Supporting States Advice and Defence Development

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Providing bilateral and multilateral help and support to develop the defence forces of the Baltic States is now a prioritised target of the foreign policy for a considerable number Western States.

After the first years in the beginning of the 1990s, of quite hesitant support to the development of the Baltic States’ defence forces, several attempts were made to focus development and support by offering a comprehensive framework.

The first was a sequence of advice sessions with the International Defence Advisory Board led by the British General Sir Garry Johnson, and composed of other retired or senior high level military officers or civil servants from the most active supporting states.

The next were national general advice framework reports: the U.S. “Defense Assessment” reports made by Major General Kievenaar and the “Defence Concepts and Plans” developed by the Danish Ministry of Defence and Chief of Defence Headquarters. Both were presented to the Baltic Security Assistance Group of states (BALTSEA), and both were received with general appreciation and support.

All this advice was very much in line with the Finnish advice and support directed towards Estonia from the very start. Even if the advice took different forms and foci, the main message was very much the same: the countries should start by concentrating their main effort on the creation of relatively lightly armed defence forces, where a significant part of the manpower would be mobilised, trained conscripts. A visible participation in international operations was politically important and desirable, but it should not compromise the main aim of developing a reliable and credible self-defence capability.

The advice also underlined that force development should be balanced in the sense that it should take place at a pace that could be supported by available funds, the quality of the infrastructure, as well as an educated, trained, and motivated cadre. The peacetime infrastructure should be
limited to what would be absolutely necessary, as any attempt to keep and maintain underused, poor quality installations would detract from the necessary focus on motivation through good quality of life and high quality of training.

These advice initiatives and reports were completed 3-4 years ago. Since then we have seen a most welcome increase in the willingness of supporting states to assist the Baltic States in their force development.

Supporting States have been offering substantial donations of equipment, in the best cases organised in complete packets, including spare parts and cadre training in use and maintenance (as happened in recent donation of vessels to the Baltic States’ navies and in some donations of equipment to the land forces).

There has been a willingness to enter into long-term training and other support commitments with advisors or trainers serving in the Baltic states for relatively long periods. What was previously mainly linked to the multinational programmes: BALTBAT, BALTRON, and BALTNET, has now spread to important parts of the bilateral support programmes. There is presently a substantial number of supporting states advisors working in the main staffs and defence ministries or linked to major support projects.

Another very important step has been the work with long term defence structure development plans in the three states, started early in Lithuania, but now well connected to the Membership Action Plans of all three states.

However, even if there is significant progress in important fields, development has stalled in other areas.

It has been very difficult for the three countries to reach domestic agreement about how the fully developed, mobilised wartime structures should look. However, it is one of the key points of this article that the important thing for a proper force and cadre development is to take the first, second, and third implementation steps in the right general direction. They can be guided by clearly realistic short-mid term objectives. Actually taking these steps is much more important than reaching an early consensus about the ideal and complete final structure.

There are several reasons why it may be a bad idea to wait for full agreement about the final structure:

Some key domestic actors may still harbour doubts about the utility of trying to develop such large structures. No small state can create a truly independent defence capability anyway. This makes it difficult in some front line states to define what force structure, beyond a minimal, symbolic level, the state should aim at. This again makes it a hard job to justify the spending of substantial resources on defence development, if the spending cannot be presented as an investment necessary to gain (or keep) credible and effective promises of outside defence support. Danish defence politics was dominated by that dilemma during the 20th Century. Not all states have realised, as Finland, the value of ignoring cool logic and going for the maximum defence resilience that can be developed without harming economic growth.

A second and related issue could be doubt about the willingness of society to face up to the degree of resource mobili-
sation and other preparations that are required to raise and support forces that are necessary for a viable initial defence capability. This latter doubt could be linked to the reaction against what seems to mirror the total mobilisation behind the military that the three states experienced in the Soviet period.

A third problem could be the very large difference between the present force level and any projected size of a fully mobilised force. Bridging this gap may look impossible. Earlier the doubt about the possibilities was linked to the fact that it would be impossible to arm or equip such a large force. With the level of donations of suitable equipment now possible, this is no longer a major bottleneck.

One could, however, add one additional reason why no clear target wartime structures have emerged. There is sometimes a clear tendency to go on looking for the perfect final solution rather than accepting that this is basically a futile exercise. This tendency may sometimes be linked to the fact that planning is a cheap, safe, and intellectually satisfactory exercise for its participants. Implementation on the other hand would be costly and could be risky. As long as one continues to improve on the plans, getting new advice from different sources to that end, the pitfalls of implementation will be postponed.

This lack of clarity about the end-state and the process of getting there pose particular challenges for advisors and other form of international support.

The advisors and support project officers arrive eager to do good during the months they work here. However, they are unfortunately only too likely to be without any prior knowledge or understanding of the defence problems of a small, poor, front-line state that is recovering after 50 years of totalitarian, militaristic, corrupt misgovernment. They only know their own system that mirrors the development of their own forces and the politico-economic and geo-strategic requirements of their own state during recent years. Most stay for too short a time to be able to learn differently and others find it difficult to accept what they learn.

The advisors and project officers are placed in weakly developed staff structures, sometimes manned by less than impressive officers or civil servants. This environment generates frustration and a lack of respect for what has been done prior to their arrival. Many of the supporting officers seem to possess very little knowledge about earlier support and advice initiatives. Where such knowledge does exist, the work previously done is too often rejected out of hand.

There are cases where a supporting state’s representative has simply left the Baltic state with two choices: either it copies the supporting state’s proven system fully (ignoring and compromising all previous developments) or loses the opportunity for support.

There have been too many cases of supporting states’ representatives actively undermining each other’s support projects, creating serious problems and delays for the Baltic state. Part of this has taken the form of advising the Baltic States against equipment donations from other supporting states. However, some criti-
The “undermining format” is also very unfortunate. It does not give the Baltic receiving state the benefit of hearing the pros and cons of each possibility.

Too much advice has simply had the character of “bessermachen”, offering marginal improvements to already existing plans, thereby causing significant delays in their implementation.

Based on the requirements of supporting states the Baltic States have developed mid-term structure development plans intended to create the framework for future assistance from supporting states. However, there is still clear pressure from the authorities of some supporting states on the Baltic States to accept off-the-shelf rather than tailored support projects, even if these programmes do not match the Baltic requirements.

In some cases important advice from a NATO authority representative is directly contrary to earlier advice coming from another senior alliance representative. The reason may be that the advice mirrors the immediate concerns of some alliance members instead of aiming to encourage steps that would support the membership aspirations of the three states. Too much advice mirrors a rather arrogant certainty that the future of all Europe will be a simple projection of the latest ten years history or it takes too little account of differences in geographic situation.

In one decisive area the supporting states have been surprisingly passive. No army can develop without collective training in the form of demanding and realistic low level (battalion-brigade) field exercises, some of which have to be combined with the exercising of foreseen system of mobilisation. Only such exercises will test and develop the cadre by giving relevant personal professional development by allowing the person to make mistakes and experience the friction that gets as close to operational reality as is feasible in peacetime. Only such exercises can test the available equipment, logistic system, command system, and procedures and lead to necessary adjustment of these procedures and doctrine. Only such exercises – combined with professional studies - can form a proper basis for later Command Post Exercise events and wargaming discussions. Such demanding field exercises would normally be planned and run at battalion or brigade level, as higher
level exercises involve too many constrains that increase artificiality. They should not be mistaken for exercises meant to train low-level SOPs or stage-managed demonstrations of the success of the existing force development or of a specific project. The fact that supporting states so far have not emphasised the need to learn by realistic exercises may be seen as another sign of lack of empathy with defence forces that are in a fundamentally different situation than their own.

One may suspect that the result of some of the advice given since the above mentioned advice initiatives of 3-4 years ago has been some waste of Baltic and supporting states money and delays in development. Based on this critical analysis of the recent past, the following advice could be offered to those supporting states that earnestly wish to support the three states in their defence and security aspirations:

1. Accept the present situation as the starting point. One theoretical example: A Nordic officer selection and education system may be more suitable to a frontline state with conscription than a British system. However, if a British system has been chosen, all supporting states should loyally assist in making that system work. As the Baltic state develops experience with the initially chosen system, it will have a better basis for developing a national system that mirrors the actual requirements. Then additional support and advice may be relevant.

2. The important thing now is to let the states get experience in implementation. Officers are just amateur bureaucrats in uniform until they learn by doing. It is totally unimportant if the infantry battalion group exercises are organised or equipped according to U.S., Swedish, Finnish, German, British or Danish model. The important thing is that the armies start getting practical experience with one, no matter which. To get proper experience at battalion level, however, two developments are necessary. Firstly, running the battalion should be separated from running the daily administration of the camp. The battalion commander and staff should be able to concentrate on planning and leading training. Secondly, the administration of officers should ensure that the peacetime battalion commander is a well-trained field grade officer rather than a subaltern.

3. The Baltic and supporting states should accept that the long term, fully mobilised wartime defence structure and defence plan is rather irrelevant to the present stage of force development. Before the cadre has realistic experience with training, operating, and supporting one infantry brigade, the far-away objective of 6 or 10 brigades is a rather less important issue. It is only relevant to the education of general staff officers to prepare them for the possible future support requirements. The only other situation where a possible long-term development structure is relevant is when the country is offered quality equipment (e.g. infantry weapons and simple fire support weapons) that does not require expensive maintenance. Before the first brigade or similar mobile formation headquarters starts exercising battalions in the field in combined arms tactics as well as in co-operation with local territorial defence forces,
the professional and structural development of the land force towards any potential wartime strength is a theoretical Pie-in-the-Sky.

4. The supporting states should support each other to a much higher extent than presently. Potential equipment donation projects should be evaluated in an open seminar form rather than being exposed to mutual sniping. There should be an understanding that the utility of the equipment in the Baltic states could differ from its use in the sending state.

5. All support should be based on sound knowledge of previous advice and better preparation of advisors. Disagreement with previous support should be presented openly, in a seminar form, and the impact of changes in course should be weighed against possibilities for further delays in implementation.

BALTSEA is properly the right forum for the development of guidelines for cooperation between supporting states that could be mirrored in the preparation of and instructions to advisors and project officers. However, so far we have been kept waiting.
Historical review of officer training in Lithuania

In 1918, after the declaration of the Independence of Lithuania, the Armed Forces of the country experienced shortage of officers. On 25 January 1919, a Military School was established in Kaunas. Its first chief was Gen. J. Galvydis-Bykauskas. Initially, studies lasted half a year or a year because after a short training the majority of the trainees were immediately sent to the front. From 1921 to 1929 advanced courses for officers were conducted to which courses for military materiel officers were attached in 1926. Here qualified pioneers, railway, communications and transport officers were trained. By 1940, the School had trained 21 classes of officers. In the autumn of 1940, with the beginning of the Soviet occupation, the Military School was transferred to Vilnius and stopped operating.

In 1931 a Higher Military School was established in Kaunas. Its objective was to train officers with higher education eligible to work at the General Staff and command major military units. The chiefs of the School were Gen. P. Kubiliunas, Gen. V. Karvelis and Gen. St. Račtikis. By 1940, three officer classes had been trained. During the Soviet occupation a lot of graduates and instructors were deported to the Soviet Union or killed. This meant that the officer training in Lithuania, which at that time was sufficiently strengthened, was disrupted.

In 1990, after the restoration of the independence of Lithuania, the Armed Forces of the country were in need of officers. Therefore, the same year an officer course at the Department of National Defence was established in Kaunas. Junior reserve officers that had served in the
Soviet Army underwent re-qualification there.

The Gen. Zemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania started as a National Defence School, which was established in 1992 under the decision of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Young people were trained here in two specialties: mechanized riflemen and border guards. By the 18 January 1994 decision of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, the Military Academy of Lithuania was established. In May of the same year the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania approved the Statute of the Academy which stated that the Military Academy of Lithuania is a higher educational institution training commanders and specialists of top qualification for the Lithuanian Armed Forces. In 1998, the Academy became directly responsible to the Minister of National Defence.

The foresight of the Military Academy of Lithuania

By the 24 February 2000 Order of the Minister of National Defence Col. Algis Vaiceliunas, who is a graduate from the Bundeswehr Commander Academy, Germany, was appointed the Commandant of the Military Academy of Lithuania and the period of changes started.

“I started heading the Military Academy of Lithuania in the year 2000 which is a significant historical point relating to the new social existence that embodies the era of changes, new information technologies and awareness”, says Col. Algis Vaiceliunas.
Col. A. Vaiceliunas. “The experience and skills accumulated by a number of developing countries are becoming a needless stuff in the 21st century, and consequently we face the necessity to essentially reform the professional training system. The year 2001 applicants to the Military Academy will find it completely changed. Changes will be reflected not only in the programs of studies but also in the possibility for the future cadets to choose one of the 3 Bachelor-degree programs - personnel management, transport and engineer management, and international relations. There are more novelties to come which, you will learn about after having read this article. I consider the Military Academy as the institution of changes. Change is the only steady process in the world.

To change in this variable world is a must although many people have not been able to do that in the ten years of independence. I am deeply convinced that we will succeed in everything and the Military Academy will be one of the most modern and prestigious higher educational institutions in the nearest future. The first signs have already appeared – this is indicated by the constantly growing number of applicants.

The Academy, on competitive basis, will accept high school graduates not older than 23 years of age and 25-year-old conscripts. Both will have to pass a professional suitability test and meet medical standards.

This year, 540 candidates including 62 females expressed their wish to participate in the entrance competition. 281 school-leavers met physical test requirements. This year, for the first time in the history of the Academy, we have 8 female cadets, which testifies to the irreversible processes not only at the Military Academy of

Female cadet of the Military Academy of Lithuania.
Lithuania but also in the democratization of the country.

First of all, I felt the necessity to reconsider the mission of the organization, the corporate philosophy, as well as such concepts as perfection, quality of education, innovations, imparting of national identity, patriotism, humane qualities of the future leader and, what is most important, strategic aims, necessary to achieve and retain the competitive edge.

It is inventiveness and not resources available that the future depends on. Inventiveness springs not from the elaborate strategic architect, but from a deeply perceived objective together with the vision of the tempting possibilities of the future.”

Mission of the Military Academy of Lithuania

The Gen. Jonas Zemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania (MAL) is a higher state officer training and qualification improvement military institution of the Republic of Lithuania – a constituent part of the National Defence System responsible to the Minister of National Defence. The Academy is also an independent scientific and educational institution training scientists, and developing and popularizing fundamental and applied military sciences.

The main tasks of MAL, defined by the Law on the Organization of the National Defence System and Military Service as well as the Academy statute, are the following:

- to train qualified officers and military unit leaders for the National Defence System of the Republic of Lithuania, providing them with higher education;
- to improve the qualification of officers of the National Defence System;
- to train officers in accordance with the NATO requirements and methodology;
- to provide conditions and possibilities for studying personnel to achieve a high proficiency level in English language, which is necessary for the integration into NATO, and for cooperation with military structures of NATO countries, as well as participation in international exercises, peacekeeping and other operations on equal basis;

All graduates of the program are appointed to command a motorized infantry platoon or take a position analogous to that of the platoon commander. Qualification requirements determine the mandatory training level of the officer and they define the post of the platoon commander and the educational objectives as well as tasks. The platoon commander is responsible for the platoon, its training, discipline, administration, safeguarding and maintenance of weapons, equipment and other requisites.

The main task of the platoon commander is to command the assigned platoon at the barracks, during training and military activities. He must be able to organize and execute combat, peacekeeping, territorial defence, military assistance to civilians and evacuation actions, humanitarian assistance and other tasks under various physical, organizational and psychological conditions. While executing tasks, he has to effectively utilize his knowledge and skills acquired during his studies.

An officer graduate from the Academy will have the following merits dutiful,
independent, have high moral principles, strong will and leadership capabilities. He must not skip responsibilities, and he must tend to the welfare of his soldiers, serve his country faithfully, and follow the Oath and laws of Lithuania, the Statute requirements and the orders of his commanders. He must keep his professional confidentiality of the state and military and improve his military knowledge and skills. An officer graduate has to be able to organize education and training of military personnel, uphold combat readiness, discipline and order in accordance with combat documents and statute requirements. He must be physically fit and hardened, well versed in military training subjects, pass the required tests and examinations with not less than 7 points out of the ten-point national assessment scale and achieve not lower than Level 2 (STANAG 6001) of English language proficiency. An officer graduate must be able to use computers in his every day work, apply the knowledge gained in management, pedagogy, psychology, ethics, aesthetics, law, tactics and general military training, weaponry, military and specialized material, engineer training, protection from means of mass destruction, military topography, means of communication, medical training, military administration and methodology.

In case of war or crisis MAL will operate as a military unit. The Commander of the Armed Forces in this case assigns tasks to the Academy.

By the year 2000 MAL has prepared 1294 officers and 43 NCOs. 185 officers had completed the studies at the Correspondence Department. 499 young people with university education had completed a platoon commander course run in accordance with the military training and had undergone a military training course. English language teaching and computer skill training were granted special attention. 198 officers attended a course in English and 84 in computers.


Officer training perspectives in Lithuania

In Brussels at the end of October 2000, Lithuanian diplomats and defense officials submitted to NATO Political Committee on Senior Level an updated programme for the year 2001 on the preparation of Lithuania for membership in NATO. Thereby Lithuania has officially begun the second round of preparation for the membership in compliance with the Membership Action Plan confirmed last year in Washington. A long-term development plan of the Armed Forces of Lithuania was also submitted in Brussels. The Minister of National Defense and the former Head of the Lithuanian Mission of NATO, ambassador L. Linkevicius stated that the current NATO command positively assesses the progress made by the Armed Forces of Lithuania, especially in the military personnel training and educational system.

We will try to make a short survey of the officer career possibilities in present-
day Lithuania. While studying at the Military Academy of Lithuania cadets cover the overall infantry platoon commander programme, perform practice in military units, and participate in exercises. After having attained the program and passed the qualification requirements, they acquire qualifications as a motorized riflemen platoon commander and are commissioned as lieutenants.

A Bachelor graduate in military science is assigned to one of the units of the Armed Forces of Lithuania and starts his service as the platoon commander. The top of his career in this position might be the deputy company commander.

After 3–4 years of service in the Armed Forces, in the position of the platoon commander or deputy company commander, the officer might have a possibility to achieve higher qualification in 2 ways:

- Serve in the battalion staff or department (not in a commanding position) and attend a shorter Course for Captains afterwards.
- Complete a 6-month Course for Captains.

The Course for Captains is conducted in 2 stages: company tactics and company service, battalion tactics and battalion staff service. This course can also be associated with the Masters-degree program (stage 2). Officers that have most successfully completed stage 1 studies and achieved the best results in their service could be sent to study at stage 2. While studying at stage 2 the officer must achieve Level 3 of the English language proficiency. The Course for Captains is planned to start in 2002. The Minister of National Defence will determine the number of students.

After the Course for Captains, officers can continue their career in 2 directions:

- The most distinguished and best course officers who have already served in the battalion staff are assigned the position of the company commander.
- Those with no service in the battalion staff will be assigned for service and afterwards promoted to company commander.

After 3-4 years of service in the Armed Forces as company commander, battalion staff officer and officers, who are studying for battalion commander or brigade staff officer can be selected for a Senior Staff Course at the Baltic Defence College. At the Baltic Defence College the officers study for a year and this education will qualify them for a position as members of a battalion staff or a higher position. The officers can also go abroad to study at military academies of various NATO countries.

The officer service system in the Armed Forces promotes constant improvement and wishes to seek higher levels of education and professional knowledge.

Commander Development at the Military Academy of Lithuania

Commander development is a gradual, progressive, and integral part of the military training when the cadets train as commanders of academic military units, execute tactical tasks during field training, and practice in Army units as platoon sergeants and platoon commanders.

While studying at the Military Academy of Lithuania cadets are granted the
possibility to obtain practical skills as commanders of military units at different levels.

In the first term, cadets are taught individual military actions in different types of battle in summer and winter to get acquainted with the organizational structure of the Army and with the evolution of weapon and their classification. Training in shooting of automatic weapons and small arms is conducted.

In the second term, cadets are trained to function as infantry squad leaders under different conditions that simulate various battle types. They must learn to operate as squad commanders.

Cadets get acquainted with illuminating and signaling means, learn to handle optical surveillance devices and different medium and heavy machine guns. They learn to master the basics of internal and external ballistics, and learn to conduct theoretical and practical exercises in shooting and armaments.

The second–year cadets’ functions as mentors for the first-year cadets. The objective of the 3rd and 4th terms is to teach cadets to perform the functions of the infantry platoon commander such as planning and executing various combat operations both in daytime and at night, as well as to fulfil various duties of platoon soldiers. They get acquainted with sniper rifles, Makarov, Czech, Colt pistols, modern submachine guns, night-vision devices, APC armaments, and infantry combat vehicles.

In the 3rd year of studies cadets perform the duties of the squad leader, platoon sergeant and company sergeant. In the 5th term the cadets are trained to perform as platoon commanders executing defensive and offensive operations under different circumstances and are also trained to execute territorial defence operations with no support from central place.

Cadets are acquainted with optical and lasers range-finders, modern mortars, and must master the firing rules from the APC armaments.

In the 6th term cadets get acquainted with the duties of the company commander. They organize, plan and execute different combat operations. Young men get acquainted with modern automatic grenade launchers, anti-tank guided missile system, portable air-defence weapons, and they learn to fire small arms, antitank weapons, and mortars and antitank grenade launchers.

After 3 years of studies the cadets will practice for four weeks in Army units as platoon sergeant and platoon commander. The aim is to provide cadets with self-confidence and experience, methodological and leadership skills in conducting soldiers’ training, in planning, organizing and controlling every day activities. It is also the aim to improve the skills to employ and maintain armaments and machinery.

In the 4th year of studies cadets perform the duties of the platoon commander and battalion commander. Rotation is applied meaning that after a certain period of time the cadet may be promoted to a higher position, remain in the same position or demoted to a lower position if he is not able to handle his position’s responsibilities.

The objective of the 7th term is to acquaint cadets with the work of the battal-
ion staff and its departments, to plan operations and prepare combat orders for defensive and offensive operations. Future commanders learn about different types of Command posts, their siting and installation. They also acquire knowledge in the rules for accounting and storing of armaments and ammunition, and familiarize themselves with heavy antitank grenade launchers and recoilless rifles.

In the final semester the structure of the United Nations is presented as well as its operations, its objectives and its tasks. During the combat commander course the readiness of cadets to carry out the duties of the platoon commander in various combat operations both in daytime and night is tested.

**Field Training at the Central Firing Range**

Every summer cadets go for 3-4 week training at the Central Firing Range. The training aims at developing future leaders, expanding knowledge of combat operations and developing practical skills, psychological endurance and improving cadets’ physical fitness. After they have achieved the theoretical knowledge practical skills are assessed.

2-3 weeks of the summer training is assigned for tactics. The training in tactics, firing, and combat support (field fortifications, installation and negotiation of obstacles, demolition operations, protection against means of mass destruction, communications etc.) is conducted at the firing range. During tactical training cadets to carry out the duties of the platoon commander in various combat operations both in daytime and night is tested.
det’s leadership-skills are developed by using various forms and methods of teaching (leading sub-units, to arrange ambushes, marches, raids, attacks, setting up camps, guarding and defending objects, and organizing offence and defence under various conditions). Combined training exercises are held during which cadets are assigned special tasks, which they must execute independently. Having been given assignments, cadets make decisions, prepare orders and command sub-units. Later, the results are discussed, instructors point out shortcomings and assess the work of cadets. To prepare the cadets for organizing and conducting firing exercises in sub-units, they learn to fire weapons assigned to the squad and platoon in daytime and at night under any weather conditions.

In combat support training the cadets are taught general military engineering: to install and negotiate engineer obstacles and barricades (antitank and antipersonnel minefields, wire and other obstacles), to set up battle field fortifications and structures, to camouflage positions, to execute the simplest demolitions as well as organize and uphold radio communications among sub-units. They learn to teach military personnel of sub-units to operate as sub-unit commanders in case radioactive, chemical, bacteriological and incendiary weapons are used. Field training is the basic form of training and it provides a possibility to consolidate theoretical knowledge under combat like conditions.

**The System of Studies at the Military Academy of Lithuania**

The Academy provides training for cadets and officers. Applicants admitted to the Academy are also called up for the mandatory military service, which they perform during their studies at the Academy.

During eight terms, three blocks of studies – academic, military science, formation and physical training are allotted an approximately equal period of time. In other words, the Academy combines academic and military training.

Summing up the overall duration of the four-year studies (Daytime Department), cadets undergo 1,588 hours of lectures. Their practical training covers 2,548 hours (tactical field training takes up more than 1,000 hours) and 2,406 hours are allotted for self-study (homework). The overall time amount of studies are 6,542 hours which is sufficient for cadets who have successfully completed their studies for the Bachelor’s degree.

Academic studies comprise three parts:
- Humanities and social education;
- Technical education;
- Management education.

Humanities and social education studies include foreign languages, history of the State of Lithuania, political science, ethics, aesthetics, pedagogy, psychology, logic, philosophy, sociology, and language culture.

Technical education consists of mathematics, physics, chemistry, applied mechanics computer science, engineering computer graphics, electrical engineering, and electronics.

Management education comprises management, economics, fundamentals of law,
mathematical methods in management, accounting and finance, marketing, management information systems, psychology, and other studies.

Theoretical military studies encompass courses in staff service, military administration, history of military art, and safety and ergonomics also known as special management education. Cadets also take many special development courses: in tactics, armaments and shooting, wheeled combat vehicles, combat vehicle maintenance technologies, combat engineer support, protection against mass destruction means, communications, commander training etc.

During the time assigned for formation and physical training, cadets study the statute of the national defence, take part in formation and physical training classes, combined field training, and during the second term in the fourth year of studies cadets take state examinations in tactics and management.

Starting in the year 2001 studies of how to reform the military educational system are planned: There will be a Stage I consisting of basic university studies, and upon completion of which the Bachelors Degree is conferred (4 years). Here the basic studies of military training are included, upon completion of which cadets are conferred the qualification of platoon commander and as lieutenants.

