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Back cover: A ZSU from the Estonian Defence Forces on display
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Section I

Military Education

The course family at the Baltic Defence College has three key members, the Joint Staff and Command Course, the Colonels Course and the Civil Servants Course. The two first courses have been introduced in earlier issues of the Baltic Defence Review. In this issue, Professor Ole Kvaerna introduces the Civil Servants Course, which will run for the second time from August 2002.
The Civil Servants Course

By Ole Kværnø, Professor*

The Background

When the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania decided to establish the Baltic Defence College the obvious main focus was on the core production of the College, the Joint Staff and Command Course, which was set up to provide officers from all services and branches with education and training at the level of general staffs. Officers with education and training at the level of joint staffs are and probably always will be in short supply in all three Baltic States, for which reason this course will remain the cornerstone of the College. The three ministers of defence, however, also realised that another type of personnel was in equal short supply, if their ambition to create western type militaries under strict democratic control within a very short span of time was to be fulfilled: civil servants with a fundamental understanding of the nature of the military instrument. During the whole period of Soviet occupation military personnel had been running the military structures without any interplay with or control from the civilian side of government. This distinct historic feature of totalitarianism had as a consequence for the three Baltic States after having regained independence that not only would they start building their military force structures completely anew; they would also have to construct from scratch the civilian structures necessary to steer and control the military. Therefore the Baltic Defence College was tasked also to establish a course aimed directly at providing young civil servants employed in agencies steering, controlling or simply interacting with the military with a fundamental understanding of the nature of the military instrument. The aim was not just to be limited to providing knowledge of the primary functions and roles of the military in a democratic society but also to provide the students with an understanding of the possibilities and limitations of military operations in support of the foreign and security policies of the three Baltic States.

Because of the obvious problem that the students in such a course would si-

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multaneously be desperately needed in their normal working capacities, it was decided to arrange the course as a combination of residential studies at the Baltic Defence College and internet based distributed learning.

In 2001 the Baltic Defence College established and successfully conducted the first Civil Servants Course for civil servants from Latvia and Estonia. Lithuania chose not to send students to the first course primarily because of the problem mentioned above with making long term investments in education when you need all available hands on deck here and now. In September 2001 the three ministers in a joint communiqué asked the Baltic Defence College to focus the next Civil Servants Courses on helping the agencies primarily affected by the pending NATO membership, i.e. primarily ministries of foreign affairs and defence, to meet their new administrative and political requirements associated with membership. Following the joint communiqué Lithuania also declared her preparedness to send students to the second course to start in August 2002.

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The Students and the Content of the Course

The Civil Servants Course is targeted at civil servants in their first or second permanent career positions in the Ministries of Defence, Ministries of Foreign Affairs or other state institutions implementing security policies. The second course, however, concentrates on the needs of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence to prepare civil servants to work in positions related to the pending NATO membership.

It is the stated mission of the course to “further qualify the students in policy-making and administration within the functional areas of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defence” - and any other organisations or ministries linking the political decision-makers with the military professionals. The course will enhance the students’ ability and capacity to understand and administer the complex building up and reforming as well as managing and maintaining national defence structures in co-operation with state agencies, with other Baltic States and specifically with NATO.

The course must be seen as an important tool in the development of the potential of selected civil servants dealing with the military instrument and military officers. The course introduces the students to military structures, military ethos, defence planning and policy, the concepts of total and territorial defence as well as security and defence related institutions and organisations. The course further teaches staff methods and staff procedures as well as management skills. To deepen the understanding and to facilitate networking between the courses the Civil Servants Course is wherever practical and possible functionally integrated with the Joint Staff and Command Course.

The second Civil Servants Course will start with its first period of residential studies on 7 August 2002 and will last 5 ½ months until graduate on 6 February 2003. The course will consist of three periods of residential studies for all together 10 weeks, and two periods of distributed
learning in between the residential periods. All distributed learning period are focused on preparing the students for the next period of residential studies. After graduation February the students will be invited back for the course study tour in June, where the course together with the Colonels Course will go to Belgium and the Netherlands to visit relevant national and international organisations and civil service agencies.

The content of the course is divided into eight major clusters, which are:

- Defence Administration; key words are training methods, procurement procedures and accountability.
- Defence Planning; key words are medium and long term planning mechanisms and procedures.
- Staff Skills; key words are staff analysis, staff procedures and problem solving tools.
- Military Affairs; key words are basic practices, military ethos, operations and mission oriented command, military organizations' capabilities and limitations, military technology and Baltic defence structures.
- Total Defence and Mobilization; key words are civil-military co-operation and crises response contingency planning.
- The International System and the Small States; key words are system theory, small state theory, structural and dynamic possibilities and limitations.
- International Security Organizations and the Small State; key words are UN, NATO, EU and OSCE.
- NATO; key words are civilian and military policy-making and command structures and procedures, institutional interplay, modus operandi, functions and role, status and perspectives.

**Lessons Learned from the First Course which Influence the Execution of the Second Course**

As one of the conditions for this particular type of course is that it is an independent ambition to limit the students' absence from their normal places of work to a necessary minimum, it is obvious that the course must very intense. One the conclusions drawn from the first course was that this is best achieved by putting much emphasis on problem solving in syndicates (small instruction groups) of seven to eight students each. It is, however, vital that the syndicates are under constant supervision of a teacher attached from the directing staff of the school.

For the second course syndicate guiding officers have been seconded directly to the course on a temporary basis from the Netherlands and from Sweden. It is the intention to establish between two and three syndicates depending on the number of students from Lithuania and from states outside the Baltic area.

It was another lesson learned from the first course that integration with the military courses is often of very good value not only in terms of sharing knowledge but also in establishing mutual cross-culture understanding and building up networks that can be immediate of value in small structures as we know them from the Baltic States.
It was a third lesson learned that the study tour should be integrated with the Colonels Course, because the focus of that study trip is on the existing politico-military strategies and on development of new strategies, concepts and structures of NATO and EU. For this reason it was accepted to plan the course trip for June, three months after graduation, allowing this integration to take place.

It was a fourth lesson learned that constant supervision and evaluation of the students both as syndicates and as individuals is a pedagogical method that can function very constructively. The students are continuously getting constructive criticism and feedback from their syndicate guiding officers during and after each separable block of teaching.

The last lesson learned, which deserves mentioning, here was that advanced distributed learning based on the internet has some enormous advantages and some dangerous traps. System requirements that are not met from the outset can create serious frustrations. The software platform established to run the teaching programs from must be unsophisticated as well as easily accessed and operated by both students and teachers. For these reasons the second course will in the distributed learning phases concentrate more on traditional distance learning techniques based on e-mail rather than attempt to exploit the full range of possibilities inherent in the advanced distributed learning system, which is being developed with the support and help from the Swiss Government.

As the coming course is the second and as the Baltic Defence College has been able to draw some valuable conclusion from the first course, some of which were found worth of mentioning above, it is believed with some confidence that the course to start in August will be yet another success throughout. The Baltic Defence College certainly also welcomes Lithuania’s, Sweden’s and the Netherlands’ participation in the course. It is therefore with pleasure and with great expectations that the Baltic Defence College looks forward to welcoming the students of the second Civil Servant Course in August 2002. The College is further confident that the course has now found a shape and form that can and will be sustained for the next many Civil Servants Courses to come.
Section II

Developments in Baltic Security

This May Lithuania for the first time in its history adopted a National Security Strategy. Adopting this vital basic planning document, based on which all further security policy planning and implementation must either be devised or revised represents a major step forward in Lithuania’s development of a comprehensive and coherent security policy.

In the first introductory article in this section Ms. Giedrė Statkevičiūtė, the Head of the Defence Policy Division, Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, explains the background and lays out the premises of the National Security Strategy.

