Journal on Baltic Security

Special Issue: Proceedings of the International Lessons Learned Conference (ILLC15)

Understanding Strategic Information Manoeuvres in Network Media to Advance Cyber Operations: A Case Study
Analysing pro-Russian Separatists’ Cyber Information Operations in Crimean Water Crisis

Russian Information Operations against the Ukrainian State and Defence Forces: April–December 2014 in Online News

Usage of Social Network Analysis (SNA) in Crisis Management

The Commander-in-Chief in Command and Control System of the Republic of Poland

NATO Multinational Brigade Interoperability: Issues, Mitigating Solutions and Is It Time for a NATO Multinational Brigade Doctrine?

The “Lessons Learned” Trap and How to Avoid It: Drawing from the Israeli Armoured Experience, 1948–1973

Determinants of Army Structures Development in the Context of Middle Sized Country Experiences in Contemporary Tactical Operations

Russia’s Hybrid War in Theory and Practice

Challenges for Leading Multinational and Multicultural Military Units

Learning from Iraq and Afghanistan: Four Lessons for Building More Effective Coalitions

BOOK REVIEWS

Works by Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk’s & Adam Zamoyski reviewed

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EDITORS’ NOTE

The third issue of the Journal on Baltic Security focuses on a question, which might seem very trivial, but which is rather difficult to answer. It is question of how we learn and what we learn. Or in other terms: how do we make sure that what we learn is relevant and useful? Therefore, this special issue is dedicated to the proceedings from the 9th International Lessons Learned Conference in Tartu on 1st and 4th June 2015, hosted by the Baltic Defence College and supported by Estonian Ministry of Defence. This conference tried to address three subtopics from a lessons learned point of view: 1) leadership; 2) crisis management; and 3) strategic communication.

The first article by Samer AL-Khateeb and Nitin Agarwal analyses the case of pro-Russian separatists’ cyber information operations related to the Crimean Water Crisis. The authors used different social networks such as blogs, Twitter etc. to collect the data and make conclusions how extremist groups are able to spread their opinions and create emotional attitudes for their followers.

The second article written by Kristiina Müür, Holger Mölder, Vladimir Sazonov and Pille Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt is a report of extensive empirical research trying to find out the patterns of Russian Federation information operations against Ukraine from 1st of April to 31st December 2014.

The next article is from the Turkish Army War College by Hakan Güreşci and Recep Sait Arpat who used a theory of social systems to analyse the usage of social network analyses within the crisis management domain.

The fourth article written by Malwina Ewa Kołodziejczak from the University of National Defence, Warsaw, Poland, takes a rather interesting topic from a lessons learned point of view. The author brings in the issue of legislation and argues about the role of the Commander-
In-Chief within the command and control system in Poland, especially emphasising the inconsistency between different legal acts.

The next article by Mark Schiller argues about the leadership challenges within the multinational brigade framework. It focuses especially on the obstacles a multinational brigade commander and his staff are likely to encounter during the planning and execution of brigade operations, adding possible actions and measures to facilitate interoperability.

The sixth article by Damien O’Connell explores some of the problems with “lessons learned” using the example of the Israel Defence Forces from 1948 to 1973. Some recommendations how military organisations might reduce the danger of lessons leading them astray are also included.

The seventh article is about army structures development written by Leszek Elak form the Polish National Defence University. This paper stresses the need to use proper theoretical concepts such as the theory of organisations and theory of management as a basis to develop the proper structures of the army for today’s medium-sized country.

The next paper by Miroslaw Banasik brings in the topic of hybrid war in theory and practise, and analyses the Russian approach to it using examples mostly from Ukraine and Chechnya. This article tries to answer to the question of what the concept of the new generation warfare means.

The ninth article gives a rather practical viewpoint about the challenges of leading multicultural military units. The author, Miroslaw Smolarek, using his own experience from international deployments, presents his view and suggestions of the aspects commanding multinational troops.

The last article by Nathan White presents some learning points from Afghanistan and Iraq which might be utilised to inform more effective coalition development and employment.
Book reviews assess Phantom Terror by Adam Zamoyski and Celebrating Borderlands in a Wider Europe: Nations and Identities in Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia by Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk.

Antek Kasemaa
Zdzislaw Sliwa
Guest Editors,
Volume 2.1 Journal on Baltic Security
UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC INFORMATION MANOEUVRES IN NETWORK MEDIA TO ADVANCE CYBER OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY ANALYSING PRO-RUSSIAN SEPARATISTS’ CYBER INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN CRIMEAN WATER CRISIS

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ABSTRACT The inexpensive nature and wide availability of emerging media outlets, e.g. social networking sites and blogs makes them easy-to-use weapons, giving power and courage to individuals to form groups that are able to win or at least force concessions from stronger forces. Today, terrorist groups know that opinions can be influenced using networked media and this knowledge empowers and enables them to alienate their audience and sometimes provoke them into violent actions. To understand the strategic information manoeuvres used by such groups, e.g., trans-national terrorist groups, we study the channels (blogs, Twitter, etc.) and methods (e.g., influential actors/groups) they use to disseminate messages pertaining to recruitment, radicalization, and raising funds. We collect data from several sources, including over 130 blog websites known for pro-Russian propaganda for events such as the Crimean water crisis and Trident Juncture Exercise (TRJE 15). In addition to blogs, we collect data from Twitter for the above-mentioned events to study the cross-influence of various social media platforms in conducting strategic information manoeuvres. The study shows that groups are able to
spread their opinions and create emotional attitudes for their followers through the sophisticated and blended use of these network media platforms via powerful actors, trolls, and botnets. We design social and network science informed methodologies to study the sociotechnical behaviours of trolls and botnets and develop detection tools ready to be deployed for Cyber operations. The tools have been further tested in the information operations of ISIL, e.g., beheading of hostages in orange jump suits. This study helps identifying the actions needed to win this “battle of ideas”.

Introduction

The Internet is indisputably one of the greatest inventions of the 21st century that has revolutionized communication and information dissemination. Its affordability and ease of use has made a tremendous contribution to human life in various aspects, such as education, healthcare, and business among others. People nowadays can attend colleges online, check how many calories they consumed or burned using various mobile apps, and business owners can keep track of their stocks and the progress of their company. However, with all these benefits of the Internet technologies, there are also some adverse effects.

Since the Internet provides global connectivity some individuals have abused the power of the Internet as a weapon or a tool to force concessions from stronger forces. For the last one and a half decades the Internet and specifically social media has become an integral part of conflict environments due to the democratization of technology (Tatham et al., 2008). Social media and digital communication tools have largely been considered as positive vehicles of change. However, the power of social media has been harnessed by extremists and terrorist groups to spread propaganda and influence mass thinking. As our government and corporations begin to rely more and more on social media and online
crowdsourcing for situational awareness and data, they will need to be able to identify, track in real time, and mitigate the risks. Existing approaches to cyber threat assessment and mitigation strategies overlook the societal aspect, which warrants the need for novel socio-computational methods.

The role of network media during the uprising of crises and conflicts is observed heavily (Nissen, 2015; Tatham et al., 2008). Many organizations around the world hire people, pay a lot of money, and use different techniques to spread a message or propaganda in an attempt to influence public opinion in their favour. They use different methods (bots and/or trolls) and spread misinformation in many cases to accomplish their goal (Sindelar, 2014). Digital communication tools could pose a dangerous force against democracy as well as diplomacy. Several journalistic accounts provide empirical evidence regarding strategic and tactical manoeuvre of information using social media to exploit local grievances, steer mass thinking, polarize communities, and mobilize crowds. In the Ukraine-Russia crisis, sites like VKontakte (VKontakte – a Russian social media platform), LiveJournal, and other blogging platforms (e.g., Tumblr, etc.) have been used as propaganda machines to justify the Kremlin’s policies and actions (Allen, 2014; Bohlen, 2014). According to Interpret Magazine, the Kremlin recruited over 250 trolls, each being paid $917 per month to work round the clock to produce posts on social media and mainstream media. These trolls would manage a stream of invective against unflattering Western articles about Russia and pro-Ukrainian media by posting several comments and blog posts a day using multiple ‘sock puppet’ accounts. Such troll armies (or more commonly known as ‘web brigades’) piggyback on the popularity of social media to disseminate fake pictures and videos and coordinate some of the very effective disinformation campaigns, to which even legitimate news organizations could fall prey. To stem the tide of fakery or at least make the people aware,
online crowdsourcing-based efforts like StopFake.org have been created to identify and debunk fake imagery and stories about the war in Ukraine. However, such efforts are severely limited and easily outnumbered by the vast troll armies.

A similar trend has been observed in the online activities of the Islamic State terrorist organization, also known as the ISIS or ISIL. Reports have indicated that a social/collaborative answering website known as Ask.fm has been strategically used by ISIS and other extremist groups to answer questions from potential recruits (Hall, 2014). According to a report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), extremist organizations such as ISIS, use highly sophisticated and carefully blended social media outreach strategies (Carter et al., 2014). In fact, ISIS has developed its own Twitter app available on major platforms including Android and iOS, which is used to recruit, radicalize, and raise funds (Berger, 2014).

A recent study published by the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America (PNAS) coined the term “femtorisk” to refer to a statistically small phenomenon that is capable of exerting a huge impact on global politics such as the Arab Spring, the 2008 financial crisis, and Ukraine’s Euromaidan protests (Berger, 2015). Although several attempts have been made to identify and study these “femtorisk” phenomena, there is still a lack of understanding in how these organizations or groups use the network media to spread their messages. This will enable authorities to take the necessary actions against these “femtorisk” phenomena.

Recently, a sharp increase in the deviant behaviours organized and conducted via the Internet has been reported, including various incidents of cybercrimes (Dye and Finkle, 2013), cyber warfare (Hoke and Babb, 2015), “Remote warfare” or “Social warfare” (Nissen, 2015), etc. Network media nowadays is also used for
military activities such as Offensive and Defensive Cyber-Operations, Intelligence Collection, Command and Control activities, Targeting, and Psychological Warfare (Nissen, 2015). All these applications where network media worked as an effective tool gave it an importance big enough to merit its study.

In this study we focus on studying how information manoeuvres are executed in network media i.e. Twitter and the likes, during the Crimean water crisis (BBC, 2014). We collect data during the crisis and analyse it in an attempt to understand the strategic information (or disinformation) dissemination campaigns conducted by groups of individuals (or trolls) and/or bots, and identify the channels (e.g., Twitter) and methods (e.g., influential actors/groups) used. Through this study we try to find answers for the following research questions:

1. How is propaganda disseminated via networked media during conflicts or crises? What roles do bots play in such information manoeuvres?

2. Can we develop a methodology to detect bot activities? We present a methodology to demonstrate bot activities in disseminating propaganda during the Crimean water crisis.

3. Is there an organizational structure to the bot activities? More specifically, who is responsible for feeding information (or rather misinformation) to these bots? What strategies do the bots use to further disseminate propaganda? And most importantly, are these bots working in collusion? Further, can we identify the positions or roles various bots assume in the networked media to effectively and efficiently coordinate the propaganda dissemination process?

Toward this direction, we make the following contributions:
We shed light on a phenomenon that is commonly used to disseminate propaganda on networked media.

We document coordination strategies among bots to enhance the reachability of their postings disseminating propaganda.

An organizational structure is identified among the bots, where a real-person feeds the misinformation to a network of bots, or botnet.

We identify network structures among bots corresponding to collective sociotechnical behaviours exhibited by a collection of bots (or, brokers) to disseminate propaganda.

The findings will inform development of predictive models and eventually tools that can assist decision-making bodies to take necessary actions.

While some of the above mentioned contributions are specific to the Crimean water crisis case study, the findings and especially the methodology to identify bot behaviours would most certainly inform development of predictive models and eventually tools that can assist decision-making bodies to design cyber-warfare operations. The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of bots in information operations through empirical observations and trends on some of the work done with regards to identifying bots and sociotechnical behaviours of trolls on network media. Next in Section 3, we give a brief description of the data we collected. Then we present our analysis and findings in section 4. We summarize the conclusions with implications of the research and future directions in Section 5.
Overview of Bots in Information Operations: Empirical Observations and Trends

In this study, we find out that a group of bots managed by group of brokers are disseminating information that is related and not related to the Crimean water crisis and this information was taken from a “real person” user account (the most influential node in the network). The reason was to spread propaganda about the crisis and try to grab the attention of as many people as possible. The bot activity in this network used a strategy called “misdirection” (a technique used by magicians to make the crowd look somewhere else while they are performing the trick. For example, the bot would tweet unrelated news that is happening somewhere else but still mention a hashtag related to the Russia-Ukraine water crisis) and “smoke screening” (when a bot would mention something about Russia or Ukraine but not necessary related to the water crisis). Similar techniques have been used in the Syrian Social Bot (SSB) to raise awareness of the Syrian civil war (Abokhodair et al., 2015 pp. 839–851).

Automated Social Actors/Agents (ASAs) or bots or botnets (a network of bots colluding with each other) are not a new phenomenon and they have been studied in the literature previously in a variety of domains. One of the earliest studies focused on the usage of social bots that were used in the Internet Relay Chat (IRC), such as Eggdrop, which emerged in early 1993 (Rodríguez-Gómez et al., 2013). This bot’s tasks were welcoming and greeting new participants and also warn users about other users’ actions. The usage of bots on IRC was very popular due to the simplicity to implement it and its ability of scaling IRC (Karasaridis et al., 2007).

As time progressed, social bots got more sophisticated and have more advanced functionality. Another study in this direction is the study of social bots usage on Multi-User-Domains (MUDs) and
Massive Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs). The emergence of Multi User Domains calls for the need for automated social actors (ASAs) to enhance the playing experience. As the online gaming market grew, the call for more advanced bots increased. In MMOGs, such as the World of Warcraft (WoW) unauthorized game bots emerged. These unauthorized bots enhance and trigger mechanisms for the players by often sitting between the players’ client application and the game server. Some of these bots were also able to play the game autonomously in the absence of the real player. In addition to that, some bots were also able to damage the game ecologies, i.e., amassing experience points or game currency (virtual gold, etc.). (Abokhodair et al., 2015 pp. 839–851).

As social media emerged, the usage of social botnets sparked. A study conducted in 2012 by Facebook estimated that roughly 5-6% of all Facebook users are fake accounts. This means that there are a large number of user accounts that do not represent real people (about 50 million users). So the natural question is, who owns these accounts? (Protalinski, 2012). One study focused on how vulnerable Facebook is to these bots and how these bots are thriving to mimic human behaviour so they would be hard to detect/capture (Boshmaf et al., 2012 p.12). A similar study to ours was conducted on the Syrian civil war conflict by Abokhodair et al. (2015, pp. 839–851), who focused on one bot that lived for six months before Twitter detected it and suspended it. The study analysed the life and the activities of that bot. More focus was given on the content of the tweets, i.e., categorizing the tweets into news, opinion, etc. The difference between their study and ours is, we are focusing on identifying the network structure of a group of bots, which are managed by a real person node (to find the leader or the most influential node in the network). To the best of our knowledge it is the first attempt to identify a bot network structure or a botnet, during crises and detect their communication and information dissemination strategies. Further, we identify the roles
and positions assumed by the bots within their group (such as brokers who serve as bridges between different parts of the network or sub networks) for affecting various information manoeuvres.

**Research Methodology**

In this study, we take the Crimean water crisis as a case to study. During the time of crisis there was an article published by the BBC news (BBC, 2014) with the title "Russia fears Crimea water shortage as supply drops". In this article, the BBC was reporting about the Russian officials who told BBC that a water shortage in Crimea is threatening to become acute because Ukraine has reduced the supply via a key canal. The dissemination of this news article was very intense in social media, especially Twitter. Usually Twitter is the “go to” medium for propaganda dissemination because it is easy to use, a mass dissemination platform (a message can reach millions of users in a short period of time), and hyper connected (a user can have thousands or even millions of friends/followers who are highly interconnected). Also, because of Twitter’s operational capabilities tricks like “thread-jacking” (the change of topic in a “thread” of discussion in an open forum) and “hashtag-latching” (strategically associating unrelated but popular or trending hashtags to target a broader, or in some cases a very specific audience) are prevalent and easily done. In addition to Twitter other tools that can be used include blogs, YouTube, Facebook, for Russian cyber operations, ВКонтакте. Such tools are gaining popularity among the cyber trolls/agents. During the aforementioned water crisis many bots were tweeting the same article using a link to a website that copied the original BBC article and made it look like it was published by itself. We use this case to examine how propaganda is spread with the help of bots on social media channels during the troubling and chaotic times of crises.
The findings in this study can be further examined in other crises in future. By studying as many crises as possible behavioural patterns would start to emerge, which can then help build tools to understand narratives and help shape counter-narratives during the time of crises. To study the strategic information manoeuvres on network media we have collected data during the Crimean water crisis. A brief description of the dataset and our findings are presented next.

Data Collection

We have used TweetTracker (Kumar et al., 2011), and NodeXL (Smith et al., 2009 pp. 255–264) tools to collect data for the period between 4/29/2014 8:40:32 PM and 7/21/2014 10:40:06 PM UTC. This resulted in 1,361 tweets, 588 Twitter users, and 118,601 relations between the Twitter users. There are four basic types of relations in the Twitter data, viz., follows, mentions, replies, and tweets. A snapshot of a tiny sample of tweets is depicted below (see figure 1). Each tweet is wrapped around by unrelated hashtags, mainly the name of cities, states, or countries. The tweets are identical, and include a hyperlink to the same article, which contains the propaganda message that the bots are employed to disseminate.

Figure 1. A snapshot for a sample of the tweets collected during the Crimean water crisis
Analysis, Results & Findings

By analysing the tweets and their content we observed a few anomalous behaviours, such as:

1. Many tweets are identical, i.e., different Twitter users posted the same tweets. Note that these are not retweets.

2. The frequency of the tweets was unusually high, i.e., a large number of tweets were posted in a very short duration – a behaviour that is humanly impossible.

3. All tweets contain ‘short’ links, pointing to the same article on a specific website.

4. All the tweets are bracketed within a pair of hashtags, i.e., there is a beginning and an end hashtag for every tweet.

5. These hashtags are not related to the tweet content. This indicates the presence of “misdirection” and “smoke screening” (Abokhodair et al., 2015 pp. 839–851) strategies. More specifically, the hashtags correspond to the names of cities, states, and countries of the world, completely unrelated to the content of the tweet as well as the webpage pointed to by the short link.

6. Extremely precise repetitive patterns and correlations were observed, e.g., users with Arabic names did not provide location information and users with non-Arabic names provided locations in the Arab/Middle-East regions.
Figure 2. Three sub-networks with unusual structural characteristics in S1 are observed, Girvan-Newman clustering algorithm is applied to the network. On the left are the expanded clusters and on the right is the collapsed view of the clusters. Five clusters are identified.
Such an anomalous behaviour is characteristic of computer software, or a bot that can autonomously operate Twitter. Further analysis is conducted to investigate whether these bots are connected and if they are coordinating. To identify the relationships between these twitter users, we collected their friends and followers network. This resulted in 1,584 edges among the 588 unique Twitter users. The network is presented in figure 2.

By examining the visualized network we find out that this network has three sub-networks S1, S2, and S3. The sub-network S1 exhibits unusual structural characteristics so we zoom in on it. The other two sub-networks (the ‘dyadic’ S3 and the ‘chain-like’ S2 sub-networks) were ignored due to their relatively small size and lack of any anomalous behaviour. We applied the Girvan-Newman clustering algorithm (Girvan and Newman, 2002 pp. 7821–7826) to this network and we found out that the network has five clusters as shown in figure 2. By diving into the analysis of S1 we find out it has a star shaped and two clique-style groups of nodes. The centre of the star-shaped network belongs to a “real person” node, which is connected to 345 bots out of 588 twitter handles in this network. This person is the owner/operator of the specific webpage that all the other bots were referring to with different shortened links. Next, we un-collapse one group at a time and examine its group-level coordination network:

- Un-collapsing the “real person” network (figure 3a) reveals its star-shaped structure, where the “real person” is the central node. It also shows the connections to the other two-syndicate groups, viz., syndicate-1 and syndicate-2. Closely examining these ties reveals that the members of the syndicate follow the “real person” node and not the other way. We can thus conclude that the “real person” is the most central node of this entire bot network and is the one who feeds information to the bots.
• Un-collapsing the syndicate-1 network (figure 3b) reveals dense connections among its members and inter-group connections with the other groups, viz., the “real person” network and ‘syndicate-2’. Closer examination of the within group ties, reveals a mutually reciprocated relationship, suggesting the principles of ‘Follow Me and I Follow You’ (FMIFY) and ‘I Follow You, Follow Me’ (IFYFM) in practice - a well-known practice by Twitter spammers for link farming or quickly gaining followers (Ghosh et al., 2012 pp. 61–70) (Labatut et al., 2014 p. 8). Unlike the “real person” network, there is no single most central node in this network, indicating an absence of a hierarchical organization structure in the ‘syndicate-1’ network.

• Un-collapsing the syndicate-2 network (figure 3c) reveals dense connections among its members and inter-group connections with the other groups, viz., the “real person” network and ‘syndicate-1’. Closer examination of the within group ties, reveals a mutually reciprocated relationship, suggesting the principles of ‘Follow Me and I Follow You’ (FMIFY) and ‘I Follow You, Follow Me’ (IFYFM) in practice - a well-known practice by Twitter spammers for link farming or quickly gaining followers (Ghosh et al., 2012 pp. 61–70) (Labatut et al., 2014 p. 8). Unlike the “real person” network, there is no single most central node in this network, indicating an absence of a hierarchical organization structure in ‘syndicate-2’ network.
Figure 3. (a) Un-Collapsing “Real Person” Network. (b) Un-Collapsing Syndicate 1 Network. (c) Un-Collapsing Syndicate 2 Network.
Figure 4. The real person network is connected to the brokers who coordinate the dissemination of propaganda through the bots in their respective syndicates.
Further analysis showed that the broker nodes act as interfaces between the group members and other groups. The broker nodes of the two syndicates establish bridges that facilitate tweet exchange across the syndicates. Broker nodes are also primarily responsible in connecting with the ‘real person network’, specifically the ‘real person’ node (the most influential node). This indicates a highly sophisticated coordination in this bot network as can be seen in figure 4.

The analysis helps in answering our research questions stated earlier. More specifically:

**Research Question 1:** How is propaganda disseminated via networked media during conflicts or crises? What roles do bots play in such information manoeuvres?

**Discussion:** Propaganda is disseminated via social media sites especially Twitter and blog sites during crises for the aforementioned reasons. Botnets act as mass dissemination tools used by individuals or groups to spread their agenda and influence mass thinking or misinformation about specific events. These bots are getting more sophisticated and use many techniques such as “misdirection” or “smoke screening” to guarantee the wide visibility of their tweets contents.

**Research Question 2:** Can we develop a methodology to detect bot activities?

**Discussion:** Yes this can be done, and there are already some tools out there that can detect botnets with different accuracy, viz., Scraawl (https://www.scraawl.com). We are working toward this direction, in collaboration with the Scraawl team. We believe by studying as many crises as possible, behavioural patterns would start to emerge, which can then help build tools to understand
narratives and help shape counter-narratives during the time of crises.

**Research Question 3:** Is there an organizational structure to the bot activities? More specifically, who is responsible for feeding information (or rather misinformation) to these bots? What strategies do the bots use to further disseminate propaganda? And most importantly, are these bots working in collusion? Further, can we identify the positions or roles various bots assume in the networked media to effectively and efficiently coordinate the propaganda dissemination process?

**Discussion:** There is an organizational structure to the bot activities depicted in the Real Person Network of figure 4, especially the brokers and bridges. Usually a real person account or accounts, managed by a group of individuals, feed the propaganda to the bots then botnets take care of the rest of the job in spreading this propaganda. Bots use many strategies to spread the agenda they are assigned to disseminate such as smoke screening and misdirection. These bots are also working in collusion (working together) to disseminate the agenda. Roles and positions can also be identified such as: the real person node has a star shaped network in this case (figure 3a), brokers are the nodes that form communication or information bridges between the real person network and the botnets (can be seen in figure 4), then the botnets have a clique network (depicted in syndicate network 1 and 2, figure 3b and 3c respectively).

**Implications & Future work**

This study shows the strategic information manoeuvre used by groups to disseminate propaganda in and through network media, specifically Twitter. Such strategies and behaviours (misdirection and smoke screening) are worth studying as they lead to developing tools that can help understand propaganda
dissemination and shape counter-narratives enabling the authorities to take effective actions in cyber space or on the ground. Our future directions include working on developing social science and network science informed methodologies that can mine such behavioural patterns on network media. We are testing these methodologies on datasets collected during the propaganda dissemination (via tweets, blogs, etc.) containing videos, images, and other memes (e.g., hashtags, etc.) for beheading of hostages by the Islamic extremist terrorist groups, such as ISIL, including the beheading of Arab-Israeli ‘Spy’ in Syria, the beheading of Copts in Libya, and the beheading of Ethiopian Christians in Libya.

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RUSSIAN INFORMATION OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UKRAINIAN STATE AND DEFENCE FORCES: APRIL-DECEMBER 2014 IN ONLINE NEWS

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ABSTRACT. The aim of the current article is to provide analysis of information operations of the Russian Federation performed against the Ukrainian state and defence forces from 1 April until 31 December 2014. Russia uses ideological, historical, political symbols and narratives for justifying and supporting their military, economic and political campaigns not only in Donbass but in the whole of Ukraine. The article concentrates on the various means of meaning-making carried out by Russian information operations regarding the Ukrainian state and military structures.

Introduction

Researchers have recognised the importance of media in war situations, especially after the recent western wars (McQuail 2006), but the “honour” of being the first mediatised war is attributed to the Crimean War of 1853-1856 (Keller 2001, p.251). Thus it is befitting that we explore the procedures of modern hybrid war in Ukraine¹ that is characterised by the plurality of features of

¹ About the Ukraine crisis, see more Pabriks & Kudors 2015.
information operations and psychological operations, where the key role belongs to the media and Internet. Russia uses information as a tool to destabilise the situation not only on the front in the Donbass region, but in Ukraine as a whole.\(^2\) The main goal of Russian information campaigns in Ukraine appears to be spreading panic among Ukrainians and mistrust between the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian army, mistrust between the government and people, and to demoralise the Ukrainian soldiers and their commanders (Lebedeva 2015, Melnyk 2015).

While mediatising war can be dated back a while ago, scholars would argue that mediatisation as a process implies a longer lasting process where cultural and social institutions are changed as a consequence of media influence (Hjarvard 2008, p.114). Denis McQuail (2006) explains that increasing power and internationalisation of media institutions, the idea of access of reporters to war and the perception that war requires effective public communication can be seen as part of raising the importance of media in war situations. Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin (2010, p.5) see that war is transformed and reconstructed so that all aspects of war need consideration of media. This also means that war, critical exploration of war and conflict coverage have gained the attention of media scholars. Most attention, however, in media scholarship is paid to war as a spectacle from a relatively safe distance to observe (McQuail 2006). The process of mediatisation of war has several directions – on the one hand, media can be considered an important player in depicting war, but at the same time, fighting war means deploying media as an informational and psychological weapon. This paper focuses on the latter part and looks at how Russia uses its media outlets, linguistically available to most Ukrainians, to support military operations.

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\(^2\) See more on this topic – Sazonov, Müür, Mölder 2015.
In the 2014 conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea (see more Mölder, Sazonov & Värk 2014, p.2148-2161; Mölder, Sazonov & Värk 2015, p.1-28), Russian information operations were used at all levels starting with the political level (against the state of Ukraine, state structures, politicians) up to the military level. Many recent studies are focused on different topics related to Russian politics, hybrid warfare in Ukraine or Russian information warfare against the Ukrainian state generally (e.g. Berzinš 2014; Darczewska 2014, De Silva 2015, Galeotti 2014, Howard & Puhkov 2014, Pikulicka-Wilczewska & Sakwa 2015, Winnerstig 2014). The aim of the given article is to contribute to filling the gap regarding the representation of the Ukrainian state and military structures in the Russian media.

This paper analyses information operations of the Russian Federation performed against Ukraine from April until December 2014. It examines and systematises the representation of Ukraine, its authorities and armed forces during their anti-terrorist operation in Eastern Ukraine, with the aim to provide empirical evidence about the varied nature of Russian propaganda. The media analysis presented is based on content analysis, which examines three Russian news outlets – Komsomolskaya Pravda, Regnum and TV Zvezda.

Ukraine in Russia’s geopolitical and informational sphere of influence

Before defining the aspects of modern information warfare, it is essential to understand the underlying reasons for the outbreak of the current Ukrainian crisis. Russia’s painful reaction to the events in Ukraine unfolding with the EuroMaidan of December 2013 (Koshkina 2015, Mukharskiy 2015), is well explained by Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997, p.46) who already two decades ago described Ukraine as an “important space on the Eurasian chessboard”, the control
over which is a prerequisite for Russia “to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia”.

Ukraine’s independence in 1991 was a shock too hard to swallow for the patriotically-minded Russian political groups as it meant a major defeat for Moscow’s historical strategy, which attempts to exercise control over the geopolitical space around Russia's borders. The return of geopolitics has always been an important factor for Russia in performing its international politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to Brzezinski (1997, p.92), losing Ukraine decreases Russia’s possibilities to rule over the Black Sea region, where Crimea and Odessa have historically been important strategic clues to the Black Sea and even to the Mediterranean. Throughout history, Ukraine has always been an essential part of narratives related to Russian nation-building (e.g. Yekelchyk 2012). Ukraine holds a special place in Russian national myths as Kyiv has traditionally been regarded as the “mother of all Russian cities” – also brought out by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his 18 March 2014 address to the members of State Duma and Federation Council (President of Russia 2014). Therefore, Ukraine does not only play a pivotal role in Russian geopolitical strategic thinking but also holds a symbolic value hard to underestimate as the homeland of the Russian civilization (see e.g. Grushevskiy 1891, Gayda 2013).