It is planned to organize basic studies for the Bachelor’s degree according to the following programs of studies
- Engineering management
- Personnel management
- International relations

Stage II is studies for the Masters-degree alongside the course for captains (1,5 - 2 years). It is planned to conduct programs of studies for the Masters-degree in two directions - management and international relations. Starting in the year 2002, the studies will be conducted parallel to a 6 month course for captains.

The course for captains involves company commander and junior staff officer training. The program of the course must conform to similar course programs of the other Baltic States, and must be coordinated with the study-program at the Baltic Defense College because graduates from the captains course can apply for Baltic Defence College.

Specialists from the American Command & General Staff College, the German Bundeswehr, and military experts from Denmark assisted in preparing this program.

The Military Academy of Lithuania will continue to organize a platoon commander course for officers and civilians with university education from the national defense system and also a Reserve officer course for students from higher educational institutions.

Survey of the Departments for Academic Training

Academic training subunits include 5 departments:
1. The Department of Management;
2. The Department of Foreign Languages;
3. The Department of Applied Sciences;
4. The Department of Humanities;
5. The Department of General Technical Sciences.
Most of the teachers in all the departments hold degrees in higher education. Most of them have graduated from Vilnius University and Pedagogical University. 11% of the teachers are professors (doctors habilitus); 33% are associate professors (doctors). Thus, the teachers at the Military Academy of Lithuania are highly qualified and able to provide cadets with the academic education necessary to acquire the Bachelor’s degree.

In the Department of Management there are 19 teachers, including 2 doctors habilitus, professors, 9 doctors and 8 lecturers. Teachers base their lectures on the experience of West European and North American countries, the US West Point Academy, the Canadian Royal Military College, and the German higher military Academies. They carry out scientific research in the field of the state monetary policy and currency market, analyze the evolution of the democratic relationship between civilians and military personnel, and explore the history of the Armed Forces and sociological changes in military structures.

The level of Bachelor–degree training in management at the Military Academy of Lithuania corresponds to the university level. This is confirmed by the fact that even 45% of Bachelor–degree graduates have continued their Master–degree studies at Vilnius University.

There are 21 teachers at the Department of Foreign Languages: 15 teach English, 4 teach German and 2 teach French. The English Language Center with 4 teachers is attached to the Department of Foreign Languages. Officers and employees from the National Defence System are taught here. They must reach Level 3 of English language proficiency in accordance with STANAG 6001, which means fluent professional communication.

In the course at the Military Academy the cadets are taught English and they must acquire Level 2 in English language proficiency. In the third year of studies they are given a possibility to choose a second foreign language: either German or French. Lecture-rooms well equipped with tape and video recorders facilitate the study of foreign languages. A modern electronic system of imparting and assessing knowledge has also been installed in some of the lecture-rooms. This allows lecturers to interface with the individual learning process of the cadet at all times in order to specify or correct his or her answer to the questions without interfering with the learning process of others.

There are 8 teachers at the Department of Applied Sciences: 2 professors (doctors habilitus), 5 associate professors (doctors) and 1 lecturer. The Head of the Department, prof. R. Rakauskas has taken part in many prestigious European and World congresses, and scientific NATO activities. He has conducted lectures in the USA and is the author of monographs and textbooks.

Scientists of this Department carry out scientific research in the following directions: mathematical modeling, application of parallel computing to the military science, creation of laser and real time management systems and applying them in Ecology, Biology and Military Science.
The level of teaching physics and mathematics for the Bachelors Degree at the daytime department corresponds to the teaching for the Bachelors Degree of engineer specialties at Vilnius Gediminas Technical University.

There are 6 teachers at the Department of Humanities: 5 doctors and 1 doctor habilitus. The principal objectives of the studies are to develop “a citizen in uniform”, to foster cadets’ national consciousness and civil awareness, to install respect for the history and cultural heritage of their country, and to develop the integration of national and patriotic education of cadets into the learning process. Scientists of the Department write scientific studies in the following fields: formation of war psychology and the direction of its investigation in Lithuania in 1918 – 1940; the correct usage of military terms; the problem of the development of national identity, the history of pedagogy and Lithuanian school, etc.

In the Department of General Technical Sciences there are 10 teachers working including 2 professors (doctors habilitus), 6 associate professors (doctors of sciences). Prof. A. Ambrazevicius was awarded a Republican premium for his merits in the field of thermal energetic. Since 1994 the teachers of the Department have issued 13 scientific methodological publications. In the Department there are specialized computer and structure classrooms as well as electrical engineering, electronics and chemistry laboratories where research work in the fields of automobile technology, electroenergetics, chemistry, explosives and computer science is carried out. The basic aim of studies in this Department is to provide cadets with theoretical knowledge and practical skills in the field of military materiel, on modern equipment, chemical substances and technologies and their application, and teach them computer skills on a user level.

**Sport at the Military Academy of Lithuania**

The Physical Training Section organizes physical training and sport activities. The basic sports are basketball, combat self-defense and wrestling, track- and field-athletics, cross-country race, triathlon, heavy athletics, weight lifting, football and boxing. Every year cadets and teachers participate in sports games. The Academy team successfully participates in the sports games of the National Defense System, in the higher school students and teachers championships in Lithuania, in competitions held in Vilnius and the Republic of Lithuania, in international competitions and tournaments and Sports games comprising Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Since 1996 basketball players of the Academy have been participating in the prestigious Basketball Tournament of NATO Countries and their partners held in Belgium.

The team of runners, one of the strongest in the National Defense system, has won the race to “The Hill of Three Crosses”, five times in a row since 1994. The military personnel of the Academy widely participate in the international race “On the Road of Life and Death” to commemorate the events of January 13, 1991.
Library

Since 1994, the library of the Academy has become recognized as a scientific academic library. It is the youngest library among those of Lithuanian higher educational institutions.

The library has a very good collection of materials; therefore, cadets and scientists can be timely supplied with materials necessary for studies and work according to the teaching plans and programs. The library subscribes to more than 60 periodicals in different languages. The library stock amounts to 80,000 copies (19,000 titles).

Interlibrary orders are also available for the readers. The library renders services for 1,125 users. There are departments of teaching materials and fiction and also a 60-seat reading room. The library is presently being modernized. The computer program ALEPH-500 has been acquired. It will enable the creation of an electronic catalogue as well as integration into the combined electronic catalogue of higher educational institutions. An Internet reading room is being installed.

International cooperation

The Academy participates in diverse international Cooperation Programs together with military personnel of Great Britain, Denmark and the United States of America.

According to the bilateral cooperation plan with the Armed Forces of Great Britain the Academy has for two years been running a basic military training course assisted by British officers and sergeants as instructors.

Friendly relations have also been established with the Danish Royal Military Academy. Working meetings are held, and exchanges of cadets and officers take place.

The Armed Forces of the United States of America, primarily the West Point Academy, provide methodological assistance on officer training and administration issues. Visits are exchanged, and seminars are arranged.

Cadets from the Saint-Cyr Academy, France, have made presentations at the Academy. Officers and cadets of the Academy participate in different international exercises arranged according to the program “Partnership for Peace”. In addition, the Academy has close cooperation with Higher Military Schools of Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic and other countries.

Resume

At present, the Military Academy of Lithuania is undergoing fast changes. A three-direction Bachelor-degree program has been developed. It comprises personnel management, engineering management and international relations. For this purpose, the material base has been established, staff positions determined and teachers selected.

In 2001 a training program for a course for captains as well as a three directions: Masters degrees in personnel management, engineering management and international relations will be developed.

Parallel to the preparation for the course for captains, similar programs in NATO countries will be analyzed, a semi-
nar conducted by the USA experts will be arranged, and instructors that have battalion commander’s or a similar positions will be selected.

During the preparatory stage for Master-degree studies, the Academy is going to expand the scope of scientific work, promote research in personnel management, development of security strategy and defence economy as well as mathematical modeling of military operations and other fields.

Wide-ranging relations and common research work with military academies of NATO countries and Lithuanian research institutions are planned.

Also, the infrastructure of the Military Academy of Lithuania will be developed to ensure proper training and education of cadets and officers and living conditions will be improved.

Only having completed these above-mentioned essential and necessary reforms, the level of officer training in Lithuania could be expected to correspond to NATO Standards.
1. Introduction

A discussion of the perspectives for Baltic participation in the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) can be divided in three aspects which should be borne in mind when the perspectives for Baltic CFE-membership are discussed: a military, a political and a legal aspect. The military aspect regards the military consequences of CFE-membership, e.g. limitations on arms and equipment and access to foreign military capabilities. The political aspect regards the current CFE-members’ views and political considerations with respect to Baltic CFE-membership. The legal aspect regards the provisions of the Adapted CFE Treaty and the way these provisions constitute a legal setting for Baltic CFE-membership. This article is based on the legal aspect and it will describe and analyse the Adapted CFE Treaty in order to examine how the many military-technical provisions of the Treaty may influence the Baltic States’ security, other European States’ security (primarily Russia) and European stability in case the Baltic States join the Adapted CFE Treaty.

CFE is a historically unique security arrangement that derives from the years of the Cold War. During the Cold War, European security was basically based on a military balance between the two adversary military alliances: The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and The Warsaw Treaty Organisation also referred to as the Warsaw Pact. The U.S. and the Soviet Union were the two de facto lead nations in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, respectively.

Relations between the two blocs fluctuated between tension and détente, while diplomatic efforts were conducted in or-
der to make sure that the Cold War did not turn hot. Overall stability was based on strategic balance - or, more correctly, on avoiding that the adversary swung the balance to his advantage. It became, after all, a general “security philosophy” that European security and stability was dependent on the East-West balance.

The leader of the Soviet Union, Michael Gorbachev, introduced a new philosophy which saw the use of arms control as a tool for improving relations between the East and the West, and in 1989, the conventional arms limitation talks began - talks that produced the current, legally binding CFE Treaty in November 1990.

During 1991, most of the original CFE signatory states turned to ratification, but before all 22 states could complete the ratification process, developments in the Baltic States, including their newly gained independence, raised new legal questions. Legally, the allotted Soviet Treaty Limited Equipment for the former Baltic Military District (The Baltic Republics and the Kaliningrad Oblast) needed to be reconsidered. The three Baltic States did not want to become members of the CFE Treaty after they had gained independence from the Soviet Union; they did not want Soviet military forces, which were considered as occupation forces, to be stationed permanently on their national territory. Moreover, they feared that any treaty participation by a Baltic State would lend legitimacy to a Soviet presence in the Baltic States. All desired, however, that the Soviet Union’s conventional military equipment and units subject to the CFE Treaty should still count against the Soviet Union’s Treaty Limited Equipment Ceilings and, if possible, be reduced in accordance with the protocols of the CFE Treaty. Recognising the Baltic States’ demands, the U.S. informally raised the possibility of another “agreed statement” regarding the Soviet Union’s Treaty Limited Equipment Ceilings. As a consequence of this, an extraordinary meeting was convened in which it was stated that the three Baltic States were not parties to the CFE Treaty. Afterwards, the Baltic States were withdrawn from the CFE Treaty’s area of application, and their Russian CFE Treaty Limited Equipment Ceilings were transferred to the Russian Kaliningrad Region, thus making this region’s Ceilings comparatively high.

2. Principles and Facts of the Adapted CFE Treaty

The original CFE Treaty set equal limits or ceilings for NATO and the Warsaw Pact in five categories of weapons, which were generally viewed as decisive in offensive army operations and tactics. These five categories of weapons were named “Treaty Limited Equipment” (TLE) and included the following:

- Battle Tanks
- Armoured Combat Vehicles (ACV)
- Artillery Pieces
- Combat Aircraft
- Attack Helicopters

Figure 1: The CFE Treaty Limited Equipment.
The CFE Treaty mandated the destruction of some 50,000 pieces of Treaty Limited Equipment during a three-year period, and established a regime of inspections and exchange of information designed to make each alliance virtually transparent to the other, thereby removing the threat of a surprise attack. In exact figures, each of the two blocs were allotted limits of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Originally Allotted TLE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20,000 Battle Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000 Armoured Combat Vehicles (ACV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 Artillery Pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,800 Combat Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 Attack Helicopters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 2: The original amounts of Treaty Limited Equipment allotted for each of the “Groups of States” - in fact NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The term “Groups of States” was a French initiative that was introduced in order to eliminate any legal linkage between CFE and NATO. Nevertheless, it was clear to everybody that the two groups were NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The term “Groups of States” has been deleted from the Adapted CFE Treaty and new basic principles have been defined accordingly. These are explained in the following.¹

The arms and equipment that are covered by the Adapted CFE Treaty, the Treaty Limited Equipment, are also called “Entitlements” with the numerical upper limit called “Ceilings”. The actual present amounts of Treaty Limited Equipment are called “Holdings”. Entitlements and Holdings are not necessarily equal. The Holdings may be lower than the Entitlements but not higher. The spacing, if any, between Entitlements and Holdings is called “Headroom”. Fig. 3 shows the connection between these basic terms.

Fig. 3: The connection between the basic terms of the Adapted CFE Treaty.
The Adapted CFE Treaty largely covers the whole Europe. More specifically, the Adapted CFE Treaty’s “area of application” is the entire land territory of the States Parties in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains (ATTU), including the States Parties’ islands in the vicinity of the European continent. Certain regional areas in Turkey have specific regulations and Kazakhstan’s and Russia’s area of application is limited to the area west of the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea. (See fig. 4).

The following definitions cover the five general types of Treaty Limited Equipment. With regard to the Baltic States, these five types of arms and equipment - TLE - are the types of military capabilities that should be considered when requests for CFE-membership are put forward.

“Battle tank” means a self-propelled armoured fighting vehicle, capable of heavy fire power, primarily of a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun necessary to engage armoured and other targets, with high cross-country mobility, and a high level of self-protection. Battle tanks serve as the principal weapon systems of ground-force tank and other armoured formations.

“Armoured combat vehicle” (ACV) means a self-propelled vehicle with armoured protection and cross-country capability, mainly meant for troop transport, but also including small calibre tanks. ACV includes “armoured personnel carriers”, “armoured infantry fighting vehicles” and “heavy armament combat vehicles”.

“Artillery” means large calibre (gun) systems meant for fire support.”

“Combat aircraft” means fixed-wing variable-geometry wing aircraft armed and equipped for ground attack.

“Combat helicopter” means a rotary wing aircraft armed and equipped to engage targets or perform other military functions. It also includes combat support helicopters but not unarmed transport helicopters.

The 30 States Parties of the current CFE Treaty are presented in the following:

The 30 CFE Member States or “States Parties”

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan (West of the Urals), Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia (West of the Urals), Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the U.K and the U.S.

Fig. 5: The members of the CFE Treaty - usually referred to as the “States Parties.”
Fig. 4: The Adapted CFE Treaty’s area of application - Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU).
- The map lists the 55 OSCE participating States, including the 30 States Parties of the CFE Treaty
- The shaded territory depicts the area of application of the CFE Treaty
- The United States and Canada are both CFE parties and OSCE participants
(Source: Dorn Crawford, CFE: a Review and Update January 2001)
The European non-member states are presented in figure 6. The basic characteristic of the non-States Parties is that they, with the exception of the Baltic States, all were neutral during the Cold War and remain so today.

A central legal element in the Adapted CFE Treaty is that the treaty is open to all the European members of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (the OSCE),. This means that all of the states in fig. 6 can be accepted as States Parties after certain negotiations where they, as requesting states, present their required accession conditions in accordance with a specific procedure described in the Adapted CFE Treaty’s Article XVIII. This “Accession Article” underscores that applicant states shall include the following information in their request for accession:

- The designation of its existing types of conventional armaments and equipment;
- Its proposed National and Territorial Ceilings and the related subceilings for each category of armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty;
- Any other information deemed necessary by the requesting state.

Furthermore, all the States Parties shall be informed about the applicant and the above-mentioned information. Moreover, the States Parties may request additional information. The exact terms for accession shall be decided by the States Parties’ co-ordination group, the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna (JCG). Furthermore, requesting states may be invited to attend meetings in the JCG. The JCG acts under consensus provisions, which means that all States Parties enjoy the right of veto on any applicants’ accession terms.

This right of veto seems logical and fair as a means to protect the CFE regime as such. If, for instance, Russia or the U.S. was forced to accept applicants under unsatisfactory terms, they might possibly wish to withdraw from the Treaty themselves, thereby jeopardising the whole CFE regime. But on the other hand, the right of veto could make it difficult for applicants to be accepted. For the Baltic States, it could be imagined that they would request comparatively robust entitlements in order to ensure a high degree of national security. Such robust entitlements could very well be approved by the NATO members, especially with reference to possible Baltic NATO-membership, but might in this light be vetoed by Russia in order

The 21 European Non-Member States

Andorra, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, the Holy See, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, San Marino, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Yugoslavia.

Fig. 6: The European non-members of the CFE Treaty.
to try to keep the Baltic States out of NATO, particularly if NATO-membership is declared a precondition for CFE-membership. Yet another situation could occur if the Baltic States, as NATO members or future NATO members, would request such low entitlements that it would, militarily, be difficult for NATO to offer the expected collective self-defence guarantee. In such a situation, the NATO members could be expected to veto Baltic CFE requests.

The procedure for accession is actually very vague and leaves much room for interpretation and discussion among the States Parties. The accession procedure is solely related to the individual applicant’s case without specific political preconditions involved. This exemption from rigid political considerations is primarily the result of U.S. insistence whereas Russia and Germany preferred a more detailed and legally binding accession procedure. Consequently, Baltic CFE-membership can only be expected after hard political and military negotiations on the accession terms.

The States Parties signed “The Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe” during the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999. This agreement presents the changes that have been added to the current CFE Treaty, and it must be read in addition to this. An unofficial issue of the consolidated Adapted CFE Treaty, “Draft as of 18 November - Consolidated Text of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe as Amended by the Agreement on Adaptation in November 1999”, is in circulation. This consolidated text is used as the basis of this analysis.

In “The Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe”, the importance of the Adapted CFE Treaty is emphasised by the following notion: “The States Parties are determined to sustain the key role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of European security”.

The phrase “the cornerstone of European security” is quite interesting as various interviews with experts and officials give the impression that some regard it literally and actually view the Adapted CFE Treaty as the most important security and stability construction in Europe. Other experts and officials, on the other hand, think that this phrase means nothing and that there are many cornerstones of European security. Differences in perception are, however, not unusual, but concerning the CFE regime it may be useful to observe how these perceptions’ influence the policies of the CFE States Parties in different ways.

Some basic principles and definitions of the Adapted CFE Treaty emphasise the spirit and values that guide the States Parties in the CFE regime. These principles are described below.

The principle of consent is an important principle that stresses that the Treaty Limited Equipment of a States Party shall only be present on the territory of another State Party in conformity with explicit consent of the Host State Party or with a UN mandate. That principle could be important to the Baltic States in light of their fear that Russia might consider possible Baltic Entitlements as a legal access to deploy Russian troops into the Baltic
States’ territory in case of a crisis or anything else that might warrant a Russian interest in deploying troops there. The two Soviet successor states and States Parties Moldova and Georgia, e.g., have hosted Russian troops for years, though they have not explicitly required these. The legal basis for the Russian deployments was the current CFE Treaty which does not specifically require consent from the States Party hosting the foreign troops. With the consent principle introduced in the Adapted CFE Treaty, all States Parties get a legal guarantee that unwanted foreign troops will not appear on their territory, at least not without a UN mandate.

The Adapted CFE Treaty underscores, moreover, some more general basic common principles for the States Parties.

Among these basic principles, one is of particular interest, namely the requirement to accept alliance memberships among the States Parties. This principle of the Adapted CFE Treaty is an important legal aspect for the NATO members and for future CFE States Parties that want to become NATO members as well. This means that no State Party can legally obstruct Baltic CFE accession solely because of Baltic NATO membership or the prospect of that membership. It is not stated precisely in legal terms whether this principle is only concerning the current States Parties or whether it automatically will be in force for future States Parties as well. Nevertheless, it must be assumed that it is a general principle for both current and future States Parties. It might also be hard to explain why future States Parties, due to a legal principle, should suffer additional limitations.

While the principle discussed above seems comparatively clear, the requirements to maintain an indivisible security space in Europe and to avoid threatening any States Parties’ national security are less clear and are open to political discussion and different perceptions.

### 3. Documents related to the Adapted CFE Treaty in an OSCE Context

The Adapted CFE Treaty text opens by emphasising that the Treaty is, “guided by the objectives and the purposes of the OSCE,

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**The Basic Common Principles**

- Do not use force against each other
- Prevent armed conflicts in Europe
- Accept alliance memberships
- Maintain an indivisible security space in Europe
- Avoid threatening any States Parties’ national security

*Fig. 7: The basic common principles for the States Parties of the Adapted CFE Treaty.*
within the framework of which the negotiation of this treaty was conducted in Vienna”.

The objectives and purposes of the OSCE are represented in three documents:

- The Vienna Document (1999);
- The Charter for Security and Cooperation in Europe;
- The Istanbul Summit Declaration;

All were signed by the OSCE states upon completion of the OSCE Summit in November 1999. Also important for the CFE regime is the CFE Document:

- The Final Act of the CFE Conference in Istanbul;

The three OSCE documents and the Final Act are all politically binding agreements while the adapted CFE Treaty will become a legally binding agreement once the ratification process has been completed. However, it should be observed that the Final Act is in fact part of the Adapted CFE Treaty though it in itself is only politically binding. Both kinds of agreements are meant to serve as efficient foreign political instruments for the involved parties and are normally regarded with full international respect and acceptance.

If an agreement is legally binding, this means all involved governments and national parliaments have ratified it and that deviation from the agreement requires national parliamentary approval.

If an agreement is politically binding it has only been signed by the involved governments and has not been or shall not be ratified by the respective national parliaments. This means that deviations from the agreement can be executed solely with the approval of the involved governments. Thus, the legally binding agreements are deemed more binding than politically binding agreements.

In the European security context and specifically in the CFE Context, the involved actors are expected to adhere strictly to both legal and political agreements. Based on this assumption, the four above-mentioned politically binding agreements are also relevant to regard as basic documents closely related to the Adapted CFE Treaty.

The following is meant to emphasise how the European and North American governments have agreed on the principles and stability strategies for the future European security architecture. Though the CFE Treaty only represents 30 of the 55 OSCE members, all of the OSCE members have signed the above mentioned three OSCE agreements. The agreements will be described in the following in order to explain how the objectives and purposes of the OSCE can serve as guidance for the Adapted CFE Treaty. The OSCE participating states are presented on next page.

3.1 The Vienna Document 1999

The Vienna Document 1999 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM), commonly referred to as the Vienna Document, serves the overall purpose of providing peace and stability in Europe. The Vienna Document represents the third stage of a series of provisions for the exchange and verification of information regarding the OSCE participating states’ armed forces and military activities, as well as certain mechanisms promoting co-operation among the OSCE-states with regard to military mat-
The 55 OSCE Participating States

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, the U.K., the U.S., Uzbekistan and Yugoslavia.

Fig. 8: The 55 OSCE Participating States.

ters. The aim of these measures is to promote mutual trust and to dispel concern about military activities by encouraging openness and transparency. The current provisions evolved in three stages: The Helsinki Final Act regime (1975-1986), the Stockholm Document regime (1986-1990) and the Vienna Document regime (1990/1992/1994/1999). The foundation of the current CSBM regime is derived from the Helsinki Final Act in which OSCE-states agreed to certain measures designed, “To contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which would give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating states lack clear and timely information”.

The OSCE meeting in Vienna (1986-1989) called for further negotiations on CSBMs, which were held in parallel with the final negotiations on the original CFE Treaty, and yielded the Vienna Document 1990. This document, updated in 1993, broadened the scope of information exchange and verification, and introduced new communication and consultation measures including: points of contact for hazardous incidents of a military nature, a communications network able to transmit computerised information and emergency meetings to clarify unusual military activities.

The Vienna Document was updated again in 1994 in a way that expanded the previous CSBM regime by introducing additional thresholds for notification and observation, and provisions regarding defence planning and military contacts.

At the OSCE Lisbon summit in 1996, the OSCE States agreed on a formal framework for arms control in order to create a web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments. The Framework should link current and future arms control efforts into a comprehensive structure, and the
OSCE states agreed on four principles that should serve as a guide for future negotiations: sufficiency, transparency, verification and limitations on forces. The Vienna Document 1999 is developed in accordance with the principles of Lisbon. It is regarded as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process to undertake effective and concrete actions to strengthen confidence, security and disarmament in order to keep European states from using or threatening to use force. More specifically the Vienna Document describes the agreed procedures for:

- Annual exchange of military information;
- Consultations in case of unusual military activities;
- Notifications of certain military activities;
- Inspection of military activities and evaluation visits regarding information;
- Observations of certain large military activities;
- Visits to military facilities;
- Constraints on number and scale of large military activities.

The procedures cover military units from brigade/regiment size and up. In general, the Vienna Document is a regime of confidence and transparency, which reduces threats of surprise attacks and contributes to friendly relations between the European states. The spirit of the Vienna Document is very similar to that of CFE in so far as both promote CSBMs. But while the CFE regime addresses military capabilities the Vienna Document addresses military activities. Moreover, although CFE is more detailed regarding information exchange procedures than the Vienna Document, the two “regimes” share the same purpose - namely stability and security.

The Vienna Document has, so far, served as an important tool that has made it possible to facilitate Baltic-Russian CSBM activities. One example is the Estonian-Russian CSBM agreement from 1998 that allows for exchange of information in accordance with the current CFE Treaty’s procedures which provide more detailed information than is demanded by the Vienna Document. Another example is the Lithuanian-Russian CSBM agreement for Lithuania and Kaliningrad where similar “CFE like provisions” have been agreed on bilaterally.