Following this introduction, the Baltic Defence Review publishes the Lithuanian National Security Strategy, which has not previously been made public.

The topic of the second article in this section is the development of the capabilities of the Estonian Defence Forces. In the framework of a small state theory the articles discusses the development of the force structures and the Finnish assistance to Estonia in this respect with a view to analyse and assess the general causes of Estonian behaviour.
The Lithuanian National Security Strategy

By Giedrė Statkevičiūtė*

Until now, the Lithuanian national security system was based on the 'Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Basics of National Security', which was adopted in 1996. The law set the foundation for the national security; however, being a normative document it could not meet the requirements on which the concept of strategy bases itself upon. The law did not clearly identify Lithuanian national interests either. It focused mainly on military means of security enhancement, without taking into account the equally important measures such as economic, political, social, etc. In fact, with no national interests being clearly identified, the link between the available means and the State’s security policy goals was not properly outlined.

Seeking to fill the gap in the State’s main documentation area, the Seimas (the Lithuanian Parliament) signed a resolution last summer committing the Government to develop a National Security Strategy. The aim of this document would be to establish a vision of the State’s development, to identify Lithuania’s national interests, the potential threats, risks and available resources and to identify the measures required to safeguard the national security.

The Government of the Republic of Lithuania formed a working group to develop the Lithuanian National Security Strategy. The group, headed by the Ministry of National Defence, consisted of representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Economy, Finance, Social Security and Employment, Culture, Environment, Transport, as well as representatives from the Seimas, the State Security Department, the Special Investigation Service and the European Committee under the Government.

As far back as in the beginning of 2001, during consultations with United States European Command (U.S. EUCOM), the USA offered Lithuania to hire U.S. experts through the use of the Foreign

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Military Financing (FMF) funds to develop the National Security Strategy. Following Lithuanian’s assent to the expert assistance, the Department of Defence (DoD) of the USA has chosen CUBIC APPLICATIONS, INC. to assist Lithuanian officials with the drafting of the document. Experts from this company had the experience of consulting the Governments of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary when drafting analogous documents.

While developing the Lithuanian National Security Strategy, the most important task was to identify national (vital and primary) interests to reflect goals and priorities of Lithuania’s internal and foreign policy.

The vital and primary Lithuanian interests were identified as sovereignty, democratic constitutional order, respect and protection of human rights and prosperity of the State. The goal of Lithuanian security policy is to ensure these vital interests by making use of all the State’s capabilities. Security is a vital condition for invulnerability and for the continuity of recognised values. Together it is a condition for free development of the country and for economic prosperity and growth.

Positive changes in the strategic environment, contributing to the implementation of the main national interests of Lithuania, are also included into the sphere of national interests, which inter alia include: global and regional stability, open and predictable security policy of all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.

While implementing its national security policy, Lithuania follows the conception that the current security covers not only military, but also political, economic, cultural, social, ecological and other aspects. Threats of a military nature are no longer dominating states’ security agendas due to the fact that a good number of new non-military threats and challenges, facing national security, have emerged or acquired a new shape.

The National Security Strategy of Lithuania reflects the trans-national approach towards security problems. Today, the line between national and international security becomes increasingly thin or even non-existing. Lithuania views its security as an indispensable part of the Euro-Atlantic security framework.

Although the U.S. led international coalition’s anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan was a major success, the threat of terrorism remains a matter of serious international concern. However, this threat is more of an external nature to Lithuania because neither the historical experience nor the contemporary international situation suggests the conditions for the formation of a functional domestic network of terrorism. This threat stems primarily from abroad: acts of terrorism may be directed against infrastructure, other objects of strategic importance to national security or objects of foreign partners. Lithuania may become a transit state or training ground for international terrorism targeting the other states in the West.

Although the likelihood of a direct military confrontation in our region is considered to be low, demonstrations of military force, provocations or the threat
to use force may take place and remain a danger to the security of Lithuania.

Uneven social and economic development that increases the gap in living standards between different social groups may present dangerous conditions. A decline in living standards and an increase in the unemployment rate may also cause the growth in the crime rate.

Organized crime, financial crime and corruption represent yet another set of serious security challenges. These activities are related to the proliferation of drugs and arms, trade in people, illegal business and money laundering – all of which may cause economic and social instability, discredit the democratic institutions of the government and democracy itself.

Although no immediate direct threat exists in our region, a wave of illegal migration may occur as a result of regional conflicts, developing into a source of instability in the whole of Europe.

Identification of the State’s interests also requires an accurate identification of the primary actions and means necessary for implementation of the Strategy, on which the achievement of State’s interests/goals directly depends. One of those is the shaping of the security environment. The processes of the Euro-Atlantic integration are the main and most effective tools of ensuring internal and regional stability, security and prosperity. Lithuania is a state firmly based on the European culture, professing and developing the same values and actively seeking integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

Good neighbourly relations is one of the means that helps to promote a favourable strategic environment, which further helps to ensure the national security and Lithuania’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic area. In this context Lithuania is carrying out a range of activities such as co-operation in the Baltic Sea region, establishing a strategic partnership with Poland, enhancing mutual confidence with Russia, participating in international peace support operations, etc.

Internal, economic and social security is not less important for a secure development of the State. The new Lithuanian National Security Strategy focuses much on this subject. Economic security – that is understood as ensuring a stable functioning of Lithuania’s economy and conditions for its further development – plays an important role in the area of national security and it is closely related with other security components. The ability to participate in global economic processes, to increase the competitiveness of the economy in the international markets, to have access to global financial and information flows; to ensure availability of up-to-date technologies and the expansion of export markets form the basis for Lithuanian economic security. A smooth integration into the single market of the European Union (EU) is amongst the key foundations for the Lithuanian economic growth, which is the basis when making strategic priorities: further implementation of structural reforms, assurance of conditions of macroeconomic stability, creation of favourable environment for the investment and business, etc.

State and society are closely associated. Therefore, social and personal security of individuals cannot be dissociated from
the State. It is one of the highest priorities. While implementing the goal, efforts are made to develop a system providing an effective response to organised crime, corruption and smuggling, increased effectiveness of the police and other law enforcement institutions activities through internal and international co-operation. Implementation of a social security policy is to help citizens to integrate into the labour market, to balance the social insurance system and to ensure social integration of socially exposed groups in the population.

In the recent years, developments in the security environment have been positive. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and EU enlargement processes are seen as further enhancing security and stability in the region and in the entire Europe. Even if the current international environment does not present any direct military risks to Lithuania, its security remains subject to a wider variety of military and non-military risks that are multi-directional. So why is the enhancement of response and readiness capabilities amongst the highest priorities? By improving military, crisis management and response capabilities, strengthening the civilian readiness system, Lithuania is taking practical steps towards becoming responsible not only for its own security, but also for a wider security when committing itself to international responsibilities.

Coming to the end of this short introduction to the first Lithuanian National Security Strategy it is important to stress that the Strategy has defined basic goals for specialised strategies established in separate areas of the State's policy. It is a flexible and open document and will be amended on a regular basis when major changes occur in the international or internal security environment.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
of the Republic of Lithuania*

I. General provisions

1. The aim of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania is to provide a vision of the state's development, its national interests and the actions required for their implementation. The National Security Strategy establishes the basic goals and means of the national security policy. It encompasses political, diplomatic, defence, economic and other spheres of the state's policy.

2. The Republic of Lithuania implements its National Security Strategy through a system of long-term political provisions and means, enabling to preserve the sovereignty of the state, its territorial integrity, democratic constitutional order, human and civil rights and freedoms, and a safe environment of individual, by confronting security challenges, dangerous conditions, threats, crisis situations or military conflicts.

