēstnesis), each meeting with Suojeluskunta was regularly followed by articles full of praise, describing history, activities and structure of the organisation. In fact a great deal of publicity was now given to Suojeluskunta activities: films depicting the life of Finnish national guards were shown, lectures were given and excursions organised.

The Suojeluskunta too followed up the first visit with words of praise for Latvia.
and the history of its armed forces, thus helping to pave the way for cooperation with the hitherto-unknown Aizsargi. For example, following a visit to Latvia, a regional Suojeluskunta commander Takkinen described with pathos the struggle of Latvia’s independence fighters and the preservation of their memory, as well as the patriotism of the Latvian officer corps.

From the second half of 1920s such exchanges were already a norm. Not only leaders of the organisations, but representatives of particular units also visited the other country. Several times each year different experts from respective paramilitary organisations made visits to the other country for various purposes. However warm and friendly the relations were between the two organisations, they never overstepped a certain mark.

Conclusions

Military relations between the two small countries developed in line with political relations. The army and national guard organisations could not overstep the mark established by the politicians. The original hopes for a military alliance might have extended beyond the limits of normal, friendly relations, but regional policy of the inter-war years and inability of the small states to unite ensured a degree of reticence. Relations between Finnish and Latvian military circles did represent an unusual example of understanding between two small nations. Forming part of the nexus of Latvian-Finnish relations in the 1920s and 30s, they promoted a mutual understanding of often contradictory history of the two peoples and forged contacts based on good will. A good example of this is the assistance provided by Latvian radio reconnaissance under conditions of what was in fact a Soviet protectorate and the heart-felt moral support for the Finnish army during the Winter War of 1939-40.

Latvian-Finnish military cooperation was also fitted well into the framework of military cooperation among the Baltic States. Estonia had even friendlier relations with the Finns, while Latvia and Estonia were united by a military pact. Although it did not produce the hoped-for result, one cannot deny that good relations had developed between the armies of the region, which might in case of need have become a united military force.

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1 Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīvs (LVVA), 2574. f., 3. apr., 352. l., 5. lp.
4 LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 140. l., 62. lp.
5 LVVA, 2570. f., 1. apr., 184, l., 4. lp.
8 LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 3173. l., 4. lp.
9 K. Beriis had served in Finland during the First World War as an officer in the Tsarist Russian army and his wife was Finnish. Regarding the Latvian stance during the Winter War, see Čērbinskis V. Ziemas karš un Latvija: 1939-1940 (The Winter War and Latvia: 1939-1940) // Latvijas Arhīvi. – 1999.
A number of Latvian Army officers completed a skiing course in Finland. At this time the Finns were considered unrivalled skiers, which was demonstrated by mobile ski units during the Winter War. See LVVA, 1474. f., 1. apr., 1581. l., 15., 19. lp.


Uprising of December 1, 1924

Hannes Walter

1. General background

Starting from November 7, 1917 the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party seized power in Petrograd by overthrow. The communists’ unhidden final goal was “the world revolution” or in other words, establishing supreme power in the whole world. In spite of the fact that Soviet Russia became the base of communism and the party ruling the country in dictatorial manner called itself the Russian Communist Party, the slogans of the “world revolution” and “internationalism” were not at first the cover of Russian expansion. On the contrary, a variegated international company, among whom the Russians formed an insignificant minority, used Russian resources carelessly in their own interests. In 1922 Soviet Russia was renamed to the Soviet Union that officially was defined as “the homeland of the world proletarians”. Among 550 members of Central Committee of the Communist Party there were only 30 Russians in 1922 (even the Latvians with 34 representatives outnumbered them).

Until signing the Versailles’ peace on June 28, 1919 the communist leadership attempted to carry out the world revolution primarily with help of direct military aggression using the splitting of Europe. Instead of the former Russian army, the Red Army as a main impact force was formed on the basis of ideological principles. The Red Army was not just the army of Soviet Russia but officially “the armed vanguard of the world proletarians”, i.e. the instrument for conducting the world revolution. The leadership and structure of the Red Army were formed according to that principle. In the higher command the Russians were a minority. Until 1925 the People’s Commissar of Military Affairs (Minister) was a Jew Lev Trotsky (with the right name Leib Bronstein) and the Supreme Commander of the Red Army a Latvian Jukums Vacietis. In the structure of the Red Army national units were formed from communists and their commiserates originating from different countries. At the point of the overthrow in November 1917 there were 4 million foreigners in the area of the Russian empire.
Half of them were prisoners of war. The other half was made up of migrant workers mainly from China and Persia (Iran), who were brought to Russia during the war; and refugees from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia etc. Among overall disruption, hunger and misery, the Red Army was in a privileged state. This fact, together with fierce brainwashing brought a total amount of 300,000 foreigners to the “international units” of the Red Army.

The Red Army’s strategic assault to West at the turn of the year 1918-1919 was unsuccessful – the Red Army was caught in the defense of border states like Poland, Estonia, and others. The strategic idea of the assault was a break-through to Germany, where the outbreak of communist revolution hung on a thread. When the victorious countries of the World War I and Germany reached an agreement in Versailles, the situation in Germany calmed down in the course of time. The hands of Western countries were freed and Soviet Russia was forced into militarily defence.

In a new strategic situation the communist leadership reevaluated the strategy of world revolution. Instead of direct military aggression it was decided to use the way of indirect military aggression where propaganda, sabotage and terror became main means. At the moment when society in some country was sufficiently destabilized, an open seizing of power was to take place with the help of an overthrow or a civil war. The Communist International that was established in March 1919 in Moscow, known by abbreviation Comintern, became the main instrument of global subversive activity. The Comintern was formed as a global communist party where the parties of different countries formed only sections. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was financing all the activities had naturally control over all other parties and determined the leadership of the Comintern at its own discretion. Its first chairman was Grigori Zinovjev (with the right name Hirsch Apfelbaum). By the IV Congress of the Comintern held in December 1922, sections were established in 58 different countries - communist subversive network had become global. In addition a whole group of sub- and phantom organisations were established.¹

The Comintern coordinated its activities with almighty Soviet secret service called Tseka until 1921; and after that (until 1934) GRU. The chief of that organisation was a Polish nobleman Feliks Dzerzinski until he died in 1926. The Comintern co-ordinated also with the military intelligence, predecessor of the later GRU, that was commanded by a Latvian Janis Berzins (with the right name Peteris Kuzis). Although the international units of the Red Army were eliminated in 1922, educational establishments to train staff remained intact.