3.2 The Charter for European Security

Another set of objectives and purposes formulated by the OSCE is the Charter for European Security in which the OSCE states declare their firm commitment to a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE with peace, freedom, prosperity and security. The Charter defines the OSCE states’ common responses and instruments for a more active and operational profile for the OSCE within the area of peacekeeping in Europe. An interesting element in the Charter, with respect to the CFE Treaty, is the Charter’s (p. 3) notion that the OSCE states:

“Reaffirm the right of each and every State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties, as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality.”
With regard to the Baltic States, this phrase actually underscores that they have the full right to join CFE, NATO, or any other security arrangement that they may find attractive. Therefore, no state has any legal right to interfere with the Baltic States’ drive for NATO or CFE membership according to this part of the Charter. But the Charter continues:

“Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States.”

This phrase could actually be seen as interfering with the first paragraph concerning Baltic NATO aspirations, in the case that such a membership could be judged as a threat to other states’ security, especially Russia’s. The question that the Charter does not answer is who is to judge whether Baltic NATO membership would constitute security at the expense of other states, specifically Russia. That will be a political judgement.

Furthermore the Charter underscores that:

“In order to facilitate the acquired security and stability in Europe, the Charter has expressed the term “Co-operative Security”. Co-operative Security is meant to strengthen and develop co-operation with competent organisations on the basis of equality and in the spirit of partnership. The platform for Co-operative Security is listed in the Charter and refers, among other things, to the Vienna Document and the full implementation of the OSCE states’ “Arms control obligations, including disarmament and CSBMs, to which they have committed themselves.”

More specifically the Charter refers to the CFE Treaty where the Treaty is emphasised as “a cornerstone of European security”. It is worth noting the use of the wording “a cornerstone”, while the Agreement of the Adapted CFE Treaty uses the wording “the cornerstone”. Thus, the OSCE, and thereby the 55 states, politically “authorises” the Adapted CFE Treaty with this Charter, and tries, in this way, to give the CFE regime a more acknowledged and robust role in European security.
3.3 The Istanbul Summit Declaration

The third OSCE document with relevance for CFE signed in Istanbul is the Istanbul Summit Declaration. The Declaration describes in some detail the OSCE’s concrete evaluations and intentions with regard to the immediate security issues in Europe. The Declaration refers specifically to the Adapted CFE Treaty:

“We welcome the successful adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The adapted Treaty will provide a greater degree of military stability through a stricter system of limitations, increased transparency and lower levels of conventional armed forces in its area of application. We hope that States Parties will move forward expeditiously to facilitate completion of national ratification procedures, taking into account their common commitment to, and the central importance of, full and continued implementation of the (current CFE) Treaty and its associated documents until and following entry into force of the Agreement of Adaptation. Upon entry into force of the Agreement of Adaptation, OSCE participating States with territory in the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains may apply for accession to the adapted Treaty, thereby providing an important additional contribution to European stability and security.”

Of special interest for the Baltic States is the notion of ratification, because accession is only possible after all States Parties have ratified the Treaty, a process that may take up to two years. But the Declaration expresses the 55 OSCE states’ common interest in other OSCE states’ CFE-membership. Thus, as getting the Baltic States into the Adapted CFE Treaty is regarded as a universal interest, there would hardly be any national reluctance to accepting the Baltic States in the Treaty. But so far any discussion about new States Parties’ accession is only preparative because acceding states must wait for the full ratification before they can join the Adapted CFE Treaty. Until then, the current CFE Treaty remains in effect.

These three OSCE documents, The Vienna Document 1999, The Charter for European Security and The Istanbul Summit Declaration emphasise the co-operative spirit of modern Europe, a spirit that should act as guidance for the Adapted CFE Treaty in opposition to the Cold War’s competitive spirit. The documents represent the official linkage between the OSCE and CFE, and it is in that context the Adapted CFE Treaty should be considered.

3.4 The Final Act of the CFE Conference in Istanbul

In connection with the signing of the Adapted CFE Treaty, the States Parties signed an additional politically binding “Final Act” in which some of the States Parties express their intentions to conduct further arms limitations in addition to the provisions of the Adapted CFE Treaty.

With regard to the Baltic States and their CFE perspectives, it is interesting to note that especially the three new NATO members Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary express their political intentions to reduce their National and Territorial
Ceilings. Moreover, they stress their right to receive Exceptional Temporary Deployments from foreign states.

In one of the Final Act’s statements Russia expresses its political intention to show restraint with regard to Treaty Limited Equipment in Kaliningrad and Pskov Oblast:

“In the present politico-military situation, (Russia) has no reasons, plans or intentions to station substantial combat forces, whether air or ground forces, in that region on a permanent basis”.

This political statement, the language of which is similar to that of NATO in the NATO statement on Stationing of forces in 1997, leaves room for interpretation. It seems as if Russia presently regards its security in the North Western Russia as satisfactory and safeguarded by “military sufficiency”. From a Baltic perspective the statement should be observed with some attention because it could actually be interpreted as Russia’s emphasising its reliance on the two principles of the Adapted CFE Treaty (see fig. 7), namely indivisible security and national security. This means that if Russia perceives European security developments moving in contrast to these principles, it might be expected to reconsider and withdraw its statement on military restraints in Kaliningrad and Pskov. Specifically Russia might, politically and militarily, perceive Baltic NATO membership as a change of the politico-military situation and a division of European security into Cold War like East and West blocks.

4. The Adapted CFE Treaty’s Concept for European Security and Stability - through Military Limitations, Flexibility and Transparency

The Adapted CFE Treaty’s “Concept for European Security and Stability” are developed on the basis of the principles that were agreed upon in the OSCE Lisbon Summit, 1996. These resulted in the following three concepts guiding the Adapted CFE Treaty:

- The Concept of Military Limitations
- The Concept of Military Flexibility
- The Concept of Military Transparency.

The Concept of Military Limitations is a concept based on the traditional arms control ideas of reducing the risk of wars by reducing the amount of arms and equipment. The concept mostly applies to inter-state situations and aims to bring down all the States Parties’ military offensive potential to a level where large-scale military aggression against any other States Party is hampered significantly or even made impossible. The idea behind this concept is therefore to reduce states’ opportunities to exploit military means aggressively in inter-state relations.

This chapter will present and discuss how the Adapted CFE Treaty has formulated the concept of military limitations by means of National and Territorial ceilings.

The Concept of Military Flexibility is a concept that works in a different way than the concept of military limitations. The
The Concept of Military Transparency represents a concept of confidence and cooperation related to the Vienna Document. While the first two concepts can be categorised as “hard security measures”, the concept of transparency can be categorised as “soft security measures” of the Adapted CFE Treaty. Transparency is achieved through information and verification mechanisms that are described in a very detailed way in the Adapted CFE Treaty and its Protocols. Information is exchanged at regular time intervals as well as in connection with certain military activities such as exercises and deployments. Verification of the Treaty provisions is achieved through the States Parties’ rights to scheduled and unscheduled inspections.

The above mentioned three concepts are meant to contribute to the States Parties’ security and to European stability. They should be regarded in connection with other confidence and security building measures, especially the Vienna Document and other bilateral agreements of that kind.

The following chapters will describe and analyse the elements of these three CFE concepts with regard to the perspectives for Baltic CFE accession.

4.1 The Concept of Military Limitations - National Ceilings

National Ceilings (NC) are important elements in the concept of military limitations as they ensure a high degree of military rigidity and long-term predictability in Europe. National Ceilings are the total amounts of Treaty Limited Equipment that any respective State Party is allowed, including deployed and stationed arms and equipment, within the area of application. It means that States Parties’ Treaty Limited Equipment outside the area of application, i.e. in the Balkans or North America, does not count. The National Ceilings are not referring to the specific geographical position within the area of application of the Treaty Limited Equipment but only to the national ownership of the equipment. The figure below shows the principle of National Ceilings.

The principle of National Ceilings is explained in the Adapted CFE Treaty’s Article IV. In addition to the National Ceilings, Article IV deals with “National Subceilings”, which are even more detailed elements of the National Ceilings and which serve the same purpose. The National Subceilings will not be discussed further because their impact is subordi-
current States Parties would demand Baltic arms reductions given the Baltic States’ present situation. Article IV includes another important element that may influence the Baltic approach to the Treaty, namely that each State Party has the right to exchange National Ceilings with other States Parties. Generally, Article IV allows each States Party to raise its National Ceilings with a limited amount of Treaty Limited Equipment (20%) every five years. Moreover, States Parties can, at any time, increase their National Ceilings if other States Parties reduce their National Ceilings accordingly. Any other increases in Treaty Limited Equipment are only possible with the consent of all other States Parties.

The National Ceilings, that are presented below, put limitations on all five types of Treaty Limited Equipment. This table, from the Protocol on National Ceilings, is an annex to the Adapted CFE Treaty and contains the basic figures of the concept of military limitations. The fixed amount of Treaty Limited Equipment ensures a high degree of military

Fig. 9: The principle of National Ceilings.

Such legal demands for reduction are somehow irrelevant for the Baltic States, as they are in a process of building up their national armed forces and thus should not be subjected to arms reduction at the present time. Therefore, the legal requirement makes little sense for the Baltic States, and probably none of the
## National Ceilings (NC)

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<th>TLE States Parties</th>
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<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Combataircraft</th>
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## National Ceilings (NC)

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<td><strong>6800</strong></td>
<td><strong>2000</strong></td>
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Fig. 10: The National Ceilings of the States Parties.
limitations but does not cope with the deployment or stationing of forces. The last rows of calculations show that the total National Entitlements are kept below the original overall allotted amount of Treaty Limited Equipment though these are not legally binding. In accordance with the original CFE Treaty, the total numbers of the States Parties’ Treaty Limited Equipment should be reduced to 40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 ACVs, 40,000 artillery pieces, 13,600 combat aircraft and 4,000 attack helicopters during the period 1992-1995. During the negotiations on the Adapted CFE Treaty it could have been expected that these originally declared overall allotted entitlements had been maintained, in principle, as arms limitations goals of the CFE regime. This, nevertheless, was never agreed on as an official, guiding principle. However, in connection with new States Parties’ accession it will be necessary to raise the overall ceilings in order to acknowledge all States Parties’ militarily sufficient self-defence capabilities.

These provisions underscore that the total amount of Treaty Limited Equipment should not be exceeded but that the States Parties have certain rights to change their National Ceilings.

The Protocol on National Ceilings explains in detail the National Ceilings for all States Parties, as seen on fig. 10. In addition to the fixed entitlements, a few additional limitations are agreed for seven States Parties including Belarus, Russia and the three new NATO members, The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, reducing their active units of the National Entitlements by approximately 10-20 per cent, which is equal to that of one brigade.

4.2 The Concept of Military Limitations - Territorial Ceilings

Territorial Ceilings is the basic term that defines the total amount of Treaty Limited Equipment that any respective State Party can hold (possess and host) on its territory within the area of application. Consequently, the U.S. and Canada have no Territorial Ceilings as their territories are outside the area of application. The Territorial Ceilings are meant to ensure that no States Party’s territory can be exploited for massing of forces as preparation for or conduct of military aggression. In other words, the Territorial Ceilings mark the Territorial Entitlements - the total amount of Treaty Limited Equipment that any respective State Party’s territory can hold, including its own National and Foreign Holdings. The Territorial Ceilings are not dependent on the national ownership of the equipment but only on the geographical territory on which it is situated. Thus, the Territorial Ceilings should be viewed in connection with the National Ceilings because the Territorial Ceilings may be higher but not lower than the National Ceilings. The figure below shows the principle of Territorial Ceilings.

The principles of the Territorial Ceilings are explained in the Adapted CFE Treaty’s Article V. Moreover, Article V deals with “Territorial Subceilings”, which are even more detailed elements of the Territorial Ceilings and serve the same purpose. The Territorial Subceilings will
not be discussed further because their impact is subordinated to the Territorial Ceilings and they represent technical details that are beyond the scope of this paper.

The allotted Territorial Ceilings (see fig. 12) include only the ground Treaty Limited Equipment because putting territorial limitations on highly mobile Treaty Limited Equipment, such as combat helicopters and attack aircrafts, makes little sense militarily. It should be noted that practically all the States Parties are “in compliance” with the Adapted CFE Treaty’s new provisions though this is not necessary yet.¹⁴

Territorial Ceilings and the Flank Regime

In the original CFE Treaty, the allotted entitlements were divided between different geographical zones each covering a number of States Parties. (See fig. 13). The lowest entitlements were allotted near the Cold War’s strategically important area around the “Central Front” dividing the West and the East, whereas the highest entitlements were principally allotted farthest away from the “Central Front”. But in order to avoid too huge massing of Treaty Limited Equipment in the Cold War’s “Hinterland” areas, additional limitations were put on the Flank Zones. Norway and the northwestern part of the Soviet Union/Russia except the Baltic Soviet Republics, now the Baltic States, constituted the Northern Flank Zone. In 1996 the Flank was adjusted, and today the Northern Flank constitutes Norway and Russia’s Leningrad Military District except the Pskov Oblast off Estonia and Latvia. The Northern and Southern Flanks are interconnected, which in fact gives Russia the legal right to move its Flank entitlements...
Territorial Ceilings (TC), Current Holdings (As of 1 January 2000) and Related Headrooms

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Former "Eastern Groups" of States Parties - NATO

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| Headroom           | 118 | 16  | 56  |     |     |     | 190    |</p>
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at its own discretion between the Northern and Southern Flank. This right has caused some concern in both Norway and Turkey because both countries in principle risk having to accept all of Russia’s Flank holdings off their respective borders. In the Flank areas, Exceptional Temporary Deployments are not permitted at all. In Leningrad Military District, military exercises must not exceed the Territorial Ceilings at all (except from Pskov Oblast), and the right to receive Basic Temporary Deployments only covers battle tanks and artillery pieces.25

Russia has always been quite reluctant towards the Flank Regime, and as a result of this the Flank was officially deleted from the Adapted CFE Treaty. Nevertheless, the Flank Regime is in reality still in force, a fact that is certified in the footnotes of the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings in which additional limitations are added to the Territorial Ceilings of the Flank territories.

From a Baltic perspective, the Flank provisions mean that Russia’s Leningrad Military District (except Pskov Oblast) is a “low level of forces area” with additional limitations on Treaty Limited Equipment and additional transparency measures.
Fig. 13: The zones of various entitlements of the current CFE Treaty. Zone 5.1, "the Flank" has officially been deleted from the Adapted CFE Treaty, but is in reality still in force.
(Source: Dorn Crawford, CFE A Review and Update, January 2001)
In 1990, when the original CFE Treaty was negotiated, the Baltic Military District was part of the Central Zone, and thereby outside the Flank zone. Whether or not such geographical and historical arguments would suggest that the Baltic States should be kept outside the Flank will be a political discussion between the Baltic States and the current States Parties, especially Russia. An important issue would be whether the Baltic States should receive the same rights as all other States Parties outside the Flank or whether they should only have limited rights like in Leningrad Military District (except Pskov Oblast) and in Norway on the Northern Flank. The question will be which concept of European security and stability should have priority: the concept of military limitations or the concept of military flexibility. Russia will probably give priority to the concept of military limitations while the Baltic States themselves might see an advantage in ensuring military flexibility in order to “receive as high entitlements as possible” for the purpose of their national security.

Another interesting issue in Article V that is related to the Territorial Ceilings are the “Transit Rules”. The transit rules are meant to add some reasonable flexibility to the general concept of military limitations, by allowing States Parties to temporarily exceed the Territorial Ceilings. The Territorial Ceilings may be exceeded under the following conditions in connection with transportation of Treaty Limited Equipment:

- The transiting Treaty Limited Equipment does not exceed the Territorial Ceilings of the State Party of the final destination; and
- The transiting Treaty Limited Equipment does not remain on the transited States Parties’ territory more than 42 days; and
- The transiting Treaty Limited Equipment does not remain on any single transited State Party, or on a territory with a territorial subceiling, more than 21 days.

The above-mentioned terms provide a little military flexibility but constitute specific limitations for military transit activities in Europe. Moreover, the military transit has to be notified, and any States Party can request further clarification regarding the transit.

The added military flexibility is a practical provision that is deemed necessary for normal military transits in connection with military exercises or crisis management operations.

Like in Article IV concerning the National Ceilings, the States Parties have the right to change Territorial Ceilings or “borrow” Territorial Entitlements from each other, as long as the total allotted Territorial Entitlements are not increased. Within each five year period, each State Party has the right to increase its Territorial Ceilings with up to 20 %, except in Flank areas. Any other increase is only possible with the consent of all of the other States Parties.

This may be important for the Baltic States because once the amount of Territorial Ceilings entitlements is agreed upon, further increases in these entitlements could be difficult to achieve.
4.3 Comparing National and Territorial Ceilings

A comparison of the National and the Territorial Ceilings shows that these represent different figures even though they are in most cases equal. The differences occur when a States Party requires stationing of foreign forces in addition to its national forces. An example is Germany that hosts large numbers of American and other allied forces on a permanent basis. There may be various reasons for keeping the Territorial Ceilings higher than the National Ceilings; political, historic or economic considerations may be decisive. The American forces in Germany may be regarded as a historical heritage from the Cold War. Moreover, they may also be regarded as a political tool in that they serve as an element of the transatlantic linkage between the U.S. and Europe, an important security factor for the European states and for NATO.

From a Baltic perspective, arguments for getting higher Territorial than Na-
tional Ceilings would be primarily economic. In the Baltic States’ difficult defence building processes it is hard to imagine that they could adequately finance comprehensive purely national armed forces in order to gain military sufficiency. To some extent, they will be dependent on foreign forces. In this respect, the option of increased Territorial Ceilings could be considered.

The North American States Parties have no Territorial Ceilings in Europe. The general picture is that States Parties’ Territorial Ceilings are equal to their Na-

Fig. 14: The relations between Territorial Ceilings and actual holdings.
tional Ceilings but there are nine exceptions to that picture among the 30 States Parties. The figure below shows the nine States Parties that have higher Territorial than National Ceilings.

An interesting observation is that only NATO members have differences in National and Territorial Ceilings, but the easternmost NATO members have practically no Territorial Ceilings increase. Only Norway has a slightly increased Territorial Ceiling. This pattern can be seen as a remainder of the Cold War’s bloc-to-bloc philosophy with reduced Treaty Limited Equipment in the border areas between the two blocks. It can also be seen as a NATO attempt to reduce Russia’s fear of stationing foreign armed forces in the neighbourhood of Russia.

It is, moreover, interesting to notice that all of the former Warsaw Pact members have equal National and Territorial Ceilings. Before the initial enormous arms reduction period in the early nineties created the military strategic conventional arms and equipment balance in Europe, the Warsaw Pact was superior in Treaty Limited Equipment. This heritage has meant that the Central and East European states have had no need for additional Territorial Entitlements beyond their National Ceilings. Moreover, Territorial Ceilings logically depend on foreign states’ Holdings, namely on alliance partners’ Holdings and National Ceilings. This is so because any contributing States Party must deploy military capabilities of its National Holdings to other States Parties’ territories in order to “top off” the respective States Parties’ Territorial Ceilings. Consequently, the contributing State Par-
ty’s National Holdings are reduced respectively. In other words, Foreign Holdings within States Parties’ Territorial Ceilings lead to a similar reduction in the contributing States Party’s National Holdings within its National Ceilings. This situation will thereby in principle threaten the contributing States Party’s national security. The only exceptions from this overall picture are the U.S. and Canada, which can station their National Holdings on other States Parties’ soil without degrading its own military capability, because the Adapted CFE Treaty puts no limitations on their ability to substitute their deployed Treaty Limited Equipment. Thus, Foreign Holdings are, in fact, most relevant for American and Canadian Forces, though the European States maintain that legal right as well. Consequently, it makes little sense for non-NATO states to have increased Territorial Ceilings.

The principle of Territorial Ceilings is in fact well suited to NATO, because NATO’s collective self-defence credibility in Europe depends on stationing North American forces in the region. For Russian military planning, Territorial Ceilings make little sense because Russia has no allies that either need or wish to station forces in Russia. Still, Territorial Ceilings are important for all States Parties and for the CFE regime. Territorial Ceilings constitute the geographical arms limitations mechanism that has substituted
the previous Zonal Ceilings that are in force until the Adapted CFE Treaty has been ratified. (See fig. 13)

The conclusion of the analysis of the relations between National and Territorial Ceilings is that differences in these two kinds of entitlements are only relevant for allied forces stationed in Europe. Certain States Parties’ Territorial Headrooms furthermore strengthen this North American perspective. Other conclusions can be drawn from fig. 12 as a consequence of the analysis of fig. 15. Generally only about 75% of the European Territorial Ceilings are “topped off” with Territorial Holdings. This can indicate an overall interest in further arms reductions below the allotted entitlement. It can also indicate that some European States Parties base their national security on reinforcements - and therefore leave Headroom for these. Specifically Germany has enormous Headroom in addition to huge Territorial Ceilings. Other smaller West European States Parties have relatively significant territorial headroom while the East European States Parties generally have no headroom. There can be two explanations for this situation. Firstly, it can indicate a certain East European desire for “topped off” entitlements in order to ensure a highest possible degree of national security. Secondly, it can indicate that these States Parties are non-allied and thus in reality have no access to Foreign Holdings and that Headroom, therefore, is irrelevant.

Consequently, there seem to be two legal options for reinforcing the Western European States Parties’ with North American Treaty Limited Equipment: to use the “free space” between the National and Territorial Ceilings if any or to use the Headroom between the Territorial Ceilings and the Territorial Holdings. The figure above shows the technical context of these relations.

4.5 Military Exercises

Certain provisions have been introduced in order to facilitate military exercises without violating the Adapted CFE Treaty. During military exercises, each State Party can host additional Treaty Limited Equipment, exceeding its Territorial Ceilings by up to 153 battle tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery pieces. This number of Treaty Limited Equipment is that of a small army division, in this paper called a “CFE-size Division”.

During military exercises the involved States Parties are allowed to exceed the Territorial Ceilings of the territories that are involved in the exercises as shown in the next page.

Deployments of Treaty Limited Equipment exceeding any States Party’s National or Territorial Ceilings must be notified at least 42 days in advance by both the hosting and the exercise participating States Parties. Moreover, the Vienna Document requires certain notification and inspection provisions in connection with exercises.

Since a precondition of the States Parties’ right to exceed their Territorial Ceilings in military exercises is that the exercise period does not exceed 42 days, these military exercise provisions serve both the concept of military flexibility and the concept of transparency. If the exercise
had a longer duration, it loses its formal status as a military exercise and becomes a Temporary Deployment.

4.6 The Concept of Military Flexibility - Temporary Deployments

In order to be able to conduct crisis management with armed forces, the States Parties have agreed on some special mechanisms that make it legal to deploy major land forces under certain circumstances, as described in Article VII of the Adapted CFE Treaty.

The first mechanism is the “Basic Temporary Deployment” (BTD) that allows each State Party, after notification, to temporarily exceed its Territorial Ceilings with one “CFE-size Division” containing 153 battle tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery pieces. Combat aircraft and attack helicopters are not included in the Temporary Deployments provisions because of their high mobility and long-range deployability that make these provisions unsuitable. All of the States Parties’ within the area of application enjoy the right to receive one Basic Temporary Deployment at a time.

In exceptional circumstances, a State Party’s Territorial Ceilings can be exceeded temporarily through the “Exceptional Temporary Deployment” (ETD) allowing up to 449 battle tanks, 723 ACVs and 420 Artillery Pieces. This number of

### Rights to exceed Territorial Ceilings during military exercises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground TLE</th>
<th>Battle tanks</th>
<th>ACVs</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Treaty Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Military Exercise Entitlements&quot; up to &quot;CFE-size Division&quot;</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>All military exercises exceeding Territorial Ceilings require notification by the hosting and exceeding parties 42 days in advance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Exercises below 42 days =&gt; &quot;Military Exercises&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exercises above 21 days =&gt; Inspection rights</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exercise above 42 days =&gt; &quot;Temporary Deployment&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>=&gt; Additional inspection rights and updated reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Fig. 17: The provisions for military exercises.  

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Fig. 18: The relations between Basic and Exceptional Temporary Deployments, National and Territorial Ceilings and related Holdings.

“Exceptional Temporary Deployment”

“Basic Temporary Deployment”

“Territorial Ceiling”

“ETD” = “CFE-size Corps”

“BTD = “CFE-size Division”

“Territorial Headroom”

“Territorial Holdings” = Foreign Stationed TLE

“National Headroom”

“National Holdings”

“Temporary Deployments”

“Temporary Ceiling”

Treaty Limited Equipment equals three Basic Temporary Deployments or three “CFE-size Divisions”. Within the area of application, all States Parties except from the Flank states have the right to receive one Exceptional Temporary Deployment on its soil. In typical military structures, an army corps contains three divisions. Accordingly, in this context an Exceptional Temporary Deployment is called a “CFE-size Corps”.

If any States Party or Parties intend to deploy an Exceptional Temporary Deployment, they must give notification and a CFE conference shall be convened. Additionally, the States Parties that are involved in any Temporary Deployment or military exercises that exceeds a Basic Temporary Deployment shall issue an explanatory report, which must be updated every two months until the respective Territorial Ceilings or subceilings are no longer exceeded.

Article VII of the Adapted CFE Treaty could be named the “Large Flexibility Article” because it allows enormous forces to be deployed in Europe. Furthermore,
it should be remarked that there is no legal time limit on the Temporary Deployments, which means that the receiving States Parties can host Temporary Deployments for an unlimited duration as long as the provisions for notification are acknowledged. This issue was actually addressed in President Clinton’s presentation of the “Implementation Conditions of Senate Ratification of CFE to the U.S. Congress May 15, 1997: “The United States has informed all other States Parties to the Treaty that the United States will continue to interpret the term “temporary deployment” as used in the Treaty, to mean a deployment of severely limited duration measured in days or weeks or, at most, several months, but not years”. Below is an overview over the provisions related to both the Basic and Exceptional Temporary Deployments.

The figure shows that exceeding the Territorial Ceilings by any amount of Treaty Limited Equipment up to “CFE-size Division” will be followed by inspections.