After the fall of the pro-Russian President Yanukovich on 22 February 2014, the Kyiv government set on a more determined path towards integration with the West. In Moscow, the possibility of losing Ukraine from its geopolitical sphere of influence was seen as a catastrophic defeat (Brzezinski 1997, p.92), probably even more than the collapse of the Soviet imperial system in 1991. In order to prevent that from happening and to keep Ukraine, or at least part of the country, under its control, Russia occupied Crimea in March 2014 and destabilised the predominantly Russian-speaking Eastern Ukrainian regions (Mölder, Sazonov & Värk
Russia has not taken any initiative favouring international or regional crisis management, though it would have had good tools for mediating between the Ukrainian government, recognised by Russia, and unrecognised People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, had it wished so.

During the course of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the role of actual military interventions has remained low in comparison to different tools of asymmetric warfare (information warfare, economic measures, cyber war and psychological war on all levels) – often referred to as hybrid warfare. According to Andras Rácz (2015, p.88-89), in hybrid war, “the regular military force is used mainly as a deterrent and not as a tool of open aggression” in comparison to other types of war. However, hybrid war as such is not a new phenomenon, as its principles were also characteristic to Soviet military thinking. What was new in 2014, was the “highly effective, in many cases almost real-time coordination of the various means employed, including political, military, special operations and information measures” that caught both the Kyiv government and the West off the guard in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Rácz 2015, p.87). The current empirical research focuses on one part of the hybrid war – information warfare.

According to Ulrik Franke (2015, p.9), information warfare is about achieving goals, e.g. annexing another country, by replacing military force and bloodshed with cleverly crafted and credibly supported messages to win over the minds of the belligerents. However, for Russia, information warfare is not simply an accidental choice of instruments in a diverse toolbox of weapons. The new Russian military doctrine from December 2014 (Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2014) explicitly states that in the modern war, information superiority is essential to achieve victory on the physical battlefield. Or, as Army General Valery Gerasimov (2013, pp.2-3), Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia explains: “Information warfare
opens wide asymmetric possibilities for decreasing the fighting potential of an enemy”. Russian scholars Chekinov and Bogdanov (2011, p.6) use the term strategic information warfare, which forms a vital part of supporting different military and non-military measures (e.g. disrupting military and government leadership, misleading the enemy, forming desirable public opinions, organising anti-government activities) aimed at decreasing the determination of the opponent to resist. Starodubtsev, Bukharin and Semenov (2012, p.24) point out that it is already in peacetime when successful information war can result in decisions favouring the initiating party.

Compared with the 2008 war in Georgia, where Russian information operations were not so successful (see e.g. Niedermaier 2008), Russia has now paid more attention to the role of information in the high-tech world, strategic communications and modern warfare (Ginos 2010). In 2008, Russia misjudged the importance of information warfare and lost the war of narratives to the West. Georgia lost the war, but Russia was not able to exploit its military advantages, much more due to the disorganisation of the Russian troops than Georgia’s resistance (Gressel 2015). In 2014, the dramatically increased pressure by Russia’s information operations against Ukraine played a significant part in the hybrid warfare carried out on the territory of Eastern Ukraine, which confirms that Russia has made its lessons learned from the previous campaign (Berzinš 2014, De Silva 2015, Galeotti 2014, Howard & Puhkov 2014, Gressel 2015).

The extensive use of special operation forces that produce public discontent in the crisis area and manipulate public opinion can be clearly identified during the Ukrainian crisis. Russia stimulates a proxy war in Eastern Ukraine, where the local pro-Russian separatists have been used as military tools of Russia’s political goals. Russia offers them its extensive support, but this support is thoroughly calculated and tied to Russia's national interests. In
conducting its operations against Ukraine, Russia follows the guidelines of hybrid war or non-linear war. It appeared first in the article of Valeriy Gerasimov (Gerasimov 2013), which became known in the West as "Gerasimov doctrine" and which brought Russian military thinking closer to that of Sun Zi\(^3\) than to the Western understanding of conducting wars (see Sun Zi 1994).

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Russian information operations against Ukraine are not of new origin. Vitalii Moroz (2015), Head of New Media Department at Internews Ukraine, and Tetyana Lebedeva (2015), Honorary Head of the Independent Association of Broadcasters, point to the years 2003-2004, when Russian propagandists started to create the idea of dividing Ukraine into two or three parts. Moroz (2015) associates it with the events in Russia at the same time – oppression of the NTV news channel and the appearance of political technologists in the Russian media space. Some of these technologists were simultaneously hired by the team of Yanukovich to work against the Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko (Moroz 2015). According to Lebedeva (2015), Russian information activities started to creep in already during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma, but the impact of the “first Maidan” – the Orange Revolution of 2004 – made the Russian rulers uneasy to maintain their influence over Ukraine. Back then, the Russian information operations were not as massive, aggressive, influential and visible as they are now. Dmytro Kuleba (2015), Ambassador-at-Large at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, considers a more aggressive wave of Russian information campaigns to have started approximately one year before the annexation of Crimea, in 2013. The overtake-process indicates that this was a well-prepared action and Russia was militarily ready to conduct the operation in Crimea.

The Russian information operations in 2014 were carried out at all levels starting with the political level up to the military level.

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\(^3\) Sun Zi was a Chinese strategist, philosopher and general, lived 544-496 BC.
According to Jolanta Darczewska (2014, p.5), an unprecedentedly large-scale exploitation of Russian federal television and radio channels, newspapers and online resources was supported by diplomats, politicians, political analysts, experts, and representatives of the academic and cultural elites. After the occupation of Crimea and the Donbass region, Ukrainian TV channels became prohibited there so that it was possible to watch mainly Russian and local separatists’ channels funded by Russia (Moroz 2015). New propaganda-oriented channels were also founded that started as online news portals, but which by now have become influential TV channels, such as LifeNews (Moroz 2015). Despite partial censorship of Ukrainian online news portals in Donbass, the population still has access to Ukrainian sites (Moroz 2015).

In these circumstances, the image of the Ukrainian army, as put forward by the Russian information operations, portrays them as murderers, criminals and Nazi perpetrators. These images are created methodically, using a very aggressive and emotional rhetoric (Kuleba 2015).

**Methodology**

To find answers to the questions on how Russia uses the media as part of information warfare, integrated content analysis was used. Content analysis is both qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative benefits of content analysis allowed for systematising the meaning-making regarding the different target groups – the Ukrainian government, army and its leadership. After that, the quantitative aspect of the analysis provided statistical output to depict various trends in using different keywords and narratives. Although content analysis is “reliable (reproducible) and not unique to the investigator” (McQuail 2010, p.362), the results still depend on the coding manual, the creation of which includes an inevitable aspect of subjectivity on behalf of the researchers. Nevertheless, it still
enables to provide structure to the various elements exploited by Russia in its propaganda.

The empirical material was gathered from three Russian news outlets – Komsomolskaya Pravda, Regnum, TV Zvezda – during the research period from 1 April until 31 December 2014. The period after the annexation of Crimea by Russia was chosen because it includes the intensification of Russian-backed military activities in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics against the Ukrainian civil authorities and Defence Forces in Eastern Ukraine.

Although not representative of the entire media landscape of Russia, these three outlets were of interest to us due to various aspects. Komsomolskaya Pravda is one of the most widely circulated newspapers, which is targeted not only at the Russian audience but also has many readers in Ukraine (especially in Eastern Ukraine), Moldova, Belarus, and in other countries with large Russian diasporas, including the Baltic States. Historically, during Soviet times, the ranks of “journalists” working for Komsomolskaya Pravda were often filled with officials from the intelligence services and KGB. Even in the 1990s, Komsomolskaya Pravda had about a dozen foreign correspondents out of whom only one was not related to the intelligence services (Earley 2009, p. 244). Regnum represents an information agency, which focuses on events in the post-Soviet space or the so-called "near abroad" (Regnum 2015). Vigen Akopyan, the former editor-in-chief of Regnum, declared that the agency would oppose Russian investments in any country whose politics are hostile to Russia or which is supporting the rehabilitation of fascism (Baltija.eu 2012). Regnum is also connected to the Russian government. For example, Modest Kolerov, the co-founder and present editor-in-chief of Regnum worked in the administration of the Russian President (2005-2007) and is one of the most prominent political technologists in Russia (Obshchaya Gazeta 2015). TV Zvezda (our analysis concentrated only on the
online news part of the channel) is owned by the Russian Ministry of Defence and is therefore of interest to us in terms of reporting the military aspects of the crisis.

The coding manual was developed based on qualitative analysis and expert discussions with the attempt to investigate the variety of themes and tools of information warfare. We focused on historical narratives and the use of them in the modern context as the preliminary qualitative analysis indicated that Russia often tries to undermine the historical nation-building process with re-utilising important narratives as part of the propaganda.

Our coding manual first scrutinised the main topics of the articles. Secondly, we examined what kind of attitudes (if applicable) the articles conveyed about the Ukrainian defence forces, the army leadership and the Kyiv government. By doing this, we intended to investigate how negative propaganda is used as a tool in information warfare. The target groups were scrutinised against the appearance of the following keywords or themes:

- parallels with Third Reich – fascists, Nazis, neo-Nazis, Bandera etc.\(^4\)
- humiliating and belittling the Ukrainian soldiers – criminals, rapists, drug addicts, cowards, violence and chaos in the army etc.\(^5\)
  - execution squads, punitive units (karateli)\(^6\)
  - genocide, fratricide, terrorists\(^7\)
- Kyiv junta and its followers\(^8\)

\(^4\) e.g. “Chairman of the Ivano-Frankivsk oblast council Vasiliy Skripnichuk suggested following the example of Hitler in road constructions in the region” (Regnum 2014)

\(^5\) e.g. “Nazis-perverts of the Ukrainian subunit “Tornado” established 360-degree defence positions” (Boyko 2014)

\(^6\) e.g. “Siloviki started a punitive operation in south-eastern Ukraine under the command of Kyiv more than a month ago” (Zvezda 2014a)

\(^7\) e.g. “Ukrainian siloviki shot wounded people in the hospital” (Zvezda 2014b)

\(^8\) e.g. “Troops of the junta started preparations for an offensive on Lubansk” (Demchenko 2014)
• Russophobia – discrimination, nationalism, xenophobia\textsuperscript{9}
• Ukrainians as “false Russians”, little brothers, failed state\textsuperscript{10}
• Ukraine as the West’s puppets\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to these negative images, other possibilities were also included in the coding manual. For example, the texts could also be conveying a positive image of Ukraine, either by the author himself saying something supportive towards Ukraine or referring to someone doing that, e.g. “We believe that the Ukrainian government is acting in accordance to the laws in their country” – she [Jennifer Psaki] noted at the briefing in the White House” (Zvezda 2014d). If not positive, the articles could have also taken a justifying stance - not being directly supportive of the Ukrainian army or the government but nevertheless giving an explanation or excuse, e.g. “He fought not for long – he was wounded and captured. And only there he realized what the siloviki had turned the towns in south-eastern Ukraine into” (Zvezda 2014e). An important category was that of neutrally presented articles which simply stated events or facts (whether true or not), but without explicit judgements – e.g. “This night the military leadership of Kyiv, DPR and LPR met for the first time” (Zvezda 2014f). If the article had a negative tonality, which did not fall under any of the above-mentioned negative categories, it was coded as “other negative”. For example, “Because the mind refused to believe that people in normal condition could so cynically taunt the corpses of their compatriots” (Grishin 2014a). The analysis did not include and aim at examining the share of true and fake stories.

\textsuperscript{9} e.g. “The core of the Bandera movement is not to glorify Bandera. Its essence is to kill Russians.” (Danilov 2014)
\textsuperscript{10} e.g. “Russian with an Ukrainian – twin-brothers” (Skoybeda 2014)
\textsuperscript{11} e.g. “According to the minister [Lavrov], the conflict in Ukraine is a direct consequence of the short-sighted and prevocational politics of the alliance of Western countries led by the US” (Zvezda 2014c)
The results are divided into four phases according to different stages in the military events on the ground:

I – Provoking the military conflict – April 2014  
II – Escalation of the military conflict – May-June 2014  
III – Direct intervention in the military conflict, changing the situation – July-September 2014  
IV – Stirring up the military conflict – September-December 2014

Altogether, the data sample comprised of 418 articles, the breakdown of which according to the phases and outlets is shown in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Komsomolskaya Pravda</th>
<th>Regnum</th>
<th>TV Zvezda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase IV</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Breakdown of the data sample according to phases of the military conflict in Ukraine (2014).
In order to cover the research period of 1 April – 31 December 2014, each week was examined as shown in Table 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Mon</th>
<th>Tue</th>
<th>Wed</th>
<th>Thu</th>
<th>Fri</th>
<th>Sat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regnum</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komsomolskaya Pravda</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Zvezda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Principles of data sampling.

From each day two relevant news stories – the first and the last – were analysed by using the coding manual. Only online news from each news channel was used.

The final coding was done by three people, using GoogleForms in a survey mode where each of the three coders filled out a “coding survey” for each article in the sample. Later, spreadsheet tools were used for data analysis. Formal intra-coder validation was not used, with several seminars and discussions including joint coding sessions being used instead.

**Results of media analysis**

The analysis of the three online news channels under investigation – *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Regnum* and *TV Zvezda* – brought out a range of approaches how Russian information campaigns construct a predominantly negative image of Ukraine. Although the three channels under scrutiny are not representative of the entire spectrum of Russian media, the study revealed how the anti-Ukrainian approach can take different forms and relies on various nuances. By using different channels with different approaches,
Russia’s information warfare manages to cater for different audiences with different tastes and needs for media consumption.

**Comparative overview of news channels**

Different target groups – Ukrainian soldiers, army leadership and the government – received the most judgemental treatment by *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. For example, 86% of the articles in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* conveyed a negative attitude towards the Ukrainian army, while the same figures for *Regnum* and *TV Zvezda* were 23% and 43% respectively. The Ukrainian government was approached in a critical way in 62% of the articles in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 43% in *Regnum* and 31% in *TV Zvezda*. The Ukrainian army leadership got significantly less attention than the army as a whole or the government. While 44% of the articles in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* criticised the command authorities of the army, then only 14% and 6% of the articles did the same in *Regnum* and *TV Zvezda* respectively. Therefore, when reporting the Ukraine crisis, the focus was mostly on the army as a whole and from the leadership point of view it was the government not the military command authorities that received the most attention.

Out of those articles that dealt with any of the three target groups (leaving aside the articles that did not touch upon these topics), the share of neutrally presented non-judgemental articles was considerably higher in *Regnum* and *TV Zvezda* than in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (see Figure 1).
**Figure 1.** Share of non-judgemental articles.

*percentage of articles regarding the specific target group, not the entire data sample

*Regnum* and *TV Zvezda* relied more on simply presenting events in a neutral style (whether or not these facts were actually true) that did not draw explicit conclusions and were, therefore, more reserved – for example, “The Ukrainian security services detained 15 people during the course of a large-scale special operation in the Luhansk oblast” (*Zvezda* 2014g). On average, almost two-thirds of the articles in *Regnum* (59%) and more than one-third (38%) in *TV Zvezda* did not include explicit judgements, while the same figure was only 12% for *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. Regarding its treatment of the Ukrainian army leadership, *TV Zvezda* was percentage-wise more similar to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* but this is explained by the overall significantly lower level of importance of this topic in *TV Zvezda*. It was only 10% of the articles in *TV Zvezda* that referred to the command authorities of the Ukrainian army, while the same figure was 54% for *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and 55% for *Regnum*. Thus, this topic was, in fact, largely missing in *TV Zvezda*. The share of positive or justifying references to any of the three target groups was marginal and therefore negligible.
The different nature of the outlets’ treatment of the Ukraine crisis can also be explained by the different genres used. TV Zvezda and Regnum focused on newsworthiness of different events and fast facts (whether or not these were actually true). Virtually all articles in TV Zvezda were news stories (140 out of 142). Regnum had adopted an interesting approach by relying mostly on two genres: news and statements. The latter mostly took the form of quoting statements, speeches etc. of different politicians, officials and institutions; thus attempting to gain additional credibility by relying on external authority of prominent figures. The share of opinion pieces in Regnum was less than 5% and non-existent in TV Zvezda. Komsomolskaya Pravda, on the other hand, used the greatest variety of different journalistic genres. While about 40% of the articles were news stories and 23% were statements, the rest divided relatively equally between opinion pieces, interviews and reportages, thus allowing for a greater extent of offering their readers the “full package” of events, facts and explicit judgements.

Although the present analysis did not go in-depth with textual and discourse analysis, differences in stylistic means also folded out when conveying, for example, critical attitudes. It was Komsomolskaya Pravda that relied more on emotional and even aggressive rhetoric when describing the crisis and its counterparts. For example, the title of an article dealing with Ukrainian army states that the “Nazis-perverts of the Ukrainian subunit ‘Tornado’ established 360-degree defence positions” (Boyko 2014).
"Poroshenko is checking the military preparedness of troops in the zone of special operations". (Source: TV Zvezda).

However, when it comes to portraying different groups of adversaries – Ukraine, its military and government institutions – attention must be paid to the subtler ways that, for example, TV Zvezda has adopted to convey its anti-Ukrainian approach. The stories that simply describe events but do not carry explicit judgements (50% of the stories in TV Zvezda regarding the Ukrainian government and almost 40% of those regarding the Ukrainian army) seemingly leave it to the readers to independently draw conclusions. Each news story taken separately seems, at first glance, to follow the technical logic of solid journalistic production – referring to sources, devoid of extravagant display of emotions,
reserved in its choice of linguistic means. Nevertheless, when looked upon as a whole, the anti-Ukrainian stance becomes apparent as *TV Zvezda* does have its ways of “helping” the reader to reach that viewpoint. One of the ways for that is, for example, the choice of photos. For instance, a news story that states in its title that Poroshenko is checking the readiness of the troops in the zones of special operations (*Zvezda* 2014i) has Poroshenko on a photo holding a pair of rubber boots in his hands (see Picture 1). As a result, the article can easily succeed in giving a discrediting impression of Ukraine – whether targeted specifically at the military supplies of the army, the ability of Poroshenko or the Ukrainian government to provide that to the troops, or contributing generally to the overall negative tonality.

*Main topics of the articles*

In our research, we focused on different military aspects of the crisis. Figures 2-4 show the distribution of the main topics across the three outlets. In all cases, the list of main topics of the articles is dominated by different war-related events – combat activities, violence and terrorism. However, differences in accentuation fold out.
Figure 2. Main topics of the articles in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. 
Figure 3. Main topics of the articles in Regnum.
Figure 4. Main topics of the articles in *TV Zvezda.*
The prevalence of different counterparts of the conflict on the ground – Ukrainian and separatist armed forces, as well as prisoners of war (POWs) – is evident to a smaller extent. Nevertheless, in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (see Figure 2) and *TV Zvezda* (see Figure 4), the Ukrainian armed forces are still the third most frequent main topic. These two outlets pay considerably less attention to the separatist armed forces. In *Regnum* (see Figure 3), on the other hand, the armed forces, whether Ukrainian or separatist, figure to equally little extent.

Out of the three outlets it is *Regnum* that focuses the most on the political aspects of the conflict by including stories that deal with the Ukrainian government, the West’s interference in Ukraine, and Russia as the main topics. These main topics are also present in *TV Zvezda* but to a lesser extent. Interestingly, they are virtually non-existent in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*.

Importantly, topics related to separatists – the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR/LPR), so-called Novorossiya, and Crimea – are present to only a very small degree as main topics across all three outlets. This shows that while reporting the military aspects of the crisis, even if the articles deal with Eastern Ukraine, the main focus was rather on specific events (battles, shootings, violence etc.) than on broader questions regarding the separatist entities.

All in all, it is *Komsomolskaya Pravda* that stands out with the narrowest range of main topics, concentrating largely on the events on the ground, leaving the political level of the crisis in the background. *Regnum* and *TV Zvezda* have a more even distribution of main topics.

When it comes to the breakdown of main topics across the four phases of the conflict, then the first phase (April 2014 – provoking the military conflict) stands out with *Komsomolskaya Pravda* dealing only with topics related to combat activities and separatist armed
forces. During phases II and III, the relative share of topics related to combat activities and terrorism is the highest across all outlets, which expectedly coincides with the most acute phases of the military conflict. In *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, the combined share of both of these topics was about 75% for both phases, in *Regnum* the same figure was about 40%. In *TV Zvezda*, it was 70% for Phase II and 40% for Phase III when other main topics started to enter the scene, such as the Ukrainian government, Russia and the so-called humanitarian convoys. The variety of main topics is the greatest in phase IV. This illustrates how the Russian information campaigns against Ukraine have become broader in their scope.

**Ukrainian armed forces and their command authorities**

Throughout the period under scrutiny, it is phase I (April – provoking the military conflict) that stands out from the rest when portraying the Ukrainian armed forces (see Figure 5). This is evident by the highest share of non-judgemental articles (*Komsomolskaya Pravda, Regnum* – 60% and 55% of the stories respectively) and the lowest share of articles mentioning the Ukrainian armed forces (*TV Zvezda* – 40% of the articles) in comparison to the later phases. After April, during phases II-IV, the share of articles critical towards the Ukrainian armed forces is always at least half of the data sample. There are virtually no articles presenting anyone’s positive or justifying viewpoints of the army.
Out of all the different negative approaches that the articles convey towards the Ukrainian army, the overall picture of different narratives also becomes more diverse during phases I-IV across all outlets (see Figure 6). Therefore, the Russian information campaigns intensified only during phase II, together with the escalation of the actual military conflict. The most frequent narratives used associate the Ukrainian army with violence (including terrorism) and label them as execution squads (karateli). Karateli is the most frequent association with the Nazis and their crimes. More explicit associations with the Nazis, such as parallels with the Kyiv junta and fascists, are always present to a lower level. The share of articles arguing for Russophobia stays the lowest throughout all the four phases.
When it comes to portraying the Ukrainian armed forces, it is also *Komsomolskaya Pravda* that offers the most colourful and explicitly negative approach. A great deal of articles concentrates on executions, killings and torturing of civilians, including Russian-speaking people, by Ukrainian forces. For example, an article describes how “One of the videos, published by militia, shows fresh burials. Bodies have not been buried in the ground but simply scattered. Everyone’s hands have been tied behind their backs. Judging upon the wounds in the heads, they had just been put on their knees and shot” (Kots 2014). More than 10% of the data sample in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* portrayed the Ukrainian armed forces as fascists or Nazis. Moreover, about 40% of the articles in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* show the Ukrainian soldiers as *karateli* who also kill and rape people, among them women and children. For example, an article states that “Bodies of brutally murdered women were found in the camp of karateli near Donetsk” (Ovchinnikov
Humiliation and belittling of the Ukrainian soldiers is also common (12% of the articles) – authors of *Komsomolskaya Pravda* often portray the army and its volunteers as criminals, rapists, drug addicts, alcoholics, robbers and cowards, who taunt and torture children, women and old people. Ukrainian armed forces are shown as revolting due to miserable conditions in the army and not wanting to shoot civilians. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* claims that the “Moral condition of the Ukrainian army makes us worry more and more. But the moral condition of the authorities of the army is a laughter through tears” (*Komsomolskaya Pravda* 2014).

As opposed to the overwhelming approach of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, the Russian information operations can also take a more reserved approach to portray the Ukrainian army. For example, the style used by *Regnum* and *TV Zvezda* was more restrained by putting emphasis on facts (whether true or not) and not playing directly on emotions. There were no colourful metaphors for labelling the Ukrainian armed forces – *siloviki* (“persons of force”, representatives of the security or military services) was probably most frequently used strongest negative label for indicating the Ukrainian fighters in the Eastern Ukraine. For example, “Ukrainian siloviki are carrying out a special operation in Mariupol against supporters of the federalisation of Ukraine” (*Zvezda* 2014h). Despite the Russian information campaigns often relying on drawing parallels between Ukraine and Nazi Germany, the respective associations were largely missing in *Regnum* and *TV Zvezda*, whether in the form of referring to past events or describing the Ukrainian government, army or its leadership. Although the term *karateli* was sometimes used, it remained rather low-profile in terms of frequency. While in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* about 40% of the articles referred to the Ukrainian soldiers as *karateli*, the respective term was used only in 7% of the articles in *TV Zvezda* and only in one article in *Regnum*.

*TV Zvezda*, compared to *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, also relies on subtler ways of constructing a negative image of the Ukrainian army. For
example, when reporting a brutal crime against innocent people, the article then casually mentions that a Ukrainian army base happens to be located in the same town (Zvezda 2014j; see Picture 2). Technically the article does not accuse anyone but it does require an effort of critical thinking on behalf of the readers not to associate these two separate statements with each other, which might not become the case.
Picture 2. “Bodies of 286 women found near Krasnoarmeysk”.¹ (Source: TV Zvezda)

¹ The main body of the article says: “Bodies of 286 women were recently found in a district of the Krasnoarmeysk town in the Donetsk oblast. This was reported by RIA Novosti with reference to
As for the command authorities of the Ukrainian armed forces (see Figure 7), the articles focus on them to a considerably lower extent than to the armed forces in general. All throughout the four phases, the share of articles that does not mention the army leadership is always the highest. While during phases I and II, the share of non-judgemental articles was slightly higher than those conveying a negative approach, then during phases III and IV it is the other way round. The share of articles presenting positive or justifying opinions is, similarly to the armed forces, practically non-existent. Overall, the Russian information operations tend to take a more lukewarm stance on the military leaders.

The Prime Minister of the self-proclaimed People's Republic of Donetsk Alexander Zakharchenko. Altogether, 400 people aged 18 to 25 have been reported missing on the territory of DPR. “Nearly 400 women aged 18 to 25 years went missing in Krasnoarmeysk, where the battalion “Dnepr-1” is quartered. 286 bodies of women were found around Krasnoarmeysk raped”, - the agency quotes Zakharchenko.” (Zvezda 2014j)
Figure 7. Tonality towards the command authorities of the Ukrainian armed forces in the articles throughout Phases I-IV.

When comparing the different negative attitudes, then no drastic dynamics emerge (see Figure 8). The share of various other unspecified negative attitudes is the highest. Association with violence is very low in phase I but becomes the second most frequent criticism by phase IV. In comparison to the negative attitudes towards the entire army, then the associations with Nazis – fascists and junta – have a higher share (despite the absolute number of articles being considerably lower). The stance on the Ukrainian army leadership also depends on the outlet. TV Zvezda, despite presenting a varied selection of narratives, nevertheless mentions the Ukraine army leadership significantly less than Regnum and Komsomolskaya Pravda. When comparing the latter two, then
Regnum is mostly non-judgemental, while Komsomolskaya Pravda offers a variety of negative approaches.

![Criticism towards command authorities of the Ukrainian armed forces](image)

**Figure 8.** Critical approaches towards the command authorities of the Ukrainian armed forces throughout Phases I-IV.

**Ukrainian government**

When it comes to tonality towards the Ukrainian government (see Figure 9), it is always dominated by negative attitudes, except for in phase II when the negative stance on the government figures less in the articles. Similarly to the Ukrainian army and its leadership, there are hardly any positive or justifying references.
As for the negative stance towards the Ukrainian government (see Figure 10), then similarly to that towards the army and its leadership, the list is dominated by associations with violence. In absolute terms the government gets associated with violence the most all throughout the phases. However, in relative terms its share decreases as the usage of other narratives increases. Similarly to the army, different outlets also target the government differently. This also becomes evident when comparing the first phase with the later ones. While TV Zvezda remained relatively modest about the Ukrainian armed forces in April when compared to the other outlets, then it is in April when TV Zvezda associates the government the most with violence. TV Zvezda argues less for acts of violence during the later phases while Komsomolskaya Pravda, on the other hand, increases the usage of this narrative.

Figure 9. Tonality towards the Ukrainian government in the articles throughout Phases I-IV.
Overall, the usage of other different negative narratives increases during the second half of 2014 (phases III and IV). Interestingly, while the Ukrainian army leadership was quite visibly associated with following the Kyiv junta, then the level of labelling the government itself as junta, except for the rise in phase II, remains rather low-profile. On the contrary, it is the government that gets associated with Russophobia more than the army and its leadership, and the usage of this narrative also increases with time. The share of portraying the Ukrainian state and people as “false Russians” remains the lowest all throughout the four phases.

Similarly to other categories, the Russian information campaigns against the government take different forms in different outlets. The selection of narratives used by Komsomolskaya Pravda widens with time, while Regnum and TV Zvezda display more fluctuation. While all three outlets argue the most for violence on behalf of the
government, then *Komsomolskaya Pravda* often tied that with violence against the Russian-speaking people, e.g. that Ukrainian state policy is genocide. For that reason, Investigations Committee of the Russian Federation started a criminal case against Ukrainian armed forces, which killed more than 2,500 civilians (Grishin 2014b). Another article stated among other negative descriptions that “Ukrainian TV channel Hromadske TV announced the planned killing of at least 1.5 million of Novorossiyans” (Resnes 2014).

*Regnum* turns to Ukrainian and Western analysts that have critical views against the Ukrainian authorities or experts from other CIS countries that may produce opinions favourable for Russia. However, in its opinion-building *Regnum* usually avoids direct disparagement of opponents. Indirect belittling can be found, which makes the Ukrainian authorities responsible for the violence and human catastrophe in Eastern Ukraine and describes the Ukrainian crisis as a battlefield between Western and Russian civilization, where the Ukrainian authorities are the puppets of the West. At the same time, *Regnum* avoids calling the Ukrainian authorities and armed forces fascists, criminals or using other extreme expressions to describe them. While in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* there are altogether 30 articles (almost a quarter) that refer to the Ukrainian government as fascists or junta, the respective figures for *Regnum* and *TV Zvezda* are only 7 and 3 articles, thus marginal.