2. Subversive centers directed against Estonia

In 1918 Estonian units were formed among the Red Army foreign units as well (the so-called Estonian Red Rifle Division). There were approximately 3000 men – communists who had escaped from Estonia.
in February 1918 and the Russian Estonians. The share of Estonians in the grouping of the Red Army by the end of the War of Independence had grown to 160,000 men in the Estonian front line. Massive deserting of men who were forcibly mobilized from the areas of temporarily occupied Estonia and particularly large coming over in May 1919, headed by division commander Leonid Ritt made Estonian Red Army soldiers highly unreliable in the eyes of supreme command and they were removed from the Estonian front to the Ukraine. Division was disembodied according to the conditions of the Tartu Peace Treaty in February 1920. But a considerably large number of Estonians went on serving in the Red Army amongst whom some reached very high positions (August Kork became the Chief of Moscow Military District).

In order to train national military cadre for operating against the neighboring countries, international military schools were established in the Soviet Union. Those were the educational establishments for infantry officers with an intelligence-sabotage bias. The 3rd International Military School operated in Petrograd (Leningrad) during the years 1921-1928 to provide military training for the Estonian and Finnish communists. The chief of the school was an Estonian division commander Aleksander Inno. Military leadership of the December 1 uprising came predominantly from that school.

The main force in the subversive activities against the Estonian Republic was the Estonian Communist Party. During the War of Independence Estonian communists belonged to the Russian Communist Party since the goal of the war was to annex Estonia to the Soviet Russia. After the defeat transition to hidden tactics was required and on November 5, 1920 the Estonian Communist Party was formally established. The Estonian Communist Party joined the Comintern and its ruling organizations were the underground in the Soviet Union and in Estonia. According to the information of the Communist Party itself the number of members grew from 700 to 2000 during 1920-1924. The party conducted wide underground activities combined with legal activities through phantom organizations. Through latter, the communists reached the hundred-seat Parliament getting 5 seats in the elections of 1920 and 10 seats in the elections of 1923.

The political cadre both for subversive activities and for future leadership in the annexed neighboring countries was prepared in special educational establishments in the Soviet Union. The communist refugees of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania were trained in the Western Communist University of Minorities. Its center was in Moscow but the department for the Finns and the Estonians was in Petrograd (Leningrad). The establishment operated between the years 1921-1936.

3. Global assault of the Comintern

On the basis of the Russian Revolution and the Civil War scientific strategy
and tactics of overthrows and civil wars was developed in the Soviet Union. It was published in an elaborate form in 1930 as a book in Russian called “The Armed Uprising”. The author of the book is said to be A. Neuberg. Actually the book was put together by a working group that included the Chief of Staff of the Red Army Tuhhatsevski, 2IC of GRU Unschlicht, party official Pjatnitski and the professional revolutionaries (an Italian Togliatti and a Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh). Generally, it may be said that in the countries bordering with the Soviet Union, unexpected rebellion was preferred against legal power with the help of impact detachments prepared underground. Declaration of a counter-government and its request for help to the Soviet Union would follow that. Having a pretense for assault by this, the Red Army was supposed to carry the main weight in occupying a neighboring country, which would then be followed by annexation according to political scenario conducted by the Communist Party. In a similar way Soviet Russia annexed Georgia in 1921: a communist agency started uprisal on February 12, “military-revolutionary committee” was established on February 16 that requested help from Moscow and on February 25 the Red Army occupied capital city Tbilisi.

In the countries that were out of reach of the Red Army, guerilla war of a local communist agency in rural areas or terrorism in towns was planned that would wear out the strength of legal government and lead to overall chaos. Uprising in Bulgaria in September 1923 is a typical example of the tactics of the Comintern in an agrarian country. The rebellions in Germany, on the other hand, are classics of the Comintern in an industrial country. As a result of a lost war Germany was both in extreme economic and moral distress that created favorable conditions for communism. As said above, in 1919 Germany was on the verge of anarchy. Uprisals broke out all over the country: in Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Willemshaven, and Ruhr conurbation. In April and May street battles lasted for a month in Munich and demanded 927 dead victims. In March 1920 the communists organized a wave of terror in Ruhr and Vogtland, in 1921 in Central Germany, Ruhr and Hamburg. On October 23, 1923 the communists made another attempt in Hamburg, 40 people were killed and 150 were injured. By the way, the Hamburg uprising was headed by the officials of the Soviet Commerce Mission Karl Radek (with the right name Sobelsohn) and Otto Marquart. Massive and provocatively open misuse of diplomatic status by the Soviet representatives was typical in those years.

As a conclusion to the above it may be stated that the uprising of December 1, 1924 was in no way exceptional, but a typical episode of global aggression of the Comintern/the Soviet Union.

4. On the eve of the uprising

Anti-state subversive activities in Estonia began already during the War of Independence and more expressive examples of this was the rebellious attempt in
Tallinn in December 1918 and the uprising on Saaremaa in February 1919. During the war subversive work done in the rear area had an importance of assisting the front. After the Tartu Peace Treaty it became Moscow’s main weapon in destabilizing the Republic of Estonia. The statistics of captured and condemned agents paint a certain picture of the intensity of activities of the Soviet Agency. There were 195 of them in Estonian prisons by the end of 1920, by the end of 1922 there were already 332 prisoners. The situation became acute unexpectedly in 1924 when the Estonian counterintelligence received definite information that the Comintern was planning a public uprising. The secret state police arrested 257 enemy agents during the raids all over Estonia conducted in January and September. Discovered documents showed that the sums paid to agents had greatly risen. If a regular agent received 5000-8000 Marks a month from the Soviet intelligence in 1922, then in 1924 it was already 20 000-30 000 and the leading officials received up to 90 000 Marks instead of 15 000 Marks. Together with the weapons discovered it proved without a doubt the transition from words to actions.