3. The Republic of Lithuania perceives its security as preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity, internal security and order, democratic foundations, economic security of all legal entities and population and protection of its natural environment.

4. The National Security Strategy defines basic goals of specialised strategies and doctrines in separate areas of the state policy. These strategies must be directly based on the provisions of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania and they must be revised every time the National Security Strategy of Lithuania itself is updated.

5. The agenda for the security policy of the Republic of Lithuania until the next review of the National Security Strategy will be determined by the following distinguishing features of the current security environment:

   5.1. final preparations for entry into NATO and the EU;

   5.2. addressing the challenge of international terrorism.

II. Basic assumptions of security policy

1. After five decades of occupation, the Republic of Lithuania restored its independence on March 11, 1990 and has since been developing as a modern, politically, economically, socially and culturally ma-

* The unofficial translation.
ture democracy, actively pursuing integration into the organisations of democratic states adhering to the same values. Dismantling of the Soviet bloc and the restoration of freedom and independence has created appropriate conditions for the Republic of Lithuania to define its security interests and policy.

2. The current situation of the Republic of Lithuania within the international security system is as favourable as at the latter decade. The independence of the Republic of Lithuania is universally recognised and respected, growth in the economy is improving steadily, friendly relations and practical co-operation with the neighbours are being maintained, national minorities have been successfully integrated into Lithuanian society, ten years of experience of functioning democratic institutions has been accumulated, democratic civil control of the military has been efficiently established, and integration into the global and Western institutions is advancing successfully.

3. Currently the majority of traditional and new challenges to the security of the Republic of Lithuania are transnational in nature. Internal political, military, economic, ethnic or other crises can exert a major influence upon other states both neighbouring and further afield. Therefore, the Republic of Lithuania considers international security as indivisible and seeks to ensure its security as an integral and indispensable part of the security of the broader regional, European and global community of states. Alongside the national efforts to ensure security, in accordance with its assets and together with the international partners, the Republic of Lithuania contributes to security and stability in other regions of Europe, and she is resolved to accept the assistance of international partners if a crisis would arise in Lithuania. Therefore, the Republic of Lithuania pledges by mutual political, military and economic commitment, to ally with states that adhere to the same political, social, cultural, and moral values. At the same time, the Republic of Lithuania attaches particular importance to cooperation with all neighbouring countries with the objective of assuring the stable functioning of democracy, civil society and free market economies in these countries. Joining and participating in those international bodies that recognise and promote these values is an essential element of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania. In this regard NATO and the EU occupy a special place among such institutions with Lithuanian membership in each as the highest priority.

4. At present, the Republic of Lithuania does not observe any immediate military threat to national security and as a result does not regard any state as its enemy. The security policy of the Republic of Lithuania is open, transparent and non-confrontational. It is not directed against the legitimate interests of any other state.

5. Globalisation in relation to the national security of the Republic of Lithuania is considered as objective process, which is inevitable due to the scientific, technical, economical and other progress of mankind civilisation, the intensification of mutual interdependence of various countries and regions, and interna-
tional economical, political and cultural integration processes, at large extent stipulated by above mentioned factors. The main result of globalisation in the area of security - internationalisation of factors determining world’s security and stability. In seeing its future as a part of secure Europe and secure world, Lithuania is open to the globalisation processes. Globalisation does not mean automatic and total levelling of national identity. On the contrary, it gives opportunity to enrich national culture, civilisation and societal political practice by most valuable world’s achievements in the corresponding areas, and, the other way round, to make best achievements of Lithuania an integral part of world’s cultural and civilisation heritage. Therefore the Republic of Lithuania does not consider globalisation as a threat to the national security.

III. Security interests of the Republic of Lithuania

1. Vital interests: The security of the Republic of Lithuania is based on protection of national interests. To secure vital interests, every possible means of protection are employed. A basic precept of national security is that failure to protect vital interests will result in immediate and serious threat to the existence of the state of Lithuania and its people. Vital interests are the following:

1.1. sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania, territorial integrity and democratic constitutional order;
1.2. respect and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms;
1.3. peace and prosperity of the state.
2. Primary interests: these are interests that if not protected, could eventually affect the vital interests of the Republic of Lithuania. Primary interests are the following:

2.1. global and regional stability;
2.2. freedom and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States;
2.3. open and predictable security policy of all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area;
2.4. ensuring alternative energy supplies and supply of resources that are of strategic importance;
2.5. a region free of environmental dangers.

IV. Challenges, dangers and threats

1. Challenges, dangers and threats that are non-military in nature arise as a consequence of globalisation, therefore, individual states cannot respond to them alone. Such transnational factors as terrorism, organised crime, arms proliferation, drug traffic, the illegal migration, and the spread of epidemics defy state borders and become international security challenges, dangers and threats. The probability that they will continue to spread is increasing.

1.1. Terrorism poses a serious security threat to the global community, and therefore to Lithuania as well. However, this threat is largely external to the Republic of Lithuania. The internal situation and the historical heritage of Lithuania do not provide conditions for the
formation of a broad domestic network of terrorism. This danger stems primarily from abroad:

1.1.1. The Republic of Lithuania may become a potential target of international terrorism. Acts of terrorism may be directed against infrastructure or other objects of strategic importance to national security as well as the objects of foreign states in Lithuania.

1.1.2. The Republic of Lithuania may become a transit country for international terrorism focused on the other countries. The following circumstances could intensify the threat of domestic terrorism:

1) occurrences of political extremism in the Republic of Lithuania,

2) social and economical differentiation may trigger conditions for social terrorism (acts of such terror may be directed against either state or private institutions, if they are perceived by groups with grievances as the source of their worsening social situation),

3) expansion of globalisation around the world and strengthening of anti-globalist movements may fuel the activities of local elements of these movements and create conditions for specific terrorism (under cover of opposition to globalisation, environment pollution, and other related issues).

1.2. While the likelihood of direct military confrontation in the region is low, demonstrations of military force, provocations, and the threat to use force remain a danger to the security of the Republic of Lithuania.

1.3. Overwhelming dependence of the Republic of Lithuania on the strategic resources and energy supplies of one country or the concentration of foreign capital representing economy, in which free market is not secured or unstable, in one or several economic sectors of strategic importance to national security is a potential danger not only for economic prosperity but also for the security of the country.

1.4. Certain economic conditions may constitute dangers to the security of the Republic of Lithuania, the well being of its population, independence of the state or constitutional order. These could be the following:

1.4.1. succession of assets and control over sectors and objects of strategic importance to national security, while pursuing political goals, as well as acting in a manner that violates economic security;

1.4.2. inferior functioning of economic and energy sectors and deranged functioning of the objects that are of strategic importance to national security, their improper usage or non-usage, interfering with the interests of the state.

1.5. Uneven social and economic development that increases the gap in living standards between different social groups may present a dangerous condition. It may become apparent as a result of a decline in the living standards of certain social groups, accompanied by an increase in unemployment, and it may at the same time trigger social and political extremism. This danger may also cause the growth of crime, which is a factor of danger to national security.

1.6. The spread of theories, religious doctrines, and ideologies that are inhumane, racist, instigate ethnic or religious hatred, assault the values of human rights,
or propagate and justify violence or genocide constitute a threat that is a precondition, or source, of many other security challenges.

1.7. Corruption poses a particular danger, because it damages legitimate individual and national interests and discreditsthe rule of law and the confidence of the citizens in the values of democracy and democratic institutions of government.

1.8. Activities of groups of organised and financial crime constitute a major threat to the state and society. Of particular concern are activities related to the proliferation of drugs and arms, trade in people, illegal business and corruption.