**Conclusion**

The analysis of Russian media confirms that media plays an important role in the management of conflict in Ukraine. Russia uses the influence and accessibility of Russian media outlets to undermine Ukrainian efforts with a variety of approaches that have intensified over time. The research showed that while the Russian information operations remained more modest during the initial phase of the military conflict, together with the escalation of
military activities, the information campaigns also reached a more intense level. Russian behaviour during the crisis has always been rational and calculated – there is no "mysterious Russia", which acts in an untold manner. While the Georgian campaign of 2008 focused principally on the demonstration of Russia's military power, then information warfare is besides the military activities a clue term for the current Ukrainian crisis and the military activities often just support the main battles conducted through media channels. There is much evidence that Russia tests its new military strategy, in which different non-military actions, popularly called hybrid wars or non-linear wars, are often used for achieving military goals.

The current study focused on outlets that represent the Russian mainstream media – Komsomolskaya Pravda, Regnum and TV Zvezda. Komsomolskaya Pravda tends to be more aggressive against Ukraine as the majority of news, statements, reportages, and interviews are given with a strong judgement. Regnum, contrariwise, usually puts emphasis on facts and avoids provoking emotions. This can be explained by its specific role as an information agency, while newspapers are more oriented to opinion pieces. The majority of news is given without judgement, but at the same time it does not provide any criticism towards the Russian government. Similarly to Regnum, TV Zvezda is rather restrained in terms of portraying the crisis and its counterparts. In building negative images, TV Zvezda targets mostly the Ukrainian armed forces and the government.

The Russian information operations have as many faces as Russia has different media channels. These mass media channels are generally critical against the Ukrainian government and armed forces, and tend to support the political goals of the Russian authorities. In their information building, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Regnum and TV Zvezda often refer to soft propaganda mechanisms and methods. Following Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2010, p.19), we are entering the second phase of the mediatisation of war and more
research is needed on how war and media mutually shape each other.

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USAGE OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (SNA) IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT. Social systems are complex structures that consist of different sub-systems. Therefore, understanding social systems is more difficult than comprehending electronic or mechanical systems. What makes social systems more complex than other systems is that society is not simply the sum of each individual in the society. In the current global system, the countries, which have become small villages, try to meet national security needs by converting the unknown to known and identifying the correlation among political, military, social and economic events. The current crisis management concepts are conducted through systematic approaches. Besides, the management of social, economic and political crises need to be conducted in a holistic approach covering all sub-systems. At this point, the function of Social Network Analysis (SNA) emerges. SNA, which forms the main subject of this paper, is a tool for examining the structure of a crisis through correlating the sub-elements. The aim of this study is to show how SNA can be used in crisis management. First, SNA is performed on a generic crisis situation and the results are presented. Then, the additional critical data requirements are put forward to manage the crisis effectively.
Introduction

Hosting different systems of social systems makes them to possess a complex structure. Thus it is harder to understand social systems than electronic and mechanical systems. With a simple glance, what makes them more complicated is that society is not only the sum of individuals. It could be paraphrased by a well-known slogan “The whole is only the sum of the constituent parts.” (Abacı, 2013, p. 35). Today more closely connected global networks revealed highly dependent systems which are hard to understand.

Networks are methods revealing complex systems, which emerge by the interaction of the components, visually. Linearity is very rare in their nature. Understanding and expressing the structure of the non-linear necessitate the drawing of complex networks, classification, analysis and interpretation (İpekçi, 2011, p. 23). A network consists of nodes and links connections. To mention a network, at least two nodes should be connected. The majority of the nodes in the network is an indication of major networks.

Social network theory identifies the interrelations of the units ranging from person to organizations. It is a theory that focuses on the way of configuring the flow of information in order to produce information for an individual or group. According to this theory the relation between individuals creates social networks (Arslan, Yanık, 2015, p. 69).

Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a frequently used method in sociology, anthropology, social psychology, biology, geography, communications, information, business and in many areas such as economy. SNA facilitates to determine the important information that could be missed. It reveals the balance of power in crisis management. It shows the subgroups. It finds the elements that will change the network greatly when removed and it pursues the improvement of the change of the network with time.
The Relation of Crisis Management and SNA

Crisis is defined in Merriam-Webster as the turning point for better or worse in an acute disease or fever; a paroxysmal attack of pain, distress, or disordered function; an emotionally significant event or radical change of status in a person's life; the decisive moment; an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending; especially: one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome; a situation that has reached a critical phase (see: the Merriam-Webster İnternet Site).

According to JP 3-0 Joint Operations, crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.(JP 3-0, 2011, GL-8).

Crisis does not have a common definition shared by everyone. The variety of crisis, levels, strategies and the way of management differs according to the interests of countries, or organizations. While the USA, EU and NATO call the crisis management process “crisis management”, the UK calls it Emergency Management. The OSCE uses Conflict Prevention and Termination. Turkey uses Emergency and Disaster Management. (Arpat, R. Sait, 2016, p. 5)

Contemporary crises are emergency situations that cannot be determined at first, in which relations of cause-result cannot be set properly, and implications that cannot be determined. The crises can be managed better by some analysing tools in case of difficulty to estimate the size of expected damage.

SNA can be applied in crisis management:

- To determine limits of crisis,
- To determine hazards regarding crisis,
• To provide flexibility to decide during crisis,
• To determine crisis dynamic structure and interconnected factors,
• To eradicate equivocality related with crisis,
• To determine end states.

SNA can be used in the context of system approach to understand the complex systems as crisis. It opens new perspectives to understand complex systems as market, economical systems social systems, crime and terrorist networks. To analyse the crisis with SNA, detecting the dynamics and the structure with a holistic view is necessitated (Goztepe, Kerim, 2015, p. 57). By this way the points that are affected by the crisis can be detected.

There are some different processes in crisis management. Crisis management consists of six phases shown in the result of the literature review (Arpat, R. Sait, 2016, p. 180).

a. Preparation, determination and pursuit possible or current crises;
b. Assessment;
c. Development of response options;
d. Planning;
e. Execution;
f. Termination of the crisis and transaction phase.

Social network analysis is a tool that can be used at the first three phases of the crisis management process. At the first phase the crisis network must be improved to generate situational awareness after gathering information regarding the crisis through PMESII systems. In this context the relations of the PMESII units should be put forward clearly. In this way the measures against crisis could be detected realistically.
At the second phase data is assessed and information is determined. The second phase (assessment) is the process in which how the crisis proliferates is examined, what its action of process development is and how its context is composed. A reaction to a crisis that has a diameter of effect and structure that is not known may not bring positive results. That timeline is the period in which the bases of reaction to the crisis have begun to be formed and the response road map is set.

At the third phase is the decision about using the SNA and hard/soft power. In this context the options are analysed with SNA. To determine the strategies for managing the crisis is the most critical issue for the decision-makers. It should not be forgotten in crisis management that a reaction to a crisis can affect the other factors. In this case, an action which is not implemented by a determined strategy can give rise to bigger and more serious crises. As a result of it, one can make the crisis bigger while the main aim is to end the crisis. That situation carries enormous risks. An operational fault performed in this phase can result in the loss of lives. Ultimately it may put the crisis management in a difficult situation.

Understanding of the effects of a crisis to the systems and their interaction with each other determines the effects of actions to the crisis. Understanding PMESII systems makes it easy to cooperate with other organizations.

**SNA Terms**

To comment on the results of the SNA some terms should be known. In addition to the variety of terms of SNA, some terms required to comment on the crisis network are shown in the following.

The effect of a network is assessed according to the intensity and distance of the network. Intensity of a network examines the quality of connection by comparing the available connection
number and probable connection number. Distance measures the number of “scheme”. Measuring the distance of a network helps to understand how knowledge transmits in a network. Distance impedes the proportion of knowledge due to lessening the probability of successful interaction.

Centrality is a criteria related with any node in the network. In a crisis network, the elements in the centre are more influential than the non-centric and have more effect in crisis solution. Centrality generally can be measured in three terms as “degree”, “closeness” and “betweenness”.

A unit’s degree centrality shows the number of connections the unit has. Closeness centrality is a unit’s direct or indirect closeness to another unit and it reflects connection. Betweenness centrality is the degree of unit’s position among the other units, which do not have any connection with each other. High betweenness centrality shows its importance about being a bridge between the other. (Gürsakal, 2009, pp. 92-94).

**Methodology**

A network consists of interconnected nodes and links in SNA. Nodes represent concrete elements, which can be affected by crisis or have direct impact on crisis. Links are functional relations between these elements. Links establish the connection between the nodes to work collaboratively as a system. Both nodes and links are symbolic representations simplifying the complexity of the real world. They are also very useful in determining the centre of gravity and the factors that they influence upon.

A crisis network has been developed through determining all-important elements of PMESII system and sub-systems in a good example of crisis management. Understanding the interactions and relationships of systems with each other over time reveals how crises affect other systems. SNA can be used in order to reveal the
relationship between elements of national power and the connection of elements with each other in crisis management.

Identifying the all nodes and links during the creation of the crisis network is a difficult process. Besides, all the identified nodes and links may not be related to the current crisis (Karaman, Çatalkaya, 2015, p. 4). Defining nodes and links correctly in an exact time improves the effectiveness of the crisis response strategy and reduces the response time.

Detection of more nodes will increase the benefits to be derived from crisis network. Different methods can be conducted in detection. This article has utilized PMESII sub-elements for the detection of nodes. Alternative methods may include (JDP 5-00 Joint Doctrine Publication, July 2013):

- **PESTL** – Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal.
- **STEEPLEM** – Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, Political, Legal, Ethical, Military.
- **ASCOPE** – Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organization, People, Events.

The sample shows a crisis network and the nodes in the network which was detected by using PMESII method:

- **Political Points**: Advisers, governors, mayors, courts.
- **Military Points**: Leaders of different levels, plans and orders, air defence systems, critical land, and ammunition depots.
- **Economic Points**: Banks, companies, trade unions, markets, ports, smugglers.
- **Social Points**: Ethnic groups, tribes, clans, religious groups, unions, associations, cultural centres, health centres.
• Infrastructure Points: Nuclear power plants, hydroelectric plants, dams, oil and gas pipelines, railways, air and sea ports, related factories, hospitals.

• Information Points: Plans and orders, newspapers, ministry of information, press and media, intelligence agencies, information technology centres, websites, etc.

Nodes and links have both horizontal and vertical directions. Nodes and links to be focused upon are determined in accordance the severity and type of crisis. In this case, the crisis network can consist of only a few nodes or may include much greater number of nodes.

Links are the relations between the dots. The graphical representation of dot-link relationship demonstrates some important dots that should be influenced. The number of the links of the dot with other dots displays the importance of that point.

Network Analysis shows the relationship between the factors and actors in a chart. These links or relations are a part of the group. They can represent different forms of interaction that include role-based, interactive and effective relationships. Dots are represented by circles and the colours show a particular system. The size of the dots varies according to their importance. Connections are indicated by lines.

**PMESII Interaction Network**

The interaction network that shows the interaction of the sample PMESII elements is shown in Figure-1. In this figure every element’s primary related element and the possible element that it can affect in an emergency is shown related with each other. In Figure-1 the interaction of the 93 PMESII elements in the PMESII interaction network is shown. There are 391 links in the network. The work can determine more PMESII elements through the time and location.
Figure 1. PMESII Interaction Network.
2005 London Bombings

After the 7 July 2005 bombing in London the aspects of administration, transportation, homeland security, sanitary system, economic system, network, broadcast and etc. system were paralyzed. Due to the case different measures were taken by the UK government. For detailed information (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactions_to_the_2005_London_bombings, 12.05.2015) address can be checked.

The crisis network of the London bombings is shown in Figure-2. The measures detected from the sources are used in detecting the elements affected by the crisis. These elements are the primary elements in the crisis. The elements affected by the measures and the primary affected elements and the other elements’ relations are shown in the crisis network. The indirectly related elements with the crisis should be informed bound to the speed of improvement of the crisis and measures should be taken. By taking measures in the elements of the affected elements a proactive behaviour will be taken.

75 elements that are thought to be affected from the terrorist attack and 319 relations among the elements are detected. The degree, closeness, betweenness and centrality analysis are made on the terrorist attack. The 20 elements those have the highest values of closeness, betweenness and centrality, which are detected after the analysis of the generated crisis network are shown in the Table-1.
Figure 2. 2005 London Bombings Crisis Network
Table 1. Social Network Analysis Results

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The element with the highest value in the table is Head of State/Government. Head of State/Government is the most affected unit by the terrorist attack and it is the element that will play a maximum role in managing the crisis. Trade Unions are among the elements that are most affected by the crisis of commercial organizations and have a significant role to terminate the crisis.

The degree centrality indicates the links of the element. Looking at the degree centrality analysis Head of State/Government is seen to be associated with the greatest number of elements. Head of State/Government’s activity in solving the crisis will naturally affect the elements that are directly linked.

An element’s betweenness centrality is the degree of being among other elements. Having a high degree of betweenness indicates that the element serves an important coordinating role in the network. Head of State/Government is the most important unit to ensure coordination between the elements. Also Global Grid Connectivity and Trade Unions can play an important role to synchronize the other elements.

The degree of closeness centrality is proximity to other elements, either directly or indirectly. Security Elements are closest to the other elements in the crisis network. Even if they are not associated directly they are close to other elements and affect them.

Results of the analysis revealed which elements have the coordination tasks and orientate elements and which elements must be taken measures firstly during a crisis. In the phase of the Development of response choices, tasks can be assigned.
Conclusion

As a result, using analysis tools at the three phases of crisis management as respectively preparation, identification of the possible/current crisis; assessment and development of the response options gives the possibility of an effective management.

This study shows the importance of the exposure of the interrelations and the analysis of the elements. This analysis is done through different values as degree, betweenness and closeness. The analysis enhances the situational awareness of the managers and brings out the measures to be taken by the help of the crisis network. The detection of the core elements provides the effective distribution of the time and resource efforts. The execution of the crisis response plan considering SNA increases the effectiveness of the plan. Apart from crisis management SNA can be used in different functions. The important case is the detection of the elements that are affected by the process and putting forward the realistic interrelations.

While implementing the crisis action plan new elements can show up. In the reaction process everything could be assessed carefully. At the same crisis the reaction process is around 24 hours but some urgent crises need to be handled even in minutes. The time and the way the crisis erupts are not clear. Thus, it is necessary to be ready for the crisis all the time and crisis management plans should be kept updated.
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THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

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ABSTRACT. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the Republic of Poland is one of the main authorities in wartime. But, in Polish legal acts it is not completely clear when the Commander-in-Chief should be appointed. According to Polish law, the Commander-in-Chief shall be appointed in certain situations - for the duration of the war and (sometimes) in the martial law period. In this paper the author will describe these situations and analyse the provisions of his functioning in peace time and in war.

Also, it should be noted, that today in Poland decision-makers adopted some very important changes in the Act of 21 November 1967 - Universal duty to defend the Republic of Poland. These changes are to be basis for new rules for the functioning of the Commander-in-Chief and it is a result of the reform of the command and control system. But, the problem is that some parts of legislation were challenged in the Constitutional Court and the case is pending... Every single act of the packet might be not in accordance with the Act of Constitution.
Introduction (methodology, aim, hypothesis, method of research literature overview)

For several months in Poland, politicians, decision-makers and scientists have discussed the role of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as well as more widely - about the national security system and subsystem of command and control.

It should be noted, that in this context there are attempts ongoing to create a comprehensive legal basis for the system and to improve the existing regulations by amending laws. Already Changes have been already implemented in: the Act of 14 December 1995 – The Office of the Minister of National Defence, the Act of 21 November 1967 – Universal duty to defend the Republic of Poland and the Act of 29 August 2002 - Martial law and the competence of the Commander-in-Chief and his subordination to the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Poland. The most important provisions are outlined in this article. Some of the changes seemed necessary to introduce, part resulted from our presence in NATO and experience with ILL, but it should be noted that some changes are incompatible, and others may prove difficult to implement in the Polish legal system. This is due to the lack of regulation of basic definitions which leads to a multiplicity of interpretations, and even a lack of confidence, which is very dangerous in law.

Therefore, the aim of this paper is characterization of the position of Commander-in-Chief in the system of command and control. In addition, it will also contain a brief presentation of the most important definitions which relate to the subject matter. Therefore, the main issue is: what is the role of Commander-in-Chief in the system of command and control? This article attempts to resolve the following problems:

- How does Commander-in-Chief operate in peacetime?
- How does Commander-in-Chief operate in war?
• How does the system of command and control work?

The main hypothesis is the assumption that the Commander-in-Chief plays a key role in the system of command and control. For several years, work is underway on the command and control system as well as on legislation defining the functioning of the Commander-in-Chief. It seems that these changes are appropriate, but can it still be deliberated that it is moving in the right direction? Working hypotheses which might help solve problems specifically focus on a few of assumptions:

1. Presumably, now it is possible to determine the share of the competence of Commander-in-Chief in time of peace. The last amendment introduced regulations, which are set out his task. However, there are still doubts about the interpretation of certain issues related to the very moment of his appointment. This aspect has facilitated an "act of appointment of the candidate".

2. Functions of the Commander-in-Chief in wartime or martial law period are specified. The problem arises in other areas - inter alia - terminology. For the functioning of the Commander-in-Chief it is important to clarify the key phrases, such as for period of war and martial law, which determine the possibility of his appointment.

3. The present organizational form of the system of command and control of the armed forces has been operating since 1 January 2014. This was the time when the provisions of the amendment of the Act - the office of Minister of National Defence came into the force, which introduced significant changes and reorganization. It is worth mentioning that some of the provisions went to the Constitutional Court to examine their compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
The main method of research from the theoretical methods is the analysis of sources, especially of legal acts and amendments. Then, the comparison method has been used, particularly in determining the changes during last few years in the command and control system and functioning of Commander-in-Chief. In connection with the collection of a number of scientific facts from the border of many disciplines (science of security, law, sociology and political science, etc.), also the methods of synthesis, deduction and reduction have been used, allowing the extraction and merging of the results. At the same time, the synthesis of the research method has been used to develop applications and proposals for solutions. Issues related to the functioning of the Commander-in-Chief seem to be extremely important, but it is relatively new, so there are few studies on this topic. Two publications should be distinguished by which it is possible to debate in this regard: Kitler, Waldemar. 2013. Minister Obrony Narodowej w systemie bezpieczeństwa państwa. Warszawa: AON and Kośmider, Tomasz. 2014. Naczelny Dowódca Sił Zbrojnych w systemie obronnym państwa polskiego. Warszawa: AON.

The problems with terminology

In legal acts and the most important documents in force in the Republic of Poland there is a multitude of formulations, with the multiplicity of different concepts causing inconsistency in their use. Absence of some legal definitions increase the problems associated with their understanding. This creates a situation in which through lack of regulations many opposite interpretations may emerge. In Polish legal acts most of the issues relate to the concept of "war", which has to be distinguished from the "state of war", "time of war" and, above all, the "martial law". These

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1 The author does not discuss in detail the definitions, but focuses on presenting their most important elements, as this is vital for the overall presentation of topics of the Commander-in-Chief.
definitions are especially important in the context of the Commander-in-Chief.

First of all, it should be noted that war is the concept of public international law. War is still one of the ways of policy, but according to the Charter of the United Nations now is banned. However, war or state of war is characterized that it occurs only between countries – the primary entities of public international law. “State of war” is a hostility or rupture between the relations of peace and a transition to the relations of war. It can be characterized by armed struggle and hostile acts directed against another state. It is worth noting that the state of war is not always synonymous with military activities. Armed struggle ends, but a state of war lasts until peace treaty is signed. For example in Poland, the state of war can occur when Parliament (Sejm) declares it through the resolution in a situation of armed attack or when it is obligated by common defence of virtue of an international agreement - which will rely on the severance of diplomatic relations and an end, and not on actual hostilities [the Act of Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 116].

An even greater problem is the distinction of “time of war” or “period of war”. This has a decisive influence on the need for the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In colloquial understanding it means actual warfare. But the problem is, can we appoint Commander-in-Chief before it – during normal functioning of the state or exactly “for time of war”?…? Recently, the problem has been noticed by the legislature, with an amendment being introduced - currently the president decides, when the "time of war" starts: "In case of national defence [the President] decides, at the request of the Prime Minister, on the date at which time the war begins on Polish territory. The same procedure shall decide on the date at which time the war ends [the Act on the universal duty..., art. 4a introduced by the Act on amendment of the act on the universal duty..., art. 1]. Maybe such a solution could
be considered as valid if a decision declaring war time is connected with the act of appointment of the Commander-in-Chief...

Currently, we have a situation where president has to wait for a proposal from the Council of Ministers to issue a decision on the start of the "time of war", and subsequently at the request of the Prime Minister on the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief. Only then he will be able to appoint the Commander-in-Chief. In a situation where every hour might count, this schedule may hinder rather than to facilitate the operation.

In turn, armed conflict is a broader concept of war – it also applies to organizations and that are not considered legally based entities! Therefore, it is important to distinguish what the subject is according to public international law and what it is not. The concept of armed conflict therefore includes armed struggle between countries without a declaration of war, but also, what is important, among non-participant entities of public international law, such as rebels and armed bands.

Difficulties of interpretation may also trigger the definition of "armed attack" used in article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, or the interpretation of "aggression". Simply, each armed attack should be considered as aggression, but not all aggression is an armed attack. What creates even greater problems is that there are not regulations regarding the definition of an armed attack. Therefore, we must rely on the interpretation of practitioners and theorists of international law or, worse, the interpretation of politicians. On the other hand, distinguishing between an armed attack and aggression is extremely important according to NATO article 5. The definition of aggression was contained in a resolution of the General Assembly, but it is not legally binding [Resolution of General Assembly no. 3314, art. 1, art. 3].
Functioning of Commander-in-Chief in peace time (normal functioning of state)

Until a few months ago, most of the lawyers and experts on the subject believed that the Commander-in-Chief does not function in time of peace, because he is appointed "for period of war" or during martial law, when it is necessary to defend the state. According the Constitution "(...) The President of the Republic of Poland, for a period of war, shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on request of the Prime Minister (...)" [the Act of Constitution..., art. 134, par. 4]. The current rules, after amendment, introduced big changes. The most important concerns the possibility to indicate a “candidate” before the time of war, during normal functioning of the state. Indication of such a person is aimed at better preparing the candidate to fulfil the tasks as Commander-in-Chief during the war. Interestingly, the designated person is preparing for the role of Commander-in-Chief, by the time of the effective appointment of the Commander-in-Chief or designation by the President another person provided for appointment to this position [the Act on the universal duty to defend..., art. 5a par. 1 introduced by the Act on amendment of the act on the universal duty..., art. 1].

Unfortunately, the interpretation of that article leaves no doubt that the Commander-in-Chief may be a different person than earlier indicated in the "act of appointment of the candidate". Importantly, the interpretation of this article indicates that it is possible to identify another candidate from time to time (e.g. the occasion of the new election). Perhaps an old provision that the Operational Commander prepares place of command for the Commander-in-Chief was sufficient [The act on universal duty..., art. 11b, par. 2 point 5]? Besides, the tasks of the Operational Commander include planning, organizing and conducting operations in the framework of using the Armed Forces in peacetime, crisis or war; planning, organizing and conducting
training of the Armed Forces command authorities, in accordance with martial law command system and determining operational requirements for the Armed Forces in the operational planning and program development of the Armed Forces, etc. On 29 June the President pointed at the request of the Prime Minister in "act of appointment of candidate" that the Operational Commander will be a candidate for Commander-in-Chief. The candidate must participate in strategic games and defence exercises, planning to use the Armed Forces to defend the state and in the preparation of military command system of the Armed Forces.

**Functioning of Commander-in-Chief in war (Polish and NATO context)**

As has already been mentioned, the Commander-in-Chief is appointed "for period of war" or in case of martial law. The author believes that one of the key elements of the "moment" of the appointment is a suitable interpretation of basic definitions. Before changing *the act on martial law*... the President could appoint the Commander-in-Chief during martial law, when it was necessary to defend state: "1. If at the time of martial law, there is the need to defend the state, the Polish President directs the defence in cooperation with the Council of Ministers; 2. President during martial law, in Particular: (...) 4) shall appoint, at the request of the Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (...)" [*the act of martial law*..., art. 10]. Currently after the first paragraph has been deleted, it may create real concerns, when in martial law, the President may appoint Commander-in-Chief? Does he appoint him in any time? It seems so.

In war (and during martial law if it is necessary) Commander-in-Chief will have a huge responsibility. The Commander-in-Chief commands the Armed Forces and other subordinated organizational units; he provides interaction between the Polish Armed Forces and the Allied forces in planning and conducting
military operations; he specifies the needs of the Armed Forces to support them through non-military part of the defence system of the state; he appoints military authorities to carry out tasks central and local government in the area of direct warfare. Importantly, he submits a request to the President for approval of operating plans using the Armed Forces and to recognize specific areas of the Republic of Poland for direct zones of hostilities, and he also requests the Council of Ministers to determine the rules of operation of public authorities in the area of direct warfare [the Act on martial law...; art. 10, art. 11, art. 16].

But, still in the end, his role in the system remains uncertain. Should he be considered to be a main commander in action or more like a “brain surgeon? And, if something goes wrong, who can sign or decide on an act of capitulation? [Kołodziejczak, p. 256-257, in Kitler 2013].

Fig. 1. Model of reaction of NATO in case of war in Poland
Source: prepared by the Author.
Therefore, suppose that at the right time at the request of the Council of Ministers, the President introduces martial law, then because of warfare on Polish territory (again) at the request of the Council of Ministers he decides on the "time of war", and only then - at the request of the Prime Minister - he appoints the Commander-in-Chief. Therefore, we try to consider the situation, what NATO could do in the case of military action on the territory of the Republic of Poland? So, besides our internal problems at the moment of appointment Commander-in-Chief we can wonder if NATO could be able to help in any case.

According to article 5, NATO could help just in the case of “armed attack”. So, it is another situation where proper interpretation of definitions is extremely important: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” [North Atlantic Treaty…, art. 5]. Because of this interpretation, presentation of differences between aggression and armed attack was so important. By adopting such a course of reasoning we can identify some situation. The article can distinguish only help in case of an armed attack. There is no mention of aggression. Thus, it appears that there is no chance to apply a broad interpretation - the legislator wrote clearly that there is only one case where NATO can respond and help an ally.

On the other hand, the relation between Polish Commander-in-Chief and Supreme Allied Commander is also complicated and it would depend on certain factors: where the warfare would take its
place. On territory of Poland, or elsewhere? Would it be a war against the whole NATO or more about Poland, just with help of NATO?

The Command and Control System – legal ground

It should be noted that recently in Poland, the decision-makers adopted some very important changes in the command and control system. These changes are to be the basis for new rules of a functioning Commander-in-Chief and it is a continuation of the reform of the command and control. But, the problem is that the rules of some elements of this reform were challenged in the Constitutional Court and the case is pending... Every single statute of the packet might not be in accordance with the Constitution.

The key change occurred on 1 January 2014, when the organizational structure was revised at the highest level. One of the most important modifications related to the reorganization - now we have just 2 commands: the Operational Command and the General Command. So we have only 2 major commanders, and at the time of that reform we had a commander for every branch of the Armed Forces. This change may be considered incompatible with the Constitution (the Constitution provides that the President shall appoint "commanders of branches of the Armed Forces"). Also, Chief of the General Staff previously was supposed to be the Commander-in-Chief and now he has become an advisor.

Conclusions and references

Today, because of rapidly changing and new challenges, the command and control system in NATO countries has to be responsive to these developments, also in terms of the applicable law. Also, for international lessons learned, using proper definitions or even creating legal definitions should be one of
those challenges. Only clear and precise definitions can protect from problems of interpretation. Properly defining, interpreting and – what is important - using appropriate concepts is a crucial condition to avoid unexpected legal consequences.

It should be emphasized that because of the current exchange of the experience of ILL many changes have taken place in the Polish system of command and control. Some of the changes and reorganization of the command posts so far is controversial. The amendments were probably necessary. Perhaps, the direction of change was appropriate, however, it appears there is a discrepancy between the ideas introduced and legislation. Therefore, in the Constitutional Court a request is waiting to check recent reforms. It would be a great problem if the reform issue proves to be not in accordance with the Constitution.

Bibliography


ABSTRACT. Multinational Brigade Operations involving NATO and its European Partners are the norm in the post-Cold War Era. Commonplace today are Multinational Brigades, composed of staffs and subordinate units representing almost every NATO Country and Partner, participating in training exercises or actual operations in both the European and Southwest Asian Theatres. Leadership challenges are prevalent for the Multinational Brigade Commander and his staff, especially those challenges they face in achieving an effective level of brigade interoperability in order to conduct successful operations in NATO’s present and future operating environments. The purpose of this paper is twofold: to examine the major interoperability obstacles a multinational brigade commander and his staff are likely to encounter during the planning and execution of brigade operations; and, to recommend actions and measures a multinational brigade commander and his staff can implement to facilitate interoperability in a multinational brigade operating environment. Several key interoperability topics considered integral to effective multinational brigade operations
will be examined and analysed to include understanding partner unit capabilities and limitations facilitated by an integration plan, appropriate command and support relationships, compatible communications, synchronized intelligence and information collection, establishing effective liaison, and fratricide prevention. The paper conclusion will urge for a NATO land brigade doctrine considering doctrine’s critical importance to effective brigade command and control interoperability and the expected missions a land brigade will encounter in future NATO operating environments as part of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).

Introduction

Commonplace today are multinational brigades, composed of staffs and subordinate units representing almost every NATO Country and Partner, participating in training exercises or actual operations. Leadership challenges are prevalent for the multinational brigade commander and his staff, especially the leadership challenges both face in achieving an effective level of brigade interoperability. The purpose of this paper is twofold: to examine the major interoperability obstacles a multinational brigade commander and his staff are likely to encounter during the planning and execution of brigade operations; and, to recommend actions and measures a multinational brigade commander and his staff can implement to facilitate interoperability in a multinational brigade operating environment. Several key interoperability topics considered important to effective multinational brigade interoperability are discussed to include initiating an integration plan to team build and increase understanding of partner-unit capabilities and limitations; establishing appropriate command relationships and compatible communications; synchronizing intelligence and information collection and sharing; establishing effective liaison; and finally, implementing interoperability
measures for fratricide prevention. The paper’s conclusion discusses the need for a NATO land brigade doctrine considering doctrine’s vital importance to brigade interoperability and the missions a land brigade will likely encounter in future NATO operating environments as part of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).