The failures in 1924 caused panic among the Comintern officials. Deserted top Soviet spy V.Krivitski wrote in his memoirs that after great failures in Germany and in conditions where fierce struggle for power took place after Lenin’s death, the commander of the Comintern Zinovjev needed a victory at any cost. A victory was necessary for the whole the Comintern apparatus where thousands of emigrants lead a pleasant life on the expense of the Soviet Communist Party but had no results to show. The attack was directed against Estonia with the initiative of Estonian communists.

The leaders of the Comintern and of the Estonian Communist Party had no idea that the Estonian Communist Party had been thoroughly infiltrated by the Estonian Secret State Police and that the Estonian Counter-Intelligence knew practically everything about the planned uprising, except of the precise time of rebellion. In spite of that, the uprising plan must be considered as a catastrophe. The circles of the Estonian Communist Party had a completely wrong picture of both their own forces and the opposition. Own forces were overrated ten times and the opposition was thought to be unreasonably weak. The hope that a part of the army and majority of the workers would join uprising was completely pulled out of thin air. They totally lacked the plan for the possible failure of uprising.

Professor Dr. Hain Rebas gives a destructible assessment to the communists’ plans but he poses an irritable question, “why the Estonian authorities allowed the uprising to happen having known everything so precisely?” Taking into account that in the course of uprising the communists murdered 25 Estonian citizens, the answer offered here is cynical though right in the opinion of the author. Without a failed uprising it would have never been possible in the democratic Estonian Republic to shoot nearly 200 communists in a few days and actually physically eliminate the Communist Party and the danger of communism altogether. Thus, the
The uprising that had to end in a failure was in the interest of Estonia in every way and justified the moderate number of victims.

**5. Forces and leaders of the uprising**

Instead of the planned 2000 members of the impact detachments all over Estonia on December 1, only 279 armed communists rebelled in Tallinn. Approximately 100 people out of them had come from the Soviet Union just before the uprising. About half of them were citizens of Estonia who were wanted by the police in Estonia. They were hiding in the Soviet Union and had crossed the border illegally. The rest of them were citizens of the Soviet Union, a part of them had crossed the border legally. Out of the captured rebels - citizens of the Soviet Union - 6 possessed a diplomatic passport and worked in the embassy of the Soviet Union in Tallinn; 33 had come to Tallinn as the Soviet workers of “Dobroflot” and “Tsentrosojuz”, organizations that dealt in foreign trade. Necessary weapons and money was brought to Estonia partly with the help of agents, who crossed the border illegally, partly with the Soviet cargo ships in ports of Tallinn. In the course of suppression of the uprising, the Estonian authorities found 5 Colt-Thompson submachineguns of the U.S. origin, 55 rifles, 150 handguns and revolvers of different types. The rebels used and were deprived 65 hand grenades and 8 melinite-hand bombs in total.

The members of the impact detachments who came from the Soviet Union were actual power of the uprising. The element recruited locally was predominantly uncertain. After a signal, less than 10% of men showed up in the secret apartments, although they were not informed about the real purpose of the convening. When men were together, the agents who had come from the Soviet Union took to guard of the exits and no one was allowed to leave. Only then the reason on convening was announced to them. It came as a shock to majority of them and in spite of guarding 17 revolutionaries managed to escape the convening locations.

The supreme commander of the uprising was Jaan Anvelt, 40. He was leader of the puppet government that operated during the War of Independence in areas occupied by the Soviet Russia. His unrealistic picture of the situation in Estonia was one of the main reasons why hopeless rebellious attempt was tried. Trying to copy the Georgian model he foresaw seizing power for 24 hours, so that the “war-revolution committee” headed by an undistinguished party soldier Valter Klein, 32, could request help from the Red Army. The plans concerning purely military part of the uprising were compiled by staff officers educated in the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army, Harald Tummeltau, 25, and Karl Rimm, 33. Plan in itself was a professional and determined conquering of strategic junctions in Tallinn by a sudden assault by impact detachments in its first phase. In the second phase the conquered locations
had to be held with the help of additional personnel resources and weapons until the invasion of the Red Army. The authors of the plan were not to blame that basic data given to them was incorrect, i.e. the available force in the first phase was smaller by magnitude and there were no reserves altogether because the units did not go over and the workers did not join in. The Red Army and the Baltic Navy were combat ready on the borders of Estonia on the eve of the uprising but the assault was cancelled as the uprising failed.

As to the leading of uprising, there was no actual central lead. Both Anvelt and his military second in command – a Red Army staff officer August Lillakas, 30 – were together with the impact detachments. Rimm was a chief of staff by name, but “staff” that at first was situated in a secret apartment at Kadaka Road and later in Tonismäe, actually consisted of 17 terrorists in reserve who ran away when they heard of defeat. All members of the impact detachments operated on their own after leaving the secret apartment.

6. The course of the uprising

The impact detachments started their activities more or less at the same time at 5.30 in the morning.