Especially in connection with military exercises, it should be noted that all the present Treaty Limited Equipment in the territory is counted in the total amount. The provisions mean that it will be practically impossible to prepare surprise attacks because other States Parties will in reality be monitoring all major military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rights to Exceed Territorial Ceilings During Temporary Deployments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TLE</strong> Temporary Deployments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;BTD-entitlements&quot; = &quot;CFE-size Division&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;ETD-entitlements&quot; = &quot;CFE-size Corps&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any excess of Territorial Ceilings requires notification by the hosting and deploying parties before the excess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETD requires notification and updated reports and CFE-Conference on request</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fig. 19: The States Parties’ rights to exceed their Territorial Ceilings when receiving Temporary Deployments.*
activities. Should there be a desire for deploying forces beyond the “CFE-size Division” and up to, but never beyond, the “CFE-size Corps” that would be a significantly extraordinary situation. In general, if larger amounts of Treaty Limited Equipment than the Exceptional Temporary Deployments are deemed necessary, the situation will no longer be regarded as a crisis management activity but real war, which means that the Adapted CFE Treaty will be out of implementation, because nobody expects the Treaty to remain in force in case of a real war.

This “Large Flexibility Article” underscores the fact that the Adapted CFE Treaty respects both the concept of military limitations and the concept of military flexibility.

4.7 The Concept of Transparency - Information and Verification

Transparency is a very important part of the Adapted CFE Treaty and contributes significantly to the confidence building measures that the Treaty provides.

Articles XIII-XVI of the Adapted CFE Treaty sum up the provisions concerning the concept of transparency. They are meant to ensure verification of compliance of the provisions of the Treaty through notification, exchange of information and inspections.

Article XIV is about verification through inspection mechanisms and provides the States Parties with the right to verify and monitor reductions of and information on the individual States Parties’ Treaty Limited Equipment. This Article is important and could be valuable for the Baltic States. It would provide them with a legal opportunity to inspect Russia, especially where the military deployments in the Pskov Oblast have sometimes caused concern in the Baltic States. The Vienna Document gives some inspection rights to all OSCE participating States but not as detailed as described in the protocols of the Adapted CFE Treaty.

As a consequence of the fact that Estonia and Lithuania have made bilateral CSBM agreements with Russia that practically allow the type of inspection described in the CFE Treaty, it can be claimed that these bilateral CSBM arrangements make up for the CFE transparency, thus making CFE-membership practically irrelevant. Such a conclusion is most doubtful because the Adapted CFE Treaty is a legally binding Treaty once ratified, and it is part of an overall European security and stability architecture that thus supersedes individual bilateral arrangements in significance. Therefore, bilateral CSBM arrangements should rather be seen as beneficial progress towards full CFE membership and not necessarily as an alternative to CFE.

Though the concept of transparency immediately seems to give unambiguous security to the involved parties, it can have a degrading effect on the efficiency of the armed forces, thereby reducing self-defence credibility and leading to military insufficiency. Finland can be mentioned as an example of this because its traditional defence philosophy is based on mobilisation with hidden depots and a high degree of secrecy concerning the national
defence. While such secrecy may improve the credibility of the armed forces themselves, it also jeopardises the spirit of transparency that is being built among European states in accordance with the OSCE agreements mentioned earlier. The comparison with Finnish defence philosophy and Finland’s reluctance to become too deeply involved in detailed transparency may be an important issue in Baltic defence. It could be a paradox for the Baltic armed forces to have to simultaneously prepare for resisting any military aggression while also revealing their defence plans to others. However, such a paradox does not seem to be a problem for the Baltic armed forces, where transparency appears to be an integral part of the modern defence planning and thinking.

The Baltic States should also regard article XXI’s provision on review conferences with some attention. The Article ensures that the States Parties enjoy the right to request extraordinary review conferences. These could be valuable security political instruments for the Baltic States in case they should once again consider their security threatened by, for example, Russian military movements in the Pskov Oblast. Moreover, the transparency provisions of the Treaty would be an efficient means of facilitating NATO-membership as they will make Baltic NATO-membership more digestible to Russia.

The concept of transparency is a very important element of the Adapted CFE Treaty and, in connection with the concept of military limitations and the concept of military flexibility, constitutes a quite comprehensive security and stability regime for European states’ security and Europe’s stability.

5. Conclusion

Generally, there appears to be an overall common understanding among not only the CFE States Parties but also among all other OSCE participating states that Baltic CFE-membership is beneficial to European security and stability.

There are no legal obstructions to Baltic NATO-membership, but only political obstructions because of Russia’s resistance. Thus, Baltic CFE-membership needs to be viewed in this light.

It is also important that the states’ political agreements of refraining from creating spheres of interests, accepting alliance memberships and avoiding threatening other states’ security are principles which may be interpreted differently by the Baltic States, NATO and Russia and are thus objects for discussions.

The Adapted CFE Treaty’s provisions of transparency are generally not negotiable, so the focus for the Baltic States should be on access to military sufficiency while preserving a low level of political tension. The Baltic States should, accordingly, consider which “package” of Ceilings and Temporary Deployments to request in the light of the political, military and legal aspects of CFE-membership.

This article has analysed the legal aspect of Baltic CFE-membership with reference to the military and political aspects where appropriate. But in order to be able to recommend a concrete “CFE-package” for the Baltic States more
thorough analyses of the military and political aspects must be made. The author of this article is preparing such analyses, which will be presented in a book that will be published by the Danish Institute of International Affairs very soon. Concrete options for Baltic “CFE-packages” will, moreover, be presented in the book.

Before the 30 States Parties meet in the next review conference in May 2001, it might be fruitful to initiate a discussion on the perspectives for Baltic CFE-membership. This article has, hopefully, contributed to such a discussion.

1 The Consolidated Adapted CFE Treaty Text Article II.
2 The Consolidated Adapted CFE Treaty Text Article XVIII (“Accession to the Treaty”).
3 The term “subceiling” explains the exact TLE in more details.
4 The Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
5 The Consolidated Adapted CFE Treaty Text, Article I.
7 Estonia’s Annual Exchange of Information,2000 , p. 19.
10 The term “Peacekeeping” is not defined specifically in the Charter but is probably equal to the UN perception of peacekeeping, namely impartial military peace operations conducted with the consent of the conflicting parties. OSCE peacekeeping should be regarded in connection with other conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms.
11 Interview with a Russian diplomat.
13 Ibid. p. 7.
14 Istanbul Summit Declaration, especially. p. 13.
15 Ibid. p. 13
17 The Final Act, Annex 5.
19 The Consolidated Adapted CFE Treaty Text, Article IV and Protocol on National Ceilings.
20 The Consolidated Adapted CFE Treaty Text Article V and the Protocol on Inspection, Section IX.
21 The Protocol on National Ceilings.
22 See fig. 15.
23 The Adapted CFE Treaty Article V.
24 Russia is violating both the current and the Adapted CFE Treaty’s Flank limitations on the Southern Flank.
25 The Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, note 1, 3 and 4.
26 During transits Treaty Limited Equipment is not in combat readiness.
27 Russia and Belarus have developed closer military relations during the recent years but are not formal allies. Moreover, both have equal National and Territorial Ceilings so stationing of forces at each other’s territory is only possible if similar amount of Treaty Limited Equipment is removed from the host States Party.
28 The Consolidated Adapted CFE Treaty Text Article V and the Protocol on Inspection, Section IX.
29 Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section XVIII.
30 Notification must be given in accordance with the Vienna Document 1999 for military activity involving the following amount of troops and equipment: 9,000 troops, 250 battle tanks, 500 ACVs and 250 artillery pieces. If the number of troops exceeds 13,000 and the number of battle tanks exceeds 300 military observers must be invited to monitor the activities. (The Vienna Document Articles V and VI.)
31 The Consolidated Adapted CFE Treaty Text, Article V and the Protocol on Inspection, Section IX.
A Finnish perspective of the CFE Treaty

By Pentti Olin

Introduction

In November 1999, the adapted CFE treaty was finally signed after intensive negotiations. One year after the Istanbul summit we are still almost in the same situation as a year ago. The ratification process has not really moved on. NATO states are waiting for Russia’s next step and its willingness to fully implement the treaty.

Nevertheless, one year is enough to analyse the consequences of the adapted CFE treaty. This article will focus on the consequences to Finland in particular, a country that is not a member of the treaty. What benefit might Finland and the other treaty states have if Finland were to join the treaty some day?

Generally, it can be noted that both the first CFE treaty and the adapted CFE treaty have improved the security situation in Europe for a number of reasons. Primarily, the signing of the first CFE treaty in November 1990 has brought about a substantial reduction of TLE¹ weapons and openness gained by the exchange of military information. Also, the verification system created to implement the first treaty has resulted in the reduction of the readiness of armed forces in Europe. The adapted CFE treaty takes into consideration the current politico-military situation and offers continuity in the area of arms control and disarmament. Although the negotiations of the adapted treaty were hard, the situation without a treaty at all would have been much worse.

The first CFE treaty

To achieve the aim of the first CFE treaty, the member states have established verification centres to verify the implementation process. At the same time, through inspections, contacts between armed forces’ verification centres have been created and officers of the two opposite East and West blocks have got to know one another. Today, these contacts are being regarded as self-evident but previously, less than ten years ago, this was a great change.

All these measures mentioned above; the reduction of weapons, the contacts and the verifications have undoubtedly improved the security situation in Europe and therefore indirectly benefited Finland. Hardly anyone can deny this.
From the point of view of arms control, the CFE treaty has also provided a basis for later arms control agreements, e.g. the Dayton Peace agreement. And it is obvious that other future peace agreements and verification systems dealing with disarmament or arms control will also be based on the adapted CFE treaty.

The adapted CFE treaty in a Finish perspective

There are several defects in the adapted CFE treaty. It concerns only five different categories of arms, in other words the TLE weapons. It is worth considering whether the categories are too narrow or if some categories, belonging to modern warfare, are missing. Furthermore, the ceilings in the adapted treaty are fairly high, so the adapted treaty doesn’t mean any new disarmament. This means that states today carry out inspections in order to verify that the existing level of TLE weapons remains unchanged.

From a specific, Finnish Defence Force point of view, there are some additional doubts concerning the CFE treaty. Comparing to the previous treaty, the adapted CFE offers better opportunities for Russia to concentrate its military power on the flank areas, theoretically also at the Finnish border. Thus, the adapted treaty has reversed Russia’s obligation to deploy the major part of the TLE equipment in the permanent sites (DPSS) and out of the flank areas. Because of that, Russia has a possibility to strengthen the active formations at the Finnish border. However, this is unlikely due to practical reasons.

The aim of the CFE treaties were, and are still, to reduce the possibility of a surprise attack in Europe. If Finland joined the treaty it would therefore amount to admitting Finland as a threat to other states. Finland does not regard itself as a potential invader or as a military threat to any neighbouring countries and has never had the capability of a surprise attack, neither has the country planned to gain such a capacity. Rather, Finland regards itself as a small country and thinks of itself as a possible target of a surprise attack.

Thus, by joining the treaty Finland would count itself among the states that have admitted to be a threat to other states. Furthermore, the Defence Forces would need to reduce the amount of weapons to the level the other treaty states accept. This is a fact, which Finland finds hard to accept. At the same time, Finland would give the treaty states the right to limit its level of the most important heavy weapons as well as the right to develop its armed forces in the long run. And it is difficult to maintain a credible independent defence when the power to decide the size or level of one’s armed forces has been given up to a foreign authority.

The above arguments lead to the conclusion that Finland also in the future should be fully capable of deciding on the affairs concerning its own security. As a member of the treaty this autonomy is limited, and therefore Finland does not see the CFE Treaty as a reasonable option.

Another aspect concerns Finland’s obligations as a non-aligned country. There are claims that all European states should
join the adapted CFE treaty and by doing so fulfill their country’s responsibility in the universal arms control process. One argument is that the non-aligned countries should join the treaty together with the rest of Europe as the non-aligned countries also benefit from the CFE treaty. Thus, the decreasing number of TLE weapons of the allied countries (NATO and Warsaw Pact) has narrowed the gap between the allied and non-aligned countries regarding TLE weapons and therefore, one can argue that the security of the non-aligned countries has increased. This is true. But it is also clear that treaty states still form two opposite pools regardless of what the new treaty says about national ceilings and the previous bipolar blocks of the East and the West disappearing. Therefore, a non-aligned state applying for membership would inevitably end up belonging to one or the other group and thereby undermine the existing balance of the groups.

If Finland or Sweden or both were to join the treaty, their ceilings would probably be counted to the northern flanks so that together with Norway they would form a contrast to the corresponding Russian troops in the northern flank area. Does Norway or NATO want to change their ceilings in the north so that Finland and Sweden with their armed forces could fit in? Or if the entry of Finland and Sweden to the treaty does not affect the ceilings of Norway in any way, would Russia like to have a reasonable size of armed forces deployed opposite its troops in the north? This would give Russia an argument to increase its weaponry in the northern flank. In this case, joining the treaty would have an opposite effect of what the CFE treaty aims at.

As mentioned above, one of the main points of the CFE treaties are to diminish the possibility of a surprise attack. Thus, both the first and the adapted CFE treaty include the exchange of military information and verification measures, which are large and extremely comprehensive and would reveal the basic elements of the Finnish defence. The storage sites of heavy weapons and the mobilization centres are exactly the places where the potential strategic strike would hit. When the weapon and equipment stores are opened for verification purposes, Finland would reveal just those parts of its defence system, which would be targets of a potential surprise attack or strategic strike.

By applying for membership of the CFE treaty and revealing the critical elements of the Finnish defence, Finland would naturally increase the risk of becoming a target of a surprise strike. Therefore, in countries like Finland, whose defence system is based on compulsory military service and mobilization, joining the treaty works against itself by increasing the capability of the potential enemy to launch a strategic strike against such a country.

Norway and Denmark have quite a similar conscription and mobilization system as Finland. One might ask how they can act as members of the treaty if Finland cannot? The difference between these countries and Finland lies in the fact that Norway and Denmark belong to the Nato alliance and in a time of crisis the allied forces can protect their mobili-
zation. Finland does not have that option and joining the CFE would therefore give Finland two options: either to increase the military readiness and/or to enter into the alliance. With the above arguments in mind, it is clear that Finland would need external help to protect the mobilisation. So, in the case of Finland the alliance would be a consequence of the CFE membership.

Nevertheless, from the Finnish point of view, the treaties have some positive elements also. The exchange of military information in the CFE is much larger and more comprehensive than in the Vienna Document. As a member of the CFE Finland would get substantially more military information than by the Vienna Document. In addition, politically Finland could benefit from belonging to the Joint Consultative Group of the OSCE and thereby influence the arms control issues in Europe. On the other hand, Finland already has a seat at the general OSCE table, that is the Forum for Security and Co-operation where all the OSCE states are dealing with security-related matters in Europe. The JCG is only for CFE members. Although, it has been claimed that the JCG forms the nucleus of the European arms control, we have to point to the fact that the only thing it has completed in the last decade is the adaptation of the document it deals with.

All that has been said above may sound as if there were almost nothing positive in the CFE treaties. That is not the right impression. The CFE treaties are still some of the cornerstones of the arms control and security in Europe. Only the nature of the treaties are such that, from the military point of view, it is hard for a country like Finland to see their beneficial features. Initially, the first treaty was signed by two military alliances and as such this kind of treaty is not convenient for a non-aligned country like Finland.

1 “Treaty Limited Equipment” which includes combat aircrafts, attack helicopters, artillery, battle tanks and armored infantry-fighting vehicles.
When Security Strategies collide

By Ole Kværnø

Introduction

The three Baltic States currently face the challenge of having to relate to two opposing and incompatible external security strategies, a Western co-operative security strategy on the one hand and a traditional Russian power based security strategy on the other. Thus, the Baltic States find themselves in a position where they are vigorously pursuing a strategy of being integrated into the Western co-operative security structures. But at the same time the Baltic States find themselves being three small states positioned in the geographical vicinity of a potentially aggressive major power and having to relate to this power’s strategy of seeking dominant influence on the future security policies of the states. Press reports in early January 2001 that Russia has deployed tactical nuclear missiles to the Kaliningrad exclave would, if this information proves true, bear indisputable evidence that Russia is indeed pursuing such a traditional major power geo-political strategy. As the article will discuss below, such a forward deployment of nuclear arms to the Baltic Sea Region would be the first of its kind since the end of the Cold War and in perfect line with the new Russian Military doctrine and the Russian National Security Concept, which outlines the security strategy of Russia. The deployment must be viewed not only as a major power attempt to intimidate the three Baltic States from furthering their wishes to join the NATO alliance. It is also as a significant message to NATO that Russia is willing to realise its threats from 1999, that “re-deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the region would be a likely response to a NATO enlargement with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary over Moscow’s opposition”. It is an ironic fact that the Russian leadership by such a step might accomplish the exact opposite of the intention bringing the Baltic Three much closer to NATO. Thus, the NATO countries and in particular the US under a new Republican presidency, which is likely to be less committed than the former administration to a co-operative strategy, might realise that the strategy towards three Baltic States and Russia in particular is flawed and quite simply not working.
The intention of this article is to discuss the specific security policy problem of the three Baltic States being caught in between the strategy of the West and that of Russia. Therefore, the article will discuss the basis of the strategy of the West towards the three states at a general, conceptual level but not the content of the strategy in any detail. In order to substantiate the discussion the article will furthermore analyse the new Russian National Security Concept and the new Russian Military Doctrine with a specific focus on the Baltic region. This analysis will be limited to the two latest significant security policy documents of the Russian Federation to illustrate the clash of strategies as it is not the intention of this article to provide a fully adequate analysis of Russian foreign and security policy.

When Baltic security in the Post Cold War era is discussed in the West both in terms of academic analysis and policy-making three basic and often uncontested assumptions are often made:

1. Security in Europe is indivisible.
2. There is no military actor threat.
3. The Baltic region is not a security vacuum as the Baltic Three are already incorporated in the so-called new European security architecture.

There is a considerable risk that the West will dense flawed strategies towards the region if Western policy-makers do not test the basic assumptions they devise their strategies from.

It is evident that the three Baltic States, sharing a common geo-strategic environment, are all of a traditional small state nature and therefore both in a neo-realistic and a more liberal analysis are inclined to be reactive rather than active in their security policies. Further, it is in this respect characteristic that the three small states share the same strategic priorities in trying to devise their security strategies, namely to seek to become fully part of Western European security structures. For all three states the specific goals derived from this strategy have been defined as acquiring membership of the two dominant European security institutions, NATO and the EU.

It is further evident that the NATO aspirations are being dismissed vigorously by Russia, which has again chosen a security strategy of a very traditional major state nature seeking strategic influence through power projection and intimidation. At the same time, we witness both NATO and the EU changing their security strategies and putting much more emphasis on co-operative security structures based on commonly shared structural threats.

The essential strategic problem of the three Baltic States is that they are caught in between the two strategies; on the one hand a traditional power based strategy from a potentially aggressive neighbouring major state and on the other hand more liberal co-operative strategies from NATO and the EU. In a traditional small state analysis the Baltic Three might be inclined either to adapt to Russia’s intimidatory strategy or to seek to disengage from Russia by out-balancing her through alliance with other major states. However, the new strategies of NATO and the EU have been changing into more co-operative security strategies placing
much more emphasis on building security regimes based on the engagement of all actors, on confidence and security building measures and on stability projection. Obviously, this strategy puts less and less emphasis on the identification of traditional actor threats, deterrence and power balances, which is again based on the assumption that no actor threat exists currently and in the foreseeable future. While at the same time dismissing that Russia is a potential actor threat and on the other hand admitting that a currently unstable Russia through its geo-strategic importance is the major problem in European security, it is essential for the success of the co-operative strategy to engage Russia as a partner.

**The three basic assumptions**

As it was pointed out above Western politicians and scholars from their European perspective often seem to base their arguments on three basic assumptions when discussing the security of the three Baltic States and their common aspirations to gain membership of NATO and the EU:

1. Security in Europe is indivisible, so a security problem for any of the Baltic Three will be a common European problem.
2. The widespread European debate about security threats can with a rough categorisation conclude that the traditional actor threat is gone. The security threats are of a more structural nature and cannot be tied to one or more single state actors in Europe. A security threat against the Baltic Three therefore is of a structural nature and a state actor threat can be dismissed.
3. The notion of a traditional geo-strategic security vacuum currently existing in the Baltic region is dismissed in a co-operative security analysis. There is no vacuum as the Baltic Three are already closely tied into the so-called co-operative security architecture of Europe through their membership of various security arrangements.

There may be some truth in all three notions when the focus is on core-Europe, i.e. the EU and NATO Europe. The argument goes that seen from the side of the EU and NATO any security threat against either Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania could not be confined essentially to an isolated Baltic strategic ghetto. It would spin-off or spillover into being a question of Northern European and thereby all-European security stability. Secondly, it seems undeniable that with the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact there is no single major military threat against Western and Central-Europe in a short and medium term perspective. All threat analysis performed over the last decade conclude that the essential security threats are of a structural nature such as economic, social and political disorder, regional conflicts based on ethnic and religious rivalries, human rights abuses leading to tension, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction etc. Thirdly, it is also undeniable that the three Baltic States have been included in a number of wider European security arrangements such as OSCE and the Council of Europe, and associated with the EU as well as the EAPC and the PfP.
Programs with NATO. The framework and nature of all these security arrangements seem to guarantee that any state within these arrangements would be able to draw any substantial security threat against it to the attention of and involve the rest of the European states and the US.

There is, however, a fine irony to be found in the fact that whereas all three assumptions seem relevant and applicable in a Western and Central-European perspective, all three fall short when a stringent Baltic perspective is assumed. In this perspective the arguments turn into dangerously false assumptions when one tries to extrapolate their validity to the Baltic region.

In the following section, the article will discuss the three assumptions in a Baltic strategic perspective with a view to broaden the debate about Baltic security and the currently very slow and uncertain processes of NATO and EU membership expansion. Finally, the article will look more closely at the core problem of the Baltic Three: Russia’s security strategy towards them.

### The divisible security

The conceptual notion of security being indivisible has become almost a religious dogma, which is seldom questioned. The end of the Cold War carried with it the disappearance of the dominant military threat against Western Europe and brought about aspirations between European states to construct a lasting peace in the common European House, such as through the CSCE process. The assumption was that security challenges were common and that security was indivisible and the strategic challenge therefore had to move from confrontation to universal co-operation based on common values. The assumption of security being indivisible had two dimensions. Security was both geographically and functionally indivisible.

The geographic dimension implied that a security problem of one state in Europe would automatically be regarded by all other European states and institutions as being a problem of theirs and therefore one they would be inclined to deal with. This assumption is an obvious extrapolation of the collective security premise underlying the collective security system.

The functional dimension implied that any security threat in a broad sense, be it ecological, economical, social, criminal, political or military in nature, would affect the other dimensions, e.g. an ecological threat would at the same time have economical, political etc. dimensions.

The geographic dimension can be empirically dismissed and does not need a deep theoretic analysis. In September 1999, shortly before the publication of a new Russian military doctrine in October, the second Chechen War was launched. Many thousands of civilians lost their lives or livelihoods as a result of a disproportionate use of violent force. However, the Western political reaction to this has been very moderate and generally at the level of declarations only. The Western strategy was and remains both bilaterally and multilaterally based on a co-operative approach towards Russia. The basic argument was that all European security regimes and arrangements are to
a very large degree dependent on Russia remaining engaged as a partner. Russia is currently restoring its institutional arrangements with NATO, which is much welcomed by all member states. At the same time, the Second Chechen War continues. It is obvious that a crisis or in this case a war of the same proportions and dimensions with such clear violations of international law and norms could not be tolerated inside Western Europe. Chechnya is plainly in the periphery of the EU’s and NATO’s area of security interest. It would not be unfair to speculate that the further away from the centre the crisis or the treats appear the more geographically divisible security becomes. It seems fair to conclude that security is indeed geographically divisible.

Likewise, the functional dimension is easily dismissed empirically. It is characteristic that the EU and the USA are managing very well to avoid linking trade issues that occasionally assume the character of confrontation and crisis to other aspects of security. The potential for a trade war between the USA and the EU is obviously present but is, however, currently remote as a possibility. While this might set back both entities in terms of economics, especially for the EU as it is struggling to integrate its economies fully, a trade war could occur while the EU and US were at the same time sharing a strategic partnership in terms of military and normative security. To suggest a spillover from a trade war to a military confrontation would be highly unimaginable.

The obvious conclusion that security is both geographically and functionally divisible is disturbing for the Baltic Three because the co-operative security strategy they meet from the West is based on the assumption that security is indeed indivisible. Obviously, the Second Chechen War has disturbed the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, who have started asking themselves to what extent they are positioned in the EU and NATO periphery.

**No Current Actor Threats?**

It is widely accepted that there is no credible actor threat against Europe (or NATO) in a short or even medium-term perspective. Only in the longer term is an actor threat imaginable. The dominant security challenges and risks, as the security threats are called with political correctness, are of a more structural nature comprising proliferation, information technology protection, terrorism, sabotage and trans-border organised crime. With China, India, Pakistan and other potentially aggressive major powers concentrating fully on enhancing their regional power projection capabilities and their regional influence only and with Russia constantly demonstrating its lack of military capacity and ability the conclusion appears to be relevant and well-founded.

This is true, however, only when the focus is on an actor threat against the US, EU and NATO. It is not necessarily true when the perspective is shifted to the Baltic region.

Russia is still, in spite of all her shortcomings, a regional military major power in relative terms, which has been demonstrated clearly by the relative massive force concentration for the Second Chechen
War. She is willing, it seems, to make use of the military instrument as this is her last available method of identifying herself as a major power. The deterrent capability of the three Baltic States is still rudimentary. Russia is of course currently preoccupied elsewhere, which makes the Baltic region one of very low tension with the number of Russian troops stationed in the region being the lowest since the liberation from Soviet occupation. With Russia’s dominant emphasis on the military instrument in the overall security policy, though, it is fair to assume that this could change rapidly. There are obviously many reasons for Russia to put so much emphasis on the military component of security, which is the subject of the discussion below, but the bottom line is that Russia in her doctrines and concepts puts pressure on and intimidates her neighbours. If Russia wished to build up a military threat against any or all of the Baltic Three she could do so within a very few months.