Integration Plan to Facilitate Understanding Unit Capabilities

Understanding each unit’s capabilities and limitations within a newly formed multinational brigade takes time and the brigade’s operating success is contingent on developing good relationships among its partner units; the understanding of each unit’s respective weapons systems and equipment; and, familiarization with each unit’s doctrine, tactics, and procedures. A multinational brigade can foster interoperability from the moment it is task organized by implementing an integration plan to promote good relationships among the brigade’s partner units and to share knowledge of each partner unit’s respective capabilities and limitations.

Integration Plan. A multinational brigade’s leadership should develop an integration plan and set aside time for its execution. The time devoted to integration should be formally planned and structured, supervised by leaders from within the brigade. Integration plans should focus on interoperability challenges like communications, intelligence collection and sharing, and fratricide prevention.

Integration Working Groups. To facilitate integration, the multinational brigade can form working groups, drawing personnel from the staff and subordinate units, giving the work groups the task to develop solutions aimed at solving interoperability issues. Solutions are then briefed for approval to the brigade commander and once approved, the solutions are formally implemented.
through written orders or standard operating procedures. During the planning and orders process, prior to conducting operations, the multinational brigade commander can implement additional measures to integrate the partner units and staff in order to enhance the brigade’s interoperability. For example, the brigade commander should include every partnered nation, regardless of size and contribution, during the brigade’s update briefings; conduct face-to-face update briefings, especially during the first few meetings, to build interpersonal relationships; and, emphasize collaborative planning with subordinate, partner units to ensure their input is taken into account during the planning and orders process.

Establish Command Relationships

An initial step to achieving interoperability within a multinational brigade is creating command relationships that are clearly understood by senior and subordinate commanders to facilitate effective operations. The command relationships must define both responsibilities and authorities between the multinational brigade commander and his/her subordinate units.

Use NATO Doctrine. The multinational brigade must decide what command and support relationships to use prior to task organizing its forces. The recommendation is to exclusively use NATO Command Relationships (Figure 1) because most NATO members and partners have been exposed to and employed it during both training exercises and operations (Department of the Army 2014, p. 2-6). However, a challenge still remains familiarizing all of NATO and its partners with the responsibilities and authorities involved in NATO Command and Support Relationships. Not fully understanding the differences has the potential to create command and control issues between
commanders because the authority and responsibility of the command relationships are not mutually understood.

Figure 1. NATO Command Relationships.
For example, note below the distinct differences in the respective definitions for NATO and U.S. Operational Control (OPCON). The NATO OPCON definition is much more prescriptive in terms of assigning “separate employment of components” and addressing administrative and logistical control.

**NATO OPCON.** The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control to those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control (AAP-6 2014, p. 2-0-3).

**U.S. OPCON.** The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission (JP 1-02 2014, p.183).

**Command Relationship Restrictions/Limitations.** The multinational brigade commander and subordinate commanders, during the early stages of forming the brigade, must set aside time to discuss limitations and restrictions involved in the command relationships. Some of discussion points may involve national caveats affecting the assignment of certain types of missions, Rules of Engagement (ROE), and working with other nations within the coalition. Some nations may have restrictions or limitations involving certain unique operations like Detainee Operations, Humanitarian Assistance, and Civil-Military Operations. For example there may be national restrictions against a participating nation using its military assets for support to nongovernmental or international organizations providing humanitarian assistance (ABCA 2010, p. 3-4).
Communications

Multinational brigade communications planners have additional hurdles to overcome when integrating multinational partners into the brigade’s communications network. There are potential differences and disparities in communications technology, equipment, security, procedures, and language all presenting communications interoperability planning and execution challenges for the brigade.

Communications Network Integration. A multinational brigade’s ideal objective is to integrate its partner units into a functional and secure communications network that can seamlessly share operational information. To achieve this objective, communications planning among partner units has to commence as early as possible within the multinational brigade.

Common Operational Picture (COP). One of primary goals of multinational brigade communication planning in the brigade is that each of its subordinate headquarters shares a common operational picture (COP). A common operational picture is a single identical display of relevant, operational information facilitating collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness (JP 1-02 2014, p. 42). A multinational brigade finds it difficult to maintain an identical COP throughout the brigade because of the analog and digital disparities between the brigade and its subordinate headquarters. For example, the brigade may employ a digital COP while its subordinate units are only resourced for analog communications. In this situation, battalion operations and intelligence officers are likely to be totally dependent for their information through frequency modulated (FM) communications, not having access to the same digital systems employed by the brigade, thus creating an analog and digital interoperability gap. One possible solution is for the multinational brigade headquarters to mandate a digital COP for its subordinate units; however, this requires prior planning for it
usually requires the brigade to send a communications liaison team, with the appropriate digital communication equipment, to each subordinate battalion enabling it to gain digital access to the Brigade’s network. Or, the brigade could choose to revert to exclusively analog communications to maintain situational awareness throughout the brigade. Other COP considerations brigade communication planners should address are the operational information to be displayed on the COP and the primary, alternate, contingency and emergency communication means of maintaining a COP (ABCA 2010, p. 5-3).

**Other Communication Considerations in the Multinational Brigade.** There are other communication considerations planners have to take into account to effect interoperable communications. What combat radio networks are going to be used by the multinational brigade and are the combat radios within the brigade used by partner units interoperable? Do adjustments need to be made to normal operating parameters such as using a single frequency mode instead of frequency hopping or operating in a non-secure mode as opposed to encryption? Another key consideration is frequency spectrum management. Are all the frequency emitting devices known in the brigade and does a plan exist for their management? Does the multinational brigade have a process in place for resolving frequency interference issues (ABCA 2010, p. 5-4)?

**Communications Workgroup.** Prior to commencement of operations, communication planners from each of the participating units should form a workgroup, led by the Brigade Communications Officer, to exchange information regarding communication equipment, encryption capability, and networks partner units employ to communicate information. An output of the workgroup should be a product depicting both compatible and non-compatible communication systems so solutions can be developed to overcome known communication gaps between
systems. To validate communications interoperability in the multinational brigade, the brigade communications officer, should plan and execute both a communication and digital rehearsal exercise prior to operations.

**Intelligence and Information Collection**

A well-planned and executable intelligence plan gives the multinational brigade a tactical advantage over any adversary it encounters. The multinational brigade commander’s most important information requirements ultimately are what guide intelligence collection and its subsequent analysis and dissemination. Some of the key considerations for a multinational brigade commander and staff when assessing the intelligence capabilities and limitations of the brigade are: who will be designated as the lead nation in the multinational brigade for providing intelligence support; which assets will remain as brigade and/or national task controlled assets; and how will intelligence be shared between multinational units (ABCA 2010, p. 17-2)? As indicated integrating and synchronizing a multinational brigade’s intelligence function is difficult but not an insurmountable task. Fundamentally, if the brigade can agree to a method to conduct information collection, synchronization and dissemination; and, agree on a classification level that enables adequate sharing and dissemination of information, then the multination brigade is apt to achieve an acceptable level of intelligence operability.

**Information Collection and Synchronization.** Collection capabilities from partner nations are typically the battalion intelligence officers and their staffs, Unmanned Aerial Surveillance (UAS) systems, Voice Intercept Teams, Human Intelligence Collection Teams and reconnaissance units. A useful technique during the planning process is having both the brigade and battalion intelligence officers brief their respective collection
capabilities and how these capabilities can best support the brigade’s operational plan. Once all the collection assets are identified and integrated into the brigade’s overall collection plan, the brigade intelligence officer should facilitate an information collection rehearsal, with the active participation of the partner battalion intelligence officers, to further synchronize the brigade collection plan.

**Classification.** Intelligence professionals have a natural tendency to over classify information for fear of releasing of information that they feel may be construed as “sensitive” to a national interest. While it is prudent to protect national information, multinational brigade intelligence personnel must jointly collaborate to classify operational intelligence products at the lowest level enabling effective information and intelligence sharing to enhance brigade operations (ABCA 2010, p. 17-2).

**Establishing Effective Liaison**

Liaison Officers (LNO) are taking on increasingly significant importance in multinational operations to enhance interoperability between a multinational brigade’s lower and adjacent units. Effective liaison within a multinational brigade is characterized by liaison reciprocity, the use of liaison teams, and employing competent, mature LNOs.

**Liaison Reciprocity.** Establishing reciprocal liaison or liaison exchange between the coalition brigade HQ and its subordinate battalions is especially important and is a proven, necessary component of coalition brigade interoperability. Liaison reciprocity contributes to the operational mutual confidence by facilitating mission essential, operational communication, through the liaisons, between the multinational brigade and its battalions (ABCA Handbook 2010, p. 2-9).
Liaison Teams. Experience shows that Liaison Teams usually operate better than using a single, liaison officer. A liaison team has more expertise to facilitate liaison, especially if it has representation for operations, logistics, and other key operational functions; and, a team usually has the capability to operate for 24 hours.

Competent and Mature LNOs. LNO personnel have to be operationally competent. They help the commander understand the doctrine, capabilities and limitations, and national caveats of the unit they represent. In addition to knowing the sending unit’s mission, current and future operations, logistics and unit doctrine and capabilities, an LNO has to understand the same regarding the receiving unit he/she will liaison to.

Fratricide

Fratricide is defined as “The employment of friendly weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment or facilities; which results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel (Department of the Army 1992, p.4).” The potential for fratricide in multinational operations is magnified due to variations between nations’ equipment and uniforms and doctrinal procedures to include important ones like command and control measures, battle tracking, and clearance of direct and indirect fire procedures.

Effects of Fratricide. A fratricide incident can diminish trust between units damaging unit cohesiveness and morale. After a fratricide incident, units tend to operate in an over cautious manner affecting the unit’s initiative and tempo.

Fratricide Causes. One of the primary causes of fratricide is combat identification which is the positive identification of a target as either friend or foe. In combat or training multinational
environments where Soldiers and units operate with a mix of unfamiliar vehicles, aircraft and weapon systems, the chances of a fratricide incident are increased unless the units and their soldiers have received extensive combat and target identification training beforehand. Other causes of fratricide during multinational brigade exercises and operations are inadequate battle tracking and reporting procedures, ineffective manoeuvre and direct/indirect fire control measures, and adjacent unit coordination.

**Fratricide Prevention.** To improve combat identification, a multinational brigade collaborating with its member units, can implement a day and night vehicle marking system compatible with all units in the brigade. Leaders usually have to give additional consideration for night operations because not all the units may have night vision capabilities. Units should conduct vehicle and equipment displays and vehicle capability demonstrations for all units within the brigade to familiarize all Soldiers with the vehicles and weapon systems in the brigade that they will encounter during operations. Units should also conduct formal combat identification training for its soldiers, supplementing it with a publication highlighting the weapons and equipment of the various units within the brigade. A multinational brigade and its member units should also establish standard operating procedures for the command and control of units to prevent fratricide. The procedures must at a minimum clearly articulate the following: how the brigade will conduct its battle tracking and reporting; what control measures the brigade will use to command and control units; how the brigade will coordinate and clear both direct and indirect fires; and, how the brigade’s units and Soldiers execute positive target identification. Rehearsals and brief backs are an excellent tool a commander can use to reinforce understanding and application of command and control procedures among subordinate units. Also, the reciprocal exchange of Liaison Teams between higher and lower units further facilitates the
A Common Doctrine Promotes Brigade Command and Control Interoperability

Establishing a NATO multinational brigade doctrine would enhance a brigade’s command and control interoperability by providing the brigade with doctrinal principles as to how it would employ its planning and orders process, organize its command and staff, and conduct command post operations to facilitate effective mission or battle command.

Planning and Orders Process. A doctrinal brigade planning and orders process would serve two very critical purposes for a multinational brigade: provide the commander’s guidance on how to integrate the staff’s activities; and, how to synchronize the functions the brigade performs during the course of its operations (Department of the Army 2010, p. 1-16). For example the staff personnel activities of operations, intelligence, and fire support have to be integrated in order that these three staffs can collectively synchronize targeting, fire and manoeuvre. A newly formed multinational brigade, with a relatively new multinational brigade staff, experiences a learning curve understanding and employing its planning and orders process. A multinational brigade doctrine would help minimize this learning curve by establishing common orders and planning process those units could train with during training at home station in preparation for future multinational brigade training exercises and operations.

Staff Organization and Responsibilities. A multinational brigade doctrine would provide baseline guidance to a commander on how to organize a multinational brigade staff and prescribe what functions each respective staff section performs. Guidance in particular would stipulate what coordinating, personal, and special
staff is required, their respective staff functions, and their appropriate location and integration in the brigade’s command posts to optimize the brigade’s coordination, command and control (Department of the Army 2010, p. 1-20).

**Command Posts & Functions.** Command posts provide vital functions for the brigade in terms of collecting, analysing, storing, displaying and disseminating information to facilitate the execution of orders through effective command and control. Doctrine would prescribe command post organization, its primary responsibilities, and the manning and their staff functions in each respective command post (Department of the Army 2010, p.1-18).

For example, doctrine would give guidance on the employment of main, forward, and rear command posts, their manning, and requisite functions to enhance the brigade’s command and control.

**Conclusion: VJTF and the Need for a Multinational Brigade Doctrine**

NATO’s decision to create a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) on 5 Feb 2015 indicates the time has arrived for the development and implementation of a NATO Multinational Brigade Doctrine (NATO, 2015). The VJTF serves as a so-called “spearhead force” of “significantly increased readiness and highly capable and flexible multinational forces (NATO, 2015).” The VJTF’s core element, besides its air and naval components and Special Forces, is a multinational land brigade task force, with as many as 5000 soldiers assigned and task organized with up to 5 manoeuvre battalions (NATO, 2015). The VJTF must be prepared on a moment’s notice to conduct operations in very complex and dynamic operating environments characterized by both symmetric and asymmetric threats. Interoperability, that the doctrine facilitates, will obviously be paramount to successful VJTF land brigade operations especially with the increased number of
battalions under its command and control, the missions it will likely undertake, and the stringent readiness and time constraints under which the VJTF will operate.

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THE “LESSONS LEARNED” TRAP AND HOW TO AVOID IT: DRAWING FROM THE ISRAELI ARMOURED EXPERIENCE, 1948-1973

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ABSTRACT The following essay explores some of the problems with “lessons learned.” It offers a few tentative observations on the limitations and dangers of lessons. To illustrate these (but not necessarily prove them), it then looks at the experiences of the Israel Defence Forces, particularly its armoured forces, from 1948 to 1973. Finally, three recommendations discuss how military organizations might reduce the danger of lessons leading them astray.

Introduction

In the last 30 or so years, Western militaries have invested significant resources to capture, maintain, and disseminate all manners of “lessons learned.” And yet, the danger of misunderstanding or misusing these experiences remains as high as

1 The author would like to extend his deepest thanks and appreciation to Drs. Martin van Creveld and Eado Hecht, as well as Col. Eric Walters, USMC (Ret.), who were kind enough to review this paper. Their comments and suggestions made it far better than it would have been otherwise.

2 For the purposes of this paper, “lessons learned” refer to practical generalizations, advice, and prescriptions distilled from particular experiences.
ever. On the one hand, this should not surprise us – the problem is an old one, presenting itself again and again throughout history. These “self-inflicted” wounds often result from military leaders failing to actually study that historical record, missing in the process some seemingly obvious truths about lessons learned. But for those who have studied the past carefully, what then? Perhaps in some instances, we should be surprised. In either case, as warnings to those who will listen, this author offers here five tentative observations, based on his own reading of military history thus far, on the limitations and dangers of lessons learned.

1) Lessons come from human observation. And humans often misperceive things – sometimes terribly so.

2) Lessons based on past success may, when applied to the future, result in failure.

3) Therefore, lessons may not transfer to other battles, campaigns, theatres, or wars.

4) Lessons regarding the enemy – particularly those in a tactical sense – generally have a short “shelf-life.” As you adapt to him, he adapts to you, and so what you learned from past encounters often becomes irrelevant or obsolete.

5) Only in combat can an armed force truly validate new ideas based on lessons learned. The results of all other “tests,” (i.e. exercises, models, simulations, etc.) therefore, should remain tentative and inconclusive. By the same token, even if an idea does prove valid, there is no telling how long it will remain so (see points 2 and 3).

To illustrate – but not necessarily prove – these observations (trying to do so would require a great deal more space and discussion of many other cases), a brief examination of the experiences of the Israel Defence Forces, particularly with its armoured forces, from 1948 to 1973, will suffice. Such an
examination should prove particularly useful to the Baltic States, since, at least from a military point of view, these countries share a great deal in common with Israel. Each is a relatively small entity geographically; each borders a much larger, historically hostile neighbour; and each receives significant military aid.

The Queen’s Reign

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) drew its first breath during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Consisting chiefly of infantry units – organizations of men who, whether marching or riding into battle, had the task of killing the enemy (often in close combat) and occupying his position – the nascent IDF relied almost entirely on its “Queen of Battle” (the traditional description for the infantry) to achieve its operational goals. There were at least five reasons for this. The first (and most obvious) came down to simple necessity. The IDF lacked sufficient numbers of equipment for other types of ground forces, namely armoured vehicles, and, even more particularly, tanks. The Israeli armoured force started the war as a collection of ‘poor man’s’ armoured cars – trucks jerry-rigged with concrete and steel plates – and ended as a motley crew of tanks, half-tracks, and other armoured vehicles. While growing during the course of the fighting, it remained, comparatively speaking, incredibly small, especially in tanks. (Indeed, when the guns fell silent, just four could still take to the field, with the rest damaged, destroyed, or under repairs) (van Creveld 2002, pp. 157-158).

The performance and reliability of tanks during the war (and for years beyond) provided a second reason. In contrast to their motorized and mechanized brethren, armour forces gave poor showings for a variety of reasons. The most troublesome of all appears to have been their tendency to break down or suffer other mechanical failures. This proved the case so often that it caused IDF commanders to cancel numerous operations, which certainly
did little to engender any trust in, or affection for, the armoured forces (Horowitz and Luttwak 1983, pp. 126-7).

A third reason centred on the view, held by many Israeli senior commanders, that highly-trained, well-led infantry units (closely supported by its sister arms whenever possible, of course) formed the decisive arm (English and Gudmundsson 1994, pp. 167-171, and Horowitz and Luttwak 1983, pp. 118, 126, and 131). Thanks to this belief, armoured forces in the 1948 War served as a handmaiden to the infantry, providing support in the form of machine gun fire and main gun rounds.

Somewhat ironically, Israel’s enemies provided a fourth reason for the IDF’s approach of “armour supports, infantry conquers”. The Jordanians, Syrians, and Egyptians employed their tanks in exactly the same manner. Thus, with few situations for Israeli tanks to fight their Arab counterparts (taking for granted the debatable idea that tanks provide the best means of killing other tanks), the IDF thought its use of tanks as a supporting arm a natural one.

The fifth reason – and probably the most important – concerned the almost total lack of understanding on the part of IDF officers (again, particularly those in the senior ranks) on what tanks could do. Indeed, the vast majority of these men (exceptions did exist) appear to have possessed only the most basic grasp of the nature, capabilities, and limitations of these steel war machines (Morris 2009, p. 85, and Luttwak and Horowitz 1983, pp. 126-27, 131-132, and 148-153). Israeli commanders so lacked an understanding of armour that, even if they had begun the war with a respectable number of tanks, they likely would have used them in exactly the same way they did historically. (The few exceptions to this probably would have taken the form of employing tanks to patrol stretches of road, escort convoys, and engage in the occasional tank-on-tank duel, which, it stands to reason, would have occurred more by accident than design).
The senior officer who perhaps most personified this view was the famous (and infamous) Moshe Dayan, who served in various military positions during the War for Independence, and, beginning in 1953, became the IDF’s Chief of the General Staff. Dayan, like many of his contemporaries, distrusted the mechanical reliability of tanks, thinking they would break down early and often in the fighting. Furthermore, he found tanks too slow to keep up with the infantry, which, following the 1948 War, the IDF equipped with trucks and, to a lesser degree, American-built M-3 half-tracks (Hecht 2015, pp. 5-6). In the next war, Dayan and most of the IDF high command hoped to use speed to defeat its enemies. That next war, known to the Israelis as Operation Kadesh, would come in 1956. Of Dayan’s views on tanks just before and during the first days of the conflict, Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld notes:

At Kalkiliya in October 1956 [during the Suez Campaign], he had ruled out the use of armor, thereby leading to unnecessary casualties; when the first plans for the Sinai Campaign were being drawn up he even raised the absurd proposal that the tanks should be made to follow the infantry on transporters. Indeed, the IDF’s regard for the armored corps was so low that when Dayan offered [Chaim] Laskov the commanding job [of the corps] in July 1956, the latter considered it a calculated insult (which it may well have been) and came close to tendering his resignation (van Creveld 2002, p. 158).

Prior to the 1956 War, therefore, the Israeli armoured force remained an ill-regarded and ill-understood arm. That started to change after the campaign, however, thanks mostly to the brilliant (and initially unplanned) successes of the 7th Armoured Brigade. According to the brigade’s commander Uri Ben Ari, these victories had been momentous, even transformative. Tanks, in his view, had
become the new decisive arm, thus displacing the ‘Queen of the Battle’ – the infantry. Most IDF officers – including those who once looked down upon armour – seemed to agree. Even Dayan, now having seen the ability of tanks, changed his mind and became a firm supporter. The IDF subsequently (and significantly) increased funding to the armoured corps, and transferred a number of first-rate officers to its ranks. One of these soldiers included Israel Tal, a man who, along with other bright officers, would work to enshrine the tank’s position as master of the killing grounds – or so he thought (van Creveld 2002, p. 159).

**Behold the New Monarch**

By 1964, despite the great shift in attitude toward tanks, the latest Israeli doctrinal publications still maintained a more or less balanced view of the employment of the various arms, asserting that infantry would do most of the fighting (Hecht 2015, pp. 6-7). This view, however, was soon shown the door when Israel Tal, soon to be the most influential armour officer in the 1960s and early 1970s, took over the armoured corps that same year. Building upon and then going far beyond the work of his predecessors, he promulgated an approach to fighting that might best be described as an inversion of the previously existing tank-infantry relationship in the IDF: “infantry supports, tanks conquer.” In this vision, the infantry would follow in the wake of armour, which would pierce enemy defences in all-tank battalions (supported directly by comparatively paltry amounts of mechanized infantry and towed artillery), and perform the often very dangerous, but always necessary, service of ‘mopping up’ cut off or bypassed enemy forces.

To many observers, both contemporary to that time and present-day, this line of thought ran counter to the experiences of a number of recent major wars, starting with the Korean War and
World War II, going back even to World War I. These conflicts had evidently shown that tanks rarely carried the day alone. Received wisdom, in fact, said that they should always work hand-in-hand with the other arms, particularly the infantry, so that one could supplement the strengths, and protect against the weaknesses, of the other. While this held true in most instances, some examples, such as the World War II battles in North Africa or those on the steppes of the Soviet Union, seemed to suggest otherwise. In contrast to the terrain of France or Germany, these vast open areas much more resembled large parts of Israel’s borders, where, at least initially, most of any future fighting would probably occur (Hecht 2015, p. 7). Tal, who agreed that well-balanced formations were appropriate in Europe, argued that tank brigades fighting in the desert – an arena providing generally excellent visibility and little natural cover – had little reason to work closely with the other arms. If fighting from unimproved positions in the open, enemy troops using short-range anti-tank weapons would not last long. To counter anti-tank guns – the greater threat in Tal’s mind – Tal trained his tank crews to engage targets at long ranges. The thinking went that this would cause enemy anti-tank guns to respond in kind, but given their shorter range, opening fire would only serve to reveal their positions, allowing Israeli tanks to dispatch them with impunity (Horowitz and Luttwak 1983, pp. 186-189).

Despite the sometimes-contradictory historical evidence and resistance from within the IDF (to include some from his fellow armour officers), Tal’s vision took root. In a cruel twist of irony, the infantry soon found itself the misunderstood and neglected arm, with the armoured forces generally holding them in contempt and even calling them less than collegial nicknames (van Creveld 2002, p. 193). Tal even prevented the mechanized infantry (which fell under the purview of the armoured corps) from getting modern vehicles, since this would prevent purchasing more tanks. He thus condemned these men to ride into the next war in their
WW II-era half-tracks, pathetically armoured vehicles in an age of jet-aircraft, tanks armed with large-calibre, high velocity cannon, and ominously, a new generation of powerful anti-tank weapons (Horowitz and Luttwak 1983, p. 188).

When war came again in 1967, armour (after the air force) took centre stage – giving in breath-taking form a masterful performance, particularly in the Sinai. In six days and spearheaded by a cosmopolitan cast of British, French, and American tanks, the IDF defeated the Soviet-equipped Egyptians, all in the face of overwhelming odds. From this extraordinary victory, the IDF drew a number of lessons. For lack of space, we will concern ourselves with just two. The first held that Tal’s ideas, having stood the ultimate test of combat, proved valid. Sending all-tank battalions to smash through enemy forces and run amok in their rear, with the infantry and artillery playing supporting roles, had worked. The second lesson stated that Arab infantrymen, when facing serious fighting, would not hold their ground but instead flee or surrender. This, IDF leaders reasoned, would likely happen again in a future conflict. Engagements such as the Egyptian defence at Um Katef in the Sinai (which stopped two Israeli attacks but fell to a third launched at night) struck Israeli leaders as the exception that proves the rule (English and Gudmundsson 1994, p. 171).

Armed with these lessons, the IDF prepared for the next war by embarking on what seemed like a logical course: greatly increasing the size of its armoured forces. And that it did. Armoured battalions grew, roughly from 20 to 50, resulting by 1973 in a total of 14 armoured brigades and three independent battalions. As for the infantry, some units converted to armour, but, generally speaking, it (along with the artillery) appears to have grown slightly. The blow to the infantry came more in further “status deprivation” thanks to the roles assigned to it. Rather than having a central part to play in a future war, it continued to serve merely
as a supporting arm, taking the lead only in certain kinds of terrain, such as mountains or urban areas. Adding insult to injury, most infantry units received low priority when it came to personnel and equipment. (IDF leaders made exceptions for crack and elite outfits.) The “Queen of Battle” had thus met its nadir, the “steel king” its apogee (Hecht 2015, p. 9 and English and Gudmundsson 1994, p. 171).

In the years leading up to 1973, the cult of the tank only continued to grow. The IDF placed so much faith in the arm that it even devised plans to create an armoured division lacking an organic artillery regiment (van Creveld 2002, p. 291). While the scheme never saw fruition, the consensus was clear: tanks, by and large, could carry the day on their own. The Israelis would have a chance to demonstrate this apparent truth yet again when war came again. As it turns out, when it did come, the results would disappoint them sorely.

Royal Folly

The next Arab-Israeli war broke out in October 1973. This time around, the IDF in general, and its tank forces in particular, met with disaster, especially in the early days of the war in the Sinai. While many (if not most) members of the IDF leadership saw an Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal as inevitable, the actual attack caught the Israelis by surprise, thanks to the paltry number of infantry manning positions along the banks. This aside, the Israelis remained confident that an armored counterattack would reverse their fortunes. Indeed, one soldier later commented that the IDF thought its steel thrust would cut through Egyptian forces like “knife through butter” (van Creveld 1974, p. 14).

This did not happen. In fact, the Israeli tank brigades attacking on the first three days of the war were mauled or all but destroyed. This resulted from at least three reasons. First, the units lacked
adequate mortars, artillery, and – especially – infantry. Second, they went into battle piecemeal and against much larger enemy forces (due, in part, to Israeli hubris born of past victories). Third, and putting the lie to the misplaced confidence in “king tank,” whenever the Israeli tanks approached enemy lines, they met not just fire from enemy tanks and anti-tank guns, but a hail of RPG-7s, RPG-43 Grenades, and AT-3 “Sagger” anti-tank missiles. In each instance, the troops operating these weapons were the very men whom the IDF had so confidently discounted – the Arab (and in particular, Egyptian) infantrymen. Military historians Bruce Gudmundsson and John English noted that “…at least a portion of the Egyptian infantry had developed the particular blend of patience and courage needed to hold their fire until the charging tanks got within the effective range of the rocket propelled grenade” (English and Gudmundsson 1994, p. 171).

Despite these problems, the IDF managed to pull through. Tanks continued to bear the brunt of the fighting for the rest of the war, but the IDF discarded their now bankrupt “tank as king” doctrine, replacing it with an approach that combined new tank battle drills with the use of more infantry and artillery (Hecht 2015, p. 11 and van Creveld 2002, p. 241). The cost, however, came a terrible price in both men and equipment. Among other things, the 1973 War seemed to illustrate a simple, yet powerful, point: that “lessons learned” could, in fact, prove quite dangerous.

Conclusion: Three Ways to Avoid the Lessons Learned Trap

In closing, how might today’s militaries avoid their own “lessons learned” traps? We offer three suggestions.

* Encourage or mandate the serious study of cases in which lessons learned had a clear, tangible, and negative effect on military organizations. Among other things, analysing how such
institutions ignore, distort, misinterpret, etc. past experiences and apply them to present and future problems may help members of your organization avoid similar behaviour, or, failing that, at least raise awareness of such dangers.

* Strive to inculcate adaptability and flexibility of mind in your members. For institutions that embody these traits will more likely gain an edge over their opponents, particularly at the outset of a war. The great military historian Sir Michael Howard said as much when he wrote: “I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, that they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What matters is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives” (Howard 1974, p. 7). On this point, the IDF in the 1973 War performed quite well, changing its approach to fit new circumstances.