The Ministry of War

The building of the Ministry of War was attacked at 5.25 by a group of 23 terrorists at the moment when the duty officer Captain Hermann Vunn (VR I/3), 30, was on his control round in the building. Duty NCO Sergeant Major Rudolf Aaman, 23, was in the sentry room and the guard platoon was asleep in its quarters. Private August-Mihkel Keng, 19 was on sentry. The terrorists dressed in the Estonian Army uniforms entered and opened fire from their revolvers on the doorway at Private Keng but missed probably because of being nervous. Private Keng jumped at the intruders and hit the first one with his bayonet causing serious injuries. Taking advantage of a momentary confusion private Keng dodged from fire into the sentry room. A moment later the terrorists threw three hand grenades and one bomb along the corridor towards the quarters of the guard platoon and duty officer and destroyed doors, windows and made a hole in the floor. Part of the intruders stormed to the first floor where according to their (misleading) information there had to be the military communication center. The other half rushed towards the rooms of the guard platoon. But Sergeant Major Aaman, Corporal Richard Brücker, 22 and Private Keng were there to meet them and held the enemy in one spot by fire until the guard platoon got dressed and arranged itself. During this time, Corporal Brücker was injured in the head by a bomb fragment and was losing blood. The decisive resistance made the terrorists escape. Now Sergeant Major Aaman together with Private Leppik hurried into the courtyard and opened fire from a light-machinegun at the windows of the first floor. The terrorists escaped in a great
hurry. Only one of them who had hid in a closet was late and was discovered in the search of the building.

Warding off the attack showed high level of training and morals of the Estonian Army. The matter was decided by fearless actions of Private Keng who belonged to the post-war generation. It also became obvious that in a critical situation an NCO could command a sub-unit also without an officer. Keng, together with the veterans of the War of Independence Aaman and Brücker, received the Cross of Freedom for their brave actions.

After warding off the attack officers started gathering in the Ministry of War and naturally it became the center of suppressing the uprising.

**The 10TH Infantry Regiment**

The regiment staff and officers’ mess in Juhkentali was attacked by an impact detachment of 27 men. The terrorists broke into the casino and murdered 2nd Lieutenants Harald Busch from Border Guard and Helmut Viiburg from the 10th Regiment and Oskar-Martin Punnison from the Signals Battalion in their sleep. The officers did not have apartments in Tallinn yet and they stayed in the mess. But the activities ended with those murders. The clerk guarding in the staff emptied his weapon at the rebels who got intimidated by that and escaped firing occasional shots in return. The clerk was slightly wounded. The regiment barracks were not attacked.

**The Signals Battalion**

A group of 15 terrorists broke into the staff of the Signals Battalion that was situated in the same building with the 10th Regiment and killed the duty officer military official Adolf Eller. However, he managed to raise alarm and sergeant major of the Training Company, August Schaurup, 22, who had taken part in the War of Independence, arranged a counterblow. Senior NCO Turi together with junior NCOs Ehrenpreis and Sternfeld were the first to storm out of the building and captured two terrorists who were shot on the spot, others escaped in panic. Schaurup was decorated with the Cross of Freedom.

**The Transport-Tank Division**

In the Tank Company of Division, located in the same building with Signals Battalion training company, was NCO Loorents who was recruited by the communists. At the moment of attack of the group of terrorists of 30 men Loorents grabbed a weapon from the sentry and broke into garage and destroyed the engines of all tanks except of one. Loorents started the tank that was in order and drove into courtyard where an attack to the crew room was happening. But Sergeant Major Rudolf Kaptein, 26, with the experience of the War of Independence woke up the crew by firing a shot to the ceiling from his revolver and together with a junior NCO Alfred Klemmer, 19, who belonged to the post-war generation, took the unit to counter attack. The communists escaped into the garage but Kaptein together with junior NCO Madisson and Private Tinn kicked them
out of there as well. Then Kaptein jumped onto the tank and killed the traitor Loorents firing his revolver into the tank through shutter. Kaptein and Klemmer received the Cross of Freedom.

Terrorists also attacked the Division Training Company in Gilde Street but here the company Commander Major Johan Mahlapuu was present himself. He quickly arranged defense and a few machinegun bursts were enough to make the rebels escape.

The hand-weapon stores of the Food and Supplies Office were also under defence of the educational establishments that were located in Tondi and that made it the main target for rebels. 56 terrorists armed with submachineguns participated in the attack. The attack began at 5.27 with throwing grenades into the windows of barracks and the mess. Then the terrorists dressed in Estonian uniforms broke into the quarters of cadets on the ground floor and unsighted fire of sub-machineguns at sleeping cadets. Cadets Arnold Allebras, Aleksander Tedder, Aleksander Tomberg and August Udras were killed, 9 cadets were injured (Dreimann, Eckbaum, Hanni, Jakobson, Mikk, Mölder, Saulep, Stamm and Steinbick). Noise woke up the second cadet company on the first floor. Headed by a 21-year old cadet with no war experience, Albert Pessor the cadets ran to meet the communists on stairway. Cadet Pessor killed one and injured another terrorist, got injured himself and fell. Cadets Paas and Johanson stormed over him into hand-to-hand fight. Another rebel was killed. The communists became frightened and escaped. 9 of them were captured at once. Cadet Pessor received the Cross of Freedom.

Captain Eduard Margusson (VR II/3) took a group of cadets and by following rebels reached their staff in the “Reimann house”. It was surrounded and the people inside it were captured. The rest of the terrorists staff team now escaped to Tönismäe. At the same time cadet Schwalbe caught a patrol car that the terrorists used to fetch weapons from Tondi. Terrorists were captured.

The Flight Division

The Flight Division in Lasnamäe was the only military object that was temporarily taken over by an impact group of 13 men. The reason for that was a recruited motorist Kaat who aided the attack from inside and malevolent inactivity of two junior officers present (2nd Lieutenants Fleischer and Rätsepp). Both officers were shot according to the decision of drumhead court-martial. Base was reoccupied by the aircraftsmen under the command of Majors Karl Haas (VR I/3) and Juhan-Karl Fischer and supported by an armored vehicle. One terrorist was killed, the others escaped. The commander of the group forced a pilot-motorist Päev to take him to Russia but Päev fooled the terrorist and landed on Estonian side. Kaat, however, managed to get to Russia by plane, the aircraft was returned.
The Police Cavalry Reserve

The Cavalry Reserve in Lennuki Street was attacked by 37 terrorists in three groups that arrived at different times. The first group threw three grenades into the windows but the grenades bounced back and exploded on the street. A bomb flew in a window but the terrorists had forgotten to activate it and it did not explode. The policemen immediately opened fire from the windows and the rebels escaped tugging along also the groups that had arrived with a delay. The communists scattered delivering occasional cover fire. The policemen who had ran out at once killed two rebels on the spot.