1.9. Activities of foreign intelligence agencies directed against the Republic of Lithuania constitute a serious threat to national security. These activities are characterised by the use of traditional and unconventional methods as well as new technologies to obtain information, compromise and influence military capabilities, political processes, and other areas of social and economic life. The disclosure or leaking of classified information to other countries would not only pose a threat to the security of the Republic of Lithuania but would also undermine the credibility of the Republic of Lithuania.

1.10. Weapons of mass destruction, their components and technologies for their production remain a global danger. The growing number of group of states and subjects in possession of such weapons, or who seek to acquire them, and the possibility that nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons may be used as a means of blackmail or terror is of particularly serious concern.

1.11. The uncontrolled migration poses a challenge to national security, although the Republic of Lithuania currently is not the main target of migration flow. A wave of migration may occur as a result of regional conflicts, which could evolve into a source of instability for the whole of Europe and at the same time could pose a danger to the interests of the Republic of Lithuania.

1.12. Industrial accidents, natural calamities, epidemics, or ecological disasters are also dangers to security of the Republic of Lithuania.

2. The above listing of threats and dangers is dynamic and is therefore subject to change dependent on internal, regional and global events and conditions.

V. Security Policy of the Republic of Lithuania

1. Major Goals and Objectives

1.1. The principal goals of national security of the Republic of Lithuania are to secure the vital and primary national interests, neutralise threats, and prevent dangerous conditions developing into threats. Among these, protection of vital interests has the highest priority.

1.2. The major objectives are friendly relationships with foreign countries, regional stability, peace and integration into the Euro-Atlantic area.

1.3. In the short term, the major objective is to become a member of NATO, upon invitation during the Alliance Summit that will be held in Prague in November 2002, and a member of the European Union.
2. Strategic concepts and implementation guidelines

2.1. The fundamental strategic concept of the Republic of Lithuania is to consolidate the accomplishments and the positive changes of the last decade and make them irreversible. In this regard the Republic of Lithuania considers NATO and EU enlargement, by extending invitations to join to all countries prepared for membership, including the Republic of Lithuania, as the most appropriate and credible means to consolidate these historical achievements. Membership of the Republic of Lithuania in NATO and EU, as well as membership of the other two Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, will ensure their long-term security and will also enhance the security and stability of the whole Baltic region and therefore it will be a long-term security gain for all states in the region.

2.2. The security policy of the Republic of Lithuania provides for the use of military force in cases of individual or collective self-defence against external aggression in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania as well as other laws and international commitments, or as part of international peace operations in support of Chapter VI or VII of the United Nations Charter in accordance with the rules of the use of armed force in operations.

2.3. Following the approval of the National Security Strategy, specialised strategies and doctrines must be prepared and revised. In this regard, the main principles in the areas of diplomacy (foreign policy), military affairs and intelligence (defence policy), internal security (public security, economic policy, social security, environment and cultural heritage), are the following:

2.3.1. Domestic stability and prosperity. Internal and foreign policies of the Republic of Lithuania are focused on fostering internal social and economic stability. This involves boosting public security, as well as stability of fiscal and monetary policies, intensification of foreign trade, encouragement of economic development, privatisation, social support, campaigns against corruption, reinforcement of civic society, development of culture and civilisation, and full-fledged integration into international economic and cultural organisations. Priorities of security policy are:

1) Internal security. One of the highest priorities in ensuring the national security of the Republic of Lithuania is the fight against organised crime and corruption. These threats to social stability have a negative impact on public security as well as economic development;

2) Human and Civil rights. The Republic of Lithuania guarantees to comply with international law regarding the rights of citizens and persons within its territory. These include full respect for the rights of minorities and ethnic groups;

3) Legitimate interests of society. The Republic of Lithuania guarantees to protect the legitimate interests of individuals within its territory against criminal offences. This involves establishing and implementing effective policies of crime control and prevention;

4) Stable economic growth. A strategic priority for national security of the
Republic of Lithuania is the formation of conditions for economic growth so as to ensure a higher quality of life for its citizens;

5) Social security and stability. An important element of security is to eliminate negative consequences of structural economic reforms and external impact on employment level of population, as well as to reduce illegal employment. Every citizen is entitled to have sufficient conditions for social, cultural and economic development. The formation of a socially self-supporting, unified and at the same time stable society is a basic element of the security of the Republic of Lithuania.

2.3.2. Deterrence and reliable defence. State defence consists of military security, as well as civil resistance. It is one of the main instruments of state security policy. More detailed defence policies and strategies have to adhere to these four strategic principles:

1) Democratic control of the military to include fostering citizenship and patriotism, and ensuring mutual trust and confidence between the military and the civilian population.

2) Deterrence based on defence rather than offence to include reinforcement of defence system and capabilities of the Republic of Lithuania.

3) Total and unconditional defence.

4) Euro-Atlantic solidarity and collective defence to include fulfilment of international commitments and active international military co-operation (diplomacy, assistance to the armed forces of the other states).

2.3.3. Euro-Atlantic stability and integration: The security system of the Republic of Lithuania is being developed as a part of common European security and transatlantic defence system. Therefore, foreign and internal policies are focused on full-fledged and comprehensive integration into the Euro-Atlantic area. Within their areas of responsibility, all State institutions must prepare policies aimed at ensuring the objectives of stability and integration into the Euro-Atlantic region:

1) Integration into NATO and EU: membership in NATO and EU, to include full support to the enlargement process, are two equally important priorities of security policy of the Republic of Lithuania. The processes of integration into NATO and EU strengthen and complement each other. Membership in one of these two organisations (NATO or EU) does not substitute for the membership in the other.

2) Active participation in maintaining peace and international stability: the Republic of Lithuania gives priority to conflict prevention, diplomacy, and international legal measures. Of particular importance is the priority given to participating in international crisis management, preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, participating in international arms control regimes, and establishing policies and legislation to address new security challenges, dangers, and threats.

3) Promotion of good neighbourly relations and regional co-operation: the Republic of Lithuania gives priority to co-operation throughout the
Baltic Sea Region, Northern Europe, and with the Russian Federation. Lithuania develops and strengthens multilateral and bilateral relations. Specific policies have also been established such as the policy of pragmatic selective co-operation with Belarus.

2.4. Legislation: systemic efforts are being made to harmonise the national legal base with the legal acts of the EU and NATO. Legal and institutional mechanisms for implementation of membership commitments have been identified. Upon the analysis of implementation of the National Security Strategy, the Government initiates the adoption of new, or amendments to existing, laws.

2.5. General resource priorities: with regard to distribution of resources in the various areas that directly affect overall security of the Republic of Lithuania, priority is given to activities, that enhance economic growth, social stability, fostering of civil society and threat response capabilities with particular attention to activities associated with integration into NATO and the EU.

VI. Primary actions and means for implementation of strategy

1. Shaping the security environment. In shaping and implementing security policy Lithuania strictly adheres to the universally accepted principles of international law, established by the United Nations Charter of 1945, the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference for Security and Co-operation of 1975, and other documents of international law. Major actions and means in shaping security environment are:

1.1. Integration into NATO. The Republic of Lithuania considers NATO membership as a principal means of ensuring both internal and regional security and stability in the future. The Republic of Lithuania has allocated certain assets for the actions aimed at qualifying for the membership in NATO. Key among these are the following:

1.1.1. Membership Action Plan. The Republic of Lithuania continues to implement the Annual National Programme of Integration into NATO, updated every year according to the initiative of the Membership Action Plan until membership of the Alliance is achieved. The Republic of Lithuania continues to allocate necessary share of state’s expenses for strengthening national defence and interoperability with NATO in accordance with the political consensus of the parliamentary parties on the goal of membership in NATO and their Agreement on the defence policy. In co-operation with non-governmental organisations and the media, the Government keeps the Lithuanian public constantly informed about the issues of NATO policy, the advantages of membership of the Republic of Lithuania in this organisation, and her future responsibilities as a member of the Alliance.