* Finally, and perhaps the most important point: periodically and rigorously challenge the validity of historical lessons in present day circumstances. You can do this through wargames, ‘what-if scenarios,’ and other related exercises. These tools, while imperfect and unable to prove anything definitively, can at least reveal hidden your own assumptions, biases, fallacies, and the like. Had the Israelis, for instance, seriously considered (say, in a series of wargames) the possibility that the Egyptian infantry would fight, and, further, perform reasonably well in certain circumstances, they might have suffered fewer disasters early on in the war. Received wisdom ought to be questioned. After all, it forms the very basis upon which our forces operate and, to a large degree, perform.
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DETERMINANTS OF ARMY STRUCTURES DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF MIDDLE Sized COUNTRY EXPERIENCES IN CONTEMPORARY TACTICAL OPERATIONS

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ABSTRACT Although a military organization is a special form of institution, grouping people and resources for the special purposes of defence and fighting in general, it is influenced by the same rules and conditions that other organizations are. Considering the problems of land forces organizational structures in tactical operations it is important to refer to the theory of organization and management which may constitute a point of reference to properly devise and forming up of land forces structures assuming that such forces make up an organization – since this is a team of soldiers including their resources, shaped into an adequate structure and predestined to perform a definite task. The article is an attempt to reveal multiple mutual relations of tactical, technical and economical inventions inflicting structural transformation of the army in the context of the reality of a middle-sized country today.

Introduction

Considering the problems of land forces organizational structures in tactical operations it is important to refer to the theory of
organization and management which may constitute a point of reference to properly devise and forming up of land forces structures assuming that such forces make up an organization – since this is a team of soldiers including their resources, shaped into an adequate structure and predestined to perform a definite task. In the theory of organization and management a set of empirically verified statements was developed which relate to efficient functioning of an organization. (Tyrała 2003, p. 53) According to prof. W. Kieżun … the development of an organization consists in enduring change (streamlining). The shorter time is needed to implement improvements, the more efficient such an organization is, more flexible, more adapted to surrounds. (Kieżun 1998, p. 383) Thus changes are an indispensable factor in the survival and development of every organization, including the military, (Ściborek 2005, p. 52) because the changing conditions of the contemporary world as well as the changing threats shape a new face of tactical operations.

Various organizations which function today are created by teams to execute specific tasks. This is why it is justified to cite the general principles of the establishing and functioning of organizational structures because they may constitute a foundation of proper functioning and forming up of task forces of the land troops component with regard to solving a critical situation. An organization, by means of assuming an adequate organizational structure, may take up activities or execute functions provided for it. (Ściborek 2005, p. 13) Referring to the subject of the research, i.e. the land forces it should be assumed that such groupings also make up an organization because it is a team of soldiers together with their resources, appropriate structure and qualified to accomplish definite tasks and missions. An organization is a team of people organized to achieve certain specific aims. (Robinson, Coulter 2007, p. 17) However, apart from the personal dimension, it uses some technology which is available to it. Therefore an organization is a structuralized, i.e. specifically ordered social-technical system. Such a system is a mutually related set of
elements, clearly distinguished from surrounding reality and possessing its own aims of activity. It means that every organization consists of two purposely related components: technical and social ones. (Krzyżanowski 1999, pp. 34-35)

The subject literature indicates that people function as creators of an organization but simultaneously they are the matter which fills its structure which has the mission to achieve the earlier posited aim using accessible techniques. It means that the function which an organization fulfils is a means to accomplish an objective and not the aim of its existence. (Krzyzanowski 1999, p. 49) Thus we face a well ordered, purposely created organized system. It should be mentioned that an organization also means connections and relations among elements of its structure. The most frequently cited kinds of organizational bonds include:

- official ties (hierarchic) joining the managers of different levels of management with their subordinates;
- technological bond fusing workstations participating in some process of production and executing its particular stages;
- functional ties uniting workstations and groups of workstations (cells, departments, sections) realizing various essential functions for efficient operation of the whole organization (for example personal function or financial function);
- informative relationship which consists in transmitting pieces of information necessary for accomplishment of tasks and undertaking decisions. (Bolesta-Kukułka 2005, p. 52)

Considering the social sub-system, i.e. people, as the material for an organization it can be stated that such bonds are reflected not only among the elements of structures but also in relations among people constituting such an organization. (Stoner et al. 2001, p. 322) Thus organizations are sets which possess common features - common elements. Such common features being components of all organizations include people, aim (mission), structure and
In view of the foregoing each organization can be pictured as a system consisting of five elements:

a) social executive subsystem – people playing various parts;

b) aims of an organization - comprehended as a set of targets to be achieved in definite period of time, taking into account the needs of surroundings as well as members of an organization;

c) control subsystem - serving as widely understood control of an organization and its formation, indicating aims and defining tasks;

d) structure – a set of various relations including associations and impacts of a mixture of types taking place inside cells and among organizational cells;

e) technology – a set of resources, means (methods, techniques) serving to achieve the aim of an organization. (Zawadzki 1997, p. 12)

It should be analysed which of the abovementioned elements of an organization plays a decisive part. In the author's opinion an organization is a tool to attain an intended aim. People set up organizations, they run them, they define their aims, and they decide about the end of their activity (life of an organization). Therefore it is a correct statement that people as a social subsystem are the most important element within an organization, and an organization serves the accomplishment of their endeavours and plans. It is worth mentioning that the organizational structure should fulfil three principal conditions:

- assurance of the completion of aims which an organization posits (in this case the land forces component of the Armed Forces);
endurance, enabling incessant functioning of an organization;
• adaptation to changing external conditions.

To assure the efficient functioning of the components of land forces it is necessary to change soldiers' mentality and/or other members of the team by means of changing individual behaviour into a team approach. It is difficult to the extent that, as practice to date shows, the land forces components are often formed up from men coming from various military units and very often possessing diverse skills and combat readiness and/or experience. J. Antoszkiewicz (1998, p. 217)\(^1\) highlights that all personal attributes brought into a team by its individual members are shaped and developed together with them. He views the evolutionary passage from the set of individuals to a compact team in phases of a team development: diversification, integration, cooperation, drifting and cohesion break down. One should deeply think about when the new structure can be used most efficiently, i.e. in which phase of its life cycle, to attain the maximum of its effects. Presenting it in a time axis a conclusion can be generated that it is ineffective to assign difficult tasks to teams in the initial period of time – when their internal relations are not yet run in as well as in the final stage, i.e. when those internal relations are attrited (worn away). In case of forming up a component of land forces destined to participate in foreign/overseas missions it is important to execute the phase of running in before departure to the conflict region. Therefore it is essential to train such a component as a whole from the moment of devising the task force.

\(^1\) B.W. Tuckman enumerates five stages of groups development: shaping, demolishing, standards setting, effectiveness and activity ending phase. (Tuckman 1997, pp. 419-427).
When planning the component of land forces one should, first of all, be driven by the organizational cycle\(^2\) which is known in theory and supported by practice and which makes up a logical system consisting of the following five stages:

1. Defining a clear and precisely described objective.
2. Examination of resources and conditions to be implemented/met to achieve the intended aim - planning of operations.
3. Preparation of forces, resources and conditions treated as vital to accomplish the benchmarked tasks.
4. Fulfilment, i.e. completion (execution) of intended tasks in accordance with the scheduled action plan.
5. Control of results and drawing of conclusions. (Zieleniewski 1981)

This cycle is applied almost in all branches of an organizational functioning; it can also be used for devising structural changes in land forces.

Planning an organization, as H. Bieniok claims, should always be characterized with a multiple-variant and multidimensional nature. It is advisable to perform an organization upgrade using a few options, as follow:

1. Elimination of superfluous elements of structure and human activity. It belongs to one of the most advantageous and desired ways of an organization’s enhancement. Elimination of redundant elements of activity leads to specialization enabling increasing the repeatability degree to optimum limits and thus to economization of activities.

\(^2\) Henry Louis Chatelier (1850-1936) – French chemist, physicist and organizer – the author of the organizational cycle.
2. Replacement (substitution, redeployment, etc.), consisting in replacement of a given element of an organization with another element, more efficiently striving for the goal and more adapted to needs and surrounding conditions.

3. Merging (uniting, integration, fusion, also increasing), is an activity consisting in spatial, temporal or functional integration of at least two objects or subjects of an operation to obtain the improvement of efficiency of their joint operation.

4. Dividing (separation, distribution, disintegration, also decreasing), based on breaking down of a given complex wholeness or a team into smaller elements to attain higher joint efficiency of operation of the whole system. It means work division into simpler component elements and assigning them for execution to specialized organs/agencies (team division, for example in case of excessive range of control), also separation of executors not adapted to each other with some regard is a frequent and very effective way of task streamlining.

5. Simplification (generalization, modification), following the idea that specified aims should be attained with simplest possible means and resources, providing it does not result in a decrease of the product quality or diminishing of the operational efficiency of the given entirety. The object or activity which is somehow simple, not complicated, inflicts less difficulty to the subject of operation as well as also to the organ heading up/controlling this operation (especially team operation). Simplification is achieved by means of analysis and separation of a given object or operation into simple elements and then through elimination of unnecessary elements.

The newly arising structure marks the functioning frames and responds to the concept promoted, in the theory of management, of multidimensional organizational structures. (Mreła 1989, p. 14) This model takes for granted the building of the organizational

- configuration including the shape of structures, roles and organizational positions;
- centralization which characterizes the distribution of decision entitlements on particular stages, levels of hierarchic structure of the grouping;
- specialization of duties and task division amongst the elements of an organization;
- standardization showing the typical character of operations and behavior in conduct processes as well as repeatability of procedures;
- formalization including the system of patterns and/or rules of operation which are set forth in regulations and normative documents.

The analysis of the foregoing planes shows that they find their full reflection in the process of forming up of the land forces component with regard to tactical operations. Centralization, specialization, standardization and formalization constitute peculiar determinants allowing them to be described. However it does not result explicitly from the essence of devising of the land forces component whether it is an enduring or interim structure. Recent years’ observations prove that the answer to the foregoing question is not unequivocal. Often during execution of long-term tasks there is a need for reorganization and implementation of changes in the task realization; additionally a change in the very task may also take place. It should be viewed as a natural phenomenon, resulting from the very character of tasks which change in the course of the conducting of tactical operations by task forces as a result of factors which are independent of their executors.
The military literature contains many examples taking into account the need of selection of appropriate means and resources to execute operations. Most frequently, depending on the planned tasks, there is a discussion about the setting up of task forces. In literature we can meet such terms as: combined weapons, warfare of combined weapons, battalion tactical and combat grouping, combat team, combat group or task forces. On the basis of results of the comparative analysis of the subject literature one can assume that the land forces component performing tactical operations stands for means and resources of troops intentionally formed up to complete a concrete task or a group of tasks. Such forces are made up appropriately for the operation objective, and more precisely for the character of tasks, method of their implementation and determinants which, according to forecasts, may appear in the course of their realization. In order to unify the notional apparatus the author uses the term ‘task forces’ from the point of view of specificity of the troops’ tasks in principal tactical operations.

Generalizing, we can assume that units of the land component are formed up to achieve the best efficiency of tasks’ execution under the existing conditions. The structure of land forces tactical groupings should be characterized with elasticity and should respond to existing demands and conditions of the contemporary battlefield.

Referring to present-day tactical operations, forming up of land forces groupings is a particularly difficult project if we take into account appropriate distribution of means and resources, insertion of elements of the combat grouping, the place and role of troops in the formation, the order of their involvement in the warfare as well as efficiency of the operation. Such elements as the use of warfare principles, meeting the requirement of the enhancement of operations, the simultaneous influence on the whole depth of the enemy's combat formation, manoeuvring with the formation
elements as well as rational utilization of the combat potential on one hand give the commanding officer a large scope of independency, and on the other hand specific difficulties in the choice and distribution of forces. In the area of making up of land forces formations there arise definite problems relating to efficient command of different groups which is affected first of all by:

- mission aim;
- number of combat groupings;
- specificity of tasks;
- variants of operation;
- prospective enemy;
- correlation of the formation elements;
- volume of information;
- informative ties.

Troops’ operations in foreign/overseas missions provided a new picture of contemporary operations, conducted in a dynamic, precise and systemic way and using modern technology. In the subject literature such operations are called network-centric warfare in which the basic role is played by information. In such operations the speed of acquiring information from the whole area of operation, their exactness and efficient use in the command process, connected with execution of precise attacks on the enemy's most important objects, makes up denial of traditional concentrated attacks and classic battles for consecutive grounds or objects. The analyses conducted of the troops’ use in operations of critical response abroad shows that the variety of tasks as well as the character of operations, so to say, cause the structures of modern-day land forces to be characterized with elasticity, mobility, and the ability to conduct operations independently and in co-operation with structures of other branches of armed forces (national and allied).
The elasticity of structures should first of all assure the possibility of easy establishment of any tactical and operation groups to be suitable for the assigned tasks. It should be affirmed that the contemporary structures do not assure opportunities which especially on the tactical level guarantee independence during task execution. The reasons of such a state of affairs include:

- heterogeneous military hardware;
- shortage of support and security assets (example: operations in-depth);
- limitations in the area of communications equipment;
- potentiality of tactical level staffs in the area of planning and controlling the operations of the branches of own armed forces and supporting forces.

As a result of the research conducted it can be assumed that functional elements are and will be formed up to be used in tactical operations home and abroad. Each time they can be diverse or change in the course of their construction. Such forces are created depending on the following elements:

- kind of task or operation mandate;
- character of tactical operations;
- potential enemy;
- type, forms and methods of planned operations;
- political - military situation;
- climate - geographical conditions;
- possibilities of organizational structures with regard to founding functional elements.

The essence of the building of the land forces component is the underlying cause of the thesis that depending on the content of the assigned task an adequate functional structure is formed up which is destined for that particular task completion. Additionally it is
posited that task forces should be able to conduct autonomic operations in allocated areas of responsibility.

While building task forces it is important to realize difficulties resulting from barriers and fears of changes (or of new challenges) resulting from innovative changes. Appearing barriers negatively influence the process of task forces building. When forming up national forces as well as multinational ones, such barriers include: organizational, technical, psychological and temporal obstacles. (*Ibid*, p. 98) It is more difficult in case of construction of multinational task forces. Unfortunately Polish COs of divisions and brigades experienced such situations in stabilization missions in Iraq.

The stances of particular contributors worked out during negotiations, and in fact limitations with regard to using individual national components used to give the Polish COs sleepless nights. In the context of multinational forces, the political and cultural barriers should additionally be taken into account. This is why the considerations relating to forming up of task forces should be viewed from the angle of not only needs but also possibilities, especially in the context of multinational forces.

According to J. Wołejszo, from a point of view of the strategy of structures devising (*Wołejszo 2003, p. 66*) the building of task forces structures can be done using various methods as: diagnostic, prognostic, diagnostic - prognostic and functional. While choosing the method of setting up of tactical formation structures a compromise between those methods seems recommended. (*Zawadzki 1997, pp. 32-36*) It results from the need of description of the real situation (for example the state of munitions and forces, losses to date, the quantity of the basic battle equipment, information about the enemy, battleground characteristics, etc.) as well as the forecast of the course of future combat operations. This state of affairs allows for foreseeing needs and objectives
within the scope of the building of tactical formations. (Mazurek et al. 2002, p. 49)

The essence of building of task forces consists in achieving the synergy effect. The potential of individual elements of the task forces structure should enable the use of combat possibilities (for example attack and fire) managed by an appropriate, coherent command system. The structure of task forces should be flexible and should make it possible to conduct various operations in changing conditions.

Conclusions from experiences from other states show that task forces should be formed up from two principal elements: the base subunit called the core of task forces and the optional module. The core is usually created on the basis of the following subunits: mechanized, motorized, tanks, airmobile or other subunits depending on needs. The main determinant deciding about the selection of the base subunit is the kind of operation (task character) as well as the objective to be achieved during operations. The base subunit determines the style of operation and the method to attain the aim. When planning the use of task forces one should take into account the specificity of all elements affecting the task execution (for example the principles of the forces use and rules of engagement). However the operation tactics will be subordinated and somehow imposed by the base subunit. This is why when analysing the assigned task, one should clearly define its tactical operation parameters as well as its specificity which in consequence will lead to the choice of the base subunit of the task group as well as the optional module. The change of the task character or conditions of its realization may lead to the necessity of modifying the composition of the optional module or even to changing the base subunit. The selection of elements of the optional module results mainly from:

1. Type of existing and future threats;
2. Conditions of task execution, including:

* location of task forces in the structure of the operation component;
* forecast time of operation and needs with regard to autonomy of operation;
* legal aspects of the forces use (mandate, status of forces, international agreements, rules of engagement);
* needs relating to reconnaissance and fire support;
* environment (terrain, climatic conditions).

The condition of carrying out self-sufficient operations of land forces is the forming up of combat modules (task groups) whose basis is made up by battalions. The combat subunits on the tactical level (tactical combat groups) are replenished [recruited] with support and operations security subunits. (Ibid, point 5006) However the training of such subunits should be closely connected with the training cycle of combat modules - task groups (tactical combat groups). Such exercises should consist in thorough correlation and accommodation of their operations to the needs of the task group. (Ibid, point 5007)

Recapitulating, it should be affirmed that in the course of the forming up of task forces structures we cannot assert that there are enduring and invariable structures of troops or template ways of operations. These two approaches are dependent on a concrete political-military situation, geographic-climatic conditions as well as assigned tasks. Undoubtedly experiences to date show that considering foreign military operations, the building of land forces structures should go toward forming up of light units, equipped with military assets which are easy to relocate and possessing practical potential of power play (defeating enemy's forces), by means of stabilizing the situation in the crisis region. In other words, a difficult environment, like for example an urbanized
terrain, woodland or mountainous area, means that soldiers must efficiently not only fight in the specific warfare environment but also execute tasks connected with stabilization missions or providing relief aid. Therefore military formations assigned to operations connected with overcoming a crisis should be able and prepared to perform various functions of special character. The research conducted confirms a thesis that structures and methods of operation of the land forces tactical groups in their principal tactical operations will be selected for a specific task and objective to be realized in concrete surroundings.

Proposals of changes in land forces structures
Among many changes defining the future operation possibilities of land forces, it is vital to make battalions independent and unassisted because battalions, according to numerous military theoreticians, are the basic organizational and training module of land forces which is a factor deciding the strength of brigades and divisions.

The analysis of the battalion structural elements as well as research conducted during exercises show (Wrzosek 2003, p. 6) that this organization does not meet the functionality requirements which in consequence creates the necessity of modifications during planning and tactical operations stages (tactical battle groups on the battle field, tactical task forces in foreign military operations).

The expansion of "the battle hard core" extorts strengthening of logistic subunits and the command. This is why maybe it is worth considering the issues of functional modification and building of the battalion structure with a larger number of combat companies, alternatively the introduction of combined structure, for example mechanized/tanks companies and maybe additionally the infantry company. Moreover, the battalion structure should also include: a support company equipped with light mortars, reconnaissance
elements (UAVs), anti-tank platoon equipped with PPK Spike, light anti-aircraft systems as well as the command and logistic support element. Following the foregoing analysis the current organizational structure of our battalions obliges the forming up of various structural variants as well as additional functional elements depending on the assigned task and conditions of its execution.

According to J. Zieliński battalions should fulfil the following basic condition: they should possess large fire and manoeuvre potential. At present, mechanized battalions as well as tank ones are equipped with larger than before quantities of munitions. On the basis of reorganized units, 58-AFVs battalions in brigades were formed up. Such a solution makes it possible to plan reserve forces, additional elements of the combat formation as well as tactical groupings of combined structure. That is why preparation of battalions for independent operations becomes a vital question, particularly with regard to guaranteeing the continuity of command and logistic support.

S. Koziej asserts that such independent battalions are capable of forming up autonomous brigades with regard to tactics (being tactical units) and in turn united into higher tactical units, which means divisions. (Koziej 1993, p. 45) Lack of such solutions in our land forces hinders undertaking effective operations in conditions of the contemporary battlefield, including co-operation on the tactical level as part of international forces. However the formation of stronger battalions, brigades and divisions meant decreasing the general number of tactical units in land forces to three combined-arms divisions and several independent brigades.

Any changes in battalions’ structure and equipment cause explicit consequences on the level of brigades which originally should present large independence, mobility and ability to conduct autonomous operations. Therefore a brigade should be self-dependent to such an extent as to be able to execute tasks without the need of engagement of outside means and forces. It should
also be anticipated that in near future the brigade structure will include helicopters as well as the means of electronic warfare.

Regardless of the proposed solutions, the brigade configuration should result from assigned tasks as well as characteristics of its munitions. It appears that the brigade should base its operations on tactical groupings, created on the basis of battalions supported with the branches’ equipment. The foregoing change of destination of the brigade organizational structure shows the need of the change of the character and equipment of battalions. Since they are going to be the basis of the brigade operations then their internal structure and combat potential should enable transforming them into tactical groups. These groups should have a character adapted to the environment of operations.

From the point of view of tactical operations the most convenient solution is formation of the brigade structure consisting of 5 battalions: 2 mechanized battalions, 1 tank battalion and 2 motorized battalions. That is why brigade commanders possessing five elements of the combat grouping may easily plan the delaying actions in the area of covering force, to organize strong defence of the main battle area, to prepare counter-attack, to increase the defence and to assure the freedom of operation in the back zone as well as to create additional elements in the battle order (for example the anti-airborne landing reserve, the Tactical Airborne Landing or the Strike-Landing Group). The present structure assures only the template solutions relating to defence or attack planning, the so-called three-field system [in Polish: trójpolówka]. The very idea of the forming up of four tactical groups from three battalions is as accurate approach as possible, however there are doubts relating to the commanding of such a group (i.e. who will be the commanding officer - the company commander or deputy commander of the battalion), operations planning (no staff), providing of signal services or logistic support.
The analysis conducted showed clear discrepancies in the area of needs and possibilities of the forming up of a combat formation within the existing structures of land forces. Under the Polish military regulations a formation means planning and deployment of munitions and forces in the field appropriately to attain the objective (conception) of fighting a battle. Besides defining this notion, our national regulations’ solutions specify elements which are elements of the combat formation. The accepted division of these elements into basic and additional, as well as such elements which are organized in specific combat environments raises many doubts. The analysis of the first group of elements, i.e. the basic ones, enables the drawing of a conclusion that these are mostly homogeneous elements, i.e. they organizationally make up a specific branch unit. The exception includes the first attack and the combined arms reserve which is not usually organizationally homogeneous. This example proves the wrong criterion of division, i.e. the reference to the organizational structure of forces waging war (Huzarski 1999, p. 40) and not to the functional division. That is why for the tasks of particular elements of the combat it should be underlined that a combat formation is established suitably to attain the posited aim having in mind the enemy’s character of operations, its thrust lines and the munitions potential. It should guarantee the stability of defence and simultaneously it should enable flexible and quick modifications reflecting the changes occurring on the battlefield. It permits focus on the combat effort in the selected region. It also contributes to outgunning and/or advance of forces.

Facing tendencies aiming at reduction of the volume of possessed munitions and forces as well as improving their quality, special attention must be paid to the rational utilization of the possessed combat power. Therefore each variant of the formation should

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also result from concrete surrounding factors. The essential aspects exerting significant influence on the selection of the specific variant of the formation include but are not limited to:

- character of combat operations and the place in the superior's formation;
- location of troops at the moment of the task receipt;
- enemy’s activity;
- conception of fighting the battle;
- lay of the land as well as the rate of replacements and training of manpower.

Giving an example - alongside the currently binding structures a classic formation of a MD consists of two brigades in the first echelon/attack and the third one in the reserve (uncommitted force) - most frequently an armoured brigade. Trying to maintain the readiness to execute repeatedly changing tasks, the composition of the defensive formation still has to be unceasingly modified. The reason for quantitative changes may result from decisions taken whereas the qualitative changes result from the needs of introduction to the armed forces of new munitions and supporting elements. Making various ‘reshuffles’ concerns to a larger degree the composition of the combat elements, whereas the special elements present more stability. Moreover some doubts are raised by the fact of forces acting in the forward area of the corps. On the basis of exercise experience the following brigades are recommended for such operations: independent, airmobile and airborne. However from the effectiveness of a combat operations point of view of a brigade, conducting delaying actions of about 250 km width and 100 km depth does not constitute any threat for the enemy's predominant forces. Operations of airmobile forces in such an area will contribute to holding of facilities, disorganizing of the enemy's approach and canalizing its movements. In the end, having finished the delaying operations the airmobile elements stay in the area occupied by the enemy and they undertake
asymmetrical operations. This is the most acceptable/correct approach from the point of view of the tactics of these branches. It is not rational to send transport helicopters to evacuate troops from the battlefield due to the threat from the enemy's side. On the other side the exploitation of all airmobile and airborne elements at this stage of the fight will deprive the CO of the initiative during counterattack. Therefore it is so important at this stage to implement the principles of the art of war and first of all the economy of power. From another point of view planning delaying actions for one of three divisions in the area of the corps defence means that we will get rid of the strategic reserve to execute the counterattack or to develop the defence in depth.

To attain the advance on force over the enemy one can create different variants of the formation and this may require making it independent of the formed up tactical groupings so as to enable them to execute assigned tasks even in the situation of losing contact with the main forces. Instead of one strong reserve it is sometimes better to form up two - three smaller combined arms reserves and several specialist reserves on particular lines of operations.

On the level of the higher tactical unit (troop) it is assumed that the tactical grouping consists of the following elements (Taktyka ogólna [General tactics] p. 78): first echelon, combined arms reserve (reserves), the artillery group formation, air defence unit (subunit), reconnaissance elements, the anti-tank reserve, barrage troop, command posts, reserves of other branches, troops (subunits) and logistical support/devices. Additionally one can form up: allocated troop, tactical airborne landing force, landing-shock troops, anti-landing reserve, rescue – evacuation troop (fig. 1 and 2).
Fig. 1. Disposition of a brigade combat team’s units in defence (created by the author based on research).
Fig. 2. Brigade in offensive operations (created by the author based on research).
Such large number of elements of the tactical grouping cannot be organized in any conditions of the battlefield. The CO should each time identify these elements of the formation which would enable him to achieve the aim of the battle. This also results from the combat potential and the organizational structure of the higher tactical unit and subordinate troops. Forming up a tactical grouping one should depart from the principle of concentration of troops/fire in appropriate locality and time for considerable mobility of troops combined with accurate synchronization of all elements of the division tactical grouping.

At present, under the peaceful organizational structure of land troops there are subunits, units and higher tactical units. Subunits make up the smallest organizational link and it is assumed that they should consist of homogeneous munitions and troops. According to W. Kaczmarek such division, however, raises certain reservations: … [such division] is incoherent, and what is most important, it does not result from the needs of conducting modern warfare but rather from administrative needs. (Kaczmarek 1999, p. 32) Moreover, as results from considerations to date the currently functioning structural models on tactical levels prefer ternary structure, with relatively firm combat potential. For example the primary combat skeleton of every mechanized division is made up from three brigades - two mechanized and one armoured. Military experts' opinions as well as results of practical verification of the abovementioned structures show that such a solution is not functional. Namely it imposes some limitations on the use of the possessed potential and negatively affects the freedom in forming up of the tactical grouping. (Huzarski 1995, p. 8) The foregoing premises substantiate the necessity of making changes in structures on the tactical level.

A right concept realized by the land troops is the concept of functioning of two components: heavy and light. The heavy component includes armoured and mechanized brigades together
with branches’ units. Whereas the light component includes air cavalry, assault/landing brigade as well as brigades equipped with wheeled APCs. On the basis of this it appears that the light component is formed at the cost of reducing the number of units planned for operations within the borders of the country.

The necessity of possessing extremely mobile, light troops makes up some challenge for the land forces resulting from international obligations. The essential determinant of operational potential includes: possibility of troops’ quick and efficient movement over large distances, as well as possession of modern munitions and equipment which should assure the professional execution of tasks. At present the following troops possess such potential: landing/assault troops, air cavalry units and, as a result of broadening of our foreign commitment, two mechanized troops (12th and 17th Mechanized Brigades and 21st Highlanders’ Rifle Brigade).

Generalizing the presented research results of this study, one can perceive a considerable scale of changes taking place in tactical operations which influences deep and multidirectional needs of adaptation of existing structures of land forces to challenges and requirements conditioning the adequate execution of military tasks. This is an undertaking requiring from executors perfect planning and organizational skills, the effect of which should be the transformation of the land forces structure to date into a new, more functional organization.

Changes in "enduring” structures of land forces of the “P” time should have a complex and continuous character. It results from way the modification of the lower level structures causes definite consequences at superior levels. Moreover, every change of the scope and character of tasks to be executed requires verification of organizational structures, equipment and the training range of the land troops.
The land forces’ operational capacity in the third - airborne dimension – acquires critical importance. Such potential is guaranteed by helicopters of various type and purpose. The currently used helicopters, on account of working out of the target service norm, will enable the security of the land forces without reducing their potential during the next several years. Taking into consideration the experience connected with the introduction of F-16 fighters it should be underlined that the launching of the National Helicopter Program becomes the vital factor affecting operational potential of the land forces.

Analysis always refers to the detailed situation of the country, such as geopolitical location, cultural and historical heritage and experiences. Other important elements are economic abilities and future threat prognosis. In the Polish reality both experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan operations and current geopolitical eastern European challenges are taken into consideration.

Nevertheless the analysis of the complex range of tactical operations and resulting tasks shows that the main areas of changes in the land forces structures should concern the following aspects:

- change of organization and subordination of land forces units;
- launching of the module structure of brigades;
- increasing the number of battalions in brigades (to 4-5);
- removal of non-prospective equipment and its replacement with the new generation of munitions and military equipment;
- possibility of support of operations in depth;
- increasing of the combat potential and manoeuvrability of subunits;
• increasing of the efficiency in the area of support on the level of subunits and brigades;
• reinforcement of higher tactical units with helicopter flights;
• establishment of qualitatively new elements of reconnaissance;
• assurance of quick, safe and unfailing communication on the tactical level;
• reorganization of the training process.