To conclude bluntly: Dismissing an actor threat as a realistic potential seems difficult for three small states with a relatively insignificant military deterrent capacity compared to that of a neighbouring major power with a relatively large offensive military capacity. This is made so much more difficult of course as this neighbour is constantly basing its doctrines and concepts on its apparent ability and willingness to use this military instrument.

**The Security Vacuum**

In a traditional geo-strategic or in a neo-realistic analysis it is obvious that the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation troops in 1992 created a military vacuum as the three Baltic States were faced with the challenge of building up totally new defence structures. This is obviously a very resource demanding and time-consuming process, which is still ongoing. There is a military vacuum in the sense that the defence structures of the Baltic Three are still insufficient in both quantity and quality to create reliable deterrence against any larger potential aggressor. The existing structures are moreover still falling short in the sense that the Baltic Three are unable to create sufficient holding time against a military aggressor to ensure the possibility of direct military support from potential allies. There would be two principle ways to fill this vacuum for the three Baltic States. Either to create a military instrument alone or together capable of deterring a potential aggressor or to obtain alliance guarantees from external major powers capable of deterring Russia and rapidly secure the structures to make sufficient host nation support available and reliable. It is obvious that the three Baltic States have laid out the same strategy: to obtain alliance guarantees from NATO as soon as possible. Their building of defence structures is more focused on membership action plans and facilitating integration than on creating independently a credible and reliable deterrence. The argument is that the military power base of Russia would be overwhelming to such a degree that any of the Baltic States must aim at creating sufficient holding time for allied
forces to get in. The three small states simply do not have the resources to build defence forces capable of individual or trilateral deterrence against any major state without substantial external support.

In a more liberal co-operative security analysis it is assumed that there is no security vacuum.

First of all, because of the assumption that a credible military actor threat does not exist. However, the discussion above suggested that there might indeed be a potential for an actor threat against one or all of the Baltic Three. Secondly, because the European security architecture in all its complexity with a vast number of security organisations and institutions inter-locking or inter-blocking each other is based on the concept of involvement and co-operation between all actors. Most of the organisations and indeed states are to some extent involved in shaping Baltic security, many of the organisations even being permanently present in the region. The argument is often heard to be that the security architecture is so overlapping and complex that one or the other security organisation or institution not fully engaged is bound to pick up and manage any conflict or crisis that might occur. This would follow from the anarchic logic that one or more of the security organisations in the architecture would either have direct interest or excess capacity and would therefore offer itself as a crisis management entrepreneur. The experiences from Yugoslavia 1989 to 1995 speak strongly in favour of this not being a sustainable argument.

It must be admitted that the liberal argument does indeed have a very strong position inside Western Europe and there is much that speaks in favour of the argument. Further, the argument carried much political weight under the Yeltsin concept and doctrine, which devised a security strategy based on a co-operative approach and on Russian involvement and engagement in all relevant security organisations. However, with the Russian change of security strategy to the Putin Doctrine being based on disengagement from the West and on external security threats as the main concern, the co-operative security argument becomes somewhat hollow seen from a Baltic perspective. In this perspective it is evident that the neo-realistic argument of a security vacuum being a problematic fact is relevant. In this respect it is evident that all three states base their making of policy and strategy exactly on a vacuum existing and on Russia being their main security problem.

The changes to Russian security policy

Is it appropriate or even relevant that the three Baltic States consider Russia as their main security concern?

To answer this question it is necessary to address the current changes in Russian security strategy and military doctrine. The article will do so by analysing the two latest significant security policy documents of the Russian Federation, the new national security concept and the new military doctrine, to illustrate the fundamental changes.

It is evident that we witness a complete change in the Russian security perception,
which in the nineteen nineties regarded internal security threats to be dominant. In the beginning of the New Millennium Russia identifies external threats as being the overall and dominant security threats to Russian security. It is further evident that this change in perception has led to a fundamental change in Russia’s security strategy and consequently to its military doctrine.

It would be wrong to regard the substantial change of paradigm in Russian security strategy as being tied to President Vladimir Putin’s assuming office on the first day of the new millennium and his personal policy. It is of course correct that the law passed in January on the new National Security Concept of the Russian Federation being the first major security initiative of the new president decisively marked the change of security paradigm. But the changes had been coming for at least a year both as a result of an emerging consensus in the Russian security elite and as a result of changes in Russia’s role and influence at the international scene. The changes have been observed in the West and in the Baltics throughout 1999 with an increasing Russian disengagement from the West and antagonism towards the west, especially of course towards the US and NATO. The Russian withdrawal from all co-operative organs with NATO during the Kosovo campaign was only one of many symptoms. And the draft of the new national security concept that came out in October 1999 together with a blueprint of a new Russian military doctrine were the first official political evidence of the changes to Russian security strategy. Although the drafts/blueprints in many cases were heavily criticised for being badly formulated, incoherent and inconsistent they were nonetheless significant of a change of paradigm coming.

The two documents were accordingly finalised and adopted, however, without substantial changes respectively in January with the Law on the National Security Concept and in April with the presidential decree on the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. The fact that the documents are both adopted by presidential decree with the status of laws is obviously significant of their marking lasting changes and not being just insignificant political election campaign gestures, as many observers would see it in late 1999. That of course does not mean that the concept and the doctrine are fundamentally binding legal documents. They are by virtue of a political nature and can be changed, amended or even ignored, as has indeed been the case with the former concept and doctrine. Yet the documents are of vast importance for understanding and relating to Russian security policy as they reflect the political self-perception, the priorities and assessments of the Russian presidency, government and the political and military elite. Further, it must be seen as an attempt to render stability and sustainability to the content of the concept and the doctrine that they are elevated to the status of laws.

The new national security concept replaces the December 1997 national security concept and the new military doctrine replaces the October 1993 military doctrine. The following section will first analyse and discuss the fundamental
changes stemming from the new national security concept and the new military doctrine, and then assess their importance for the three Baltic States.

**The New Russian National Security Concept**

**The Background**

The 1997 national security concept was indeed the first attempt by the Russian leadership since the breakdown of the Soviet Union to formulate a coherent strategic analysis as the basis for devising a security strategy and a military doctrine. Before 1997, the only formulated basis for security policy-making had been the 1993 military doctrine. This meant that there appeared to be no political consensus about the general security strategy or indeed about Russian foreign policy as such. The main thread, mainly determined by the narrow elite around president Yeltsin, was a need for Western co-operation in the fields of economic and political reform. The result was a general policy of integration and partnership with the West with a view to allow Russia to take up its position as an equal member of the civilised Western international system. But the security policy in the period 1993-1997 appeared to be extremely incrementally decided with a multiplicity of different views on Russian security interests based on various political, economic and societal interests.

Based on the views of the so-called Westernizers around Yeltsin the 1997 national security concept formulated a strategic concept based on co-operation and integration with the West. It was characteristic that that concept identified the threats to Russian national security to be primarily internal. This was indeed an important confession to the West that Russia did consider that neither NATO nor the USA posed a security threat to Russian interests. The 1997 concept did acknowledge difficulties for Russia in assuming its rightful position in the European security architecture if Russia was a full member and equal partner only of the OSCE. In all other fora Russia had a more junior status. Apart from trying to develop the OSCE to a universal security umbrella for all other security arrangements Russia sought a strategic influence on NATO’s role in European security. Yeltsin contributed personally to an assessment of this being a successful policy by his acceptance of a Permanent Joint Council between Russia and NATO and his presentation of it to the Russian population as an effective Russian veto over NATO missions beyond collective self defence of the members’ territories. To a large extent Russia based her reluctant acceptance of NATO expansion with the three new Eastern European members on this assumption.

The decision by NATO in spite of strong Russian protests to launch the military campaign in March 1999 against Serbia based on Serbia’s violation of human rights in Kosovo proved this assumption to be false. Over the summer of 1999 it became evident that the Westernizers around Yeltsin were loosing ground to
the more Eurasian and slavophile actors in the Russian security policy elite. The Kosovo War undermined the Westernizers’ argument for partnership and integration with the West to gain Western support for Russia’s internal economic reform and for Russia’s integration into the international economy. The argument was that the war signalled an expansion of NATO’s mission to include unilateral intervention to settle internal conflict unrestrained by UN. The perspective of this would be a destruction of the fundamentals of the international system, the Westphalian principle of protecting the sovereignty and internal affairs of the state. And the further perspective was that this posed a direct threat to Russia’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Few Western analysts would agree to this argument but it was and is important for Russia’s self-perception. In this line of argument the launching of the Second Chechen War in September 1999 could even be seen as a direct outcome of the Kosovo war. It obviously added further to the drawback for the Westernizers’ position that the Russian economic development since the devaluation in 1998 had been quite favourable and allowed for less economic dependence on the West.

The Content

On the background of this shift of focal point of the Russian security policy elite a draft for a new Russian national security concept was published in November 1999 and finally adopted by decree in January 2000. The major change from the 97-concept is, as indicated above, that the concept suggests disengagement from the West and a much stronger emphasis on the military instrument, which makes the subsequent adoption of a new military doctrine interesting and important.

Whereas the old concept pointed out the dominant security threats to Russian security to be of an internal nature, the new concept gives priority to external threats elevating their importance and expanding their types. The old concept stated that there were no external threats resulting from deliberate aggressive action against Russia. The new concept does not and it makes an almost paranoid general reference to “a number of states stepping up their efforts to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily and in other ways”¹⁵. This formulation is obviously pointing directly to the West and to the potential expansion of NATO.

A comprehensive list of external threats is given in the concept, including¹⁶

- The desire of some states and international associations to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the UN and the OSCE;
- The danger of a weakening of Russia’s political, economic and military influence in the world;
- The strengthening of military-political blocks and alliances, above all NATO’s eastward expansion;
- The possible emergence of foreign military bases and a major military presence in the immediate proximity of Russian borders;
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles;
- The weakening of the integrational processes in the CIS;
- Outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of CIS members;
- Territorial claims on Russia.

The concept concludes that the level of a military threat is growing and that “NATO’s transition to the practice of using military force outside its area of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction could destabilise the entire global strategic situation”17.

The concept emphasises that the natural tendency of the international system developing after the cessation of the Cold War confrontation is towards multipolarity but that this tendency is under deliberate pressure from the US and NATO seeking to establish US hegemony in world politics.

It is characteristic that the concept calls, further, for more and stronger traditional major power instruments to be employed in handling the threats to Russian security. Internal threats are still mentioned extensively and threats of a political, economic, socio-economic, social and criminal nature are pointed out. Occasionally, the formulation is surprisingly blunt in pointing to corruption and the merger of “certain elements of executive and legislative authority with criminal structures”18 as an internal threat.

Given the greater emphasis on external threats and the significance of employing more forcefully and on a wider scale traditional major power instruments in pursuing Russian security policy goals, the subsequent adoption of a new Russian military doctrine becomes of obvious interest.

**The New Russian Military Doctrine**

**The Background**

The new Russian military doctrine to replace the 1993 doctrine was first published in October 1999, subsequently amended and finally adopted in April 2000.

On November 4, 1999, Security Council Secretary Yuri Baturin held a conference to follow up on the publication of the draft for a new Russian Military Doctrine19 and to explain the background to the ongoing revision of the doctrine. In his presentation, he stressed the importance of the new military doctrine as a foundation for the ongoing military reform and general military development in Russia. He further emphasised that the new doctrine should be seen not just as a political manifestation, but also as the basis for practical work on tactical, operational and strategic actions.

At the conference, which was attended by representatives from the power ministries (the ministries of economy, foreign affairs and defence industries), the Academy of Sciences, the government and the security council, it was pointed out that the former military doctrine first adopted in 1993 and the national security concept from 1997 had been made obsolete by
events and the national and international developments. Three areas were headlined as areas where developments had been most unfavourable for Russia:

1. Russia’s geo-political situation, it was stated, is strongly influenced by the potential expansion of NATO to the east, which directly threatens Russian security. Moreover, Russia sees a certain opposition to the integration process within the CIS and some states’ attempts to limit Russian influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

2. New real military dangers have surfaced and tensions on Russia’s borders and in conflict zones near the borders have grown over the past three years.

3. The socio-economic situation in Russia has deteriorated forcing a change in the structures of the power ministries and a review of their qualitative parameters. The border guards have further been reinforced, as has the ministry for emergency situations. Moreover, the combat readiness and ability of the armed forces have dwindled due to insufficient financing.

Mr. Baturin, in his presentation, further gave special attention to the division of functions between the power departments and the federal services in repelling external aggression and in settling internal conflicts. Lastly, he stated that the military doctrine cannot be fully implemented for a long time and must hence be made provisional. This is due to the fact that measures must be carefully defined to make up for Russia’s diminishing military might. The time of operation of the provisional military doctrine must hence be used to define the foundations of a future military policy. It is quite apparent from the foregoing that the need for devising a new military doctrine rests on five pillars:

1. Russia’s deep social and economic crisis, which has badly damaged the military both in terms of structure and ability as well as the morale of the troops.

2. Russia’s profound identity crisis. The Russian political leadership is caught in the dilemma between major power ambitions and insufficient resources coupled with impotent political structures. This is reflected in the strong Russian unwillingness to accept uni-polarisation of the world. Russia’s, in many respects irrational, attempt to seize Pristina airport in the early stages of deploying KFOR to Kosovo demonstrates this dilemma. The apparently total internal confusion between the ministry of defence and the ministry of foreign affairs in terms of the aim, scope and extent of supporting operations adds to this picture. The opposition to uni-polarisation is not new. It builds on the foreign policy doctrine of multi-polarity worked out by former foreign minister Primakov re- emphasising Russia’s orientation to centres of power other than the West, such as China, India, Iran, Iraq and other states.

3. NATO’s New Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington Summit, which was seen by Russia as having been worked out without any consideration for Russia’s security interests and position. It is obvious, in this context, that Russia completely failed to make use of the special Russia-NATO institutions, i.e. the Permanent Joint Council, to influence the
elaboration of the New Strategic Concept thus contributing to the view of Russia as a very ineffectual actor.

4. The NATO campaign in Kosovo without a UN or OSCE mandate\(^2\), which the Russian government so strongly spoke against. It is obvious that Russia was marginalized, or rather marginalized itself, in the management of the Kosovo crisis demonstrating without qualification that Russia is not regarded by NATO or the USA as being an equal partner in the handling of European security problems. It is also of interest that Russia, following the first NATO airstrikes against Serbia, withdrew from all organs of co-operation with NATO without, however, causing much worry inside the Western Alliance.

5. The Russians ill fated attempts to establish a trustworthy collective defence alliance through the CIS. The establishment of GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) with an intended collective security mechanism has essentially left Russia with a weakened sphere of influence. Russia’s claim for a Russian prerogative in defining security in the “near abroad” is quite simply not substantiated. Georgia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan’s refusal to renew the CIS security treaty was indeed the last straw to break the camel’s back and made the ambition to create a reliable and credible security mechanism within the CIS framework obsolete.

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**The Content**

When viewing the content of the new Russian military doctrine it is interesting to see the perceived security threats listed\(^3\). Both the former national security concept of 1997 and the former military doctrine of 1993 reflected the assessment that a major actor threat was unlikely\(^4\) and that the risk of a major scale war involving Russia was estimated as low. The former doctrine and security concept therefore focused very much on internal concerns and emphasised the threats arising from internal socio-economic crises and local armed conflicts along Russia’s borders. The new draft shifts the focus to emphasise external military threats without, however, assessing the risk as being imminent. As a second priority threat, the draft mentions intervention in the internal affairs of Russia. This is a clear reference to Kosovo and reflects the Russian fear of seeing the Westphalian order with its unqualified protection of the internal affairs of the state being compromised. The sovereignty of Serbia was violated gravely by NATO and Russia rejects a general development in the direction of armed humanitarian interventions becoming an accepted norm in international law. For the same reason Russia is very eager to reject any foreign role in the second Chechen War by playing it down.

The new draft also emphasises Russia’s rejection of a unipolar world order. As a priority three threat the draft lists attempts to ignore or infringe Russia’s interests in resolving international security problems and to oppose the strengthening of Russia as one the influential power centres in the world. The marginalization of Russia by NATO and USA is regarded as a major strategic problem. Russia is, and has been ever since the end of the Cold War,
the junior partner to USA, the EU and NATO. A part of Russia’s security strategy was to make the OSCE develop towards an all-European collective security system thereby bringing NATO under some degree of control from an umbrella organisation, where Russia would at least formally be an equal partner. This strategy has obviously failed, which was clearly demonstrated at the OSCE Istanbul summit in November this year. The security charter adopted at the Summit has very few significant innovations, the most robust of them being the creation of rapid expert assistance and co-operation teams (REACT-teams) consisting of civilian and unarmed observers. The charter agreements on streamlining co-operation with and between other international organisations on security issues are so vaguely worded and non-operational in their content that they must be regarded merely as a manifestation of the good faith and noble intentions of the 54 participating states. The Summit declaration adds to the impression of Russia being regarded as part of the problem rather than part of the solution to European security problems. Much of the declaration is concentrated on Russia’s war in Chechnya, withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova, limitation of Russian troop presence in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It was even found necessary in the declaration to reassure Russia of its territorial integrity.

As it appears from the list of external threats the doctrine is in its essence far more anti-western than the previous one. It is noteworthy that the Russian denunciation of the nuclear no-first-use policy that was first made in the 1993 doctrine is reaffirmed in the new draft. No-first-use is no longer, not even at the declamatory level, a part of the Russian doctrine. The former no-first-use policy adopted by Leonid Brezhnev never had much military validity, but it did indeed serve a reassuring political purpose. With the new strongly anti-western doctrine the definitive denouncement of no-first-use must be regarded as an implicit instrument of deterrence, which can best be understood against the background of Russia’s apparent shortcomings in the conventional fields. It can also be understood against the background of Russia’s fear for the future of the ABM regime. Russia’s fundamental view is that the 1972 treaty is the basis of all international nuclear regimes and that a ballistic missile defence system would corrupt all agreements and force a new nuclear arms race. Russia would not, the argument goes, be able to develop an ABM system by itself in the foreseeable future and would hence be forced to secure sufficient quantities of nuclear ballistic missiles to ensure the ability to penetrate a defence system. American reassurance that such a system would only provide protection against “rogue” states does little to calm the Russian fear of it being aimed at Russia. The new doctrine mentions this as a specific security threat, which must be intended as a strong political signal to the USA. In this context, the wording stipulating the use of nuclear arms is very difficult. It qualifies the reassuring formulation in the former doctrine that nuclear weapons would never be used against
states party to the Non-proliferation Treaty and not possessing nuclear weapons (unless participating in an alliance aggression against Russia involving states with nuclear weapons). With the wording of the new doctrine nuclear weapons can be used in a large variety of situations, including as a response to a conventional aggression in situations critical to the security of Russia or its allies. That there is political will to substantiate this new concept was seen in late June 1999 during exercise “Zapad 99” (“West 99”), when nuclear weapons were indeed used as a response to a conventional aggression\(^\text{30}\). The exercise was meant as a warning to the West following the Kosovo campaign as well as a manifestation of Russia’s military might as a major power. The exercise included, for the first time in more than a decade, five military districts and three fleets as well as a combined Russian-Belarussian group of forces. The exercise was clearly directed against the West responding to a cruise missile attack from an unspecified military alliance against Belarus and the Western part of Russia\(^\text{31}\). While the exercise demonstrated that the Russian Strategic Aviation Force and the Strategic Missile Forces are still operable and operative, it also clearly demonstrated the major shortcomings of the Russian military in terms of command, control and communications as well as the urgent need for upgrading much of the materiel\(^\text{32}\).

In a further interpretation of the content of the doctrine from a Baltic perspective it is noteworthy that Russia intentionally puts pressure on the Baltic Three in general and on Estonia and Latvia in particular. The list of basic external threats listed thus includes “violation of the existing balance of forces close to the borders of the Russian Federation and the borders of its allies”\(^\text{33}\). As the following paragraph warns against NATO expansion in general, this paragraph must be interpreted as a specific warning against Baltic membership of NATO in particular. Further down in the same paragraph one sees that Russia considers discrimination against Russian citizens in foreign states as an external military threat. This must be interpreted as a strong warning to Estonia and Latvia, that Russia might take military steps to secure the “rights, freedoms and lawful interests” of the Russian minorities in the two countries\(^\text{34}\). Whereas this at the declamatory level is apparently intended to protect the interest of the Russian minorities it might just have the opposite effect. Such wording might do little to calm Estonian and Latvian fears that the Russian minorities could be a fifth column serving the interests of a potentially hostile neighbour.

**Conclusion**

There can be little doubt that the new national security concept and the new military doctrine should be seen as a political attempt to re-establish Russia as a major actor in both European and global security. In spite of Mr. Baturin’s assurance cited above that the new doctrine is not just a political manifestation, one is tempted to conclude that it is exactly that. Whereas the exercise “Zapad 99” was clearly intended to substantiate the content of the later published new doctrine
and give credibility to it in terms of strategic and tactical capability, it did in fact the opposite. The exercise used up a full year’s allotment of fuel and demonstrated the major technological shortcomings of the Russian military. The new security concept’s and the military doctrine’s many intended political signals of an anti-Western and indeed anti-Baltic nature support this conclusion.

It is also interesting that Russia in its new doctrine puts so much emphasis on nuclear weapons at a time when all other major powers seem to be toning down the military importance of nuclear forces as theatre weapons. This must be regarded as a result of Russia’s deep identity crisis as well as politico-military and socio-economic crisis, because of which the nuclear status is the last and only remedy to help Russia identify itself as a major power. It is in this respect thought provoking to see how much attention the Russian president gives to the possession of the so-called “nuclear suitcase” containing the code keys to release nuclear weapons. It has almost become a talisman symbolising political control of the Russian State.

The new security concept and the military doctrine are in many respects, as it appears from the discussion above, not a well-formulated platform from which Russia can devise a pro-active security strategy. Hence the two documents must be concluded to have the character of a response to Russia’s deep crisis in almost all spheres of politics and economy both domestically and on the international scene as well as the changes to the Russian perception of its international environment 1998-1999. Thus, the two documents contain a large number of strong political messages intended for the international scene.

It is apparent from the discussion above that the Baltic States are forced to respond to the new largely aggressive Russian security concept and strategy. They should try to do so by pursuing the establishment of credible and reliable defence structures and concepts that would enable them to create at least a degree of deterrence against military aggression. The ambition must be two-fold: Firstly to make a potential aggressor aware that a military aggression against any of the states would be very costly. And secondly to create a defence capacity sufficient to allow each of the states to hold back a potential attacker in time and space long enough for allied support to be brought in. In accordance with this they allocate most of their defence resources to create defence structures. NATO acknowledges this and has indeed also made it a pre-requisite for considering Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian membership of NATO. However, at the same time the Western security establishment lead by NATO and the EU is forcing upon the three states the fact that the security strategies of the West are based more on a co-operative approach to security than on defence and deterrence. In line with this the three states are being strongly encouraged to share the burdens of producing co-operative security. NATO has for example, in its definition of partnership goals to be accomplished by the three states in the framework of the NATO Membership Action Plans,
strongly suggested that the three states each create a relatively large crisis response capacity to be deployed abroad. The suggestion is that each state creates a mechanised infantry battalion strength crisis response unit with all the logistics needed for it to be deployed and sustained in the framework of a NATO or EU led crisis response operation. This is a very heavy demand on all three states, which is not achievable certainly in the case of Estonia and Latvia given their current resources available for creating defence structures and given that at the same time they must aim at creating credible defence structures.

The three Baltic States find themselves in the very unpleasant position of having to relate to two opposing external security strategies directed towards them. Firstly there is a co-operative strategy from the West, which they strongly want to relate to as an imperative part of their overall strategy to become an integrated part of the Western security structures. Secondly there is a traditional power based major power strategy from Russia putting emphasis on military pressure against the three states, which they have to relate to. If the West does not recognise the unique and very difficult strategic position the three states are in, the three states might find themselves in a position where they desperately try to relate to both external strategies but end up being unable to effectively relate to either of them.

It appears evident that the strategy of the West, certainly that of NATO, is flawed and must be changed to recognise the special geo-strategic position of the Baltic Three. NATO simply demands too much at the same time of the three states and must adjust its requirements to the three states to acknowledge the specific need for the three states to build up totally new defence structures. The situation of the three states is not directly comparable to that of other new NATO members or aspirants, which have already existing defence structures that “only” need to be reformed and downsized. By easing its demands for the three states to contribute to crisis response operations NATO could help them focus their priorities in constructing credible and reliable defence forces. This would allow them to relate effectively to the security strategy of Russia by creating an independent deterrent that would further be the prerequisite for NATO to extend a security guarantee to the three states. This would further allow them over time to create military crisis response structures in order to take their share of the burden of the co-operative security strategy of the West.

1 Substantial parts of this article have been published earlier in the Swedish Strategic Yearbook 2000.
3 ETA Defence News January 10, p.5.
Russia deliberately contributed to this state of affairs by taking as much defence equipment as at all possible during the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territories of the Baltic States or by deliberately destroying all installations and pieces of equipment they had to leave behind.

Toivo Klaar, advisor to the Estonian Minister of Defence: Intervention at Tartu University ESDP conference May 13 2000: The latest decision to establish a defence structure based on British type brigade and parallel territorial defence regions was taken specifically because such a structure was believed to support NATO membership integration; not a decision taken to create more credible and reliable defence.

The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture: Understanding the Northern Europe Initiative

By Edward Rhodes

In intellectual terms, America’s Northern Europe Initiative (NEI) represents one of the most extraordinary and most exciting conceptual departures in U.S. international security policy undertaken during the Clinton years. The NEI must be viewed not simply as a creative, pragmatic package of policies aimed at encouraging continued and expanded stability in the Baltic basin but as a remarkable, though largely overlooked, revolution in American thinking.

Launched in 1997 with little fanfare and pursued quietly in the years since, the NEI reflects a fundamentally altered conception of the nature of international security and of how this security is to be created. In important regards, the NEI’s architectural blueprint is not simply post-Cold War but post-national in design. It assumes not only that the global distribution of power has shifted in the last decade but that the goals and means of security policy have changed. To use a phrase that slips off the tongues of political scientists far too frequently and far too easily, the NEI represents a paradigm shift.