Toompea

17 terrorists were directed to attack the government buildings in Toompea. The guard team of the Toompea castle put up an energetic resistance. Private Jaan Bergson was killed, senior NCO Aleksander Int was mortally wounded. The watch commando retreated while firing into the Parliament rooms. The terrorists hesitated to follow them but they killed a cleaning woman Marta Grünberg who had arrived to work. At the same time house of the Prime Minister was attacked. At the very same time the principal of Toomkooli School Eduard Grünwaldt drove to work and was killed together with his driver Heinrich Burmeister. That was the limit of the communist achievements. General Ernst Pöder (VR I/1), Colonel Karl Parts (VR I/1, II/2, II/3) and Colonel Oskar Raudvere (VR I/3) impact detachments arrived in Toompea supported by an armored vehicle. The communists escaped in terror, those trapped in the castle jumped out of the windows into the Schnelli pond. Majority of them was caught by a commando of Lieutenant Johannes Ambos.

Three terrorists tried to attack also the house of a former Minister of Interior Karl Einbund at 1 Kaevu Street. Grenade thrown into the window bounced back and exploded on the street. It scared the communists who escaped firing occasional shots.

Balti Railway Station

Balti Railway Station together with the 5th Police Department was conquered by a group of 16 rebels including Jaan Anvelt who murdered Constable Mihkel Nutt with his own hands. The district chief Herman Ubin was killed there as well. When the station was in the communists’ hands the Minister of Transport Karl Kark arrived. As three saboteurs had tried to blow up Mustjõe bridge in Aegviidu and
the Minister, having heard that, planned to go there himself. As soon as the Minister stepped out of the car, the terrorists’ bullets hit him and he fell down dead on the pavement in front of the station.

The communists who had conquered the station agitated the railway workers to join them but the latter refused. Thereafter, the furious communists murdered Edmund Mikker and Priidik Hoov. When young railway-trainees Kristov Tiik and Artur Fogt tried to run away in shock, they were shot in cold blood.

At the time when the communists were busy murdering Estonian workers, the platoons from the NCO School headed by Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Rossländer surrounded the station. At 8.15 he personally took the men to storm since at the same moment Anvelt escaped from his detachment in a great hurry. The terrorists fought in despair among the dead bodies that they had murdered. Lieutenant Colonel Rossländer was killed. Major Karl Ainson (VR I/3) took over the leadership; 2nd Lieutenant Järv assisted him. The station was taken back and four rebels were captured alive. Rossländer was decorated posthumously with the Cross of Freedom.

Anvelt escaping from the station accidentally met Lieutenant Commander Karl Stern (VR II/3) and shot him on the spot.

The center of civilian communication in Vene Street was attacked by 12 terrorists who rapidly took over an object that was not guarded. But soon General Pödder arrived with five men, an armored vehicle and a platoon from the Training Battalion of the NCO School. Two terrorists were shot and 8 were captured.

The Station of Tallinn-Väike was conquered by 5 terrorists who killed the stationmaster’s assistant Johannes Laanus and senior constable Hendrik Lossmann. Having sawed two telephone poles in halves the rebels escaped with no obvious reason.

Near Russalka’s monument the terrorists killed a border guard member Johannes Kruusmann by shooting him in the back. The rebels devastated the 2nd Police Department at Narva Road and killed a senior duty constable Jaan Holts and Constable Johannes Kumel, and left after that in a hurry.

7. Conclusion

The uprising failed completely. At 12.45 an official announcement was published in which, among other things, it was said:

In the capital there is complete order. Offices are doing their everyday work. Outside Tallinn all over the country there is peace... According to the decision of the government there is established martial law and Lieutenant General J. Laidoner is appointed the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces with the powers of the Supreme Commander.

Already at 11.00 the Supreme Commander issued Order No 1 in which he
said among other things: *Every rebellion against a lawful regime must be suppressed in the most decisive way... I command to bring everyone rebelling against the lawful regime to the court martial.* In his order half an hour later the Supreme Commander gave the Governor General authority to the division commanders in posts.

In the course of the uprising 26 Estonian citizens were killed and 41 were injured. Out of the dead, 12 were military people and 5 were police officials, out of the injured, the corresponding figures are 25 and 3. 14 rebels were killed with weapons in hand. After the uprising two more shootings took place – on December 4 in Tupsi farm and December 6 in Rakfeld apartment – where a total of 6 terrorists were killed. 3 were shot when they attempted to escape. According to the decision of a drumhead court-martial 155 terrorists were shot. It included Lillakas, who was captured in Aegviidu in Bogdanov apartment. Estonia in all got rid of 178 enemy agents and 209 were sentenced to prison. Among 387 agents who were rendered harmless were also those who got cold feet before the uprising and did not come to the collecting locations but were turned in by their comrades. 199 managed to cross the border, including Anvelt and Rimm. The Communist Party in Estonia did not get on its feet again and in 1930 there was not even an underground center in Estonia. In 1938 the members of the Estonian Communist Party were counted 130, including the ones in prison.

1 Communist Youth International and the Organization of War Veterans, Red Trade Union International (Profintern); Children’s-, Women’s-, Peasants’-, Blacks’- and Sports’ Internationals, International Red Aid and Worker Aid, Union of Friends of the Soviet Union, International anti-imperialistic League and the Proletarian League of Freethinkers, Revolutionary Union of Writers and Artists and World Committee to Fight War and Fascism.