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RUSSIA’S HYBRID WAR IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

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ABSTRACT The warfare is evolving and it is confirmed by last conflicts in which Russia was involved. They were asymmetric in nature and their objectives, developments, consequences in broader sense and end states have been a matter of research by many scholars. The nature of those conflicts is causing concerns and a question if there were randomly run or just perfectly synchronized operations? If so, should a hybrid war be considered a way of strategy and its objectives seen through the prism of the Russia’s interests? The answer to this question can be obtained after the evaluation of the theory and practice employed by the Russian Federation in the concept of hybrid war. This is the purpose of this article. The results of the research are presented by solving the following problem: What does the concept of the new generation warfare mean?

Introduction

Preparation for future conflicts requires serious tracing of events and drawing of appropriate lessons from the past. Particular attention should be paid to the blended threats and hybrid wars that are successfully carried out by the Islamic State and the Russian Federation (FR) within the Ukrainian conflict. Hybrid war defined as a combination of conventional methods and irregular
formations, asymmetric tactics, and terrorism with actions of a criminal nature, is a unique form of planned and synchronized impact on the opposite side through military and non-military instruments (Hoffman 2009).

Observation of the conflict in the Ukraine entitles anyone to say that it was a flawed argument that hybrid warfare has been conducted by non-state actors who represent a weaker side in the conflict. Theorists of the art of warfare and military experts on the basis of the experience involving Chechens, Hezbollah or the Tamil Tigers recognized how big challenges are being posed by multi-modal warfare. However, some of them have criticized the concept of hybrid warfare indicating that tactical problems have no relevance to a strategy and warriors having nearly mystical powers do not exist in reality (Kapugeekiyana 2014, p. 1).

It is difficult to agree with this opinion if we follow the conflict in practice which took place during the last few years in Ukraine. Attentive observers of the conflict have certainly noticed that Russian aggression in Ukraine was expressed by a combination of regular and irregular forms of warfare, economic sanctions, political destabilization, information warfare, financial pressures and finally cyber-attacks (Maigre 2015, p. 2). Were the above-mentioned spheres of influence random or just perfectly synchronized? If so, should a hybrid war be considered a way of strategy and its objectives seen through the prism of the Russia’s interests (Koffman & Rojanski 2015, p. 1)? The answer to this question can be obtained after the evaluation of the theory and practice employed by the Russian Federation in the concept of hybrid war. This is the purpose of this article. The results of the research are presented by solving the following problem: What does the concept of the new generation warfare mean?
War in Ukraine

The campaign against Ukraine was conducted for many years by diplomatic, political, economic and information means. One can notice its severity after W. Yanukovich’s fall. It was expressed by a concentration of Russian armed forces nearby the Russian – Ukrainian borderline and the emergence of the so-called “green men” in Crimea who seized all the important state facilities, including those of military origin just within 24 hours. A similar scenario took place in April 2014 in Donetsk and Lugansk, when a group of demonstrators seized the state and police facilities and then declared themselves the separatists, thus expressing their strong dissatisfaction with the new government in Kiev.

Consequently, the Russian Federation without a single shot being fired has made rapid annexation of the Crimea; and Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts were proclaimed two independent republics. These actions were supported by a well-coordinated and intensive media campaign conducted on the territory of Ukraine and abroad, pressure to use concentrated regular detachments of the Russian armed forces, and pressure to cut off the gas supply. Unprecedented and very well-coordinated actions of Russian soldiers, pro-Russian local separatists, the media and diplomacy were described by many experts as hybrid warfare (Rácz 2015, p.11).

The concept of hybrid war gives the luxury of a wide range of possible choices of one or more actions like, for example, aggregated impacts in cyberspace, information space or even criminal activities involving kidnapping (Winiecki 2014) and killings. Such actions are usually spread over time and give the impression that they are not connected together in any way. They create ambiguity, because it is impossible to recognize those ones who really stand behind them. The flexibility of the instruments inherent in hybrid warfare inadvertently creates good conditions
for politicians to become involved. The politicians are those who achieve the desired goals by applying a special strategy and tactics in war. In this case, therefore, Clausewitz’s warfare paradigm applies which says that war is the continuation of policy by other means (Clauzewitz, p. 483).

In Ukraine, there appears uncertainty and ambiguity expressed by Clausewitz as the “fog of war” and ubiquitous friction (Clauzewitz, p. 45). It turns out to be true that war is the realm of uncertainty; three-quarters of the factors on which action is based are wrapped in a fog (Górecki, p. 89). The new tactics that are based on the hybrid sequence of improvisations of disproportional and incomparable impacts in various spheres and in various geographic areas along with the conventional attributes of war, for example tanks and artillery, at the same time conducting humanitarian convoys creates an effect of the so-called nonlinearity and causes consternation not only on the attacked side, but also among politicians and policy-makers from international organizations. The effectiveness of hybrid war is expressed in the fact that only in the spring ministerial session, in June 2015, NATO came to the conclusion that in the Ukrainian conflict the Russian Federation is the aggressor (Sekretarz Generalny NATO […] 2015). Perhaps it was easy to associate what was the purpose of the action and who stood behind the cyber-attacks in the Baltic States and Ukraine, who stood behind the vast disinformation campaign, who stood behind the random forays of fighter-bombers and strategic-bombers in NATO airspace, who played submarine games in the Baltic Sea (Schadlow 2015, p. 2).

Rebellious Wars

Into the new nature of actions applied by the Russian Federation in Ukraine many actors are involved and they have various measures of influence at their disposal. They are inspired and
supported from outside by those who do not take direct part in the conflict and do not want to be associated with it. In the 60s of the last century this model of actions was described in detail by the theorist and strategist of the art of warfare J. Messner (Sykulski 2015, p. 105) in his book *Rebellious Wars* (Месснер 2005). J. Messner, while pointing to the nature of the wars of the late 20th century and early 21st century predicted the spread of international terrorism and the unpreparedness of state structures to withstand these kinds of threats. Messner’s concept told about blurring of the differences between the states of war and peace, between regular and irregular activities.

According to the Russian strategist, the basic form of fighting the so-called rebellious wars were irregular activities under which one can mention diversions, sabotage, terrorism, guerrilla activities and uprisings (Месснер 2005, pp. 90-91). In the new form of armed conflicts which are called rebellious conflicts, not only the military will take part, but also civilian bodies and ordinary citizens who are involved in national movements, insurgent movements and rebellions.

This phenomenon can be considered from different points of view; however, the most important here is psychological one. In regular armies psychology does not matter much, but if anything, it plays a complementary role. Nevertheless, for fighting insurgents, separatists, terrorists or rebels, psychology plays a crucial role. Messer argues that guerrilla and terrorist wars will be separate types of wars and they will be called *psychological wars* (Месснер 2005, p. 12).

Psychology of the rebellious masses in the rebellious wars will eclipse regular forces’ equipment and will become the deciding factor between victory and defeat. Messner claims that the psychological effect should be achieved not only through the usage of surprising strategy and tactics aimed at enemy troops but also at hostile society through intimidation and pressuring, blackmail,

Messner believes that new forms of armed conflict will be of revolutionary character (Месснер 2005, p. 420) which is called half-warfare. He indicates that aggressive diplomacy will play a big role in such half-warfare which he compares to a weaker form of war. He calls diplomacy the politics in white gloves that utilises various forms of intimidation, imposing will or negotiations on every important issue (Месснер 2005, p. 110). Diplomacy will be linked with subversive activities. In such half-warfare, partisans will take part or the so-called fifth column, terrorists, subversives, saboteurs, hooligans, devastators and propagandists who use the means of mass information. Demonstrations and manifestations, disorder, terror, rebellion recruitment will aim at changing the mentality of people and constructing a new social system.

The purpose of the rebellious war strategy is to destabilize state structures and consequently to lead to the collapse of the state. Omnipresent chaos is a characteristic feature of the rebellious war. The defending side cannot be abstracted from the chaos as it is possible to do in the case of conventional wars. Nobody knows where the attacking side and where the defending side will be located. There will be no possibility of physical separation of those objects. There will be no visible borders between the warring parties in the cities where future conflicts will take place. Chaos will not be created accidentally but in an organized, structured and thoughtful way by the central management representatives. The most important factor in future wars will be the belief that there is a just cause to overcome the opponents’ fighting spirit.

J. Messner claims that subversive war (Cierniak 2012) is a psychological war and its objective is to defeat the mind and spirit of an attacked nation and to defeat its consciousness (Месснер 2005, p. 394). The above statement gives the conclusion
that in the rebellious war psychology of the masses moves regular army weapons aside and becomes a deciding factor between victory and defeat. Admittedly, there are ways of exerting influence on the opposite side’s actions by violence and intimidation, by terroristic and partisan actions, but classical weapons play a supporting role.

The philosophy of substitute weapons can be compared to pornography, drugs or brainwashing. In the past wars the most important was to capture and keep a territory. In modern wars the most important is to conquer the minds of society in an enemy country. In the past wars enemies were separated by the front line; in future wars there will be a lack of boundaries between the fighting sides and the theatre of operations, between the society and the fighting sides. The fight will take place throughout the territory of the enemy, and behind the front like there will appear political, social and economic warfare. There will be no distinction between legal and illegal ways of warfare and the latter will gain in importance. Regular forces will lose their monopoly on military operations which will bring us closer to new forms of warfare, breaking the law and ethics of war (Месснер 2005, p. 70). A new fourth dimension will appear which will constitute the psyche of the fighting nation (Месснер 2005, p. 135 & p. 395). The people involved will be guided and supported logistically and financially from the outside by a state which would neither be officially involved nor be a side of the conflict.

J. Messner believes that both classical and rebellious (revolutionary) warfare is an art. Considering the new generation war as a strategist is in more difficult situation because of the abundance of goals of its value and importance. Messner offers the following hierarchy of objectives (Месснер 2005, p. 132): 1) breaking the hostile nation’s unity (lowering its morale); 2) overcoming an active part of nation, namely the part which is able to wage the armed struggle i.e. regular forces, guerrilla, fighting
national organizations; 3) seizing or destruction of objects valuable from a psychological point of view; 4) seizing or destruction of objects of material value; 5) achieving the externalities i.e. winning over new allies or weakening enemy’s allies.

At the same time, efforts should be made to: 1) strengthen the unity of one’s own nation; 2) protect own nation’s forces; 3) avoid negative repercussions in neutral (but important for one’s own interests) countries. In all cases, it is important to take into account not only the response of the government of the opposing state and selected fighting social groups but above all the response of the whole society. The paramount goal of rebellious strategic war is an enslavement of the hostile nation in a psychological way rather than a physical one by destroying its fundamental ideology, causing doubts, disappointment and dejection, confirming themselves in the victory of our ideas and eventually conviction that they are predominant.

The means for achieving those goals is propaganda. Propaganda is not only about winning a victory by means of weapons or terrorism. J. Messner believed that the end of the 20th century ended the era of classic wars in Clausewitz’s meaning as a clash of two opposing forces. War takes the rebellious form without frontline and military columns. Success or failure will depend on the spirit of the nation (Месснер 2005, p. 118). Messner believed that there will be no direct clash of two powers with weapons of mass destruction. As the history has shown, Messner’s words proved fully true. He claimed that the idea of a total breakdown of the opponent’s manpower is an anachronism rather than a modern strategy. One cannot take the life of an entire nation if it is involved in a fight (Месснер 2005, p. 129). Instead, one should think about breaking the psyche of the opposing side, says Messner (Месснер 2005, p. 130). The era of keeping a conquered territory has ended. Today, the most important thing is to maintain control over strategic objects and the aim is not a routing the
enemy but the imposition of our will of victory upon him. It is tried to be achieved with all possible ways: military, information, economic and diplomatic. In such a war, mass troops with the accumulated technology and logistics facilities are useless.

Messner assumed that the main means of warfare is agitation. He distinguished between offensive agitation aimed at weakening the enemy and defensive agitation aimed at reinforcing the fighting spirit (Месснер 2005, p. 134). He was a supporter of half-truths and he stated that one half-truth belongs to our own nation and the other one belongs to the enemy, therefore, a war requires an art of the waging of the psychological dimension (Месснер 2005, p. 135).

To conclude, it is worth saying that in the rebellious war only one side has strategic purpose and management. The other side does not have it, so without seeing that warfare is taking place it replaces the strategy of hostile war with the strategy of peace. Such a situation clearly contradicts one of the fundamental war principles which states that one should firmly anticipate the enemy’s actions or resist the enemy’s attack.

**War in Chechnya**

W. Nemeth while presenting his assessment of the war in Chechnya argues that the armed forces of the contemporary society reflect this society. He claims that as a result of long-running conflict, the society evaluated and transformed into a hybrid society. This society also organized hybrid armed forces, which constituted a major challenge for the opposing side especially militarily. Nemeth compares hybrid war to the fourth generation war by indicating the weight of terrorism when combined with new technologies (Nemeth 2012, p. 3).
W. Nemeth claims that Chechens have successfully used the regular subdivisions which in turn used irregular tactics and guerrilla warfare. It is surprising that they used the skills of easy methods of transformation and ways of fighting which often took different forms. Ambushes were widely used at the tactical level. However, more sophisticated elements of action such as murder, kidnapping, arson, improvised explosives etc. were successfully introduced (Nemeth 2012, p. 61).

There were no well-defined boundaries between guerrilla and terrorist activities. On the example of Chechnya one can trace how the armed groups in underdeveloped societies use new ways to integrate their activities with highly developed technologies and adapt to the tactics of the enemy. It makes the fight more effective.

The nature of the activities described above clearly confirms Messner’s predictions about the methods, ways and forms of fighting in the future wars. Messner’s statement on the importance of psychological influence has been confirmed. Through the usage of mobile radio and television, Chechens combined successfully the new possibilities of guerrilla activities and reduced effectively the morale of Russian soldiers. Knowing perfectly the rules of the Russian psyche, Chechens were able to effectively strike the Russian society while remaining resistant to any attempt to break the resistance. An anti-Russian climate, ethnic unity and the most important – strong religion and public support for the fighters caused the Russian propaganda to be ineffective (Nemeth 2012, p. 62).

In Chechnya the modern media was used in a very skilful way. It was used as an effective means of command as well as disinformation. Through the media Chechens controlled the society of the opposing side. Through the skilful propaganda they effectively affected both the fighting soldiers and the rest of the society of the opposing side. Nemeth indicates the following
sources of power of the hybrid war (Nemeth 2012, p. 74): 1) ideas; 2) charisma of the leaders and particular rebels; 3) resistance of the society and people who fights to suffering and severe punishments; 4) strong belief in their cause; 5) decentralization of tactics.

Hybrid warfare in Chechnya took the form of total war as the people fought for their existence and had a strong belief in the cause of the struggle. The side which fought against the hybrid society always paid a high price in the form of damaged supplies of food and water as well as terror and massacres (Nemeth 2012, p. 74). As Messner underlines, the rebellious war has no front line, therefore, it is naive to say that the Chechen war took place only in the territory of Chechnya. War activities were carried out in neighbouring Ossetia and Dagestan. From time to time in the media, even after the official end of the conflict, there were some reports about bomb explosions in Moscow, Volgograd, Voronezh, Astrakhan and many other places. Chechen terrorists have operated under the guise of criminal organisations. They commit crimes throughout Russia in order to take control over its economy. As Messner says, one can only win the rebellious war by overcoming the psyche of the entire opposing nation. There is belief in Russia that people live in a peaceful country and the government does not risk the mobilization of the masses (Мясников 2005, p. 7).

**New- generation Wars**

The development of new technologies in the 90s of the last century created new opportunities of waging armed struggle. Russian General M. Gareev in the book *If War Comes Tomorrow* (Gareev 1998) proposes the thesis that new technologies fundamentally change the character of war. New measures will allow using information better and waging a fight effectively in the
sphere of psychology which was the most important in Messner’s theory.

Messner emphasized that new information and communication measures will allow collecting and processing the information quickly and thus responding in the sphere of information and effective destabilizing of the enemy’s systems of command (Gareev 1998, p. 51-52). He argued that systematic dissemination of psychological and provocative information materials will create Clausewitz’s effect of a fog through blurring the boundaries between the truth and falsehood. Activities of that kind can lead to mass psychosis, a sense of despair and hopelessness, loss of confidence in the government and the national armed forces that as a result lead to the destabilization of the attacked country and the creation of favourable conditions to use other instruments of influence (Gareev 1998, p. 53).

Gareev treated the information war as the decisive element of conflict. On the other hand, new methods of information struggle allow the opposing side to attack without the declaration of war. Those ideas and theses were developed by General W. Slipchenko. He characterized the future war as being non-contact. He argued that the war will begin with precise strikes from the air on the objects of military importance, such as command and control centres, as well as politically and economically significant places throughout the territory of the enemy, without the involvement of armed forces into a direct confrontation (Mattsson & Eklund 2013, p. 37). Similarly to W. Gareev, Slipchenko pointed out the significance of information war and global networking emergence (Mattsson & Eklund 2013, p. 33).

New elements of military tactics and crisis management appear in the Military Doctrine of 2010, but they relate more to the characterization contemporary conflicts than to their own armed forces. The doctrine indicates the integrated use of military and non-military entities along with their resources. It stresses the
importance of the aerospace and information dimensions. It assumes that the information war allows for the achieving of political objectives without using armed forces, or may create the conditions for their use (The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010, p. 7). Another Doctrine of 2014 contains provisions about asymmetric modes of action which allow mitigating the advantage of an opponent, participating in the conflict between irregular subdivisions and private military companies (Sabak 2014). Strong emphasis was placed on the use of political forces and social movements directed and funded from outside (Военная доктрина Российской Федерации 2014).

Changes in the Russian strategists’ views on waging a war can be seen in the articles and public speeches of the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Federation V. Gerasimov. General Gerasimov presented a model of the XXI century war called the war of the new generation, where the main emphasis is on non-military means in order to achieve the political and strategic objectives. Changes in the character of armed conflicts are presented in Figure 1.

In the opinion of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, future armed conflicts, including in the Eurasian area will be of considerably different character than we can see now. (Chief of the General Stuff, Gen. Witalij Gerasimov, 2013)
### Traditional military methods

1. Military action starts when strategic forces are deployed (declaration of war)
2. Frontal clashes between large units comprised mostly of ground units.
3. Defeat of the forces (of enemy), firepower, taking control over regions and bonders to gain territorial control.
4. Destruction of economic power and territorial annexation.
5. Combat operations on land, air and sea.

### New military methods

1. Military action starts by groups of troops/ action groups (battle groups) in time of peace (no declaration of war).
2. Non-contact clashes between varied manoeuvrable military groups.
3. Annihilation of the enemy’s military and economic power by precise short-lived strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure.
4. Massive use of highly precise weapons and special operations, robotics as well as weapons that use new physical principles (direct-energy weapons—lasers, shortwave radiation, etc.)
5. Use of armed civilians (4 civilian to 1 military).
6. Simultaneous strike on the enemy’s units and facilities all over of the territory.
7. Simultaneous battle on land, air, sea, and in the informational space.
8. Use of asymmetric and indirect methods.

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**Fig.1.** Changes in the nature of the armed conflicts. Source: Dave Johnson, *Russia's Approach to Conflict - Implications for NATO's Deterrence and Defence*, Research Paper No. 111, April 2015, p.7.
In February 2013, he wrote that in the 20th century it is possible to observe a blurring of boundaries between war and peace in the classic sense of the notions, and blurring of boundaries between uniformed personnel and activities under the cover. Wars are not declared but simply begin in a unique way. W. Gareev believes that the state could be in uproar within months or even days. Lack of any direct military intervention may lead to civil war, a humanitarian catastrophe and even total collapse of the state. In order to achieve the strategic objectives and policies the non-military means play a greater and greater role because they are more effective than military strikes. Therefore, it is necessary to synchronize instruments of political, economic, information and humanitarian impact. Military means are complementary elements and are means of a camouflaged nature, thus the need for special operations (GRU, FSB, SWR) grows.

Open use of the military forces may take place under the cover of peacekeeping operations or just in the decisive phase of conflict with the purpose of achieving ultimate success as occurred in Crimea. Particularly desirable are various specialized units which are compact, mobile, digitalized, networked, and integrated in the information space. Classic military actions are becoming the past, thus nowadays con-contact attacks from a distance are becoming the main means of achieving operational objectives. The differences between the level of strategic, operational and tactical disappear as well, as well as between offensive and defensive operations. The use of high-precision weapons will have a massive character.

Operations in Libya have shown that the private contractual units of the armed detachments cooperated closely with regular intervening forces and with opposition. Gerasimov, similar to Gareev and Slipchenko, indicates the major role of modern technology, for example DRONE type unmanned aerial vehicles or multi-functional robots. Asymmetric activities neutralizing the
opponent will be widespread. The massive use of special forces and internal opposition supported by information activities will be guided by a permanent army operating all over the territory of a hostile state. The information space will provide a range of opportunities to reduce the opponent’s potential, especially through the use of new technologies and information networking. A non-standard approach to the fight will be crucial in the new-generation wars.

To conclude, we can say that no matter what forces and capabilities the opponent possesses, it will be always possible to select such forms and methods which allow for defeating him in a battle. Yet the opponent will always have sensitivity (weaknesses) that means that it will be possible to find a way to counteract (Герасимов 2013).

As stated in Gerasimov’s speech, the future new-generation wars will be of hybrid character known also as nonlinear, similar to that which takes place in the Ukraine. The new-generation war will have the following characteristics (Dave 2015, p. 8): 1) the majority of the activities will be covered (masked) indirect actions; 2) activity in the information sphere will play a crucial role; 3) large-scale masking operations will be conducted in order to hide the real purpose of war; 4) the role of cooperation between planners involved in the operation will be increased; 5) steering the involved actor’s actions must be done from the central level, and the managers must incorporate a member of the government.

The theory of the new-generation war, alongside Messner and Gerasimov, was also developed by Czekinow and Bogданов. They postulate that new warfare forms and methods will develop with the help of new technologies. They support the thesis with the experience of the war in Iraq in 2003 – 2011. They confirm the statements of the above-mentioned theorists on the importance of contactless strikes from a distance on the most important state facilities throughout its territory, which is an example of non-
contact fighting and the entry into the age of the high technology (Chekinov&Bogdanov 2013, p. 15).

They prove that the technological superiority of arms reduces the quantitative advantage and casts doubt on the possessing of large and heavy armed forces structures which are dominated by a terrestrial component. The consequence of the new technologies’ application is the boundaries blurring between the warring parties and the lack of clear front lines reflecting the nonlinearity of the new-generation war. They confirm the need of joining reconnaissance and fire with the use of radio-electronic operations, information and modern technology. The usage of satellites, networked forces and electronic warfare elements will have a decisive impact on the development of doctrinal usage of the new generation armed forces. Robotics, weapons systems automation, reconnaissance and communications systems efficiency will be extremely helpful in achieving the objectives of the fight (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2013, p. 14).

The above-mentioned specialists confirm Messner’s theory as to the meaning and psychological impact of information indicating that they are primary determinants of weakening morale as well as the will to fight, and thus having an advantage over the opponent. The specialists do not decrease the importance of propaganda in social networks, carried out especially by the so-called trolls and of electronic warfare. They predict that in the new-generation war the fight will take place in the information sphere (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2013, p. 18).

They agree also with Gerasimov and Messner about the need to act in an asymmetric way. They feel that the advantage will be achieved through the combination of political, economic, ecological and informational campaigns in a communal strategy of indirect actions. The usage of those instruments will enable the implementation of new forms, methods and non-military techniques and non-military means of struggle which, combined
with the information fight, will help to gain dominance in all dimensions. The specialists calculate that media, religious organizations, cultural, economic, public, and other entities can lead coordinated attacks on the enemy state (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2013, p. 16). The catalyst for these actions should be special operations. The attacker will have non-military and indirect techniques at their disposal, including cyber-attacks on vulnerable infrastructure systems of the state (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2013, p. 18).

They predict that in future wars non-traditional forms of struggle will be widespread, for example, earthquakes, tornadoes and prolonged rainfalls will be deliberately caused and such a situation can lead to the destruction of the economy and social psyche deterioration of the target country (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2013, p. 14). The above mentioned theorists claim that the new-generation war will be preceded by a long-term planning process. This point of view proves that the conflict in the Ukraine must have been planned long before Yanukovich escaped. On the basis of Bogdanov and Czekinow’s article, the new generation war can be divided into the following phases (Chekinov&Bogdanov 2013, p. 18-20):

**Phase 1.** It starts at least one month before the decisive moment of conflict (it may also take several months and even a few years). It involves non-military asymmetric warfare encompassing psychological, ideological, diplomatic and economic spheres. This phase creates favourable conditions to start the military operation.

**Phase 2.** Special operations are conducted to mislead the political and military leaders regarding the real operational objectives. Well-coordinated measures are carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies; they include leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions. Cyber-attacks may be
successfully carried out as well. The major role in the phase of military action is played by propaganda targeted at the armed forces and the civilian population of a hostile state. The propaganda aims at making chaos, loss of control over the situation by the authorities in the whole country and demoralization in the society. The attacker can use also genetically engineered biological weapons.

Phase 3. The attacker attempts to intimidate the enemy and deceive him. He/she tries to blackmail and bribe the authorities as well as the officers in top positions and to make them abandon their service duties. The attacker manipulates the society to change its behaviour as well as tries to isolate an unsatisfied segment of the society.

Phase 4. Destabilizing propaganda by use of secret services (of agents) to increase discontent among people and to incite them to undertake unlawful activities, cause chaos, panic and make people disobedient towards the legal authorities. In comparison to subversive activities, agents are supported by funds, weapons and materials from outside i.e. by the interested state. Sharpening and deterioration of situation may be the consequence of the armed military groups and aggressive propaganda.

Phase 5. The use of non-military means (before the direct armed forces) by establishment of no-fly zones, imposition of land and sea blockade, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with local armed opposition units.

Phase 6. The start of the military operation is preceded by the reconnaissance and subversive missions conducted under the cover of the information operation. In the troops’ operations there all types of the armed forces
will be applied, including special troops as well as all forms and methods of operation in the aerospace and radio-electronic space. In order to identify the object of strikes and to evaluate their effects, industrial espionage, diplomatic, military as well as aerospace operations, navigations and investigations are used.

**Phase 7.** Multi-day electronic overwhelm combined with aerospace operations using high-precision weapons launched from various platforms, special operations conducted by means of reconnaissance units and military robots. Network-centric missiles from the aerospace, land; air and sea are targeted at communication centres, key military capabilities and industrial facilities. Water, food and energy supplies are cut off which as a result should lead to the opposing side’s surrender. In the new generation war the extensive use of new-generation robots capable of carrying out reconnaissance, gathering and processing information, coordinating troops operations, building defensive positions, destroy the enemy’s fortifications, removing mines and carrying out a decontamination of an area is anticipated.

**Phase 8.** A couple days after the aerospace operations are completed and physical elimination of key facilities is ensured and the majority of the armed manpower, the terrestrial component may be implemented. Military subdivisions are used together with the special troops to roll over the remaining points of resistance.

S. G. Czekinow and S. A. Bogdanov assumed that the final victory in the new-generation war cannot be achieved without the terrestrial component. Therefore the general military subdivisions must be equipped with the latest high-precision missiles and radio-electronic weapons. They argue that the war will be waged
according to the rules dictated by the side which is stronger and better prepared to fight. To conclude, they indicate that when the military actions do not bring their expected results, the Russian Federation may ultimately use nuclear weapons on the territory of the enemy’s state (Chekinov&Bogdanov 2013, p. 22).

Conclusions

Past experience in the Ukraine and theory evaluation indicate that the new-generation war includes multi-level efforts aimed at destabilizing the state functions and changing the internal order. **The centre of gravity of the new-generation war**, in contrast to conventional warfare, **will be focused on the society**. Messner indicated that Russian perception of the modern warfare is based on the idea of fighting in people's minds. Consequently, it leads to the extensive use of information impact to gain the psychological advantage, bringing frustration and moral decay of both armed detachments and civilian populations. The aim of the new-generation war is to deploy combat detachments of the armed forces only as a last resort. On the other hand, the enemy will be forced to reach its full potential. It will allow the implementation of the destructive actions towards the government and the entire country. It should lead in turn to the country’s bankruptcy. It is worth noticing the fact that the concept of a permanent war appears with the notion of a permanent enemy. In the current geopolitical order, it is clear that Russia's enemy is Western civilization, its values and culture, political system and ideology (Bērziņš 2014, p. 4).

The results of the research prove that Russian actions undertaken on the territory of Ukraine are not just an improvisation but a reflection of the ordered use of the entire spectrum of tools available to the opposing side. In terms of the whole sequence of events one can argue that they fit well into the Clausewitz
paradigm on waging armed struggle which says that the war is merely the continuation of policy only by other means. The author of this article claims that hybrid actions refer precisely to these very measures, although, the rules of warfare, its nature and objectives still remain the same.
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CHALLENGES FOR LEADING MULTINATIONAL 
AND MULTICULTURAL MILITARY UNITS

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ABSTRACT The paper deals with the opportunities and challenges which might face a commander leading multinational and multicultural troops, especially in peacekeeping and peace support operations. Peacekeeping missions have had an international character since their beginning. Internationalization of operations provides legitimacy to a mission and greater international support. However the combined operation causes significant challenges, especially for commanders, who have to lead these types of military units. The paper presents the benefits as well as challenges which faces the international leader in multi-ethnic environment. The author, based on his own experience gained in international deployments, presents his views and suggestions regarding the aspects of commanding multinational and multicultural troops.

Introduction

Recent experience of conducting peacekeeping and peace support operations shows the necessity of a multinational and multicultural force. Leading such kinds of military units offers several opportunities as well as poses various challenges. The commanders of the combined military units have to realise the pros and cons of
such a situation as soon as possible. The deep knowledge about capacities as well as deficiencies of his/her soldiers from different countries, religions and cultures will allow a military leader to build a combat-effective and cohesive team of “seasoned” peacekeepers. The analysis of the benefits and problems resulting from multinationality and multiethnicity, combined with experiences of former peacekeepers could draw some conclusions which might help a commander to understand, train and assign his/her multinational troops in a more efficient and well-thought-out way.