1.1.2. NATO activities. The Republic of Lithuania furthers an active co-operation with the Alliance and the applicants for membership within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and Planning and Review Process (PARP) and
uses this co-operation as a part of preparation for the membership in NATO. In accordance with available resources, the Republic of Lithuania continues to make an active contribution to NATO-led international peacekeeping operations.

1.1.3. Cooperation with NATO Member states. In pursuit of NATO membership, and to further strengthen regional security, the Republic of Lithuania continues expanding and developing bilateral and multilateral political, security, and defence cooperation with NATO member states, in order to:

1) consolidate the national security system of the Republic of Lithuania;
2) reinforce national and international crisis management capabilities;
3) implement NATO standards in various areas;
4) encourage political support of the Governments and Parliaments of NATO member states for membership of the Republic of Lithuania in NATO.

1.1.4. Strategic Partnership with the United States of America. The Republic of Lithuania continues to develop its relations with the United States of America as a strategic partner. The Republic of Lithuania considers the United States of America as the main partner of European security. The implementation of the 1998 Charter of Partnership between the US and the Baltic States continues to be instrumental in the development of the strategic partnership with the US. The Republic of Lithuania also maintains its historical and cultural links with the Lithuanian minority in the United States, which is the largest Lithuanian community abroad, and develops these links as an important aspect of its strategic partnership with the United States. The Republic of Lithuania continues to provide political and practical support for the antiterrorist campaign of the US, after they became the target of terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.

1.1.5. Co-operation with NATO Aspirant countries. The Republic of Lithuania continues to develop political and defence co-operation with countries, which pursue similar security policy objectives: Estonia, Latvia, and other states of Vilnius process', i.e. those, who are seeking membership in NATO and are implementing Membership Action Plans. The Republic of Lithuania seeks to develop military projects, created under trilateral military co-operation together with Estonia and Latvia, including joint military units, education institutions, and defence infrastructure, as future integrated part of NATO military structure.

1.1.6. Strengthening representation in NATO institutions. During the process of integration into NATO and taking into account that membership may soon be a reality, the Republic of Lithuania is increasing and strengthening its diplomatic representation, and the representation of institutions, forming and implementing security policy, at the NATO Mission, specialised committees and agencies, as well as in the Headquarters and Commands.

1.2. Integration into the European Union. As a part of the on-going work associated with membership in the EU, an important objective for the Republic of Lithuania is to close accession negotia-
tions by the end of the year 2002 and to be ready for membership by 1 January 2004. To this end, the Republic of Lithuania seeks to harmonise its legal system and procedures with those of the EU acquis communautaire, by implementing administrative and economic reforms. The Lithuanian Government informs the public about EU objectives, achievements, distinct policies, as well as the consequences and responsibilities that will arise as a result of Lithuania’s future EU membership. Other important actions for the Republic of Lithuania are:

1.2.1. solidarity with the EU’s Common Foreign Policy and participation together with the EU in the process of developing a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that complements and strengthens the transatlantic partnership between Europe and the United States;

1.2.2. cooperation with EU members and institutions, efficient use of assistance provided by the EU and its member states to Lithuania;

1.2.3. administrative adjustment inside the state;

1.2.4. strengthening Lithuanian diplomatic and institutional representation in EU institutions and specialised agencies.

1.3. Strengthening international cooperation and good neighbourly relations. The Republic of Lithuania is carrying out a range of activities and means focused on improving the strategic environment of neighbouring regions. The most important actions are as follows:

1.3.1. Cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. The Republic of Lithuania seeks to promote stability and prosperity in the Baltic Sea region. The security dimension of this cooperation consists of the following actions:

1) trilateral security cooperation with Estonia and Latvia, including joint military projects;

2) close multilateral and bilateral cooperation with Northern Europe states: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, which assist Lithuania in its preparation for NATO and EU membership;

3) participation in multilateral initiatives to include strategic partners into cooperation of the region, especially the EU and its separate member states and the United States, and to promote inclusion of Russia in practical and mutually beneficial cooperation with the West;

4) active participation in the work of the Council of Baltic Sea States.

1.3.2. Strategic Partnership with Poland. The Republic of Lithuania develops co-operation with Poland as a strategic partner. This co-operation continues at all levels: between the parliaments of the two countries, their governments, various institutions, universities, local and municipal authorities, and non-governmental institutions, which foster interpersonal contacts. The Republic of Lithuania seeks to learn from the experience of Poland (and other new NATO members) gained by joining NATO and adapting to its requirements. Due to her geographical location, Poland is considered an indispensable link in the process of integration of the Lithuanian economy, information, communications, transport, energy and infrastructure into Western European systems, and in the process of inclusion of her defence infrastructure into NATO’s integrated military structure.
1.3.3. Relations with the Russian Federation. One of priorities of the Republic of Lithuania is to enhance mutual confidence with Russia in the area of international security. The Republic of Lithuania makes constructive use of the multinational arms control system and confidence and security building measures; implements bilateral confidence and security building measures agreed with Russia; and takes unilateral security and defence policy initiatives to increase openness with respect to Russia and other neighbours. The Republic of Lithuania supports multinational initiatives that seeks to include Russia more closely in relevant practical co-operation with the North Atlantic Alliance, and participates actively in such initiatives. The Republic of Lithuania cooperates with Russia in assuring her military transit to and from the Kaliningrad region through the territory of the Republic of Lithuania in accordance with mutually acceptable and legally regulated measures. This transit is executed in accordance with regulations approved by bilateral agreement, reviewed on an annual basis, and conforming to the laws and requirements of other normative acts of the Republic of Lithuania. The Republic of Lithuania is satisfied with the current military transit arrangements. The approach of NATO and EU membership of the Republic of Lithuania does not alter its inclination to cooperate with Russia, and to ensure that Russian civil, commercial, and military transit through the territory of Lithuania on the terms that do not contradict to Schengen acquis.

1.3.4. The Republic of Lithuania is particularly interested in political, social, economic and ecological stability in the Kaliningrad region. Instability can cause serious problems associated with smuggling, organised crime, uncontrolled migration and pollution of the neighbouring countries, including the Republic of Lithuania. Other interests of the Republic of Lithuania with regard to the Kaliningrad region include the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and economic, trade and cultural partnership, and improving economic development and the standard of living so that it compares more favourably with neighbouring countries, particularly those approaching the EU membership.

1.3.5. Relations with Belarus. The Republic of Lithuania, as a democratic country and neighbour of Belarus, is interested in the establishment of democratic norms and principles in this country, together with prosperity for its people and internal stability. The Republic of Lithuania implements tactics of pragmatic selective cooperation at a practical level. This tactics beside other issues encompasses cooperation on border protection and border control institutions, application of confidence and security building measures, cooperation with non-governmental organisations of Belarus and representatives of media. The Republic of Lithuania would expand the area of cooperation upon the strengthening of democratic trends in Belarus.

1.3.6. Interregional cooperation. The Republic of Lithuania takes an active role in sharing the experience gained from security cooperation in the Baltic Sea region with interested states in other regions,
in particular Central Europe, the Balkans, the Trans-Caucasus, and Central Asia.

1.3.7. Participation in international peace operations, crisis management and prevention. The Republic of Lithuania gives priority to participation in operations led by organisations that acquire the mandate of the United Nations Security Council. The Republic of Lithuania is developing its military and civil police forces, which are included in the UN register, as permanent standby forces. The Republic of Lithuania also intends to take part in international agreements that constitute the basis of the multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), assigned to carry out operations of the UN, and take an active part in the activities of this brigade. The Republic of Lithuania will continue to contribute to conflict prevention, peace making, peace-building initiatives, and other diplomatic, civil police and monitoring missions led by the UN, OSCE and other international organisations.