2 Mark at that time equals approximately half a Crown today.
The article that follows is by Lt Col A J Parrott RLC British Army presently serving as a member of the Directing Staff at the Baltic Defence College. There is a tendency by some to think that the October Revolution in Russia in 1917 and the end of the First World War in November 1918 were tidy events that by themselves redefined Central and Eastern Europe. Nothing could be further from the truth and fighting between a bewildering variety of protagonists continued after October 1917 until, in the context of the Baltic States, early 1923. This article aims to do no more than outline the brief involvement of the British Army in the events of 1919 in Estonia and North West Russia.

With Lieutenant Colonel Hope Carson in Estonia and Russia

Following the end of the First World War it was British, and Allied, policy to provide support to the White Russians opposing the Bolsheviks. Some obligation was felt towards the White Russians whose regime and forces had, prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, opposed the Central Powers in the east and, besides, there was considerable opposition to the Bolsheviks whose revolutionary ideas, it was felt, might easily spread to the west. Additionally the Allies had no wish to see the Germans, beaten in the west at great cost, take advantage of the confused situation in the east for their own purposes.

In the aftermath of the First World War, however, there was no enthusiasm amongst the Allies for a sustained and substantial military involvement in the vast open spaces of Russia. Indeed in the United Kingdom, with demobilisation in progress, elements of the Army came close to mutiny at the prospect of deployment to Russia and other Allied countries experienced similar situations. The support given to the White Russians was therefore somewhat half-hearted. Much equipment was gifted to the White Russians and other Anti-Bolshevik forces and Allied forces were established in North Russia, Siberia and South Russia to stiffen White Russian resolve. With this support the White Russians were expected to defeat the Bolsheviks. The Allies, however, were less than united in their support and the White Russians too lacked unity, were poorly organised and irresolute. In time the Bolsheviks prevailed.

The United Kingdom at this time had
no clear policy towards the Baltic Nations. In so far as the Baltic Nations opposed Bolshevism then they were supported but initially, at least, there was no active support for Baltic independence and at first the United Kingdom opposed the Estonians reaching agreement with the Bolsheviks at the Treaty of Tartu. As the White Russian efforts failed, though, support for and recognition of Baltic independence grew, the limitation of German aims and ambitions being an important consideration.

In Estonia the part played by the Royal Navy at this time is well known. From December 1918 and throughout 1919 British naval forces were tasked with blockading the Russian Baltic Fleet in its base at Kronstadt. They achieved a high degree of success with this task and General Laidoner, Commander of Estonian forces in the Estonian War of Independence, believed that this success contributed in great measure to the achievement of Estonian independence. ¹

Perhaps because their efforts contributed to no lasting success the part played by the British Army is less well remembered. Eleven Infantry Regiments of the British Army, however, have battle honours for service at Archangel and Murmansk in 1918 and 1919 and two, The Middlesex Regiment and the Royal Hampshire Regiment also have battle honours for service in Siberia.²

In addition a number of small detachments from the British Armed Forces served outwith the forces outlined above and one of these is the volunteer tank detachment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel E. Hope Carson in Estonia and North West Russia. Considerable materiel support was given to both the White Russian North West Army, commanded by General Yudenitch, and the Estonian forces. Most of this support was given without accompanying personnel but with tanks, the use and maintenance of which was more difficult, the story was different.

Lt Col Hope Carson’s detachment, consisting entirely of volunteers, was formed at Swanage, on the south coast of England, in July 1919 with a total of 48 personnel, 22 of them being officers. The detachment arrived in Tallinn from the port of London on the night of 5/6 August 1919 aboard the SS Dania, a ship formerly in the German service but now laden with materiel for the White Russians. During 6 August the detachment was unloaded from the SS Dania and entrained while Lieutenant Waine, the reconnaissance officer went forward to Narva to secure accommodation and make arrangements, including the construction of a ramp, for unloading the tanks. On 7 August the detachment arrived in Narva. In his articles, in the journal of the Royal Tank Corps, Lt Col ³ Hope Carson suggests that perhaps only one of the detachments tanks arrived in Narva on that day. He refers to General Yudenitch making a thorough inspection of “the tank”, being very interested in it and giving permission for it to cross onto the Russian, eastern side of the Narva River where the unloading ramp had been constructed.

Towards the end of August, the dates are not entirely clear in Lt Col Hope Carson’s account, two tanks were deployed
by train from Narva to Pskov about 100 miles to the south. Estonian forces held Pskov, some 20 miles east of the Estonian border inside Russia, but they were under heavy pressure from the Bolsheviks and the intention was to mount a reinforced battalion counter attack using the two tanks to relieve the pressure. Lt Col Hope Carson relates that General Yudenitch’s conference, held in the railway carriage compartment he was using as an office, was “interesting” with as many officers as possible squeezed into the compartment and English, French and Russian being “amongst” the languages used. General Yudenitch told the meeting that the situation was critical and arrangements were being made to evacuate the town. There was obviously still an intention to go ahead with the counter attack because Lt Col Hope Carson gives details of his reconnaissance, during the afternoon following the conference, to the south of Pskov with Colonel Puskar the local commander of the Estonian forces. However, on rejoining Lieutenant Akerlind who was in charge of the tanks, which had not yet been unloaded, he relates that he found the train on the point of pulling out to the north amidst some confusion as to whether the town was surrounded or not. It appears that they were fortunate to escape as Lt Col Hope Carson refers to a bridge being blown up shortly after their departure.

Following his account of the aborted Pskov operation Lt Col Hope Carson makes a number of comments regarding co-operation between the Estonians, concerned simply to keep the Russians out of Estonia, and the White Russian’s North West Army whose aim was to capture Saint Petersburg but who were also opposed to Baltic independence. Both sides to the Russian conflict opposed Estonian independence but for the moment keeping the Bolsheviks out of Estonia meant for the Estonians supporting the White Russians. The hard-pressed White Russians could only hope to turn their attention to the Baltic nations following success elsewhere.