It is of course possible to discuss the various programs that compose America’s NEI in traditional terms. To do so, however, is to profoundly misunderstand the NEI. The basic vision of the NEI; its conception of what security is and how it is created is profoundly different from the vision that shaped twentieth century approaches to building security. Thus, in addition to representing a practical effort to deal with the unique circumstances
found in northern Europe today, America’s Baltic policies promise to serve as a critical test of an alternative model for building global security in the twenty-first century.

**Three Underlying Assumptions of the NEI’s Vision**

To understand the NEI’s vision of northern European security architecture, it is necessary to begin by identifying three key assumptions on which the NEI is based.

First, the NEI starts with a broad conception of what security means. Security is taken to mean not simply safety from external aggression, but at least some minimally acceptable level of protection from the range of threats that endanger human welfare for example, from economic deprivation, shortages of energy, infectious disease, environmental toxins and hazards, crime, corrupt political institutions, and the forceful imposition of an alien culture. In other words, the NEI takes as its goal not simply ensuring that the nations of northern Europe are secure from military aggression, but ensuring that individuals in the region have the security necessary to pursue a meaningful, productive life.

Obviously, many of the threats to security, when security is defined in this sweeping fashion, are domestic in source and scope and can be resolved by individual sovereign states or by domestic non-governmental institutions. In today’s increasingly tightly interconnected world, however, an increasing number of these threats escape the capacity of individual states or societies to manage. For example, problems such as capital movement, pollution, and crime, which typically used to be local or national in scope, are now frequently regional or global ones. As problems become regional or global in scope, they demand regional or global institutions to manage them.

Examining Baltic realities, the NEI has specifically identified six A-priority areas in which regional and cross-border cooperation is particularly useful; economic development, law enforcement, the construction of civil society, energy, the environment, and public health.¹

Second, in the American perspective, security is not zero-sum. To the contrary, reflecting this broader understanding of security, security is understood as a collective good. To succeed, security policies will have to increase security for all, not the security for some at the expense of others. The NEI argues that the security problems facing the peoples of Northern Europe are ones that can be solved only by thorough cooperation; they cannot be solved competitively.

As troubled as American policymakers are by certain developments in Russia and by certain Russian actions - most obviously, Russian military policies in Chechnya - Russia is seen as a necessary partner, not as an adversary, in the pursuit of security. “The U.S. goal”, the State Department insists, “is to demonstrate that integration and cooperation in the NEI region benefit Russia as well as its Baltic neighbors.... By strengthening the cooperative links between Russia and its neighbors, NEI increases security for all
and helps build the foundation for greater economic prosperity in the region.”

Third, American thinking starts with the recognition that while individual sovereign states will be important participants in the effort to provide the peoples of the Baltic region with this broadly-defined security, sovereign states will not be and can not be the only important actors in this effort. Rather than focusing exclusively on the role of sovereign states, in designing regional security architecture the NEI expands attention up, down, and out from the state.

The NEI expands attention outward from the state by recognizing that non-governmental actors play a critical role in the provision of security, broadly conceived. Non-governmental actors are not at the margin: they are as integral to the process of building security as are states. The NEI Seeks to energize government agencies, the private sector, and the community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to build “a culture of cooperation.” “... The Northern Europe Initiative is a conscious effort to develop a more active public-private partnership in the conduct of diplomacy, in which the U.S. Government works closely with the business and NGO community to achieve shared goals.”

The NEI also expands the focus of attention up from the state to a variety of intergovernmental organizations that, like non-governmental actors, are seen as playing a critical role in northern Europe’s security architecture. Far from simply being superstructure in the interaction between sovereign states, these intergovernmental actors are viewed as playing an important, independent, non-sovereign role in regional governance. Although the European Union and NATO are the most obvious among these actors and have certainly dominated the foreign policy agendas of the Baltic states, from the perspective of the NEI they are only two of a wide range of problem-solving intergovernmental institutions able to facilitate discussion of common concerns and to exert pressure on member-states to contribute to common efforts. Other, less widely watched, intergovernmental institutions are seen as also playing an important role in the provision of northern European security: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Partnership for Peace, the Council of Baltic Sea States, the Nordic Council, the U.S.-Baltic Partnership Commission, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and the Arctic Council. More narrowly defined institutions for cooperation between the three Baltic states for example, the Baltic Defence College, the Baltic Battalion, the Baltic Squadron, and the Baltic Air Defense Network are also regarded as serving a critical function, and are targeted for U.S. political and financial support.

Finally and perhaps most provocatively, the NEI also recognizes the importance of sub-state actors and institutions. The NEI thus expands attention downward from the level of the nation-state to provincial and local governments, seeing these sub-state actors as full and directly engaged partners in the security-building process. They are regarded not merely as the instruments of the central governments of the various sovereign states, but as in-
dependent and critical contributors to the resolution of regional security challenges.

The net impact of this refocusing of attention up, down, and out from the states is to highlight the fundamentally changed picture that has emerged of what security is and how it is created. Security is not seen as simply an absence of violence, nor is it assumed that it can be created simply by states’ recognition of each other’s sovereignty and by their ability to keep order within their boundaries; rather security is seen as a human condition, and it is assumed that it is produced by the interaction and mutual effort of states, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and sub-state actors. These players are seen as engaged in complex and constantly evolving functional partnerships designed to meet the emerging challenges to human well being.

**The Hanseatic Analogy**

Explicitly recalling the Hanseatic tradition of the region, the NEI’s objective is to create a northern European community within which state and national boundaries mean relatively little, a community within which security is provided by a host of interlocking international and transnational institutions. The Hanseatic reference is conceptually quite provocative because this return to the past for a model of the twenty-first century security suggests nothing less than a revolution in international political life. This reference being so provocative, it is useful to underscore two critical ways in which the medieval Hanseatic security architecture differed from modern, twentieth century security architecture.

In the first place, the Hanseatic era was pre-national: politics between communities was conducted with relatively little attention to national identity. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott explained in a lecture to an Estonian audience, the Hanseatic League was a concert of city-states precursors of nation-states that felt secure enough in their identities and in their neighborhood to make a virtue of their diversity and derive benefit from their interactions with one another.” In other words, identity did not matter or at least matter very much. What the NEI looks toward is a post-national system of politics in the Baltic region, in which national identity and national rivalries do not preclude cooperation for mutual benefit.

In the second place, the Hanseatic era pre-dates the emergence of modern, sovereign states. In the Hanseatic system interactions between communities were regulated by a range of governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental authorities including, *inter alia*, guilds, the church, religious military orders, the empire, and civic rulers. In contrast to the modern, Westphalian system in which authority (and responsibility for providing security) has been geographically defined and hierarchically concentrated in the state, in the Hanseatic system authority was embedded in a complex web of institutions.

It is not that nations, states, and sovereignty will wither or disappear in the American vision; it is that they will cease to be of central importance. Observing
that most of the problems facing the region transcend the borders of particular nations and particular sovereign states, the American perspective envisions the development of a dense network of border-spanning political, economic, and social institutions serving legislative, judicial, and executive functions that is, providing governance and regulation, authority to resolve disputes, and the capability to mobilize resources for the common good.

The new security architecture, in the American perspective, will have to be both functional and complex. Institutions will need to be developed to meet specific security needs economic integration, pollution remediation, crime prevention, cultural protection, and so on. No single institution will have the right membership and the right structure to solve all of these problems, so multiple institutions will be needed. And since no single problem dominates the others, no single institution will have primacy: there will be no hierarchy of institutions. Nor will all of the institutions be governmental: in some cases non-governmental organizations and non-governmental modes of problem solving may be more effective than state, inter-governmental, or transgovernmental ones.

A map of problem-solving institutions will not be neat: it will not look like a tidy political map from the 18th, 19th, or 20th centuries, with each piece of territory colored a particular color indicating the sovereign authority in that territory, with solid black lines separating them. It will look more like a medieval map, with overlapping loyalties, duties, and responsibilities. Different aspects of human security will be ensured by different, and in some cases multiple, institutions. Indeed, as in Hanseatic times, maps showing political boundaries may be misleading when it comes to understanding how problems are actually solved.

This security architecture and its network of institutions explicitly will reach into Russia, in some cases engaging the central government, in other cases engaging regional governments or local communities. While the boundaries of the northern European region are vague and blurry, and depend on the specific security issue being addressed, the notion is to be inclusive, not exclusive in building institutions. Common problems require common endeavors, not a division into them and us categories.

Specifically, the NEI is described as pursuing three, integrative objectives: to
- Integrate the Baltic states into a regional network of cooperative programs with their neighbors and support their efforts to prepare for membership in key European and Euro-Atlantic institutions;
- Integrate northwest Russia into the same cooperative regional network to promote democratic, market-oriented development in Russia as well as to enhance Russia’s relations with its northern European neighbors; and
- Strengthen U.S. relations with and regional ties among the Nordic states, Poland, Germany, and the European Union.

What the U.S. hopes will emerge is a Kantian community of Civil states committed to collective security again, using a broad definition of security and bound
together by innumerable ties in a relationship of perpetual peace.

**The NEI’s Practical Attractions**

This emphasis on the idealistic and visionary qualities of the NEI should not obscure two very practical features that also make it attractive to American policymakers and that make it appealing even to those policymakers who might be troubled by its revolutionary, post-national, non-state-centric conception.

In the first place, the NEI successfully avoids commitment of significant U.S. government resources. The U.S. national security agenda is, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be, dominated by concerns about East Asia and the Korean peninsula, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, the Balkans, and, to a lesser degree, Latin America. Given the absence of high profile dangers or critical American interests, northern Europe ranks, and will rank, low on the U.S. agenda, despite strong cultural and emotional ties to the region. Critical U.S. resources not least of them, top decision-makers’ time and attention are overstretched already in addressing the problems of other regions. True, the programs lumped together under the umbrella of the Baltic-American Partnership have included financial and political commitments, but these are extraordinarily modest. While at the margin, it is conceivable that resources for the region could and will be increased, but it is unlikely that dramatically greater resources can be found. Thus, from the American perspective the NEI has the desirable quality of being politically, economically, and militarily affordable.

In the second place, the NEI is seen as an important element in U.S. policy toward Russia. The NEI is attractive to U.S. decision-makers not only as a modestly-priced strategy for advancing Baltic security but as a means of contributing to the liberalization and democratization of Russia, a means of trying to bring Russia home to the west. The NEI’s Hanseatic analogy explicitly recalls the fact that the Hanse’s influence extended eastward into Russia. The Hanseatic community not only linked Russia’s northwest to western economies and created a shared prosperity based on the exchange of raw and finished goods, but changed mental geography. Historically, Pskov, Novgorad, and Smolensk all had ties to the Hansa and through it were exposed to western European values and ways of thinking; these Hanseatic outposts provided a window through which the larger Russian nation could be reached.

The NEI thus aims at blurring the border between Western Europe and Russia, not at shifting, strengthening, or reifying that border. “Our hope,” Strobe Talbott has explained, “Is that Russia will come over time to view this region [the Baltic] not as a fortified frontier but as a gateway; not as a buffer against invaders who no longer exist, but as a trading route and a common ground for commerce and economic development in a word, that Russia will come to view the Baltics Hanseatically.”

Such a Hanseatic view would have two consequences, both positive. First and most immediately, Russian acceptance of a
Hanseatic space would facilitate mutually beneficial Russo-Baltic cooperation and enhanced northern European security, defined both in traditional military terms and in the new, broader conception. Second, though, a Hanseatic highway would facilitate not only the flow of goods but the flow of ideas. For Americans seeking to encourage a changed Russian understanding of the world beyond and seeking to promote liberal, democratic values in Russia, such highways are critical. What the American Hanseatic architecture is designed to facilitate, Talbott has noted, is that a democratic Russia, at peace with itself and its neighbors, integrate itself into an undivided Europe. That is not only desirable, it is possible. The NEI assumes that there are no objective bars to this. In the American view there are no structural issues or unresolvable conflicts that would prevent the peaceful integration of Russia into Europe. The only obstacle to this integration, in the NEI’s analysis, is the Russian mindset: Historically, Russia has tended to define security in zero-sum terms win/lose, or, as Lenin famously put it: kto/kogo. The Soviet Union seemed unable to feel totally secure unless everyone else felt totally insecure. Its pursuit of bezopasnost, or absence of danger, posed a clear and present danger to others, especially small countries on its periphery. The issue on all our minds is whether post-Soviet Russia, as it goes about redefining its political system through elections, will redefine its concept of state security as well. Ultimately then, the security of northern Europe requires a change in how Russian leaders view the world and define security. In place of the Realpolitik lenses for viewing security which both Russian history and the Marxist legacy have imposed, the NEI seeks to use the Hanseatic connection to provide liberal ones.

It is worth recognizing, however, that while the NEI offers an appealing vision from Washington’s perspective it is a vision that may be quite troubling to others. Especially to those in the Baltic States who are concerned about the autonomy of Kaliningrad and for St. Petersburg, and conceivably other parts of the Russian northwest as well. The NEI vision imagines incorporating these border areas of Russia into a variety of economic, political, social, and cultural ties that will inevitably reduce the power and influence of Moscow, further weakening the authority and legitimacy of a badly strained Russian state.

Indeed the NEI’s desire to replace clear, sovereign, black-and-white boundaries with grey areas of overlapping institutions may at times also be troubling to Russia’s Baltic neighbors. Even while the NEI seeks to anchor the Baltic peoples in a Hanseatic that is, in an Euro-centric, westward-oriented identity, it also assumes and insists that the Baltic States will serve as a bridge eastward to Russia. With perhaps a touch of diplomatic exaggeration reflecting both wishful thinking and gentle pressure, in 2000 Talbott praised Estonia for reaching out to the East; you’re redefining your relationships there not on the basis of a cruel divisive past but on the basis of a cooperative future. For nations only recently freed from Soviet rule, concerned
with preserving distinct national identities, and painfully aware of the power and size of their eastern neighbor, this vision of blurred borders may be troubling, particularly if it implies relatively uncontrolled movement of people and capital.

**The NEI in Practice**

Though the vision of the NEI is clear, what the NEI will mean in practice is substantially more difficult to predict. It is difficult to predict for at least three reasons.

First, it is difficult to predict because much will depend on events in Russia. This dependence is not a linear one. Plainly, liberal reforms in Russia permit faster development and expansion of the institutions envisioned by the NEI. Ironically, however, Russian regression may also result in faster progress for NEI, though on a geographically narrower basis, as the United States and its European partners press to solidify progress in anticipation of greater challenges. It is uncertainty about developments in Russia that is likely to encourage more cautious, step-by-step forward movement, avoiding early deepening of those institutional ties that are easiest to create. Ties that exclude Russia lest this sharpen and darken the border between east and west that the NEI would prefer to blur.

Second, exactly how the NEI vision will be operationalized is difficult to predict because of uncertainty about other institutional developments in Europe. In the final analysis, both U.S. Baltic security policies and the emerging northern European security architecture will be critically shaped by three related but nonetheless quite distinct and separable institutional developments; NATO enlargement, European Union (EU) enlargement, and the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). While it is possible to treat the NEI and these other three institutional developments as a single package, American decision-makers are unlikely to do so. From the American perspective each of these four issues has its own distinct logic and political imperative. American policies on each are seen as the solution to quite different problems. Thus, while American positions on NATO enlargement, EU enlargement, and ESDI will have a critical impact on how the NEI is implemented, these positions are likely to be adopted without much, or possibly any, regard to that impact.

Third, what the NEI will look like in practice is difficult to predict because the NEI like NATO enlargement, EU enlargement, and ESDI has escaped serious political debate. The discussions that have taken place have been conducted by policy analysts individuals without political responsibility and, as often as not, without political instincts. At times these discussions have been analytically elegant and theoretically sophisticated. But unfortunately they provide no information about the choices America’s political decision-makers will actually make when political decisions are called for (It is useful to recall that American policy analysts were overwhelmingly opposed to moving ahead with the first round of NATO enlargement and are overwhelmingly opposed to national missile defense. Look-
ing at debates among policy analysts for clues about how America will act thus is not a good strategy).

The bottom line is that because none of these four issues, Baltic security architecture, NATO enlargement, EU enlargement, or ESDI has been politically salient in America, it is difficult to guess what conclusions the American political elite and attentive public will actually reach when events confront them with a need to act. There is no serious disagreement within the elite or attentive public over American objectives or stated policies. American objectives and policies are, and will be, quite clear. But how those policies will be implemented is unclear, and they may be implemented in ways that are quite counterintuitive.

It is no accident that serious political debate regarding Baltic security, NATO and EU enlargement, and ESDI has not taken place, and observers should not expect that such debate will ever take place. However important the underlying issues are by any objective measure, they are not politically salient in America. No significant economic, ethnic, ideological, or single-issue interest group in American society is particularly concerned about the outcome of any of these four matters. Thus, unlike on issues like the World Trade Organization, the Middle East, relations with repressive regimes like China, or ozone depletion and funding for family planning, the government can proceed safe in the knowledge that it will receive little public scrutiny. Only one of these four issues - NATO enlargement - has any chance at all of ever becoming part of a serious political debate in the United States; and if the first round of NATO enlargement is any indication, even this issue is unlikely to impinge in any significant way on public or Congressional consciousness or to force the administration to examine, explain, or defend its foreign policy.

The fact that northern European security institutions, NATO and EU enlargement, and ESDI are not salient political issues in America has two diametrically opposed consequences.

On the one hand, it means the stated policy of the United States is likely to be quite clear and consistent. There will be little domestic political pressure either to fudge or to change official policy. Neither political party (nor, for that matter, any ambitious politician) is likely to make any of these issues a campaign issue. And election results are not likely to shift America’s stated policy.

On the other hand, the actual operationalization and implementation of the stated policy is likely to be quite unpredictable, ambiguous, and full of unexpected twists and changes. Since these issues are not at the top of political agendas and the NEI and decisions regarding Baltic security architecture are likely to fall even lower on these agendas than the twin enlargements and ESDI what the United States actually does on a day-to-day or year-to-year basis will depend on chance and circumstances. More specifically, it will depend on the context within which policy questions arise and how these issues are packaged with, or linked to, other more politically salient issues. U.S. actions and reactions on all four issues are also likely to depend very much
on the particular agendas and world-views of the particular officials and bureaus assigned to implement policy. Personalities may play a major role not in determining policy, but in determining what American policy means in practice.

For example, the United States unambiguously supports EU enlargement. But what this unambiguous support will mean in real life is anyone’s guess. Whether U.S. official support for EU enlargement translates into meaningful pressure on EU-member states to move forward with enlargement or, by contrast, turns into tacit support for a go-slow approach may have more to do with beef and bananas, or with who happens to become U.S. Trade Representative, than with the U.S. vision for central Europe and the Baltic region. Similarly, whether the U.S. policy on ESDI equates to meaningful positive support for a separable European military capability or to behind-the-scenes pressure on Britain and Germany to proceed skeptically is likely to be determined as much by French rhetoric, the domestic politics of National Missile Defense in America and the particular sequence of crises in the Balkans as by any long term plan for building a European security architecture.

The NEI and NATO Enlargement

With regard to the question of NATO enlargement, the unpredictable nature of American behavior is even more evident. However firm and clear in principle, the American position on NATO enlargement is extraordinarily uncertain and ambiguous in practice.

It must be emphasized that the commitment in principle to further NATO enlargement is crystal clear. As Strobe Talbott put it in Brussels in December 1999, it has always been the U.S. position that NATO enlargement is not a one-time event, but an on-going process. Our newest members must not be the last. Our leaders committed to review enlargement again at our next summit, no later than 2002. This unambiguous commitment explicitly includes the Baltic States. As Talbott reaffirmed to an audience in Tallinn: ”the American desire is that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania become Secure, stable, prosperous democracies integrated into all the structures of the Euro-Atlantic community... [It] remains a bedrock principle of American foreign policy that no country should be disadvantaged for reasons of history or geography. The Baltic states in particular should not be punished for having prevailed over occupation and dictatorship, nor should you be forgotten or neglected now that you have made such progress in establishing prosperity and openness in your neighborhood”.

Indeed, these commitments are enshrined in international agreements. The Baltic-American Charter officially commits the United States to nothing less: As part of a common vision of a Europe whole and free, the Partners declare that their shared goal is the full integration of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania into European and transatlantic political, economic, security and defense institutions. Europe will not be fully secure unless Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania each are secure.... The Partners
believe that the enlargement of NATO will enhance the security of the United States, Canada, and all the countries in Europe, including those states not immediately invited to membership or not currently interested in membership. The United States of America welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania to join NATO. It affirms its view that NATO’s partners can become members as each aspirant proves itself able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve European stability and the strategic interests of the Alliance.  

As this language suggests, however, the American perspective is that two criteria need to be met before candidates are accepted into NATO: new members will be admitted only when they are ready and when we judge it to be in the overall interests of the Alliance. It is this second criteria that will make American policy, in practice, so unpredictable. 

The American vision looks to create the conditions under which the Baltic states can become members - that is, it seeks not only to ensure that the Baltic states will be ready for membership but to alter European political realities so that their admission enhances their security, the security of the region, and the security of the Alliance as a whole. That the Baltic States will eventually join NATO assuming they continue to desire to join is essentially certain, given U.S. commitments and given support in principle from other NATO members. What is difficult to predict, however, is when Americans conclude that the necessary conditions have been met. American policy presently proceeds on the assumption that NATO membership for the Baltic states is neither in the Alliance’s interest nor in the interest of the Baltic states if it disrupts relations with Russia or if it results in a substantial hardening of Realpolitik thinking in Russian decision-making circles. 

As the Baltic Charter and repeated U.S. statements make clear, no non-NATO country has a veto over Alliance decisions. Nonetheless, the NEI’s Hanseatic image of Baltic security envisions bringing Russia in as a partner in the region’s problem-solving and security-building, even while Russia remains excluded from some of the key institutions, such as NATO and the EU. An isolated and angry Russia undermines the region’s security, preventing the widening and deepening of the network of institutions and ties necessary to deal with the real and pressing problems of environmental security, economic security, cultural security, and so on. Even if Russian isolation and anger are entirely self-generated, even if they are entirely unjustified, and even if they are in both the short- and long-run self-destructive, they nonetheless reduce the ability of the nations of the region, and of Europe and the trans-Atlantic community as a whole, to meet shared challenges. Ideally, creating the conditions for Baltic membership thus means shifting Russia from its zero-sum view of security and educating Russians that Baltic membership in NATO is, as Talbott puts it: “Good for everyone - I stress everyone - since it is the best way to ensure that
this region as a whole never again becomes a zone of insecurity and instability.”

Again, however, what this will mean in practice is hard to predict, and will certainly depend on developments in Russia, on American perceptions of developments in Russia, and on the sequence and salience of particular political events. Realpolitik is deeply ingrained in Russian thinking, and Americans are not known for their patience. Thus, either a more forthcoming Russia or a clearly less-forthcoming Russia might result in American support in NATO councils for early admission of the Baltic States.

To interpret the American position as giving Russia some sort of back-door veto over NATO enlargement is thus absolutely incorrect. American policy is aimed at bringing the Baltic States into NATO. At least at present, though, the United States appears inclined to be patient and to engage in constructive dialogue with Russia to alleviate concerns that NATO enlargement threatens Russia or its interests, even while recognizing and firmly enunciating that these concerns are objectively groundless. In other words, it is the process of enlargement, not the end state, that is uncertain and that may be influenced by Russia.

The NEI in American Grand Strategy

How exactly the NEI fits into overall American grand strategy, and whether this is a comfortable or uncomfortable fit, will depend on certain fundamental political choices facing the American nation in coming years. While policies and institutions have considerable inertia and, as a consequence, we are unlikely to see dramatic, immediate changes in either of these even if a major shift in underlying conceptions of American identity and interests were to occur, the direction in which U.S. policies and trans-Atlantic institutions evolve will clearly be strongly influenced by how the American people come to understand themselves and the world around them. It is therefore both useful and necessary to consider American commitment to northern European security, and to the particular vision of northern European security embodied in the NEI, in the broader context of America’s historically problematic engagement with the world and to be aware how changes in Americans’ self-conception are likely to impact these.

With only an acceptable degree of oversimplification, it is possible to argue that American society and leaders have historically moved uneasily between two competing visions of the world. The first is the Realist vision. This account of international life starts from the observation that politics between sovereign states takes place in an anarchic setting that is, it takes place in the absence of any higher, supersovereign power with the capacity to impose authoritative judgments on competing states. As a result, interstate politics is one of self-help. While states can frequently resolve their differences through bargaining or negotiation, military power remains the ultimate arbiter of interstate disagreements, and war the final court of appeal. Thus, in the Realist view, military conflict is an unfortunate but nonetheless
inevitable fact of international life. However pacific a particular nation may be, and however willing it may be to try to resolve disputes through peaceful means, in the end the international system is inherently conflictual and participation in international politics will involve even pacific states in violent conflict.

In this vision of the world, a state’s policies must proceed, as George W. Bush’s foreign policy advisor, Condoleezza Rice, recently explained, from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community. States must look out for their particular nation’s interests because no one else will. If this pursuit of one’s own self-interest also happens to bring benefits to others - as Americans believe the U.S. pursuit of a liberal international political and economic order does - so much the better, but making sacrifices for the good of others is a dangerous business. Again in Rice’s words, to be sure, there is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect.

The second and competing vision of the world in American thought is the Liberal one. In this vision, conflict is not inevitable. Yes, the international system is anarchic, but this, in the Liberal view, does not necessarily imply disorder and violence. It is, the Liberals argue, possible to imagine a well-ordered international society composed of peaceful republics that have created the international institutions necessary to resolve conflicts of interest on the basis of the rule of law rather than through an appeal to raw power. Just as in well-regulated families and domestic societies order is based on communication, consent, and accepted rules of behavior, not on raw violence and open intimidation, in well-regulated international societies order can be based on negotiation and law rather than brute power. While the absence of a super-sovereign authority, with the ability to adjudicate disputes definitively and punish transgressors, makes international order more difficult to achieve, Liberals contend that the international realm, like the domestic one, can be one of peace. Realists are unnecessarily pessimistic, Liberals argue, and their pessimism is a self-fulfilling prophecy, preventing the creation of the institutions - ranging from a free trade regime and international courts of arbitration to a more powerful UN and a better-financed IMF - that would facilitate a mutually beneficial international order.