1.3.8. Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Republic of Lithuania cooperates with foreign partners and international organisations, and strictly applies all regulations and conventions defined in international agreements limiting proliferation or prohibiting Weapons of Mass Destruction, their components and technologies for their production. The same applies to limiting proliferation or prohibiting of nuclear, chemical and biological materials.

1.3.9. International arms control. The Republic of Lithuania regards international arms control regimes and confidence and security building measures as important element of the world’s and particularly European security. The Republic of Lithuania takes an active part in UN and OSCE arms control regimes. While participating in multilateral regimes, the Republic of Lithuania also consults with the individual countries on application of bilateral confidence and security building measures and actively prepares for the possibility of joining international arms control regimes and confidence and security building measures, such as the adapted 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and 1997 Open Sky treaty. The Republic of Lithuania supports and already adheres to the provisions of the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines, and seeks to prepare as efficiently as possible for the future ratification and full implementation of its provisions.

1.4. Responding to international security challenges and dangers. The Republic of Lithuania places the highest priority on taking specific measures in the fight against terrorism, corruption, organised crime, trade in people, drug trafficking, illegal migration, smuggling, and responding to other challenges of modern society such as crime related to informational technologies and telecommunications. Together with foreign partners and international organisations, the Republic of Lithuania creates, ratifies, and implements instruments of international law, paying special attention to the resolutions of the UN Security Council, promotes inter-institutional cooperation of police forces, border control services, customs and special services on a bilateral basis as well as through international organisations such
as Interpol and Europol.

1.5. Prevention of terrorism. The anti-terrorism program includes:

1.5.1. participating in the fight of the international community against terrorism;
1.5.2. developing general anti-terrorist legislation;
1.5.3. protecting potential targets against terrorist attack – including critical infrastructure;
1.5.4. identifying individuals involved in ordering and executing possible terrorist acts;
1.5.5. identifying and removing potential sources of terrorist funding;
1.5.6. establishing clearly defined procedures for investigating acts of terrorism;
1.5.7. constant preparedness for eliminating crisis situations caused by acts of terrorism;
1.5.8. reinforcing counter-terrorist intelligence capability.

2. Strengthening internal, economic and social security:

2.1. Crime control and prevention. A new model for a crime control and prevention system is being formed in Lithuania, the application of which will allow consistent and complete elimination of the main causes and conditions of development of crime and rational use of the allocated resources. The role of local authority institutions is reinforced in the process of creating a safe living environment. Activities of pre-judicial investigation institutions are being strengthened in investigating and revealing crimes and their efficient intercommunication and interaction with prosecution office is being ensured. Smooth implementation of the new Criminal Code and Criminal Process Code is being pursued. Priority in the sphere of crime control is given to the fight against organised crime and corruption. Measures are taken in order to destroy the economic potential that has been illegally accumulated by the criminal structures thus reducing organised crime. Prevention of money laundering conforming to the international standards is being implemented and protection of witnesses and victims is being reinforced. The fight against corruption is executed through implementation of measures of corruption prevention, comprehensively eliminating causes of this phenomenon: the national legal basis is being improved (National anti-corruption programme has been adopted) by harmonising Lithuanian legal acts with EU legal acts, and by including the norms of the international law. In order to prevent illegal migration and cross-boarder expansion of crime, the development of state border protection system is being continued by means of implementing the EU requirements for state border control, introducing the control of individuals and vehicles crossing the border in conformity with international requirements, and forming professional State border protection service. Besides, the national Schengen information system is being established.

2.2. Protection of information. In accordance with international standards, legal regulation of security of informational technologies is being improved, protection of the critical informational systems of the state is being strengthened, appropriate control of implementation meas-
ures for security of information technologies and data is being ensured.

2.3. Environmental protection. The main sources of atmospheric pollution in Lithuania are the transport, energy, and industry sectors. Lithuania is implementing agreements on requirements for air protection in order to prevent injurious effect of improper quality of air on the health of people and the ecosystems. To achieve this goal, measures such as transport pollution reduction, energy saving measures and technologies of progressive production and purification of pollution, and the use of local and renewable energy sources, are to be introduced rapidly and effectively. International requirements regulating the management of chemical materials and preparations are being implemented in order to avoid harmful effects of such materials on the health of population and environment. Protection from the danger of radiation is a priority of national security in Lithuania, because there is a potential source of nuclear pollution - Ignalina Nuclear Plant. In accordance with the laws and other legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania, control of nuclear waste material and monitoring of the environment of nuclear energy sites are being implemented. The management and disposal of nuclear waste and used nuclear fuel is priority action in ensuring secure environment.

2.4. Social security. In order to ensure social security of the inhabitants of the country, an effective labour, social insurance and social support system is being created and implemented in accordance with the EU law.

2.4.1. Implementation of the Programme to increase employment allows to overcome the negative consequences of economic restructuring and the external impact on the employment of population and the labour market. Increase employment of population and balance the labour market. Regional policy allows overcoming imbalances in regional development with regard to the labour market, employment and social development.

2.4.2. The measures of the Labour code, the State programme for safety and health of the workers and other programmes are being applied in order to ensure the necessary requirements of labour relations, payment, safety at the workplace etc. so that the working conditions would considerably improve as a result.

2.4.3. In order to maintain internal security, social partnership is being improved by inclusion of non-governmental organisations into the decision-making process. Coordination of measures of social insurance and social support ensures that all citizens are provided with social protection, and measures of social support are guaranteed for the people who need it the most.

2.4.4. The goal of the reform of the pension system is to provide an opportunity to the population of the Republic of Lithuania to acquire greater social guarantees. With the final implementation of the reform of the pension system, a three-level pension system will become operational, consisting of current financing, compulsory accumulation and voluntary accumulation levels.

2.4.5. Programme of Implementation of strategy for poverty reduction in
Lithuania seeks to reduce poverty and social isolation and overcome extreme poverty. With the reform of monetary social support, the creation of a common monetary social support system based on the principle of income and property evaluation is being pursued. This system will enable the reduction of poverty and will ensure that family members receiving social support also have the incentive to return to the labour market and thus enhance economic activity. Institutional development and allocated financing are aimed at ensuring the implementation of reforms and programmes listed above.

2.5. Economic security. In order to ensure the national security of Lithuania in the economic sectors that are of strategic importance, it is established which strategic objects will belong to the state by ownership right and in which objects private national or foreign capital will be allowed, provided that the controlling decision power is retained by the state. A single national investor, or an investor from a foreign state, is not allowed to dominate in one or several economic sectors that are of strategic importance. Capital of unclear origin is prevented from penetrating into the economic objects of the country. The state attaches a high priority to the actions that are planned to strengthen the economy of the country. Such actions are focused on creating conditions for stable economic growth, ensuring a higher quality of life for the citizens of Lithuania, and increasing the competitiveness of the economy. The main activities for ensuring sustainable economic development of the Republic of Lithuania are related to smooth integration into the single market of the EU. Priority has been given to the following actions:

2.5.1. further implementation of structural reforms;
2.5.2. assurance of conditions of macroeconomic stability;
2.5.3. creation of favourable environment for the investment and business, benefiting to economic development;
2.5.4. implementation of employment policy, encouraging small and medium sized business and regional development;
2.5.5. export incentives;
2.5.6. establishing obligatory energy reserves;
2.5.7. ensuring stable fiscal and monetary policy;
2.5.8. diversification of sources of energy supply;
2.5.9. preparing the economic infrastructure and transport for operation under extreme and critical conditions.