Back at Narva in the early part of September there was time for training. The White Russians formed a new battalion, named the Tank Push Battalion, for the particular purpose of working with the tanks. Lt Col Hope Carson speaks of battle practices and demonstrations being carried out and comments favourably on the troops of the new battalion describing them as “exceedingly good”. During the first week of September the detachment received two more tanks bringing the total to six. Lack of space had prevented these machines from being loaded onto the SS Dania and instead they had followed later on a ship from Hull. They are reported as having been in very poor condition on arrival and needing much work done to them under the direction of Lieutenant Wilson, the detachment’s engineer.

On 11 September three tanks deployed by train with the Tank Push Battalion south from Narva to the vicinity of Gdov, a small town about 35 miles south of Narva on the eastern side of Lake Peipsi. Lt Col Hope Carson mentions being asked to provide two tanks but deciding to take three to ensure that he always had two
available. Operations against the Bolshevists lasted four days and the support of the tanks was considered a great help in recapturing a number of villages and pushing the enemy back. All three tanks were named and, not allowing for manoeuvre but taking distances from the map, it was estimated that Captain Cromie travelled 99.5 miles, Brown Bear did 96 miles and First Aid covered 81 miles. First Aid had been so named by General Yudenitch, this being the tank he inspected on its arrival in Narva. The account of the operations in the Gdov area makes clear the difficulties that were experienced in operating the tanks in forest areas with narrow, poorly surfaced roads and bridges unable to take the weight of the tanks.

Concerned to ensure the availability of his machines for operations “further north”, which it is assumed refers to the St Petersburg area, Lt Col Hope Carson made arrangements in mid-September to bring Captain Cromie, Brown Bear and First Aid back to Narva for overhaul. His intention was to replace them with the other three tanks, including the two recently arrived from England and still needing extensive work on them, which under the command of Captain Craven were to remain at Gdov for morale purposes while being worked on. Nevertheless, only a couple of days later Lt Col Hope Carson gave his authority for these machines to be used in a reserve role and a few days later, with the front line being reported as heavily pressed, he gave further authority for the tanks to be used for a counter attack as long as thereafter they were returned to Narva. Later Lt Col Hope Carson returned to Gdov when it was obvious that his instructions for the use of the tanks, backed by the Army Commander, were being ignored. At a conference, though, he was told that the Army Commander had now agreed to the use of the tanks. For a further few days the two tanks that were still in working order were involved in operations, covering at least 80 miles each. One that was damaged and beyond local repair was guarded on the spot where it had become a casualty. On 2 October all three tanks finally returned by train to Narva under the command of Captain McCrostie. Lt Col Hope Carson’s account refers to the very considerable difficulties experienced in recovering and loading the damaged machine. He also notes the apparent lack of loyalty shown by the White Russian senior officers to each other. He reports that some were happy as long as they got their own way and cared little for the impact this would have on others and comments that under such conditions co-ordination was not possible.

Lt Col Hope Carson had returned to Narva on 1 October to find that preparations were being made for an advance on St Petersburg, or Petrograd as it was then being called by the Bolsheviks. It is obvious from his account that he was very disappointed that the operations in the Gdov area had deprived him of the opportunity of supporting this advance with his full force of six tanks. On 11 October Captain Cromie, Brown Bear and First Aid participated in a preliminary operation to take the town of Jamburg from the Bolsheviks. Jamburg is only some 20 miles east of Narva but the tanks were
taken to a point 2 miles west of the town by train and unloaded on a specially prepared ramp. Attacking at dawn the tanks led the way towards the town but, not being able to cross any of the bridges over the Luga River into the town centre on the eastern bank could only play a supporting role thereafter. The attack was a complete success and in a special order to his troops on the day following the attack General Glazenap the White Russian Commander made particular mention of Lt Col Hope Carson. It was only on 15 October after work to improve certain bridges and improve a ford across the Luga River that the three tanks could cross to the eastern bank and reach Jamburg railway station. On the evening of 17 October, once trucks and vitally an engine had been procured, the tanks were able to depart for Gatchina, 50 miles to the east and only some 25 miles south west of St Petersburg, which had been secured by the White Russian infantry on 15 October. Lt Col Hope Carson also makes reference in his account to the difficulty of bringing forward supplies and spare parts from Narva to Jamburg by road.7

On 19 October the three tanks moved forward from Gatchina to support the infantry who it was reported had been stopped by the Bolsheviks at Ontolovo 8 miles north of Gatchina on the road to St Petersburg. Two of the tanks were delayed with engine trouble but one reached Ontolovo and passed through to join the infantry a mile further up the road. With evening approaching and concerned about fire from the Bolshevik armoured train on the railway a mile or so to the north-west Lt Col Hope Carson gathered his three tanks in Ontolovo for the night. The next morning the attack was resumed at six-o-clock with the tanks operating to the east of the main road to avoid fire from the armoured train. First Aid advanced with supporting infantry some 6 miles to within quarter of a mile of Tsarskoe Selo, the village only 12 miles or so from the centre of St Petersburg where had been situated the country residence of the Russian Tsars. Captain Cromie operated on the right flank of the attack dealing with Bolshevik infantry in two small villages a couple of miles south of Tsarskoe Selo. Brown Bear, which had started the day with mechanical problems, caught up and, also operating on the right flank dealt with the enemy in a third small village. By mid-day the tanks were short of petrol and suffering from mechanical problems and Lt Col Hope Carson informed the General that they would not be able to support further operations that day.8

On 21 October only one tank, First Aid, was fit for duty and commanded by a White Russian officer with a Russian crew this tank played an active part in operations south of Tsarskoe Selo for a further three days. Captain Cromie and Brown Bear returned to Gatchina for repairs and were joined there by the other three tanks, which had been brought up from Narva. Plans were in hand for further offensive operations and Captain Manning took part in reconnaissance towards Pulkova. On 24 October with the Bolshevik forces having gained the upper hand Lt Col Hope Carson was asked...
to make three tanks available for a counter attack between Gatchina and Tsarskoe Selo. Two of the tanks recently brought up from Narva, Deliverance and White Soldier were used along with Brown Bear. In this operation White Russian officers commanded all the tanks with Russian crews.