At the same time that America has moved back and forth between Realist and Liberal visions of the world, it has also moved back and forth between two competing visions of how America should engage that world. The two visions of America’s role are usually termed internationalist and isolationist, but these terms, especially the latter, are quite misleading. The latter vision, the isolationist one, does not imagine a hermit America that eschews contact with the external world. To the contrary, like the internationalist vision, the isolationist vision assumes that America will be integrated into the world economy and that Americans will travel, trade, and invest in the outside world. Nonetheless, in a key aspect the isolation-
ists and internationalists part, and this is on the desirability of politico-military involvement and commitments in the world - what George Washington in his Farewell Address termed “Entangling alliances.” At heart is the question: Does the use of force or the commitment to use force, except in self-defense, threaten the basic nature of a democratic republic?

For internationalists, the answer is no. Like any great nation, America must compete on the world stage (in fact, has a duty to compete on that stage) either to make sure that stage remains safe (that is, embodies an acceptable balance of power) or to make sure that stage incorporates the values and rules the nation believes necessary or desirable (that is, has the institutions necessary for a peaceful order). Indeed, at its root, the internationalist vision defines American identity in terms of the nation’s external relations. Who Americans are, and the pride they can take in that identity, depends on America’s place in the world and the role that Americans play in improving and transforming that world or in shaping that world’s future. To achieve their full nature, the American state and American nation must participate in the full range of global politics and be active players on the world stage. However different America may be from other nations internally, internationalists believe the United States has to engage externally just as other states do - using the same means (e.g., war, alliance, intimidation, and intervention), though perhaps with different goals.

The isolationist vision, by contrast, answers the question in the negative and has an inwardly focused construction of identity. The essence of America is its domestic society, and the principal goal of the American people and of the American state needs to be the perfection of that society. While Americans wish others well, and will exchange ideas, goods, and investments with them, the isolationists argue that Americans must not confuse other peoples’ political struggles with their own. Their fight is theirs to wage. While isolationists are delighted if America serves as a beacon on the hill - a role model for other societies - and while they hope others will walk down the same liberal, democratic path that America has chosen, this is their decision. So long as other nations do not seek to impose their rule or their values on America, the American state should not use military force against them or involve itself in their political affairs. In some sense the isolationist vision might be better described as a “republican vision, with a small r”. It is the vision of an independent republic without external claims.

**Four Visions of American Foreign Policy**

Obviously, if one combines the two possible worldviews with the two possible views of America, one ends up with four possible visions of American foreign policy; Realist isolationist, Realist internationalist, Liberal internationalist, and Liberal isolationist. Looking across American history, it is possible to find periods in which each of these was dominant, and in today’s political discourse it is possible to see at least three of these compet-
ing for predominance. Which vision comes to dominate American thinking has had, and will have, enormous consequence for the broad shape of America’s engagement with the world.

The power of each of these visions to seize the American imagination, however, depends on how Americans define themselves— that is, on the identity Americans construct for themselves. Thus, at the present time much hinges on the stories Americans devise, and come to believe, about what makes them a single nation despite the increasingly multi-cultural composition of American society, despite the widening social and economic polarization created by movement to an information-based post-industrial economy, despite the growing gap between sectors of society subscribing to traditional religiously-based value systems and those subscribing to liberal ones, and despite widespread de facto racial segregation.

The Realist isolationist vision dominated American thinking in the early republic and shaped U.S. foreign and defense policies for the first century of America’s independence. Americans, in this view, are a unique (indeed in some accounts, chosen) people guided by a firm and unchanging set of values, forever threatened by the darkness that lies outside. In the Realist isolationist perspective, the world is an evil and dangerous place, in which imperial or expansionist powers will inevitably war with each other as they seek to conquer weaker states; the best course of action for a liberal, democratic republic such as America is to avoid getting dragged into these quarrels and to guard against the mauroading basic feature of world politics. The prescription is to create a “Fortress America” — to raise the barriers high against the various evils, contaminations, and dangers posed by the corrupt world outside the nation’s borders, to eschew alliances, and to reserve the use of military force for self-defense.

Since the 1890s, Realist isolationism has never dominated American thinking, but it remains a powerful undercurrent. In the 1920s, it was the vision of the handful of Irreconcilables in the U.S. Senate, who opposed Woodrow Wilson and his League, tooth and claw. In America today, this is the intellectual grounding of political spokesmen on the far right of the spectrum, individuals such as Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan.

Realist isolationism gave way, in the late 1880s and early 1890s, to Realist internationalism. Industrialization, immigration, urbanization, and the reincorporation of the Southern states back into the Union created enormous social and domestic political challenges for America. The effectiveness of any solution to these problems hinged on creating some sort of unifying national identity that included old Americans, the new urban immigrant proletariat, and Southerners. The Progressive solution was to rebuild American identity around a stronger central government and to turn the republic’s attention outward. Using the iron of traditional America, the trace metals of the new immigrants, and the heat and oxygen of the state, the melting pot would yield a new, beautiful steel, strong enough to stand up to foreign nations in the clash
of blades on the world stage. The American nation, in this conception, was strengthened by the addition of the best of other national groups - the strongest, the most determined, the most intelligent - but these individuals then had to surrender themselves and become or be made into Americans. In this Progressive view, membership in the national community was defined by loyalty and service to the national state. What justified such loyalty and service - that is, what made the state the worthy object of veneration - was the American state’s greatness and, by implication, the nation’s greatness, evidenced by its role in world politics and by its ability to defeat other states in the great global struggles between nations.

Thus beginning with the Harrison administration in 1889, the United States pursued a foreign policy that was premised on the assumption that while the world was a hostile and inevitably violent place in which great powers competed for primacy, American domestic order required that the American state join in this great social Darwinist competition. No lasting international order was possible, and American policy did not aim at creating a lasting peace. Rather, in this Realist internationalist vision, American military power was needed to protect America’s global interests from the imperial claims of other great powers and to maintain a global balance of power. Though sometimes couched in terms of America’s special mission or American exceptionalism, in practical terms Realist internationalism embraced a policy of Realpolitik. The creation of an American sphere of influence and the balancing of the European great powers replaced Fortress America as the central principle of foreign policy.

This Realist internationalist vision went into eclipse in 1913 with the Wilson presidency. It returned, however, in 1946 with Truman, and was the vision that shaped American behavior during the Cold War. For nearly half a century following World War II, Americans and their leaders saw global politics as inevitably conflicting and believed that America had to step in, build a balance of power, construct deterrent capabilities that would hold hostile forces in check, and generally preserve an American-led free world from the hostile, enslaved world beyond. This was the vision of American foreign affairs that justified Realpolitik policies to contain the Soviet Union, to intervene in politico-military struggles across the third world, and to pursue tripolar balancing with China. Although the end of the Cold War led to another eclipse of this Realist internationalist vision, this vision remains a powerfully attractive one today. Advisors surrounding George W. Bush, for example, explicitly describe American foreign policy in Realist internationalist terms.21

What displaced the Realist internationalist vision in 1913 and again in the 1990s, and also dominated American thinking for a short period in the early 1940s, was a Liberal internationalist one. This is the vision of American foreign policy popularized by Woodrow Wilson, resurrected by Franklin Roosevelt, and flirted with by Bill Clinton. The Liberal perspective, unlike the Realist one, does not assume that difference implies conflict. Rather, it assumes that so long as liberal, democratic institutions exist, different cultures can live peacefully, side by side, within
America and in the world as a whole. Indeed, the task of building these liberal, democratic institutions itself serves as a source of common identity. The Liberal internationalist vision thus links American national identity to moral purpose: at its heart, it is a crusading vision, defining American identity in terms of a commitment to a noble, transformative goal, abroad as well as at home.

This Liberal internationalist vision holds out the prospect of a meaningful peace. It argues that if two conditions are met, a stable global order based on law and not on power, is possible. First, there must be a spread liberal democracy: liberal, democratic states will by their nature tend to be peace-loving and to prefer trade and negotiation to conquest and war. Second, the necessary international institutions must be built to facilitate the orderly and peaceful resolution of such disputes as do arise. The liberal internationalist vision then makes two assumptions. The first is that American power can and must be used to achieve these changes to spread liberal democracy and to construct and empower international institutions. The second is that if international institutions and democracy are in place, reason and rule of law will be secure: that is, it assumes that shortsightedness or passions or ethnic identities will not be a problem.

The implications of this vision for American policy are interesting. Though the goal is the creation of a millennial, peaceful world order, based on democracy and law, Liberal internationalists tend to accept the use of force as necessary to achieve this. Hence we have Wilson’s interventions in Mexico and Latin America and his interest in transforming World War I into a struggle to make the world safe for democracy, and we have Bill Clinton’s Liberal internationalist advisors pressing him to intervene in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Balkans. It is not entirely unfair to suggest that the Liberal internationalist notion is that democracy and the international institutions necessary for harmonious cooperation can be created at the point of a gun.

The costs of Liberal internationalism being the need to intervene politically and militarily in areas in which American strategic interests are not engaged have made this a hard vision to sustain. Nonetheless, much of the American elite continues to subscribe to it today, and polls suggest that it continues to shape the views of much of the general public; certainly this vision found its way into Al Gore’s campaign rhetoric. Where Realist isolationism looks to build a Fortress America in a hostile world and Realist internationalism seeks to create an American sphere of influence and satisfactory balance of power, Liberal internationalism aims to impose, crusader-style, a democratic, liberal peace on a backward world.

The fourth vision, Liberal isolationism, dominated American thinking during the 1920s and early 1930s, defining the policies of successive Republican administrations. It starts from an image of America that denies American exceptionalism or, rather, asserts every nation’s exceptionalism: every nation can and must strive to create and to maintain its own political institutions that allow it calmly and rationally to advance the public interest in the face of ever-changing social, technological, and economic chal-
lenges. Because these challenges will be different in different nations at any given time, every nation will have its own unique institutions, and the paths to stable, liberal order will be as varied as the nations themselves.

For Liberal isolationists, membership in any community - national or international - is defined by submission to the rule of that particular community's law and by a willingness to accept short-term individual sacrifices for the long-term collective good. American identity is thus rooted not in a particular set of American values, in a melting pot designed to produce a nation stronger than any of its adversar-ies, or in a covenant to undertake a great moral crusade, but in a commitment to a rational pursuit of the public interest.

Liberal isolationists share the Liberal internationalist ideal of global order based on law, not power, and on a community of liberal democracies. They assume, however, that such an order depends on the natural evolution of mature, liberal societ-ies around the world. While economic and cultural contact can encourage such development, Liberal isolationists con-clude that in the end democracy and sta-ble liberal domestic institutions can not be imposed from outside or from above, but must grow organically from the culture of individual nations. Indeed, by destroying the delicate political plants that are beginning to grow and the ecosystem that is emerging around them, politico-military crusades to impose a liberal, democratic world order are likely to set back progress, rather than to advance it. Further, the Liberal isolationist argument suggests, in the absence of mature, stable democracies, international institutions of the sort championed by Wilson and FDR are mere superstructure and will be unable to preserve or impose peace. Only if nations possess the maturity and the democratic domestic institutions that allow them to comprehend that their best interests are served by submitting them-selves to the rule of law will international institutions be able to resolve conflicts of interest.

In this Liberal isolationist vision, American politico-military power can thus do little to speed or make more likely the emergence of a stable international order. By unnecessarily threatening and provoking other nations, however, it can make progress more difficult. Intervention and war may be necessary in self-defense when America is threatened by non-liberal powers (most Liberal isolationists supported U.S. entry into World War I, for example), but they are not useful tools for advancing the millennium. Hence, a key element in the Liberal isolationist vision is to avoid displays or uses of American military power that would stimulate mili-tarism or excessively nationalistic responses. At the same time, in contrast to the Realist isolationist vision, the Liberal isolationist vision underscores the importance of economic and cultural openness, seeing the outside world not as a dangerous and evil place, but as a potential partner in the construction of peace. In sum, the underlying aim in this vision is to create a peaceful world order through simulta-neous economic and cultural engagement and politico-military noninterven-
Competing Visions and the NEI

Obviously, each of these four competing visions has very different implications for U.S. policies in the Baltic region, as in the world as a whole. Realist isolationism implies a return to Fortress America; Realist internationalism calls for an aggressive pursuit of American national interest and containment of or balancing against potential adversaries such as Russia, China, rogue states, and radical ideologies; Liberal internationalism calls for active, crusading employment of American power, military as well as economic and political, to protect liberal, democratic governments and to roll back illiberal forces in the world; Liberal isolationism calls for the maintenance of economic and cultural openness while resisting military involvement. Which of these competing visions emerges triumphant in tomorrow’s America will depend on the outcome of the soul-searching and identity-construction efforts now underway in American society. The election of 2000 has revealed just how divided Americans still are and how difficult a prediction about the future will be.

Since the end of the Cold War, America has flirted with a return to Liberal internationalism. It has, however, repeatedly shied away from the apparently open-ended price of actually carrying through with this vision. At the same time, this Liberal internationalist vision has faced two challenges, one from the center-right of the American ideological spectrum and the other from the far right.

From the far right of the ideological spectrum, Realist isolationist voices continue to demand that America turn inward and wash its hands of a world that they describe as corrupt and evil. At the extreme, these voices are at times xenophobic and reactionary, looking backward to some sort of idealized past when everyone in America was white and Christian, or wanted to be.

The more serious challenge to the Liberal internationalist vision of foreign policy comes from Realist internationalism. A large section of the American political mainstream, including much of the Republican party, is skeptical of the notion of a multi-cultural rainbow America and sees the need to return to a common, melting pot construction of identity that would produce a distinct, singular American culture. For Realist internationalists, cultures inevitably clash rather than coexist harmoniously. Logically, this vision implies an inevitable clash of cultures, liberal-western versus others, in the world as a whole. This is a struggle that America can not shy away from. Thus, though the communist threat has collapsed, this broad section of the elite and mass public continues to view the world through the Realist internationalist lenses of the Cold War. The notion of a peaceful world order is regarded as a self-delusion: enemies exist or will arise, and America must combat these enemies. While the identity of the principal enemy is still unclear - perhaps a non-western Russia but, if not, then China, or Arab nationalism, or Islamic fundamentalism - an activist foreign policy is necessary, designed to protect America and its friends from the dan-
gers that will surely emerge, as they always have in the past.

It is hardly surprising that the NEI emerged during an American flirtation with Liberal internationalism. The NEI, with its emphasis on the non-zero-sum nature of security, on the importance of constructing institutions, on the significant role of non-state actors, and on the need to commit America’s politico-military power to the task of building global order, fits squarely within the Liberal internationalist vision of American engagement in world affairs. It co-exists less comfortably with other visions of American engagement. Indeed, if America’s flirtation with Liberal internationalist ideas does not yield a more permanent commitment, the NEI will increasingly stick out as an oddity or inconsistency in American foreign policy. The NEI is nonetheless likely to remain in place, both because of inertia and because northern Europe (or at least the non-Russian portions of it) lies safely inside the “us” side of Realism’s “us”/”them” divide, if Realist internationalism or Realist isolationism comes to dominate American thinking it would not be surprising to see a gradual evolution of the NEI.

The direction of such evolution is quite predictable. If Realist internationalist thinking emerges triumphant, the NEI is likely gradually to focus more narrowly on military concerns and on state-to-state contacts; unless Russia moves quickly in the direction of liberalism, the NEI is likely also to become geographically narrower. In this scenario, NATO enlargement is likely to proceed more rapidly, limited principally only by the perceived ability of the applicants to contribute meaningfully to NATO’s strength. By contrast, in the less likely case that Realist isolationism emerges triumphant, American commitment to the NEI will wane, as European security is defined as a matter of European, not American concern; support for NATO is also likely to decline. Although, it is difficult to discern voices advocating Liberal isolationism in America today, it is easy to see what such a vision would imply for the NEI: were Liberal isolationism to emerge as a dominant vision of foreign policy, American support for the NEI, minus its implicit military guarantees, would grow, while American support for NATO activities, particularly out-of-area military interventions, would decline.

It deserves to be underscored, however, that these changes would come only at the margin. Particularly given the low political salience of the NEI and its low costs, regardless of the direction in which American foreign policy as a whole moves, the natural inertia of policies and institutions means that American commitment to the NEI and its vision of northern European security architecture are likely to endure.

Conclusions

In its underlying premises, the NEI steps outside what could be characterized as the traditional or modern, national framework for conceptualizing security, rooted in three-and-a-half centuries of experience with the Westphalian sovereign-state system of international politics. Implicitly, the NEI is grounded in a post-Westphalian vision of how international order can best be constructed, a vision
that differs from the traditional, modern one in two key regards. First, where traditional thinking about international security has focused on the security of sovereign states, this post-Westphalian approach is concerned with the security of individuals. Second, where traditional Westphalian models of international security have focused narrowly on security from physical violence, this new vision focuses on security to pursue a meaningful, productive life. The NEI envisions security, defined in this broader manner, as a collective good and reasons that its provision will depend on a complex network of institutions including sovereign states, non-governmental organizations, international agencies, and local governments.

The image that the NEI’s authors have is the Hanseatic one, in which national identities are relatively unimportant and international interactions are regulated by a number of overlapping and interlocking institutions, not simply by sovereign states. In this model, borders blur. In particular, the NEI hopes to encourage the blurring of the border between northwest Russia and the rest of northern Europe. This would have two consequences: in the first place, it would improve Baltic security by facilitating regional cooperation and the resolution of shared problems; in the second place, it would facilitate the transformative flow of liberal, democratic ideas into Russia. While the NEI explicitly anticipates the enlargement of NATO to include the Baltic States, it hopes to accomplish this enlargement without hardening Russian Realpolitik views and without deepening the divide between east and west within the region. What this will mean in practice remains uncertain.

The fit between the NEI and the general thrust of American foreign policy also remains uncertain, largely because the latter itself is uncertain. As in the past, how the American public and policymakers come to view the world and America’s role in it is likely to depend on how, in the face of problems that divide American society and threaten to tear it apart, Americans come to define their own identity. America’s movement to a post-industrial economy, the resulting growing divide between a highly educated class and a less well educated one, new patterns of communication, and alienation from traditional sources of social and political authority all challenge both the cohesion of American society and the cultural bases for this cohesion. Elites are now struggling, as during the Progressive era, to create new cultural foundations for a cohesive American society. Public debates over values, lifestyles, and multi-culturalism reflect elements in this struggle. Thus, the outcome of today’s efforts to redefine American identity will powerfully shape how Americans view their world and how American leaders define the goals of American foreign policy. This said, at least in its general form and at least for the foreseeable future, the NEI seems likely to endure regardless of larger shifts in American foreign policy: the NEI’s low political salience and low cost offer it a substantial degree of immunity from change.

More interestingly, the success or failure of the NEI may provide important lessons to policymakers as they wrestle with the meaning of globalization and with the problem of providing meaningful human security in the new era. In its backward glance to the Hanseatic League, the NEI
explicitly looks for an alternative model of order and governance. Whether or not this model proves to be a good one may well have significant consequences for the construction of international order in the coming century.

1 Overview of the Northern Europe Initiative: Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of European Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, May 1, 2000, p. 1. (http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nei/fs_000501_nei.html; downloaded 7/24/00)

2 Ibid., p. 4.

3 Ibid., pp. 1, 3.


5 Ibid., p. 2.

6 Overview of the Northern Europe Initiative: Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of European Affairs, U.S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 1.


9 Ibid., p. 2.

10 Ibid., p. 3.

11 Ibid., p. 2.


18 For a more detailed discussion see, for example, Edward Rhodes, Constructing Peace and War: An Analysis of the Power of Ideas to Shape American Military Power, Millennium Journal of International Studies (Spring 1995).


20 Ibid., p. 47.

21 See, for example, Rice, op. cit., and Robert B. Zoellick, AA Republican Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs (January/February 2000).
On the surface, there is consensus among experts from the Baltic States and supporting states that the land defence forces will eventually have the following elements:
- A relative small reaction force that can participate in international operations and be available for emergencies without formal mobilisation.
- A larger field army force involving most of the peace-time army training units that depend fully or to some degree on mobilisation of trained conscripts and other reserve personnel to reach combat strength.
- Territorial defence units, fully or partly established by the voluntary defence organisation, manned by the volunteers and supplemented by mobilised trained conscripts.

However, behind the facade, there is still substantial disagreement about the emphasis these different elements should be subject to, partly depending on which path is seen as most favoured by NATO. However, the varieties of opinion also come from different views of the threat and different opinions about the effectiveness of the different parts of the trilogy. These views have their foundation in the national background and experience of those holding them.

In order to get a clearer picture of the strengths and weaknesses of the different elements of the land defence forces, it is necessary to isolate each, and analyse and evaluate what would happen if all resources were used on one rather than on a balanced combination.

Each element is considered in relation to the following implicit missions:
- Maintaining a defence presence everywhere, making the population feel defended (This is of key importance for the popular support of defence in any democratic front-line state, even if professional planners may reject it as irrelevant).
- Having a capability to participate in international operations.
- Countering a territorial challenge to a limited part of the country.
- Maintaining effectiveness in spite of enemy intelligence efforts and the enemy’s early attempts to limit defence effectiveness through air power and special operations.
- Countering a coup-attempt against the capital, followed-up over land and/or by landings from the sea.
- Countering an invasion that may be concentrated on a couple of clear axes or spread over a wide frontage. It may be accompanied by an attack against the capital.
- Maintaining a bridgehead for any external assistance to arrive.
- Having a significant deterrence value and thereby affecting the enemy’s pre-invasion calculations of losses and time needed, making it likely that both will be significant, thus further making effective external defence response more likely.

**Scenario 1:**

*All resources to a standing, reaction force of regular contract soldiers, only supplemented with a reserve of former regular personnel*

Depending on which of the three states we are looking at the serving part of the land force could probably *gradually* be developed to have a maximum personnel strength of approximately 2,500 (estimate for Estonia) to approximately 8,000 (estimate for Lithuania). This would make it possible to create 2 to 6 mobile battalion groups plus some support structures. But as the economy develops, it will be still more difficult to recruit good quality personnel to reach that number, especially for the basic combat soldier positions. This problem of recruiting is facing all those nations of the developed West that have abandoned the conscription model rather than mixed the conscription model with other models.

Such a force will have to concentrate its efforts in one or a couple of geographic areas. If it were dispersed among all potentially threatened areas, it would be militarily useless. For example, it could maintain a visible presence in international operations, in the case of Lithuania of battalion strength.

Also, the force could ensure a presence in direct protection of a specifically threatened part of a country, but being so deployed, it could find itself in a wrong position if the situation escalated to a general threat. The limited size of the force thus makes it very vulnerable to pre-invasion attack by enemy air power and special operations.

If allowed to do so, such a force could also protect the capital against a coup (in the case of Estonia only a few key areas could be protected). However, it would not be possible to counter any follow-up operations.

Doubling the force by mobilising the regular reserve with personnel strength of 5,000-15,000, the force could create a maximum of 1-3 brigade-groups plus support structures. Due to the size of the force, it could be fully equipped as a modern mechanised force. But deployed for defence or delaying-actions close to a border even such a brigade would only cover a frontage of 10-20 kilometres (depending on whether the terrain is open or wooded) or two major roads. As such,
the force would only cover a tiny fraction of the possible invasion axes, and the force would be by-passed by some enemy units while other enemy units fixed it by frontal attack. The good training standard of both the standing reaction force and the regular reserve may make it possible for part of the force to extricate themselves and attack the bypassing units, but they would be hampered by enemy air power. The force may be able to move without serious casualties using darkness or minor roads plus dispersion, but in the ensuing meeting engagement, they would be quickly defeated by the overwhelming combination of direct, indirect, and airborne fire power. The invading force is likely to have reached all key objectives in a couple of days. As such, also the force enforced with the regular reserves will be incapable of maintaining any relevant bridgehead for external assistance.

The conclusion must be that the general deterrence value of the force that could be raised using regular contract soldiers only would be very limited.

### Scenario 2:

**All resources for the creation of a field army manned by mobilised conscripts, trained in peace-time training units**

It is not realistic today - with modern urban society - to expect that field army units mobilising conscripts more than 5 years after basic training can be made ready for general use without a re-training period of many weeks. Even with the general conscription training of all suitable citizens, the maximum general field force that the three states could gradually develop is probably around 20,000 (estimate for Estonia) to 70,000 (estimate for Lithuania), making it possible to mobilise 4-5 to 14-16 brigade size formations. Mobilising older conscripts, it could be possible to add 50% to those numbers for field force units that initially could be used only for less demanding tasks. In armies that can not use the intensive Israeli reserve service and training system, mobilised conscripts older than 30-32 are probably best used outside the field force units. Using the presently available donation possibilities, such forces could probably be given a reasonable equipment level. However, the running cost of maintaining balanced mechanised brigades is likely to result in the majority of the formations being light infantry brigades with their mobility based mainly on mobilised civilian transport.

Such forces could – after mobilisation - be present in several of the threatened areas. However, if it was dispersed equally among all threatened areas, it would be militarily useless. In its pure form, it could not participate in international operations. It would be necessary – as in most other countries with training-mobilisation armies – to develop special regular forces (with regular reserves) for that purpose. Also, the force would need partial mobilisation to ensure a presence in direct protection of a specifically threatened part of the country.

The vulnerability to pre-invasion attack by enemy air power and special operations depends on how the mobilisation is organised (centralised or decentralised). It would need a timely partial mobilisation to respond effectively to
a coup as well as to follow-up operations.