2.6. Protection of cultural heritage. The Republic of Lithuania observe the provisions of the UNESCO’s Convention concerning the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage stating that the risk of cultural and natural heritage destruction increases not only for traditional reasons, but also because of changes of social and economic conditions. It is important to the Republic of Lithuania to join the international agreements and other global efforts to preserve cultural heritage while in particular focusing on the protection of heritage during periods of possible conflicts. The Republic of Lithuania seeks to create economic, technological, informational, legal, cultural
and educational conditions ensuring the creativity of the society, enabling to transfer common European and global cultural values to the cultural context of Lithuania, and preserving unique national character enriching the culture of the world.

3. Enhancing response and readiness capabilities:

3.1 Improving military capabilities. As a result of positive changes in the strategic environment of the Republic of Lithuania, ongoing economic growth and taking into account the requirements and readiness levels necessary to meet international commitments, the Republic of Lithuania continues to revise its defence structures and capabilities. The main focus in this work is directed at:

3.1.1. optimally balanced capabilities, necessary to address dangerous situations and threats and to carry out international commitments must be compatible with the available resources enabling creation of these capabilities;

3.1.2. creating and exercising on a regular basis highly qualified, well commanded and properly trained armed forces. These capabilities are developed primarily to meet the internal security needs of the defence of the Republic of Lithuania. At the same time their interoperability with NATO is pursued, the capacity to fulfil international commitments being the main criterion. These capabilities are based on analysis of military threat, evaluation of actual resources and risk assessment. Priority is given to the development of effective, reliable and mobile land forces.

3.1.3. further development of host nation support capabilities.

3.2. Strengthening intelligence, counter-intelligence and protection of classified information. Intelligence and counter-intelligence are carried out by the national security institutions, operating in accordance with the law. The Republic of Lithuania is implementing and improving measures for the protection of the state and military secrets. Particular attention is focused on the verification system for confirming the suitability of personnel who will be working with confidential state and service information in compliance with NATO requirements and the new technologies as well as other areas related to protection of communications and informational systems.

3.3. Improving Crisis Management and Response Capabilities. In order to ensure national security in the area of crisis management, their detection and prevention, the crisis management system is being established in Lithuania. This will improve the ability of the Republic of Lithuania to take part in international crisis management. The crisis management system is being prepared for efficient functioning in the pre-crisis situations, ensuring comprehensive monitoring of dangerous situations and threats, crisis detection, preparation and implementation of preventive measures. The main means and measures for improving crisis management and response capabilities are the following:

3.3.1. priority is given to enhancing the preventive role of the crisis management system in order to detect dangerous situations and threats and eliminate the possibilities of their occurrence and development;
3.3.2. to establish, in compliance with international standards, civil safety and rescue institutions capable of managing crisis extreme situations and to meet the needs of society in this sphere - to ensure immediate emergency aid in the case of fire, industrial disaster or another incident.

3.4. Strengthening civil resistance system. Establishment of a high quality mobilisation system ensuring regular training of the reserve, and capabilities including those necessary for organisation of civil resistance in the case of foreign military aggression. This aspect of national security is directly linked to the principle of total and unconditional defence. This principle commits each and every citizen to resist aggression by all means possible, including military defence and guerrilla actions, non-conformity of civilians, non-collaboration with occupation administration and other methods. Civil resistance stems from the determination of the nation to fight for its freedom and the determination of every citizen to resist the aggressor in every possible way. The system of civil training for civil resistance is organised by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the law regulates its functioning. On a regular basis citizens are trained in various means of resistance and civil safety. Fostering of patriotism and training in resistance means and skills will remain a constituent part of compulsory education.

VII. Final provisions

1. At present, the Republic of Lithuania is in the process of becoming fully integrated in the Western security structures. The Republic of Lithuania is fully prepared to undertake the commitments inherent in NATO membership. Membership in this organisation will give Lithuania an unprecedented level of military, political and economic security.

2. Membership in the EU will provide the Republic of Lithuania with conditions for improvement of the level of economic prosperity and provide non-military guarantees of security. Integration into the democratic Western societies stimulates economic growth, internal stability and paves the way for the new opportunities of cooperation to counteract organised crime and to respond to natural or industrial calamities.

3. It is anticipated that the conditions, which could affect the vital interests of the Republic of Lithuania, will remain stable in the future. However, the global dynamic development will present new challenges, dangerous conditions and threats and therefore in the future the Republic of Lithuania must be prepared to adapt accordingly. Long-term strategies will continue to be pursued in compliance with political, economic, social, military and cultural interests based on values acknowledged and respected by the democratic world.

4. The National Security Strategy is a flexible and open document regularly adjusted to the major changes in the internal or external security environment.

5. The procedures for preparation, adoption, implementation and review of the National Security Strategy are established by the Law on the Basics of National Security of the Republic of Lithuania.
Development of the Estonian Defence: Finnish Assistance

By Erik Männik*

Finnish resilience in fighting for national independence in 1939-1940 and in 1941-1944 has inspired many Estonians during the Soviet occupation and afterwards. After all, these are impressive and, perhaps, unique examples of a small state’s ability to withstand enormous outside military pressure. Therefore it is reasonable to expect smooth and efficient defence cooperation in the good traditions established before 1940 to be developed between Estonia and Finland after the former regained its independence in 1991. This, however, has not been the case. The cooperation initiated almost immediately after August 1991 has experienced several ups and downs whilst still contributing largely to the development of Estonia’s defence.

The aim of this article is to evaluate Estonia’s behaviour in this cooperation process from the perspective of the small state theory. To do that, the development of the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF) and respective Finnish assistance will be outlined, the general causes of behaviour of the Estonian side will be established and the respective assessment given.


Estonia regained its independence on 20 August 1991 during the unsuccessful attempt to seize power by conservative forces in the USSR. The development of Estonia’s defence structures began soon afterwards. By the end of the year the EDF and its General Staff were legally established. The Estonian Ministry of Defence was set up in July 1992. By 1 January 1992 there were 27 officers, 48 NCOs and 10 conscripts in the Estonian Defence Forces. The EDF had practically neither any equipment nor functional infrastructure to rely on. In addition to personnel shortages, there were estimated to be 30,000 Russian Federation troops stationed in Estonia at the beginning of 1992 (Bodie, 1993).

From there in ten years the EDF have

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developed into an organized system based on conscription. The EDF consist of a regular component (divided into three services: Army, Air Force and Navy), a voluntary defence organisation, the Defence League (Kaitseliit) and the militarily organised institutions and units under the Ministry of Interior subordinated to a Commander-in-Chief in wartime. The total strength of the regular armed forces was approximately 8,600 men, as of March 2001.

The Air Force and Navy are structured so that their peacetime strength is equal to their envisioned wartime strength. The Army is built up differently. In peacetime it consists mainly of training units, units for participation in peace support operations (PSOs) and units in reserve. This means that the Army, which, according to the National Military Strategy, bears the main responsibility for defending the state, relies on mobilisation to achieve its wartime strength. After mobilisation there will be two types of army units: the territorial units and the general-purpose units (brigades). This defence posture is very similar to the Finnish defence model.

Estonia’s defence budget has experienced a tremendous growth since 1992. From 0.71% of GDP in 1992, it is ought to reach 2% in 2002.

The EDF, however, are still some distance away from forming one integral structure. The planned size of the wartime force has been reduced from 120,000-130,000 envisioned in 1992 (Allison, 1993, p.52) to 20,000 stated in November 2001 (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2001). The situation is similar for the EDF armaments. Currently the EDF Army has practically only light weapons (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). Various figures of necessary heavier equipment have been proposed, but the final decisions are yet to be taken.

By 2001 Estonia reached a status where for the first time it had a comprehensive set of documents (laws, security concept, military strategy) regulating and guiding the development of the national defence.