The counter attack did not restore the situation and at midnight on 25/26 October Lt Col Hope Carson received orders to entrain to move back to Jamburg. Amidst much confusion the three tanks that had taken part in the counter attack and were still operating forward of Gatchina were located and recovered. The last tank did not get back to Gatchina until eight o’clock on the morning of 26 October. It was loaded immediately and the train left for Jamburg two hours later. Lt Col Hope Carson makes no mention of them elsewhere in his account but reports that the train load included two light French tanks. Jamburg was reached on 27 October and work continued on repairing the tanks. A few days later, once a temporary bridge had been completed, the detachment returned to its base at Narva.

By 4 November the Bolsheviks had recaptured Gatchina. The White Russians evacuated Gdov on 6 November and on 12 November Jamburg fell to the Bolsheviks once again. In the days that followed the White Russian North West Army collapsed. Many of its personnel crossed into Estonia and here some were disarmed but others who were prepared to assist the Estonians retained their arms and took up positions with the Estonian forces. Some preferred to give themselves up to the Bolsheviks. Starting on 18 November the Bolsheviks attempted over a period of about two weeks to break the Estonian lines at Narva but all their attempts failed and on 3 January 1920 the Treaty of Tartu was signed ending the conflict between Estonia and Russia.

On 18 November the tank detachment withdrew from Narva to Tallinn. Lt Col Hope Carson mentions that the withdrawal to Tallinn was delayed while Estonian permission was sought for the Russian personnel to accompany the tanks. His articles in the journal of the Royal Tank Corps conclude without saying exactly when the British volunteers left Estonia and without saying what became of the tanks. It is thought that the Estonian Army, which later purchased more tanks from the United Kingdom, took the tanks into service. All of these tanks of course fell into the hands of the Red Army when the Soviet Union forcibly annexed Estonia on 17 July 1940. Lt Col Hope Carson’s articles give an excellent insight into a fascinating corner of British military history that remains largely unknown. His articles nowhere mention the name of the sixth tank. It seems unlikely that this tank was not named when all the others were but it seems that the name of this tank must remain a mystery.

1 From page 5 of Britain and the Estonian War of Independence, a booklet produced by the British Embassy in Tallinn on the 80th Anniversary of the Republic of Estonia with the assistance of Mart Laar, the Prime Minister of Estonia.

2 Details taken from A Guide to the Regiments and Corps of the British Army on the
Regular Establishment by J. M. Brereton

3 Lt Col E. Hope Carson DSO MC published his account of his time in Estonia and North West Russia in eight articles in the Royal Tank Corps Journal in 1927. Most of the details in this piece are drawn from those articles. A summary of these events can be found in A Short History of The Royal Tank Corps published by Gale & Polden Ltd of Aldershot.

4 From Chapter 3 of Lt Col Hope Carson’s account. Return to Narva and Operations in the Gdov District. Lt Col Hope Carson was very impressed with the Russian’s ability to make quick and effective use of the plentiful supplies of timber for improving routes and bridges.

5 From Chapter 4 of Lt Col Hope Carson’s account. Again to Gdov. Given the effect that even three tanks had north of Gatchina it is interesting to speculate what would have happened if all six had been available.

6 In his account Lt Col Hope Carson states “such confusion could not have happened with anything approaching staff work”.

7 From Chapter 5 of Lt Col Hope Carson’s account. Jamburg. It should be noted that the road they were having such difficulty with is the main road from St Petersburg to Tallinn.

8 From Chapter 6 of Lt Col Hope Carson’s account. Gatchina. It is not made clear exactly which General he informed but it is recorded that by way of several messages the General sought to get the tanks back into action as soon as possible.

9 From Chapter 7 of Lt Col Hope Carson’s account. Review of the Operations and Causes of Failure. The White Russian North West Army collapsed very quickly partly because it had no reserves and partly because the Bolsheviks had been able to transfer troops from South Russia where their situation had improved to the St Petersburg area.
In its first issue the Baltic Defence Review declared its commitment to participate in a broad public debate on security and defence policy. The second issue has been designed with this purpose.

The aspirations of three Baltic States to become the next NATO members have long been reflected in their westward policies. Following the Washington Summit all three states have started work on their national Membership Action Plans, therefore it is natural for the Review to dedicate the first section of this issue to the plans.

The second section publishes the first two articles in a series of articles on Baltic Co-operation and the future. In its second issue the Baltic Defence Review has chosen to concentrate on the Baltic Battalion and will in the third issue focus on naval co-operation and BALTRON.

The third section analyses some events in Russia with specific relevance for security and defence of the Baltic Three.

The fourth section is intended to be a permanent section in the Review bringing articles on the military history relevant for the three Baltic countries for whom the Baltic Defence College, as well as the Review, are working.

In December 1999 faculty members of the Baltic Defence College decided to form a non-governmental and non-profit organisation, Baltic Security Society, with the aim of contributing to the integration between the military and society. The purpose is also to enhance knowledge of foreign policy, security politics and military knowledge in the Baltic region and to participate in and promote public debate on these subjects. The Baltic Defence Review will in future be published under the auspices the Baltic Security Society, which will give the Review a freer role in the public debate. In order to make the finance of an independent Review possible I would encourage all with interest in Baltic security to make use of the possibility to subscribe to the Review. The subscription form is to be found on the last page of the Review.

I would finally, on behalf of the Baltic Defence Review like to express our gratitude to the many diligent and skilled authors, who have contributed to this issue.

Ole Kvernø,
Head of the Editing Board