The multinationality is the key for conducting effective and internationally acceptable peacekeeping and peace support operations. The UN peacekeeping missions had an international character from the very beginning and participating military units can be considered as the first "combined" units. The first UN mission was organized in 1948 (UNTSO Magazine 2008). It was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) mission, which included representatives from Belgium, France, and the United States (Bielewicz 2011, p. 379). Currently, one can observe also a trend towards internationalization of operations and for several years even international military units have been established, such as the German - French Brigade or the Lithuanian – Polish - Ukrainian Brigade which is currently organised and should be used for future peacekeeping operations.

**Benefits of multinationality**

Especially in the peacekeeping operations, multinationality is particularly a very important factor, because it shows that the giving operation is not just a “little war” of one country against another, but the mission has been organised due to the concern of the international community for peace in the world. Therefore, the United States laid particular emphasis on the establishment of an international coalition during military interventions against Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussein within the operation “Desert Storm” in 1991, during the Second Gulf War in 2003 and the NATO during operation ISAF in Afghanistan. Examples could be multiplied. Another important aspect in addition to “internationalism” of the peacekeeping forces is also a cultural and religious diversity. During the Gulf War, particular attention was paid to the involvement of Arab countries as the operation should not be perceived as a crusade of Christian “Crusaders” against Islam, which was how Saddam Hussein wanted to present it to the other Arab countries.

Some beneficial factors of the multinationality can have a tremendous influence on the support for an international mission. They are:

a. legitimacy – As was mentioned above internationality brings a higher acceptability to the operation. Internationality shows that not only one or a couple of countries want to intervene, but the forces have the mandate of the international community which authorizes a coalition or an international organization to operate in the spirit of preserving peace in the world.

b. access to larger resources – An increasing number of countries participating in the operation gives planners the possibility of using larger number of resources, both human as well as material. One can apply a wider range of military technology and supply for the operation. Furthermore the multinational design sometimes allows use of the safe territory of a coalition state, its air bases, harbours etc., as APODs or SPODs (Air/Sea Ports of Debarkation). That was the case during the 1st Gulf War (Desert Shield and Desert Storm – the coalition forces stationed in Saudi Arabia). Another important factor linked to internationality is fundraising for the operation (e.g. in the case of NATO involvement, operation costs are covered by Member States participating in the campaign).
c. More effective diplomatic support – A large number of countries involved in the peacekeeping or other military operations also contribute for increasing of the diplomatic influence on conflict factions. It could be done through various international organizations, whose opinions the warring parties have to take under consideration (UN, NATO, EU, AU, OSCE, etc.) It allows them to force some solutions beneficial to a military operation. Moreover the diplomacy can assure international legitimacy to the campaign (e.g. The UN Resolution 1386 which allowed the official intervention in Afghanistan) (UN SCR 1386 (2001)).

d. Greater flexibility – Internationality assures the opportunity of using soldiers from different contingents with various nationalities’ religious and cultural backgrounds. In some particular areas, soldiers from certain nations or ethnic groups might be more easily accepted for stationing as the peacekeeping forces in the given areas. For example, in the case of the operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the local community in Bihac town (an overwhelming number of the population is Serb origin - Slavs and Christian Orthodox), demanded stationing there of Polish forces, due to the reason that the inhabitants trusted much more the soldiers with a similar ethnic background. They did not consent to allow the presence of the Turkish military, perceived as supporters of the Bosnian Muslims.

The above mentioned examples show the numerous advantages offered by the multinational structure of peacekeeping forces. However the “internationality” of the military brings not only the benefits but also causes several challenges, especially for military leaders at all levels of command.

Challenges in commanding of multinational forces

There is a large number of factors that affect, impede and complicate commanding of the international troops. This is the
price which has to be paid by the leader of combined forces for the benefits of the international structure of his/her military subunits. Overcoming these problems is one of the key challenges and problems which will face the commander of the multinational troops.

Challenges in the professional area

- Different training/professional standards. The training of soldiers is a national issue, based on various national military standards, different TLPs (Troop-Leading Procedures) and TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures). Therefore, the peacekeeping soldiers present a very different level of preparation and military skills, not only due to their individual abilities, but the level of training applied by the Armed Forces of the given country. For example, in Lebanon, UNIFIL soldiers from the Ghanaian contingent used Finnish made APCs (Armoured Personal Carrier) SISU. For many of these drivers it was the first contact with such large vehicle and they had to be taught how to use those APCs, which hampered the combat readiness of the contingent. Therefore, the commander of the international military unit must estimate very quickly the military skills and knowledge of his/her soldiers to be aware of some limitations but also extra capabilities which they represent. If necessary, the commander has to arrange additional training.

- Command and Control (C2) arrangements. C2 is a very difficult area which a multinational leader has to cope with during the operation. The issue of commanding combined units is simpler in the case of NATO Peace Support Operations, where affiliations between the commander and the subordinates have been defined in NATO doctrinal documents called Allied Joint Publications, inter alia AJP-1 (Chapter 6) and AJP-3(B) Section XIII. A much more complicated situation faces a commander in a UN operation, because such a relationship is not defined so clearly. Full Command is never given to the UN by participating states, only
Operational Authority is exercised by the UN commanders in accordance with the Mandate, Memorandum of Understanding and the mission’s Standard Operation Procedures. Moreover, national caveats have an enormous influence on the possibility of employment of subordinate troops. The issue will be addressed later.

Other factors which create problems are different national standards for C2. The NATO widespread standard is "mission command", where subordinates have the huge confidence of the commander and they have broad freedom in making decisions and taking actions. However, in the case of certain non-NATO countries, the subordinate commanders expect detailed and specific orders how they should act and they do not show any initiative. The reason is not lack of motivation or skills, but it is due to the “command culture” applicable in the given armies where initiative and freedom of command is severely restricted. Also in this case the international leader has to identify at the very beginning of the operation which tasks cannot be carried out by his/her subordinates. However, he/she has to be observant to ensure that any “unusual” and undesirable national command habits are not transferred to an ongoing operation hampering it.

Additionally, some countries try to develop the commanders’ competences for Peace Support Operations even in a very early stage of the officers’ education, during their studies in military academies. However, “such leadership competences can be developed during multinational exercises and officer cadets’ education still at the military academies” (Bielewicz, Kozúbek 2013, p.93). This solution can dramatically shorten the adaptation period and multinational unit cohesion process during deployments.
Political restrictions

The peacekeeping missions have been and are not only military actions, but primarily they have a political nature. Therefore, important political considerations influence the way of conducting the military aspects and determine military objectives. As a rule, the political factors outweigh the military arguments. That is why so called “national caveats” cause enormous challenges for the military leader. The caveats are defined as “restrictions placed by nations on the use of their forces on multinational operations” (House of Commons Defence Committee 2008). These political-military constraints are imposed unilaterally and without any consultations with multinational bodies or commanders involved in the combined operation.

The problem of national caveats is a very sensitive and challenging issue which has been said to be even an operations’ “cancer” by the Atlantic Council of the United States. “National caveats that restrict the commander’s ability to use forces as needed, especially in emergency or in extremis are a cancer that Allies should attempt to remove, much as the Alliance did in Kosovo in 2004” (the Atlantic Council of the United States 2008). The commander of the multinational forces has to be aware of these limitations from the very beginning of the mission, and has to appreciate them and incorporate into in his/her operational planning and employment of the forces.

Language considerations

Currently, the primary communication language in international operations is English. During the mission the commander could be exposed to different levels of language proficiency, even to lack of language skills, especially among
soldiers of lower ranks. He/she can experience various pronunciation styles, accents and even unusual sets of vocabulary. The international leader should quickly figure out what is the level of language knowledge among his subordinates. He/she should issue the orders in a clear and understandable way, use ‘simple’ vocabulary and make sure that his subordinates understand his/her way of speaking and check if they understand the issued tasks. Linguistic misunderstandings can sometimes lead to tragedy and even death of soldiers or civilians. The long-term peacekeeping operations have a tendency to develop an unofficial “mission language” consisting of various abbreviations, acronyms or words referring to equipment, geographical locations, terrain features in the Area of Responsibility etc. Sometimes these expressions are understandable only to members of the mission. Therefore, the commander should quickly acquire this type of vocabulary in order to understand the other members of the mission.

Religious and cultural restraints

Religious and cultural aspects are very broad themes, which very seriously can affect the way of conducting the operation. One can find many studies, both military and civilian, how to cope with this issue. They can help the future commanders of multinational military units to deepen their knowledge about this important factor of the international operations. The issue is particularly crucial for a commander and the mission because some nations are very sensitive especially towards religious aspects. Religious and culture-related differences can cause tensions and misunderstandings among the contingents’ members and affect the success of the mission.
Commanders must know the basic principles of the religion of their subordinates, and be familiar with their culture. Moreover the international leaders have to accept the religious practices of their soldiers and civilian employees. On the other hand, a commander has to be sensitive to attempts of any religious indoctrination that could be conducted by his/her subordinates. Moreover the responsible superiors should understand the religious, cultural and historical conditions of the country of operations in order to avoid unnecessary cultural and religious clashes. A commander has to be aware that cultural differences might hamper the building of a trusted and combat-effective team of peacekeepers.

Another sensitive topic in the area of cultural factors is the participation of women in peacekeeping operations, especially in case of female personnel being in commanding positions. While in this case, soldiers from European nations generally do not cause any problems, the situation might be more complicated in the case of military contingents from other continents. For example, the Indian soldiers of the very elite, but the very exclusive Sikh Regiment serving in UNIFIL in 2005 had some difficulties in recognizing the authority of the female directing staff, although the Indian Armed Forces have women in their ranks. Moreover one can observe that they have problems to accept the authority of some higher ranking Indian officers from other ethnic groups. This problem is particularly evident among countries where women cannot serve in the military or they do not occupy the higher commanding posts. However the majority of the Armed Forces accept the fact that women are commanders in international operations. In the case of female soldiers or civilian employees a commander has to pay attention to the obeying of general rules and laws of human beings and mutual relations, and he/she should react very strongly to all forms of human rights violations and attempts of sexual harassment.
Of course, during a combined operation there are much more factors that pose a challenge to the international commanders that have not been listed as such. Climatic factors, standard of welfare or even personal relationships and frictions inside the national contingents drawn from tribal differences to point out only some examples. The international leader is not able to predict all of them, but he/she has to be prepared for the “unknown” and react to accordingly to the emerging challenges.

Effective leadership in multinational operations

As was mentioned above, the military leader of the multinational peacekeeping forces has to be aware of the benefits of such a situation, but he/she also must be prepared for the challenges waiting for him/her in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). Additionally he/she must have thorough knowledge about the AOR, geography, religion, culture and social conditions of the local population. Commanders have to gain such knowledge, even in the pre-deployment phase in his/her native country, by studying books and documents, exchanging views and experiences with former participants of the mission and through participation in in-place reconnaissance before the final deployment. However, after arriving to the Area of Responsibility the commander should practically verify his/her knowledge during the adaptation period.

D. Cremin, along with a group of other co-authors, proposed in 2005 ”Top 10 tips for multinational commanders” which are still valid and have not lost their relevance (Cremin 2005, p. 59).

1) If you don’t already have it, build your ‘national knowledge’ of the historical, social, political, economic makeup of other nations in your command (along with a database of multinational experience).

2) Be prepared to adapt your command style.
3) Prioritize relationship building. Mutual respect is key. The goal is to foster a communicative, collaborative, and co-operative relationship.

4) Understand national contingent capabilities. Do not over task contingent forces, but build the level of challenge in tasks slowly.

5) Don’t assume your way is the only way. Different approaches may be needed.

6) Negotiation is commonplace; command by discussion.

7) Be prepared for variations in the standard of spoken English (and be careful about the use of acronyms). Always seek closed loop communication when conveying important information.

8) Establish a common sense of purpose.

9) Where possible, establish a Common Operating Procedure (COP) (e.g., when shared doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are lacking, create a unifying set of COPs/SOPs).

10) Promote equity of risk and reward.

Based on the author’s own experience gained during his service in the UN, NATO and EU missions and employments in the Middle East and the Balkans, he wants to suggest some measures which might help the multinational commander to understand and effectively lead his/her multinational troops. The international leader should:

- be familiar with educational background and training system of the Armed Forces of their foreign soldiers;
- present a flexible style of command;
• have general knowledge about his/her foreign troops’
environment, history, culture, religion etc.;
• present respectful behaviour and mutual respect;
• be able to accept diversities;
• present so called “cultural intelligence”;
• try to “enter” socially into their troops’ communities;
• assimilate some basic sentences of his/her foreign troops.

A commander, through his/her formal and informal activities
should integrate commanding troops into a cohesive team, which
he/she can trust in crisis situations. An international leader has to
be aware about the troops’ potential and combat capabilities. Only
in this case will a commander be able effectively to employ his/her
soldiers in order to achieve the objectives of the operation.

Conclusions

The specificity of commanding multinational and multicultural
military units presents many challenges for the military leaders,
especially for those who had no previous experience in
commanding such types of military structures. A commander is a
key constituent to the success of the military operation or the
peacekeeping mission. His/her ability to create mutual trust, to
integrate the subordinates and to establish one coherent and
efficient military “toolbox” in the form of an action-ready military
unit, can determine the success or failure of the whole mission. A
military leader must be aware of the problems arising from
commanding international troops. He/she has to understand that
the composition, structure and equipment of his/her multinational
subunits are very often the result of a political compromise which
imposes restrictions on the ability to act militarily in a mission area.
Furthermore the international military leader must realize that the multinationality can often result from circumstances and strategic goals which not always go along with the objectives at the operational or tactical level. A commander has to wisely use the opportunities allocated to him in form of the multinational forces. He/she has to build an efficient and trusted team of peacekeepers who know each other very well, have mutual trust and present a common understanding of mission goals. The clever, well-balanced and flexible behaviour of the commander could only enhance the building of a coherent team with peacekeepers’ spirit.

The effective multinational leader should be aware about the differences among his/her soldiers, should tolerate diversities, equalize divergences, integrate the team, and bring the attention of his/her soldiers to the necessity of the common effort. Such conduct could help him/her to build so called “Esprit De Corps”, necessary for fulfilling operational and strategic objectives of every peacekeeping operation.
Bibliography


LEARNING FROM IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: FOUR LESSONS FOR BUILDING MORE EFFECTIVE COALITIONS

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ABSTRACT Despite many tactical and operational successes by brave military and civilian personnel, post-9/11 operations by U.S. led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan did not achieve their intended outcomes. Although many efforts are underway by discrete organizations within coalition countries to identify and learn their own lessons from these conflicts, comparatively less attention is paid to broader lessons for successful coalitions. Given that the U.S. and its allies will most certainly form coalitions in the future for a range of different contingency scenarios, these lessons are equally deserving of close examination. This article identifies four interrelated lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan that can be utilized to inform more effective coalition development and employment.

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Introduction

Post-9/11 operations by U.S. led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan did not achieve their intended outcomes. Despite many tactical and operational successes by brave military and civilian personnel, today the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its affiliates control large areas of Iraq, and the Taliban insurgency rages on in Afghanistan. Both of these outcomes are surprising given the cost in blood and treasure for coalition members.

Much of the lessons learned debate from the two wars centres around how operations were planned and executed, what went well and what did not, and how things could have been improved. In some cases, coalition partners are working to take stock of this analysis and adapt accordingly. Many efforts are underway by military and civilian organizations to place lessons observed in the context of the current security environment, so as to ensure learning, and ultimately, improved outcomes in future engagements. However, less attention is paid to lessons for successful coalitions. Given that the U.S. and its allies will most certainly form coalitions in the future for a range of different contingency scenarios, these lessons are particularly important.

This article identifies four interrelated lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan that can be utilized to inform more effective coalition development and employment. For contingency operations, coalitions play three important roles: geopolitical legitimacy of the mission; shared cost and responsibility; and most importantly the effective design and execution of campaigns. Although all three are important, this article is primarily concerned with the third component. It contends that effective coalitions require clearly articulated goals and strategy that are agreed upon and understood by coalition partners – lessons one and two. It also identifies a
requirement for a strategy coordination element, even when unity of command is absent – lesson three. Additionally, the importance of recognizing the capabilities and limitations of partners is discussed – lesson four. Ultimately, the article provides an analysis of key lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan that if heeded, will lead to improved outcomes for future coalitions.

**Lesson 1: Develop Clear and Specific Goals**

Effective coalitions require that a clear and specific determination be made upfront about what the campaign is meant to achieve. Although vague goals were developed for Iraq and Afghanistan, clear and specific explanations of what those goals entailed were not. A 2002 U.S. National Security Council memo, signed by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice provides an example. It states that the desired end-state for Iraq was a country that, “Does not threaten its neighbours; Renounces support for, and sponsorship of, international terrorism; Continues to be a single, unitary state; Is free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery, and associated programs; No longer oppresses or tyrannizes its people; Respects the basic rights of all Iraqis including women and minorities; Adheres to the rule of law and respects fundamental human rights, including freedom of speech and worship; and Encourages the building of democratic institutions.”

Although these goals were identified, the specifics of what each goal entailed were not outlined to a sufficient degree. In the absence of a clear and specific understanding of the goals, many different interpretations emerged by individuals, organizations, and coalition partner countries.

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The ambiguity surrounding the enduring steady state that the campaign sought to achieve left many who were charged with executing the operation confused about how to proceed. For example, in a 2015 interview, General David Petraeus shares a vignette from the 2003 initial operations in Iraq:

When I was in Kuwait, we had this final gathering of commanders on the eve of battle, and we were already out on the desert floor. We were already all dispersed in our assembly areas, coiled, just waiting for the word. We were called back to that camp that we had used for our ascent, CFLCC [Coalition Forces Land Component Command] camp, and all gathered in there. At the end of this discussion, they asked for questions. I raised my hand and said, excuse me, but again, could someone just, you know I got it about the fight to Baghdad and taking down Baghdad, but can you go into a little more detail on what happens after that? And one of the ORHA [Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance] guys, a retired General, I think he was a deputy, stood up and said, ‘Dave, you don’t worry about that. You just get us to Baghdad, and we’ll take it from there.’ And I reflected on that many times subsequently.²

Upon arriving in Iraq in 2003 as the Commander of the 1st Armoured Divisions, General Martin Dempsey remembers, “My sense was that we were a bit adrift frankly, at least in Baghdad. I can’t speak to what was happening in Mosul, Ramadi, or Diyala Province. But in Baghdad, there was a bit of almost discovery learning, about what it means to have gone from this exquisite manoeuvre across the desert from Kuwait to Baghdad, to now being fundamentally responsible for the safety of a city of 7 million people, 75 square miles with a river running through it, and with

² David Petraeus, unpublished interview by Joseph J. Collins and Nathan White, March 27, 2015
deep ethnic and religious tensions.” He reflects, “I was trying to learn as quickly as possible what the mission was going to be because it was, quite frankly, unclear. The Iraqi army had been disbanded and de-Ba’athification had occurred. General David Petraeus at this time famously asked, ‘How does this thing end?’ It was a fair question.”

Dempsey concludes of the Iraq war that, “We debated and negotiated resources before we debated and negotiated objectives.”

Although former U.S. National Security Advisor Steven Hadley claims that there was more planning for a post-invasion Iraq than is frequently characterized, he also admits that it could have been much better. Hadley explains what he believes was required for Iraq and Afghanistan through the words of General John Allen. Hadley quotes Allen, “The thing I’ve learned from Iraq and Afghanistan is, that when you do your planning, you need to begin with Phase IV and what you want it to look like; how you are going to get it to look like that? And then work backwards.”

Note: General Dempsey also explains, “General John Abizaid came to see me around the time I took command, and I had a candid conversation with him about my initial observations, and I asked him as CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] commander: ‘What is my mission, how would you articulate the intent?’”


5 Stephen J. Hadley, interview by Joseph J. Collins and Nicholas Rostow, October 7, 2014; Published in PRISM Volume 5, No. 3, 2015; http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-3/Interview_Stephen_Hadley.pdf
Hadley continues in his own words, “So, where you want to end up informs your Phase III, II and I planning about how you are going to get there. This was a new idea to me; we didn’t do it that way. I don’t think the United States has ever done it that way.”

With the U.S., as the coalition leader in both countries having fallen short in articulating specifically what it was the campaigns were trying to achieve, it goes without saying that the desired ends eluded coalition partners as well. This clouded the ability to make informed decisions about who to bring into the coalition, what type of assistance different coalition members might provide, and how. In an effort to be pragmatic, coalition personnel regularly developed their own views about the specific nature of the goals. The lack of specificity left a lot of leeway for interpretation of what right looked like, which led to friction among members of the force. Former ISAF Commander General McChrystal provides an illustration:

“What’s the overall mission?’ I’ve written about this in my own book, and you’ve probably heard as well, we’re in that one session, an early VTC, and I’ve had our people study the mission, and we got it from reading Presidential speeches, before and after his election, and in everything we had. But we didn’t have a mission statement otherwise. So we derived a mission statement, we put it up, and said here’s our mission statement and people go, ‘Well where did you get that mission statement?’ So I had them make a slide that says, ‘Here’s our NATO mission statement,’ and ‘Here’s our U.S. one,’ here’s where we derived them from. If they’re wrong, somebody please change them, and I’m happy to

\[6\] Stephen J. Hadley, interview by Joseph J. Collins and Nicholas Rostow, October 7, 2014; Published in PRISM Volume 5, No. 3, 2015; http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-3/Interview_Stephen_Hadley.pdf
change. ‘Oh you know, that’s right.’ Then somebody says, ‘Why are you trying to destroy the Taliban?’ I said, ‘I’m not. I’m trying to defeat the Taliban.’ ‘Well, what do you mean you’re trying to wipe out the Taliban.’ I said that’s not what defeat means. Defeat doesn’t mean that. Defeat means rendering the enemy incapable of achieving their mission. Someone says, ‘Argh! Well, where did you get the word defeat?’ I got back to the mission statement, ‘That’s what you told me to do.’”

The unclear, unspecific mission objectives enabled a situation where virtually anything coalition civilian and military organizations did could be interpreted as supporting the mission, regardless of the impact. This issue applied across the security, governance, and development efforts of the coalitions, but a statement in Kabul from a senior U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) official is particularly telling. He explains how the ambiguous goals led to a situation in the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan where, “Development people in the field had a lot of leeway to do whatever it was they wanted. All they had to do was get somebody to take them out to a village, pick a few things that they could focus on over the course of their deployment, and hang their ornament on the Afghan Christmas tree.” Similar observations were made about the Canadian development efforts in Regional Command – South and the German development activities in Regional Command – North. The ambiguity surrounding the mission challenged the ability of the coalitions in both countries to

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8 Interview with senior development official, conducted July 2011 by Nathan White and Sara Thannhauser
9 2011 interviews with military and civilian personnel in Kabul and Afghanistan conducted by Nathan White and Sara Thannhauser
prioritize their efforts and make valid determinations about what they needed to do that was truly required for mission success.

**Lesson 2: Develop a Workable Strategy**

Related to the imperative of well-defined goals, an effective coalition requires a workable strategy that is clearly articulated, specific, and understood by the relevant coalition partners. Certainly many partners will come to the table long before a strategy is developed, and in fact, it is optimal that these partners play a role in the early stages of strategy development. However, once the strategy is formulated, the coalition must be assembled and structured to support the strategy.

Yet in Iraq and Afghanistan, the problem of unclear goals was compounded by that absence of a true strategy. Effective strategy aligns ends, ways, and means while also nesting the tactical and operational levels of war with the strategic.¹⁰ When a coalition does not know where it is heading (the ends), it goes without saying that aligning ways and means for a positive strategic impact is difficult – some would even say impossible. Even when goals were articulated more clearly as the campaigns progressed, the lack of a coherent strategy remained. General Petraeus identifies a lingering strategy deficit in Afghanistan that persisted over the course of nine years, “I think it still took us until late 2010 before we had the inputs right in Afghanistan. And by inputs, I mean all of the different concepts and strategy, second, the organizational architecture and elements to carry out that strategy.”¹¹

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¹¹ David Petraeus, interview by Joseph J. Collins and Nathan White, March 27, 2015.
When such a strategy gap occurs, as with ambiguous end-states, what tends to happen is that different entities within the assembled coalition are forced to interpret the strategy in their own way, either through the lens of their own organization’s core mission, their own experiences, or a combination of these and others. The interpretations of the many disparate individuals and organizations often at best do not complement one another and at worst, they work at cross purposes. Iraqi Security Force development is a case in point. Without a clear understanding of the type of force that the coalition sought to build as part of its strategy, disparate efforts went on simultaneously where different elements of the same force were trained differently. General Dempsey remembers that coalition partners, “took sectors of Iraq.” He explains, “The boon and bane of a coalition, as you know, is that it is a coalition—so everyone gets a voice. The boon is they’re there, and you get 26, 28, or 45 flags. But there’s no doubt in my mind, I can give you chapter and verse, that the way the British were developing the security forces in Basra was different than the Poles were developing security forces, and it was different than the way the [U.S.] Army was developing security forces in Diyala Province, different than the way the [U.S.] Marines were developing security forces in Al Anbar.” He notes that, “Even in our own Service [Army] we had different approaches, a different way of partnering,” and he asks rhetorically, “Now is that a strength or a weakness? Initially it was a weakness because we were a little inconsistent.”

Even worse is that the interpretations of the strategy tended to devolve into an overwhelming focus on achieving technocratic

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outputs within functional lines of effort. The following description of five lines of effort for Afghanistan in 2012 provides a typical example:

- Completing the *transition* to Afghan full sovereignty. This effort had three major components: security transition — Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) taking lead security responsibility across the country; political transition — conducting the 2014 and 2015 elections and transfer of power from the Karzai government to a successor; and economic transition toward greater Afghan self-reliance.
- Prosecuting the *civil-military campaign* to degrade the Taliban and build Afghan capacity. This included developing Afghan government institutions, security forces, and economy.
- Developing a *strategic partnership* with Afghanistan, which encompassed a long-term diplomatic relationship; negotiations to conclude a bilateral security agreement for a post-2014 troop presence; and commitments for long-term economic support;
- Promoting *regional diplomacy* to gain support from neighbours and the international community for a peaceful, stable Afghanistan.
- Exploring *reconciliation* in an effort to seek a diplomatic solution to the conflict.\(^\text{13}\)

These lines of effort are all certainly useful and very important, but they do not constitute a strategy on their own. Instead, they

represent a set of functional activities, elements of which, if pursued and integrated in accordance with a workable strategy for stabilizing the country, may have resulted in improved strategic outcomes. But successful actions in each line per se did not necessarily equate to strategic progress.

Good strategy for a campaign synchronizes lethal and non-lethal actions over time and space to create conditions that drive the decision making and behaviour of relevant actors (e.g. militants, host-nation governments, sections of the local populace, regional governments, and any other individuals, groups, and populations that impact mission success) in accordance with objectives. More specifically, whether applying lethal force to remove adversaries from the battlefield, conducting negotiations with host-nation and regional governments, training indigenous military forces, supporting host-nation governance, or conducting economic development, these actions must all be subordinate to a campaign strategy and corresponding plan designed to shape relevant actor decision making and behaviour in a manner that is in line with (passively or actively) coalition objectives.14

Often missing from the strategies were the specific effects coalition activities were supposed to achieve and how those effects would lead to attainment of the overall goals. As an example, one might ask, “how did the coalition in Afghanistan ensure that efforts designed for a transition to Afghan full sovereignty in the areas of security transition, political transition, and economic transition result not just in transition, but also greater stability?” There was no guarantee that the ANSF taking lead security responsibility across the country, successful elections and transfer

of power, or greater Afghan economic self-reliance would actually result in corresponding stabilization effects. And in fact even if these efforts were successful on paper, they could have the opposite effect on the ground for stabilization. The lines of effort and the activities within them amounted to things that the coalition would do, as opposed to the effects it sought to achieve.

The second line of effort – Prosecuting the civil-military campaign to degrade the Taliban and build Afghan capacity – provides another example. It supposedly relied on developing Afghan government institutions, security forces, and economic mechanisms. But these activities, even when successful, were often executed in a way that was politically destabilizing for the country. A proper strategy draws a link between the activities that will be conducted and a theory of change for achieving the desired enduring steady state, and this element of the strategy was almost always absent.

Without properly conceptualizing strategy, a coalition runs the risk of what Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster describes as a tendency to, “confuse activity with progress,” which refers to mistaking success within an activity or line of effort as progress toward desired campaign ends, regardless of whether or not those actions had any real value. In both countries for instance,

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LTG McMaster explains that in war, “... we often start by determining the resources we want to commit or what is palatable from a political standpoint. We confuse activity with progress, and that’s always dangerous, especially in war. In reality, we should first define the objective, compare it with the current state, and then work backward: what is the nature of this conflict? What are the obstacles to progress, and how do we overcome
coalition civilian and military organizations often focused on achieving metrics that they deemed to be favourable, but which had a questionable correlation to strategic progress. In the security realm, favourable numbers related to troops trained, reductions in significant activities (SIGACTs), and the amount of improvised explosive device (IED) incidents were held up as signs of progress across both countries. For development, roads built, children educated, and the amount of people provided healthcare were often highlighted. On the governance side, government posts filled, government officials trained, and the amount of people who voted in an election were all considered important.  

Although aspects of all of these factors are usually required, they do not alone lead to greater stability. What if SIGACTs and IED numbers went down because insurgents, on their own accord, had moved out of a given area to mass in another location where coalition forces were not present? Or how about if coalition forces had shifted their patrolling to areas where militants were not present? The resulting decrease in security incidents might be falsely interpreted as progress. What if the government positions filled were filled by predatory corrupt officials that inflamed grievances within the population and fuelled instability? Was filling those positions still an indication of progress? What if the basic services provided or restored were not actually addressing drivers of instability? In fact many were provided electricity who didn’t want or need it. Is that still a sign of progress?  