When fully mobilised and deployed for defence, the force could cover some or most invasion axes (depending on which country). However, the force level will not make it possible to create a cohesive defence front backed up by mechanised reserves. Some parts of the force would still be by-passed by some enemy units while they will fix others in frontal attack. As post-mobilisation training is likely to be limited, it is doubtful if other than mecha-

nised parts of the force will be able to extract themselves and attack the bypassing units. However, they would be hampered by enemy air power. They may be able to move without serious casualties using darkness or minor roads plus dis-

dersion, but in the ensuing meeting en-

gagement, they will be quickly defeated by the overwhelming combination of direct, indirect, and airborne fire power. The invading force is likely to have reached all key objectives in a few days. But contrary to a standing regular force of contract soldier as in scenario 1, the fully mobilised force would be capable of main-

taining a bridgehead for external assistance if concentrating entirely on that objective.

The conclusion must be that as the combat effect is completely dependent on mobilisation followed by deployment, the deterrence value of the force is limited.

Scenario 3: All resources for the creation of the pure territorial defence capability

The enemy will be met and fought everywhere across the territory with light forces, using a combination of ambushes and obstacles, e.g. Swedish type road demolitions. The force would mobilise locally and quickly due to the low level of complexity of the force: it is not meant to fight at a higher level than a platoon or a company with light infantry and anti-armour weapons. The main effort will be in the enemy rear. All forces (that is, all contract regulars or units of trained conscripts as well as the volunteer defence organisation supplemented by mobilised conscripts with a very short, basic training) will be used according to this doc-

trine. The total number that might be raised for this type of territorial defence by light sub-units, with general conscrip-
tion implemented, could probably be around from 100,000 in Estonia to 350,000 in Lithuania. Using the presently available donation possibilities, such forces could probably be given a reasonable level of light equipment.

The territorial defence forces would be present everywhere on the territory of the state. In its pure form, participation in international operations would not be possible. However, one of the regular units with regular reserves (that is, those units and reserves that are part of the peacetime force) could participate in peacekeeping operations that require basic light infantry. The force could easily mobilise locally in response to a threat limited to one part of the country. The vulnerability to pre-invasion attack by enemy air power and special operations units is very limited due to its decentralised organisation and mobilisation.

Also, the force could easily respond to a coup, but the reaction is likely to be
ineffective and very limited due to the low combat power of the individual sub-units involved. The follow-up force would experience significant delay, but that is likely to mean very little for the outcome in the capital.

When fully mobilised and deployed for defence, the force would cover all invasion axes. No matter which approach the invader uses, he will be delayed. However, the invader will never meet any effective and lasting challenge to his force as he can specialise his order of battle and tactics to counter the very basic force composition of the defender. Where the invading forces are concentrated the effect of the territorial defence will only be of nuisance and delay. The invader’s main problem will be destruction of routes and infrastructure. The problem for the defender is that a dedicated and resilient implementation of this pure territorial doctrine is likely to lay the country waste as the invader responds to pinpricks with massive firepower. So even if the cost in peacetime of this defence posture can be kept low, the implementation of the doctrine in war would be disaster for the country. Due to the limited depth of the Baltic states, the invading force is likely to have reached all key objectives in a few days, even if resistance could last months, before the country is subdued completely. The pure territorial defence would be incapable of maintaining a bridgehead for external assistance as it disperses rather than concentrates combat power.

The conclusion must be that if the invader is really convinced that the people would accept a full and heroic implementation of the territorial defence, the deterrence value is considerable. The question really is, does the history of the Baltic States support the credibility?

Scenario 4: A mixed territorial-field army defence capability

Consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the pure forms of land force defence doctrines can lead to a solution with the gradual build-up of a mix of the different force-types and ideas. It is the solution chosen in the Baltic Defence College Blue Order of Battle and the operational doctrine of “Active Territorial Defence”:

- The country is divided into “Military Regions” responsible for defence at the operational level.
- The Military Regions conduct the main defence operations with general purpose, field army formations (brigades).
- The Regions are subdivided into Military Districts that carry out local territorial defence as well as support and protect the deployment and combat operations of the field army formations.
- The main effort in building up the land forces is invested in the creation of the field army brigades.
- Part of the peacetime field army organisation is organised as a quick reaction force. It also has responsibility for participation in international operations.
- Personnel too old for service in field army units man the territorial defence units of the Military Districts together with personnel from the volunteer defence organisation.

The territorial defence force elements of the Military Districts would be present
everywhere on the territory of the state, even if it is likely to be much weaker in personnel strength than in the pure territorial defence model. The quick reaction element of the peacetime field army will be responsible for participation in international operations. The training undertaken by the majority of conscript classes will ensure enough volunteers to sustain participation even in the more demanding types of peace operations. The territorial defence force could easily mobilise locally in response to a threat limited to one part of the country and be supplemented by elements of the reaction force. The vulnerability to pre-invasion attack by enemy air power and special operations can be reduced. The response to a coup would be a combination of a response by the reaction elements of the field army and of the quickly, locally mobilising territorial defence units. The enemy follow-up force would experience delay from the territorial defence forces, and resistance would be hardened as field army units mobilise and deploy.

When fully mobilised and deployed for defence, the force would cover all invasion axes with, as minimum, territorial defence units. Depending on the stage of the gradual increase in the number of field army brigades (to the maximum outlined above), the defence of a few or most key axes and areas can be based on general purpose forces. No matter which approach the invader uses, he will be delayed. The operations of the territorial defence units of the Military Districts delay and weaken the invader by ambushes with both direct and indirect fire weapons, often linked to obstacles such as road demolitions and by using harassing indirect fire to delay reconstruction. As the command cadre of the territorial defence units are trained in field army units they are better prepared for the effective tactical integration of the fire from indirect fire weapons than if they had been prepared for the pure form of territorial defence described above. However, in combination with field army operations the effort of the territorial defence units is not to be seen as something independent. It creates time to re-deploy both field army units that have been placed where they cannot influence the battle and units that are being bypassed by invading forces. They screen and protect the redeployment of such field army units, and they create the best possible conditions, security and intelligence for their entering combat, be it in a meeting engagement, delaying operations, defence or attack. The mixed active territorial defence would be capable of maintaining a bridgehead for external assistance for a considerable period. The length of time it can do so, however, depends on the stage of the development of the field army formations.

As it removes all easy options, the conclusion must be that the doctrine and force structure outlined in scenario 4 is estimated to have a relatively high deterrence value.

**Conclusion**

The analysis above leads to the conclusion that a mixed territorial-field army defence capability is the superior option. The successful implementation of the outlined mixed doctrine does, however, de-
pend on effort spent in a few, very significant fields in the territorial defence units of the Military Districts:

- The units must mobilise locally.
- They should have the equipment (most of it mobilised locally) and explosives to carry out major road demolition work and mines to reinforce the obstacle value.
- There must be an adequate mix of good infantry weapons (including machine guns, sniper rifles, grenade launchers, and anti-armour weapons).
- They must have some relatively light indirect fire weapons for the reinforcement of ambushes and the subsequent hampering of enemy engineer reconstruction work by harassing fire.
- They must have VHF radios compatible with the radios used by the field army units.
- They should have a few HF sets for co-ordination of deep operations and intelligence reporting.
- The leaders should be familiar with field army tactics and procedures as well as capable of independent effective action.
Deep Operations and Active Territorial Defence: Some ideas for the Baltic States

By LtCol Ron LaGrone


Current military literature suggests that deep operations can only be conducted by extremely sophisticated technical means brought to the battlefield by large and well-equipped military forces. The images of precision munitions and long range intelligence gathering means used by military forces in Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf Region and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo have reinforced this impression with the general public and some military professionals alike. Increased reliance on high speed data processing infrastructure integrated into military command and control systems have created both opportunities and risk for those leaders considering how to integrate concepts of deep operations and information warfare into national defence doctrine.

Deep operations, especially those requiring small unit action in enemy controlled territory, do not stand alone as a suitable concept for national defence. They must be integrated into an overall operational plan to secure advantages for later and more decisive engagements by main battle forces. They achieve this goal by denying the enemy freedom of action and disrupting the coherence and tempo of enemy operations.¹ Active Territorial Defence as adopted by the Baltic Defence College combines the concept of continuous operations against an invading enemy within a framework of a national Total Defence effort. Military commanders conduct rear, close and deep operations within the principles of “Auftragstaktik” in which subordinate commanders are provided mission type orders, resources, and the freedom to conduct their missions to reach the required coordinated result.² The doctrine
calls for resistance against the enemy throughout the length and breadth of friendly territory with synchronized operations conducted by maneuver and territorial forces.

While many of the expensive and technically sophisticated means of conducting deep operations are not yet available to the Baltic States, military planners have the considerable advantage of planning to conduct these operations on their own terrain with the support of the local population. Well-trained and led small units, supported by low visibility logistics and communications networks, can conduct intelligence gathering and combat actions in the enemy’s rear area. These actions would have the effect of revealing the enemy’s intentions to friendly forces and destroying the most vulnerable elements of his combat power, breaking the momentum of the leading units and creating an atmosphere of insecurity throughout the enemy’s area of operations. In this way, the enemy’s will to fight will be undermined and he will not be able to employ his highly mechanized and logistics intensive forces in an effective way.

The Levels of War and the Framework of the Battlefield

Deep operations are planned and conducted at all levels of headquarters consistent with their assigned responsibility. In the model used at the Baltic Defence College, the Joint National Command would be responsible for strategic planning for the armed forces. At this level, which is the present level of capability for the Baltic States, typical plans in support of a deep operations strategy may include the conduct of national level intelligence gathering activities and some elements of information warfare.

Lower level missions within a specific Area of Responsibility (AOR) are provided for the Military Regions, which are considered to be the operational level of command. The three or four Military Regions that might be organized within each Baltic state are the main planning and logistical support level for the deep operations conducted by land forces. The AOR assigned to the Region is allocated to the forces available for combat with the intent of facilitating the use of the operational environment within the doctrine of Active Territorial Defence.

As the bridge between the operational and the tactical level of war, the Military Region determines the key objects that must be defended with main battle forces and those areas that the enemy might allow into in order to expose his rear areas to deep attack. An extensive analysis of the operational environment would provide a match between missions and the task organization to conduct deep operations.

It is at the Military Region that the requirements for reconnaissance and strike operations are determined and mission orders are prepared for the tactical units assigned that will conduct these operations. To meet this requirement, the Military Region must be a field deployable war fighting headquarter capable of peacetime preparations and 24-hour operations under combat conditions.
Short Term Options: A Model for the Baltic States

When confronted with the considerable work needed to build a deep operations capability within the Baltic States, it is far too easy to imagine it an “impossible mission”. In fact, based on a strong collective and individual will to defend national territory, an initial capability can be built up in fairly short order. In this case, a workable strategy is to start with guidance, resources, and a readiness inspection program from the top down and soon after follow up by hard and realistic training and preparation from the bottom up.

A well trained, supported, and motivated squad, capable of independent action in support of an overall operational plan, is the key to deep operations conducted within active territorial defence. A ready and capable squad can be incorporated into larger formations as required by the situation. It provides a force that can hit hard for a short time and then leave little trace of its presence on the battlefield. The ability to bring a platoon or company together to conduct an operation only to have it disperse into smaller units and effectively hide after the battle frustrates the enemy attempts to destroy these forces. In order to increase enemy uncertainty and harden the defence force, any combat unit within the current Baltic States armed forces must prepare for this mission. Both main force and territorial forces share this requirement and can be trained towards the same standard. Thus, within their specifically assigned AOR, a highly determined Home Guard unit would be able to conduct a specific range of these operations given the proper leadership, resources, and training program.

Organization and Capabilities of Small Units for Deep Operations

Consider as an example, a squad with the mission to strike high value targets in enemy held areas. Their target might include enemy command and control facilities, essential logistics capabilities, fire support units, and key combat engineer assets. The squad would attack by surprise inflicting the maximum damage on the target and leave the engagement area within minutes. They would also have the capability to employ various anti-armor munitions and attack key enemy personnel by the means of precision fire. The ideal configuration would be ten soldiers
organized into a command group of two personnel and eight soldiers task-organized into specific teams to support an ambush style of attack. They would normally be expected to conduct independent operations for up to ten days in enemy occupied territory.

The squad leader and his assistant easily have the toughest jobs in the armed forces. Ideally they should be as physically strong as the rest of their squad and have excellent skills in small unit leadership. When supporting fire support is available to the squad, the leaders must be able to employ it to maximum advantage. They must have deep knowledge of the their assigned area of operations and serve as the bridge between the squad and the unique support system that may be employed to support deep operations. The squad leader must have the judgement to know when to accept and decline risk in support of the mission and have a clear idea of the squad’s abilities to plan and conduct operations.

The majority of the combat power of the squad resides in the anti-armor and engineer team. This team would consist of two anti-tank gunners trained with the Carl Gustav or a similar man portable system with the same versatile capability. In addition, capability with various anti-tank mines and explosives in general will provide a flexible capability to the squad leader to meet targets of opportunity that appear within the squad’s planning cycle.

A well-trained sniper team represents a significant asset to any commander conducting deep operations. Their ability to attack key military personnel at significant ranges creates an apprehension and uncertainty that slows the tempo of en-
enemy operations. While all soldiers are not destined to be a completely proficient sniper, those marksman identified as the best 20% in the employment of their individual rifle during their basic training should receive additional training and equipment in the event they will be employed in this mission. These “Designated Marksman” will greatly enhance the effectiveness of any combat unit.

The two soldiers each on the machine gun team and the security team respectively seal off the objective during combat operations and provide small arms fire against personnel and light equipment. They help the squad break contact during combat engagements and provide covering fire to the other teams as required. They also provide surveillance, long range communications, and should receive additional medical training. They must be equipped with a lightweight easily maintainable machine gun capable of area fire to a range of 500 meters.

The capabilities listed above are achievable by light infantry forces but will not be obtained by unmotivated soldiers and leaders. The key to success in this case is to set priorities and training standards and enforce them ruthlessly. Leaders must ensure that the members of the unit achieve the highest level of physical fitness and weapons proficiency. Within the training resources available, all members of the squad must be cross-trained in other team functions. They must be at home in the field.

Air Defence: A more difficult but solvable problem

Small units conducting deep operations mainly rely on passive measures to avoid air attack. Small units deep in the rear are difficult to locate and target. There is also the problem of fratricide as the enemy air force may be forced to en-
gage a small and elusive target close to their own main battle forces as well as less prepared logistical units. The enemy air force will more likely be on the look out for large mechanized forces and fixed installations. This set of circumstances creates an opportunity for light and mobile air defence systems in deep operations.

In the future after the application of more resources, time, and careful planning, it will be possible to deploy a man-portable air defence missile system within the Baltic Armed Forces. Employed throughout the AOR this will have the effect of forcing the attacking air force to take protective measures throughout his operational area. Command and control and utility cargo aircraft would be particularly vulnerable to these systems. Employment of such systems would be within the framework of a national or better still a Baltic Air Defence system. The man-portable systems deployed throughout national territory would increase the risk to enemy air forces in general. Enemy aircraft would be required to chose between exposure to small arms and handheld missile systems or flying higher to face higher altitude and more capable missile systems.

**Logistics and Communications**

Of course the small unit cannot operate in a denied area without support. Important factors to consider are medical care, communications, and other logistics support. Medical care is the most demanding requirement to meet under deep battle conditions. The risk incurred is considerable. Soldiers must know the situation concerning medical evacuation during operations. If they do they are normally willing to operate in the most extreme conditions. Commander’s can minimize the risk by a special training program for combat medics and establishing a system of evacuation that can hand off wounded soldiers to civilians within the AOR.

A redundant and survivable long-range military communications system must be established to support operations throughout national territory. Planners establishing this system should consider not only traditional military systems, but also look at the use of both current and older means of passing military communications. Clandestine and low visibility systems can and should be used but extensive planning and security precautions must be placed into effect to safeguard the personnel using and supporting these systems.
Combat stocks of arms, ammunition, explosives, and food can be hidden within the operational area to support deep operations. The information concerning the location and contents of these stocks must be carefully managed so that essential personnel can make use of these stocks in a disciplined way and still deny this critical information to the enemy.

**Conclusions:**

**Things to be done now**

Nothing can be done without clear lines of responsibility and authority. Defence planning cannot be conducted without a strategic, operational, and tactical framework. A defence system must be in place in which planning for active territorial defence and supporting deep operations can be conducted in a practical way. This means the establishment of a regional system of defence including maneuver, territorial and other forces as established by defence law and operational doctrine.

The extreme conditions encountered by units conducting deep operations will require the very best small unit leaders. Leader initiative and resolute action by each soldier will be required for success. Tough training standards, extensive weapons firing and frequent exercises in all weather conditions will ensure that each soldier is prepared for reality of fighting in enemy controlled terrain. Training of anti-tank gunners, snipers, combat engineers, and machine gunners should receive special emphasis.

Training standards must be backed up with resources. National low visibility communications and logistics support systems must be established that will continue to operate even when the enemy is in control of the area. Defence planners must procure sufficient numbers of anti-tank weapons, sniper weapons, and machine guns to equip national forces. Commander’s must ensure training ammunition, firing ranges and other resources are available so gunners are trained to use their weapons. In time, procure a man-portable air defence missile system should be integrated into the deep operations concept. Together with a national air defence network, this system could be dispersed throughout national territory making the small mobile units using them difficult to target and creating uncertainty within an aggressor’s air force.

History has shown us that a prepared and determined population can bring a numerically and technically superior force to a standstill and deny an irresponsible invader his strategic objectives. Most of all, it is the will to fight that determines the Baltic States’ capability to defend themselves. Along with national main battle forces, well-trained and equipped small units capable of independent deep operations provide the means for the will to fight and give any potential aggressor a difficult problem to solve.

I want to begin the story of my life in the spring of 1937 where my adult life began after graduating from Jelgava Gymnasium in Latvia. I wanted to attend university but I did not have the required money. Instead I joined the Army on a voluntary basis because my conscription was coming up any way. I did not fear the toughness of the military service because from an early age I had been used to hard labor. On October 17th 1937 my military service began as I was enlisted in the 1st Infantry Regiment situated in Liepaja. Most of the other conscripts were graduates from gymnasiums and universities.

The German aggressive policy from the late 1930’es had an enormous impact on most states around the world and certainly on all states in the Baltic area. In the spring of 1938 Hitler’s Army started to pillage Europe and occupy independent countries. Very soon the Sudeten Mountains in Czechoslovakian were occupied and soon thereafter Klaipeda in Lithuania was also occupied. When German submarines were detected in Latvian territorial waters Latvia had to prepare its military in order to defend its independence. International tension was growing day by day.

We were encouraged to attend military academy because Latvia was in shortage of officers. After passing the medical check-up and the military school’s entrance examination I was enlisted in the military academy as a cadet.
The USSR was preparing actively for war and one of the most significant aggressive acts of the Soviet foreign policy was the signing of the secret annexes to the Molothow-Ribentroph Pact. On the 1st of September 1939 the Second World War began with the occupation of Poland. The soviet aggression against Finland failed but the Baltic States were forced to accept soviet military bases within their territories. In my opinion the Latvian government made a huge mistake by accepting the deployment of soviet military bases. We knew that the result of this was a loss of Latvian independence at a time when the Latvian population was more than ready to fight for freedom.

The military studies were suspended and the military camp in Daugavpils was evacuated and deployed to Baldone in Latvia. We followed the developments closely as the situation changed every day. President Ulmanis together with the Latvian government were subverted and the Stalinist henchmen Kirhenstein and Lacis seized power in Latvia. The Army underwent significant changes as well. Retired general Dambitis was nominated to Minister of Defence and retired general Klavins was appointed commander of the army. The commandant of the military academy was replaced and the Latvian flag was removed from the academy. The cadets received a message saying that graduation would be on the 27th of July 1940. After the ceremonies the graduates were given our new assignments and I was assigned to the 3rd infantry regiment in Jelgava in Latvia. The commander, Colonel Apsitis of the 3rd Infantry regiment placed the 14 new officers in different sub-units and I became an anti-tank platoon commander.

In September 1940 the Latvian Army was reorganized and incorporated in the Soviet Army. The higher commanders were liquidated and the Latvian officers with a record of service during the existence of the Latvian Republic were retired together with those who fought for independence in 1919. At least 20-25 officers from the 3rd infantry regiment including Colonel Apsitis were retired and Colonel Aunins was appointed as the new commander.

In my battery large changes also took place. The Latvian Army was abolished and the names of the regiments were changed. The 3rd infantry regiment was united with the 6th infantry regiment stationed in Riga and renamed as the 195th riflemen regiment which later on was absorbed in the 181st division of the Baltic military region. As a result of these reorganizations a lot of Latvian officers handed in their resignation. Others stayed due to the promise from officers in the Red Army that there would be no other changes in the service conditions for Latvians apart from the change of uniform and the names of the units. History clearly underlines the falseness of these promises.

At a later point in time special political officers, the “politruks”, arrived at the 195th regiment under the leadership of Political Commissar Bisenieks. Within a few days the “politruks” were incorporated into each unit and they functioned as the eyes and ears of the Stalin regime. Shortly after they began to arrest Latvian officers and soldiers. The arrests took place during the nights to avoid too much public atten-
tion and resistance. The Red Army “Che-
kists” registered every Latvian officer and
no one knew who were to be arrested next.

At the end of January 1941 the 195th
riflemen regiment were to have a shoot-
ing exercise at the relocated Lilaste-Gauja
training area instead of the area in Kuldiga.
I was appointed senior officer of the
march-column heading for Kuldiga, and
my assistant was a “politruk” Poznakov
from our battery. During the march he
fully ignored all of my commands and
was very lazy and a dastard. This was the
first conflict between us and the episode
puts in perspective the function a
“politruk” would have in a unit. Such
episodes became more and more common
and they were all provoked by the
“politruks”. After returning to Kuldiga
the 76th battery commander 1st Lieuten-
ant Spuris assigned me again as a platoon
commander of an anti tank platoon in
the 3rd battalion in Ivande in Latvia.

From March until the beginning of
June 1941 our regiment was relocated in
Aluksne in Latvia and in June we went on
a summer camp in Litene and Ostroviesi
in Latvia. Our artillery regiment arrived
in Ostroviesi on the 12th of June and
Commissar Bisenieks was ordered to leave
all ammunition outside the camp area in
order to prevent soldiers from stealing
it. The next day we established the camp
and the only thing that went on was the
Red Army having an exercise with troops
some 300-400 meters away from the camp.
The camp was encircled three times dur-
ing the course of this exercise. On the
14th of June 1941 orders came from com-
missar Bisenieks and the deputy com-
mander captain Beilinson that I should
report to the HQ at 8.00 with a map, a
compass and a pistol in order to take part
in a tactical exercise called “Company in
Defence Positions”. Some of our officers
and a lot of “politruks” were already there
when I arrived a little early. Trucks with
other officers from our region passed by
while we waited for a pick up that would
take us to the exercise area. On our way
to Gulbene in Latvia we were stopped by
a General from the Red Army and or-
dered to turn right down a country road.
At a closer inspection we noticed that
Russian soldiers were hiding in the bushes
along the road and pointing their weapons
in our direction.

A large number of Russian officers
were waiting for us when we arrived at
the destination in the woods. One of them
a KGB colonel came to our truck and
ordered us out and into lines where the
content of the exercise would be ex-
plained. He then ordered the officers to
come closer in order to be able to hear
him. The KGB officer positioned him-
self opposite us and opened fire without
any warning. He then yelled three times:
“Put your hands up”.

We were armed with pistols but they
were not of much use because they were
without ammunition. They forced us to
surrender when they put a pistol against
our backs. Then they took our pistols,
watches and other personal belongings
but fortunately a Russian general ordered
an end to this maltreatment. We were
given back our personal belongings but
not our knives and pistols.

We went to Gulbene station guarded
by the “politruks” and put into Black
Maria trucks normally used for arrested people. 14 years of long torture started. 43 officers from the 195th riflemen regiment and in total more than 560 officers were arrested during that day. We arrived in Riga the next day and train wagons with arrested Lithuanian and Estonian officers were added to our train. Later the same day we departed Riga in the direction of Daugaupils. The border was crossed during the night and on the 17th of June 1941 after three days of traveling the train stopped at Babino station in Russia. Two hours later we walked in unknown direction guarded by “chekists”. At the end of the day we reached a built-up area which we later found out was a manor house in Johnova. The camp we arrived at was divided in three parts. The first part contained arrested and deported women from Latvia, in the second one men from Riga were placed and the third contained arrested Polish army officers. We stayed in Johnova until the 28th of June 1941 when we were forced to walk the 30-km back to Babino station. The next day we headed in Black Maria trucks towards Moscow.

At that time we knew nothing of the breakout of the war between USSR and Germany but that we learned about when we reached the station in Moscow where our guards immediately took shelter because the alarms were going.

The trip to Krasnojarsk in Russia was very slow and at every station military echelons passed us in a westward direction. On the 28th of July 1941 we reached Krasnojarsk and after a couple of days the journey continued in a northern direction along the river Yenisei.

On the 10th of August 1941 the violent journey ended in the frozen grounds of Norilsk in Russia. Here we were in the hands of a real “chekist” sadist who was in total control of our lives. The interrogation officer were selected killers without any moral limitations. With lupine and cruel interrogation methods they could force anybody to confess any fictional crimes.

My first interrogator hit and kicked me for three days and tried many different vicious types of interrogation on me because I refused to sign the interrogation protocol. I kept saying that I did not understand Russian and that a translator was required. The torture continued but I never signed the interrogation protocol. I was not interrogated again until June 1942 when the KGB tortured 20 men. This time my interrogator was a border guard officer and the difference was very clear. He only used physical force against me twice. My last interrogation was on the 15th of May 1943. I was called to the office of the KGB and here I was forced to sign a verdict, which imprisoned me for 8 years. It was formulated according to the law and “proved” that I was showing antagonistic attitudes towards the Soviet power. I later found out that this meant that I had been an active fighter against the revolutionary movement.

In 1956 I applied for vindication at the military public prosecutor of the Baltic Military Region. Prosecutor Kosenko told me that I had successfully avoided the death penalty by not signing the interrogation protocols in 1941. In 1957 I received my vindication but still I was under constant KGB observance.