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17 White, Nathan; “Learning from the Struggle to Assess Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Operations in Afghanistan”, 2015 not yet published.

18 White, Nathan; “Learning from the Struggle to Assess Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Operations in Afghanistan”, 2015 not yet published; Also discussed in an interview with a coalition official at National Defense University in 2012, conducted by
Without tying the various coalition efforts to some type of vision of progress toward a goal, conclusions drawn could be misleading. Referencing reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, a report from a Wilton Park conference with many coalition partner representatives in attendance found that, “There is an urgent need to ensure that the new ‘population centric’ COIN strategy is evidence based, and does not continue to uncritically assume that development aid ‘wins hearts and minds’ and/or promotes stability. Priority should be given to assessing stabilization effects of projects, rather than assuming impact based on amounts of money spent or the number of projects implemented.” The report continues, “Greater emphasis should also be given to understanding drivers of conflict, as aid projects can only be effective in promoting stability objectives if they are effectively addressing the main causes of instability.” The report concludes that, “The replacement of the international community’s ‘enemy-centric’ approach with a ‘population-centric’ military strategy emphasizes the need for a sober assessment of what motivates people to rebel, and a deliberate incorporation of these observations into the design of a more effective strategy that addresses the underlying causes of unrest.”

Dr. Stephen Downes-Martin explains how this disconnect manifested itself through the lens of assessments of progress in accordance with an ambiguous strategy. He reports, “during an IJC [ISAF Joint Command] Metrics Evaluation Meeting held in Washington, D.C., on 17–18 March 2010, one participant claimed that ‘child mortality’ was an appropriate metric under ‘Development.’ Asked to explain how this metric supported counterinsurgency, the participant replied simply, ‘Afghan families

Nathan White and Sara Thannhauser.

care about their children.” He continues, “Unfortunately, most commands do not appear to have clear connections between their objectives and the metrics they are collecting; and at this conference no sound answer was forthcoming from the officers present as to how infant mortality was or was not tied to their counterinsurgency objectives.”

The coalition approach to strategy was often more akin to throwing a bunch of things up against the wall and seeing what would stick, as opposed to determining first what specifically the coalition was trying to accomplish and how, and then applying only the required tools, when and where required, to achieve those goals. There was often no clear line drawn between the hard work and sacrifice, and the relevance to mission success. Assumptions often permeated that if organizations just did things that fit their core missions in the realm of security, governance, and development (e.g. Advise on democratic processes, progress human rights, deliver humanitarian assistance, eliminate adversaries from the battlefield, and complete development projects), this would lead to some type of desirable end-state. What was really required was that to the extent these activities were relevant (and many were), they needed to be tailored for the local context and nature of the conflict, in accordance with a workable strategy to shape relevant actor behaviour in an enduring way. As one civilian observed of his time in Afghanistan, “a lot of brilliant people and a lot of brilliant teams are all digging tunnels through the mountain and they are not going to meet in the middle. There needs to be more strategy.”

20 Downes-Martin, Stephen; Operations Assessment in Afghanistan is Broken: What is to be Done? Naval War College Review, Autumn 2011, Vol. 64, No. 4.

21 Center for Complex Operations Iraq and Afghanistan interview database. This database contains interviews with civilian and military personnel who had returned from deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. The interviews were conducted between 2010 and
Lesson 3: Put Somebody in Charge

For a coalition to be effective, somebody has to be given the task and authority to lead strategy formulation and execution, and of course the adaptation of both over time. This does not mean a single chain of command, which is bureaucratically unrealistic. But it does mean that there needs to be some type of coordination body that oversees the design and implementation of strategy. Without someone playing this role, there is no way to get everyone in the coalition on the same page about what the campaign is trying to accomplish and how, or to ensure partners are working together for maximum impact toward desired ends. Especially in the absence of clear guidance from higher, having an entity that plays such a role is the only hope for ensuring that all of the tools of hard and soft power that are employed by the coalition ultimately contribute to something of strategic value.

Even within just the U.S. Government, such a coordination capability does not exist. Some contend that this is the role of the U.S. National Security Council, but former NSC director for Afghanistan and Pakistan Paul D. Miller argues to the contrary, “The United States’ national security establishment lacks an integrated strategic planning capability.”22 The reality is that the Iraq and Afghanistan coalition structures were set up far more to support and protect the bureaucratic equities of the partner nations and individual organizations within them than they were for coordinated strategy formulation and execution. In the case of the United States, Miller notes, “Disparate organizations—such as the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, the Joint Staff’s J5,

22 Miller, Paul D., “Organizing the National Security Council: I Like Ike’s”; Presidential Studies Quarterly 43, no. 3 (September 2013) Paul D. Miller previously served as director for Afghanistan and Pakistan on the National Security Council staff from 2007 through 2009
United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy—carry out strategic planning for their respective organizations with minimal coordination between them.”

U.S. administrations recognized and sought to address this issue internally at different points for Iraq and Afghanistan. Examples include General Doug Lute’s role as Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s role as the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. But, Miller explains, “the most crucial piece of the national security establishment, the one designed to knit it together and coordinate all its parts, has gone completely untouched by the reforms of the past decade: the National Security Council (NSC) and the interagency system it oversees.” Furthermore, Miller notes that, “The NSC and its

23 Miller, Paul D., “Organizing the National Security Council: I Like Ike’s”; Presidential Studies Quarterly 43, no. 3 (September 2013)

24 The Project on National Security Reform’s “Forging a New Shield” 2008 report highlights five major deficiencies in the national security system that, among other things, impede the management of strategy. It lists the following: “1. The System is grossly imbalanced. It supports strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms; 2. Resources allocated to departments and agencies are shaped by their narrowly defined core mandates rather than broader national security missions; 3. The need for presidential integration to compensate for the systemic inability to adequately integrate or resource missions overly centralizes issue management and overburdens the White House; 4. A burdened White House cannot manage the national security system as a whole to be agile and collaborative at any time, but it is particularly vulnerable to breakdown during the protracted transition periods between administrations; 5. Congress provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that reinforce the first four problems and make improving performance extremely difficult.” The report goes on to summarize, “taken together, the basic deficiency of the current national security system is that parochial, departmental, and agency interests, reinforced by congress, paralyze cooperation even as the variety, speed, and complexity of emerging security issues prevent the White House from effectively controlling the system...The resulting second and third-tier operational deficiencies that emanate from these five problems are vast...Among the most worrisome is an inability to formulate and implement a coherent
subordinate committees and supporting staff are supposed to integrate and coordinate interagency efforts—but no regular mechanism for integrating strategic planning has existed in the NSC system since 1961.”

In the field, coalitions in Iraq, and especially Afghanistan, were devastated by the absence of a strategy coordination element. With four deployments to Afghanistan under his belt and having served as a senior advisor in the Pentagon on Afghanistan policy, COL Christopher Kolenda outlines the impact, “…no one is in charge of our wars…Among all of the so-called lessons from the recent bloody, expensive, and protracted wars, this one needs urgent attention. This may also help explain why the best people armed with the best equipment and supported by American national resources underperform and fail to deliver success when it counts the most.” He concludes that, “An organization with the necessary authority, responsibility, and accountability is needed to organize and direct the conduct of the war and manage the myriad trade-offs that inevitably occur. It is here that we consistently fall short.”

Indeed it is actually quite remarkable how little the ISAF Commander for instance actually controlled in his own battlespace. General McChrystal shares that even having served previously as the JSOC Commander, he arrived in country as ISAF Commander and he did not control any of the special operations forces operating on the ground. “I took over [in 2009] as ISAF strategy.”

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25 Miller, Paul D., “Organizing the National Security Council: I Like Ike’s”; Presidential Studies Quarterly 43, no. 3 (September 2013)

commander—NATO Commander, U.S. Commander. These Special Forces didn’t work for me, the American Special Forces didn’t work for me technically.” In addition to Special Forces, he explained that the Marines and the Air Force didn’t work for him either. He chalks up this challenge to major systemic obstacles, “…we have these doctrinal habits that are created that we say we’re going to cooperate or we’re going to give TACON [tactical control], and my sense is that we’ve created these doctrinal practices that are absolutely counter to what you need for modern warfare: unity of command and flexibility.” The general continues, “We’ve let cultural things reinforce those practices, but the practices are in many cases bad habits. To maintain good will, we’re willing to allow those things, and say: ‘It’s not optimal, but we’ll make it work.’”

He concludes by saying that in retrospect, he should have spoken up, “I know for many years, to include my time in ISAF, at least initially, I said, ‘well, it’s not optimal, but I’ll make it work.’ I think that was a mistake. I think there are things where you’ve got to put a stake in the ground and say, ‘If you don’t fix this, then I think the risk to mission is higher than you perhaps perceive up the chain of command…’And I think that if we look at ourselves hard in the mirror, you can’t do something as difficult as Afghanistan without one person in charge. And we still don’t have that.”

Especially when the strategy and goals are vague back in the home capitals of coalition leaders, there has to be somebody in charge of campaign strategy coordination to pull disparate efforts together and synchronize them over time and space for greatest effect. In the words of General McChrystal, speaking specifically about the U.S. Government, “If they’ve got a shared task, you’ve got to have


some person in charge. It usually should be civilian. I’m not pushing for military. But you’ve got to have somebody who gets up in the morning and goes to bed at night knowing that they’re in charge.”

Lesson 4: Understand Partner Strengths and Weaknesses

Coalition strategy must be informed by an understanding of the strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of coalition partners. Each partner brings its own unique characteristics and allotted resources to bear in a campaign. Only by developing a sound understanding of what each partner is capable of and willing to do can a coalition be properly organized and employed for best effect. Speaking for non-attribution at a 2012 conference, one senior official reflected upon his time in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. He recalled that in the early stages of his deployment, the strategy called for coalition partners to do things they couldn’t and/or wouldn’t do. This led to operational approaches that were based on unrealistic and ultimately false assumptions, which in turn led to less than favourable outcomes. He thought that once it proved impossible to push the capability and will of a partner any further, instead of

29 Stanley A. McChrystal, interview by Joseph J. Collins, Frank G. Hoffman, and Nathan White, April 27, 2015. The General adds, “We didn’t have the big huge pieces right in Afghanistan. Lines of authority were confused in some cases. Again, when you’re looking at SOF, and you’ve got black SOF, white SOF, coalition SOF, some US only SOF, some are coalition SOF, it actually matters. You have to know what hat a guy is wearing at a particular time.” General McChrystal provided an example of how the lack of a strategy coordination element played out on the ground. He remembers that in 2009 as he was preparing to deploy to Afghanistan, there was a bombing that went bad and that killed several Afghan civilians. He observed that, “there was an Afghan force that had a MARSOC element working for it – didn’t own the battlespace. They were out there doing their own thing. There was a Special Forces regional taskforce, but that was different from the battlespace owner, and then the people who were actually dropping the bombs. So essentially, I can’t remember exactly, I think there were 5 different players all in the proximity of the things that happened and nobody in charge, in fact. They didn’t even have the requirement to keep each other informed except from the standpoint of common sense.”
continuing down a path with limited likelihood of success, it was far more effective to adapt and design strategies and corresponding plans with realistic expectations of partners in mind. This would help identify gaps, which would either need to be filled by other partners, and/or lead to further adaptation of the approach.\textsuperscript{30}

Navigating the intricacies of partner capability and will is particularly challenging for coalition Commanders. Speaking from experience as the ISAF and MNF-I commander, General Petraeus explains that, “the art of coalition command involves enormous amounts of coalition maintenance, sensitivity to national sentiments, as well as national caveats. And it requires the commander to organize the force in a way that capitalizes most effectively on what each coalition member provides, and, perhaps most importantly, uses U.S. resources to compensate for shortcomings that virtually every coalition partner has.”\textsuperscript{31}

The issue of national caveats is particularly challenging. Each nation comes with its own caveats that serve as self-imposed limitations on what they can and will do. Petraeus explains, “I might note that there was no country in Afghanistan that did not have caveats.” He recalls a vignette where the challenge posed by caveats came to a head in Southwestern Afghanistan:

British protestations notwithstanding. Evidence that was most vivid came when the commander in Helmand Province, the Marine two-star, who had tactical control of British, Georgian, and UAE, and others, in addition to U.S. Marines and Soldiers, decided to expand the British area of

\textsuperscript{30} Brownbag at the Center for Complex Operations at National Defense University with senior coalition officials, 2012.

\textsuperscript{31} David Petraeus, unpublished interview by Joseph J. Collins and Nathan White, March 27, 2015.
operations slightly to encompass three additional villages, that were part of a district; half of a district, so that we could focus other assets on a key operation. And to me, this seemed to be a tactical decision, not even operational, not one that the IJC needed to be involved with, much less myself, but that decision ultimately ended up in Number 10 Downing Street. It ended up the subject of a late night conversation with Prime Minister Cameron, when he visited Kabul at the British Ambassador’s residence. And it ultimately resulted in the Brits not moving. Again, even the British had caveats, as they also had in quite significant ways in Basra, as well.\textsuperscript{32}

Throughout the campaigns, different partners were repeatedly surprised and even grew angry at times due to the challenges posed by caveats. Yet based on the fact that they always exist in a coalition environment, they will always be a point of consideration for strategy development and execution. As Petraeus notes, “Typically, soldiers sometimes tried to rationalize politically imposed caveats, but more forthrightly, they would sometimes acknowledge that these were political constraints within which they had to operate.”\textsuperscript{33}

In Iraq and Afghanistan, arguably the most important partners to understand were the host-nation governments that were stood up in the wake of regime change. In both countries, those governments adopted practices that disenfranchised elements of the indigenous populations and significantly added to the instability. Nevertheless, the coalitions continued to work by, with, and through the indigenous governments without applying

\textsuperscript{32} David Petraeus, unpublished interview by Joseph J. Collins and Nathan White, March 27, 2015.

\textsuperscript{33} David Petraeus, unpublished interview by Joseph J. Collins and Nathan White, March 27, 2015.
sufficient carrots and sticks to change behaviour. Having first not fully recognized this shortcoming in their indigenous government partners, and then failing to take adequate action to address the problem, the success of the coalitions was severely challenged. Adding to the difficulty, the coalition was seen as siding with the predatory central governments, which served to drive greater instability in many instances.

General Dempsey speaks to this point in the context of failed and weak states, “I have come to believe that support needs to be transactional and conditional. I believe that because, generally speaking, in these failing and failed states the issues are societal—they are not political issues. Sometimes they begin as political issues, or they’ll start as representational...It starts political, but it goes pretty quickly to sectarian issues, to religion, and ethnicity because these are historic impulses that have been suppressed for generations. In those environments, it’s absolutely predictable that the “victor and vanquished” mentality will quickly come forward. Those who have been suppressed will see themselves as victors, and they will come and vanquish those oppressing them, and I think whether we are asked to conduct military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, [or] Nigeria, that “victor-vanquished” instinct is the dominant societal instinct. If I’m right about this, then there can be no unconditional support, in my opinion, because unconditional support will simply reinforce the “victor-vanquished” paradigm as it emerges.” Linking this observation to the current situation in Iraq, the General states, “Some people are saying, ‘Why aren’t you doing more, and sooner?’ Our support needs to remain as support and not ownership. Furthermore, support needs to be conditional. If the Iraqi government does not meet its commitments to create a more inclusive political environment and to address some of the grievances of the Sunni
and Kurd populations, then nothing we do will last. It will be painting over rust.”

More realistic and workable coalition strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan would have been far more likely had efforts been made to fully understand the strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of the coalition partners themselves and integrate that understanding into the design and conduct of operations. This is especially true of coalition local indigenous partners.

**Conclusion**

It is impossible to know if the U.S. led coalitions would have achieved complete success had they considered the four lessons discussed here. Both conflicts were extremely complex and had countless challenges. Yet, so many who served in the two coalitions raise variations of these issues time and time again, to include a number of current and former high-level civilian and military officials within the governments of the U.S. and coalition partners. The research for this paper reflects that there is merit to these issues. And in order to avoid repeating the many mistakes of the past, they are worthy of careful consideration by those charged with forming and employing coalitions in the future.

With similarly unfortunate results from coalition operations in Libya where the U.S. played a supporting role, and with many expressing concern about the progress of the U.S. led coalition to degrade and defeat ISIL, there is clearly work to be done on improving the effectiveness of coalitions to succeed in contingency operations. Future coalitions should take note of the lessons raised

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here and apply them, as appropriate, to the specific context of their own campaigns. The lessons should also be incorporated in the training and education schoolhouses where senior civilian and military officials prepare to be effective coalition leaders. It is the hope of this author that by doing so, the U.S. and its allies will avoid repeating mistakes of the past and achieve improved results that are worthy of the contributions and sacrifices made by so many.
BOOK REVIEWS

CELEBRATING BORDERLANDS IN A WIDER EUROPE


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Much of the academic and political debate on the ‘post-Soviet’ space since the early 1990s has nurtured a dominant perspective on the countries that found themselves in between larger power nodes, with their respective hegemonic claims, as arenas of great power political contestation. In a way, it immensely contributed to objectifying the lands trapped between multi-layered borders – legal, cultural, normative and so alike. Inevitably, the thinking on post-Sovietness got prompted into the widespread belief that ‘the ‘post-Soviet’ remains an empty space, a non-existence, devoid of its subjectifying force, its own signifier, and its own meaning effect’, as put by Serguei Oushakine back in 2000. (Oushakine 2000, p.1010) As such, these allegedly aphasic spaces would be doomed to be stuck in endless contestation between the powers from without. Countering such a mainstream – and common especially in geopolitical theory – strand of thinking, Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk in their new book on celebrating borderlands make a case for subjectifying the latter ones, thus praising borderlands’ own agency. Focusing on the various actors in Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia, a representative part of the wider borderland space, – from local governments to central ones, from national non-governmental organisations to international ones, from local communities to nations – as well as their techniques of self-
subjectifying, signifying and meaning-making, the authors praise borderland subjectivity and agency. ‘Celebrating Borderlands…’ is what conceptually can answer the question of what will come after, and should come instead of, the decreasing in its explanatory value ‘post-Soviet(ness)’ frame in East European and Russian studies.

In their quest for borderlands’ self-subjectifying force and patterns of agential behaviour, Makarychev and Yatsyk proceed from answering a triple research question: what borderlands are, how they define their national identities, and what strategies they pursue in the context of binary logic of contestation that structures their agential space (p.13)? Borderland identities form a centerpiece of the authors’ research strategy to explore and explain both the reviving binary logic of EU-Russia conflictual interaction in the space concerned (projections of external ‘Selves’), as well as borderlands’ own politically consequential self-subjectifying interaction with the EU and Russia (projections onto external ‘Selves’). The topical ideas of ‘Russian incompleteness’ and ‘many Europes’ are thus the ones that get particularly addressed in the book within the latter perspective. Informed this way, the study followed a twofold research approach that synergized ‘post-politics’ and ‘governmentality’ theories. The authors’ main claim is that ‘the logic of borderland authorities is often grounded in post-political thinking’ (p.41), thus prompting them prioritize popular welfare, consensual governance and development policies of sorts rather than power projection and rivalry, that nonetheless can be effectuated as a side-effect of the former efforts. Side-effectual have subsequently to be deemed also external influences, for the authors hold that the very notion of borderlands’ subjectivity negates the viability of external governance (dominance) and celebrates the virtue of governmentality (enabling and empowering practices). The Foucauldian – depoliticized – ‘governmentality’ concept thus consistently frames the book’s main line of argumentation. Rather than portraying borderlands as spaces of contesting ‘extended governance’ exercised either by Russia or the European Union, the book conceptualizes the borderlands in a wider Europe as actors that pursue a ‘rational self-conduct’ (p.46) even when embraced in external institutional settings and normative practices. The lenses of ‘governmentality’ theory hence allow for escaping the dominant discourse of a strategically imposed-from-above power that saturates the
agential space of the borderlands concerned, and conceptualize tactical ‘governance at a distance’ that is mostly about ‘helping others to constitute subjectivities and abilities to act independently and optimize resources’ (p.46).

Such an approach represents an astonishingly stringent and carefully tailored contemporary reading of Michel Foucault’s late-1980s conception of power in his idea of governmentality – the latter entailing essentially ‘the contract between the technologies of domination of Others and those of the Self’ (Foucault 1988, p.19). Seeing the notion of ‘borderland’ much deeper than as a geographical construct (that is borderland as a cultural, economic, normative, symbolic and performative phenomenon), Makarychev and Yatsyk are keen on identifying in their study specific mechanisms, or governmentality techniques, that shape borderland meaning-making and identity-building thus eventually co-producing autonomous borderland subjectivities. These basically include, according to the book, ‘good governance’, ‘festivisation’, ‘disneyisation’, and other urban ‘performative events’ that transcend the boundaries of the local and are effectively translated onto the national level. The authors trace these practices of self-‘enabling’ and self-‘empowerment’ that come to force out the patterns of external ‘dominance’ in three comparative country/case studies: Ukrainian Galician political culture and Western Ukrainian festivals of sorts, including the European Football Championship (EURO 2012); international sporting events in Georgia, particularly the European 2015 Olympic Youth Festival and the final of the UEFA Super Cup; and Estonian national song and dance festivals as key components of its spiritual tradition of nurturing national identity. It should be pointed out however that the book’s narrative goes beyond those three case studies and deals with broader issues of internal-external interaction policies and discourses. Structured in four chapters that contextualize the theme (chapter one on borderlands and their meanings and techniques) and substantiate the argument in three comparative case studies (chapter two on Ukraine’s West as ‘another Europe’; chapter three on Estonian song festivals; and chapter four on Georgian sport performative events), the book’s concluding part dares to ask a rhetorical question that is highly politicized in public and political discourses ‘in a wider Europe’. In posing the question whether ‘the story of Europe [can] be told from its
Eastern borderlands? (p.125), the authors reverse traditional core-periphery understanding of international interactions in the region concerned, and subtly but boldly advance a promising thinking on celebrating agency beyond hegemonic contestation of different sorts. Ironically, while focusing on celebration as meaning-making performative events in Europe’s borderlands they make a well-argued and more than timely case for celebration as scholarly praising of borderlands in a wider Europe, but also in other geographically distant but no less contested and allegedly aphasic agential spaces.

References


IF MEN DEFINE SITUATIONS AS REAL THEY ARE REAL IN THEIR CONSEQUENCES


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The true initiate is he who knows that the most powerful secret is a secret without content, because no enemy will be able to make him confess it, no rival devotee will be able to take it from him.

Umberto Eco. Foucault’s pendulum

The so-called Thomas theorem would probably best define Adam Zamoyski’s book. In a history of the years between 1789 and 1848, he shows how the fear of revolution and the belief that there was an organized conspiracy to overthrow the governments of the day shaped the contemporary politics. It shows how the search for this phantom conspiracy and phantom revolution led to the development of the contemporary surveillance state\(^1\) with the rulers determined to get into the heads of their subjects and to deal with the potential subversion before it happened.

The book is beautifully written, its sombre topic diffused by the sarcastic style of the author. It is full of amusing anecdotes about the leaders of the times and their subjects, and paints a picture of the forces of order of the times which would strongly resemble a caricature if it was not based on true facts and real, well-researched events. At the same time, the events described are rather tragicomic. The eagerness to please (and thus to uncover as many ‘plots’ as possible) and the blunders of ‘secret agents’

\(^1\) The subtitle of hardcover edition reads ‘Political Paranoia and the creation of modern state 1789-1848’ which is another good representation of the author’s intent.
stifled legitimate protest, suppressed some political ideas and landed people in jails or even gallows for largely imaginary crimes.

The inability of the people, both the leaders and the followers, to deal with the contingency of events that followed the storming of the Bastille is palpable throughout the book. In order to make sense of what was going on, they tended to resort to conspiracy theories and to see behind any discontent the hand of Illuminati or the Comité Directeur.² The author challenges their views by providing an impressive amount of factual details on the events of these sixty years, showing clearly the contingent nature of their occurrence.

It is very salutary to read this type of history, which clearly challenges traditional linear historical writing where one event inevitably leads to another, with society developing along a preordained path and the ‘causes’ lead directly to ‘effects’. Most of the great upheavals mentioned throughout the book, ‘revolutions’ in various places of Europe, have a farcical character about them and the private lives and fears of the leaders of the day have as much to do with the development of events as the ‘historical forces’ or process of industrialization. The July revolution of 1830 in France addressed a political grievance, but could well have been thwarted if the King had actually acted; in the Decembrist ‘rising’ in Russia, the bewildered soldiers brought out by their officers thought “Constantine and constitution” … to refer to Constantine and his wife.’ (p.333) The pinnacle of the book, the ‘revolutions’ of 1848, caught everyone off guard not because the conspirators in them were so well hidden from view, but precisely because they were not planned at all, came as a surprise for the participants themselves and on occasion, as in Berlin, were caused by nothing more than the incidence of good weather. It is thus, only in the minds of the rulers of the day that all these contingent events came to form a coherent story. The monarchs of the day were right to fear their own shadow, yet this was more because of their own actions than because of some great conspiracies bound to overthrow them right from the start. The examples of this abound in the

² The former were invented by the revival of mysticism of the 18th century, the later – a product of French revolution, both groups were used to show that behind all the discontent, disturbances and upheavals there was a vast conspiracy to overthrow the ‘thrones and churches’. They captivated minds of such prominent figures of the day as the Tsar Alexander and Prince Metternich.
The mild Polish Constitution of 1791, passed by the King and nobility, blessed by the Pope, was branded ‘Jacobin’ by the Empress of Russia Catherine II, who moved quickly to dismantle the Polish state and persecute all involved in the constitutional process. The Poles rose against the Russians in 1794, ‘confirming’ that they were indeed ‘Jacobins’ (all of them, the King included). All the revolts, uprisings and insurrections in Poland were treated as a part of this ‘grand conspiracy’ to overthrow the ruling monarch, which, obviously, had nothing to do with the local conditions. Austrians treated any disturbances in Italy and German states in exactly the same way.

The Russian and Austrian governments were to a significant degree concerned with such nationalist upheavals, yet they were even more adamant to stamp out any possible resistance inside their principal nationality domains (both empires were multinational, but were dominated by Russians and Germans respectively). Consequently, in Russia, they outlawed all innocent (literary and the like) associations, which made them move underground and ‘discover the thrill of conspiracy’ (p.328); in Germany they clamped down on all displays of nationalist sentiment, which made it more militant and virulent; all over Europe they introduced webs of surveillance of the population which made people unwilling to talk, but did nothing to make them love their rulers better.

The book is a strong indictment of Metternich, the all-powerful chancellor of Austria, who, due to his belief in the conspiracy, not only stifled the aspirations of the rising nationalists in Italy, Germany and Poland making them more radical in the process; held back Austrian economic development by resistance to any innovation and by overwhelming expenditures for the military, used more to clamp down on the local disaffections than to fight wars with external opponents; and ‘welcomed’ all the disturbances of the time, as they proved for him the existence of this grand conspiracy.

It also gives voice to those who tried to resist the temptation of fear. Duc de Richelieu, a fugitive from the French revolution and later Prime Minister of France, wrote that ‘It cannot be denied that the intoxication of the French in these unfortunate times is a real fanaticism, and that those who are styled patriots really do form a sect. … It will be with this one as it has been with all those which have agitated the world. If it is
left to itself it will die and vanish into the void from which it should never have emerged; if, on the contrary, it is persecuted, it will have its martyrs and its life span will be prolonged far beyond its natural term.’ (p.37) The statement would be familiar for those studying terrorist movements of our days, many of which rely on the government overreaction to increase their numbers of supporters, following the logic of action-reaction-action, where the action of the groups provokes unmeasured response, leads to more recruits and the possibility of more action. Even the author of the most acclaimed book on the Illuminati conspiracy of the time, Augustin Barruel, invited his readers to fight the supposed conspiracy with ‘society, humanity and conservativism’ (p.20). This invitation, however, was heeded by few of his addressees.

The author invites the reader to draw parallels for herself between his depictions of the world in the sixty years after the French revolution and the realities of today. Those parallels are indeed easy to draw and quite troublesome to behold: the web of secret police that entangled European societies after the French revolution, and managed to uncover numerous plots, yet most of them of their own concoction; the feeling of ‘being watched’ developed in the societies, the members of which had their mail opened all the time and their conversations both in public and in private recorded by the policy, which reflect the scandals of surveillance of our own time; Burke’s designation of ‘anyone who did not hold the same views as himself’ (p.45) as a terrorist and his ‘surprising lack of faith in democracy’s ability to defend itself by standing by its own values’ (p.68) should also sound familiar to anyone who followed the news of the current ‘war of terror’.

The author hints at some parallels in the chapter titles, such as ‘War on Terror,’ ‘Suicide Terrorists’ and ‘The Empire of Evil’. While some historians object to building such analogies, for a political scientist it is a salutary reminder of the amount of cases available to anyone interested in the role and effects of fear and paranoia in political life. The author may be a little harsh on the elite figures of the times, who succumbed to the quite natural desire for order and clarity in times of disorder and ambiguity, yet the effects of their actions do warrant some harsh words.

3 For the parallels of our time, see the article of one of the most prominent researchers and advisors on terrorism policy Marc Sageman and his ‘indictment’ of the use of ‘agent provocateurs’ for sending ‘impressionable youth’ to prisons in the US (Sageman 2013)
In short, the book is a must for anyone who is interested in the origins of our fears and their public expressions, of the government uses of largely imaginary terror to push through more and more control over the private lives (and even thoughts) of the citizens to which not only the autocratic regimes, such as the Russian one, but also more benign and liberal ones can easily succumb. The moral of these sixty years is simple and still valid today: ruling with fear, whether of the government itself, or its contesters lurking in the shadows, is not the way to bring about social cohesion and resilience to terror whatever form it would take. That lesson is useful for the leaders and opinion makers of our day to learn as well.

Reference