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**Finnish assistance in building the EDF**

Finnish assistance to the build-up of the EDF started almost immediately after their re-establishment. The first ten Estonian servicemen graduated the Lappenranta Military Academy (they became NCOs) in Finland already in December 1992 (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992). The first ten officers graduated from the Santahamina Military College in Finland in June 1994 and the first two naval officers graduated from the Finnish Naval Academy in 1996.

Finland has also provided very important material assistance to support Estonia’s independence quite from its beginning. Already in 1992 Finland donated three border guard vessels and some 20 motorboats to Estonia’s Border Guard (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995). The major contribution to Estonia’s defence came in the form of howitzers donated for training the EDF artillery personnel. Finland has even provided
a shooting ground for the EDF artillery unit on its territory on three occasions (Puolustusvoimat, 1999).

The training assistance provided by Finland evolved into a special training course for the EDF leadership in 1998. That course has been gradually developed by the former and current Commanders-in-Chief of the EDF Lieutenant General Johannes Kert and now Vice Admiral Tarmo Köuts, former Chief of the General Staff, etc. (Nokelainen, 1999).

This development was associated with the establishment of a special ‘Estonian Project’ in the General Staff of the Finnish Defence Forces in 1996. In the framework of this project over 20 retired Finnish officers have provided advice and done a lot of organizational work to advance the development of the EDF (Haario, 2001).

In recognition of the achievements of the ‘Estonian Project’ and of the overall Finnish efforts to assist in development of the EDF, retired Finnish Major General Pentti Lehtimäki was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General in December 2000, which was a very rare occasion as retired officers do not usually get the promotions. He has acted as a coordinator of assistance to Estonia in the Finnish General Staff for five years, just before retiring. The major achievements of provided assistance were named as: training of the top leadership of the EDF, initiation of National Defence Courses in Estonia for the national leadership and establishing artillery as a separate branch in the EDF (Ruotuväki, 2000). Finnish assistance has also been evaluated as a very efficient and practical by military personnel from NATO states (Clemmesen, 1998, p. 250).

In financial terms, Finnish assistance has been worth tens of millions of Finnish markkas. In addition to the above-mentioned donations of equipment and training of personnel, Finland has also provided direct financial assistance for the development of Estonia’s defence (Council of State of Republic of Finland, 1997). Providing military assistance to Estonia has been mentioned as a separate issue in the Finnish White Papers on Defence (Council of State of Republic of Finland, 1997; Government of Republic of Finland, 2001).

**Problems in cooperation and their causes**

Having outlined the process of the development of the EDF and the practical Finnish assistance, it is clear without any deeper analysis, that Finland has played a crucial role in the build-up of its southern neighbour’s defence. Despite this, the relationship between Estonia and Finland in the field of defence cooperation has been, at least, changing. In the period 1991-1993 things were going well, from 1993-1995 they were frozen, since 1996 cooperation has resumed, though it is has been argued that the intensity of cooperation has been declining again since 2000 (Clemmesen, 1998, p.250; Visuri, 2001, p.210, 216-217).

In order to understand this phenomenon one must look at both its political and military contexts. To explain these fluctuations it is possible to assume that they have been caused primarily by the inability of the Estonian authorities to
find a solution satisfying requirements arising from the need to defend itself as well as joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This dichotomy was probably aggravated by the silent scepticism of the Estonian decision-makers toward Finnish policies, the shortage of military competence available for the defence build-up in Estonia, pressures from Russia on the former Soviet Union republics and also the shortage of information on what was actually needed for a successful integration into NATO. The following subsections will take a closer look at some of these topics.

_The scepticism of the Estonian decision-makers_

The Estonian officials stated openly their desire to join NATO for the first time in October 1991, after an Estonian delegation returned from the first visit to the North Atlantic Assembly. Since then this desire has been guiding Estonia’s foreign and defence policies. The Estonian-NATO relations can be divided into three periods: (1) 1991-1993 was a time of establishing relations at the political and diplomatic levels and work in the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC); (2) 1994-May 1997 was a period of multilevel cooperation and establishment of the official working relations (Partnership for Peace (PfP) period) and (3) June 1997 to the present has been a period of NATO candidacy and preparations for the NATO membership (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) period) (Kolga, 1999, p. 40).

This 'march' to NATO shows that Estonia has sought constant improvement of its military security since regaining its independence. This process was amplified by radical attitudes left over from Estonia’s independence struggle in 1987-1991 (Made, 1997). This kind of mindset rejected totally the idea of political acquiescence (especially to Russia) or ‘finlandisation’ of Estonia’s security and status in international relations and strived uncompromisingly towards the desired goals.

The Estonian politicians have, however, not made so many very direct and open comments on Post-Second World War Finnish foreign policies. One of them, made by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Toomas Hendrik Ilves, although admiring the Finnish achievement of staying independent after the Second World War, nevertheless mentioned that the foreign policy of Finland ‘...was designed in Moscow’ (Sildam & Mattson, 1997).

Interestingly, by the autumn of 1992 a radicalisation of attitudes also took place in Russia, where foreign policy became a major issue of domestic politics and the moderate liberals were pushed aside from the policy-making (but not implementation) by the moderate conservatives (e.g. S. Karaganov) and hard-liners (e.g. S. Baburin, G. Ziyagov) (Arbatov, 1993, p. 24). It found its reflection in the concept of the ‘near abroad’ that evolved gradually during 1992, followed by considerable economic and military pressure on the Baltic States, which only strengthened negative Estonian attitudes with respect to any acquiescence to Russia.

The period since 1991 has been a period of fairly radical transformation for
Finland. It broke free from the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and the special relationship with the USSR and avoided entering the same mode of relationship with Russia, joined the EU and assumed a wider international role. However, Finland maintained a low profile vis-à-vis Russia in questions of the independence of the Baltic States (Pentilä, 1994, p. 47) and sometimes even loudly questioned their NATO-integration objectives (Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996).

Adding to the above-mentioned facts, there were various Russian initiatives aimed at finding special regional security arrangements (like offering security guarantees to the Baltic States in 1997) to avoid the Baltic membership of NATO. Thus there could have been considerable mistrust toward the Finnish policies on the Estonian side, given the background of the Estonian-Finnish defence cooperation since 1991. To an uneducated eye, adoption of the Finnish defence model (which was the only one Finland could introduce to the Estonians) could have led to a defence system that was ‘not compatible’ with NATO and thereby in contradiction to the integration goals. It is possible to argue that the Estonian policy-makers, striving toward NATO membership, started looking more favourably at Finnish defence advice and organisation only after assurances were given from the West that ‘it was compatible with NATO’. An example of this type of assurances can be found in the study carried out by Asmus and Nurick (1996).

**Shortage of military competence**

As it was mentioned above, the development of the Estonian Defence Forces began in 1991 from scratch. Whereas the EDF lacked many things, the most important shortcoming was the lack of experience in developing the defence of a small state.

The main problem in such a development is finding a balanced solution to counter the perceived threats within the existing resource constraints. In the case of Estonia it was and still remains very painful to strike that balance in a way that would be sustainable and militarily meaningful. Throughout the development of the EDF it is illustrated by the changing size of the envisioned wartime EDF. The initial planned size of the EDF has been reduced by a factor of six over the years, due to an increasing realisation of the associated costs and demographic limitations. The struggle of opinions continues. There are arguments proposing a maximum effort in defence build-up ‘...ignoring cool logic...’ but ‘...without harming economy...’ in order to achieve a militarily meaningful size of the EDF for the worst case scenario of invasion (Clemmesen, 2000, p. 8) as well as arguments stating the importance of costs, which leads to forces having remarkably smaller size. It must be noted here that the EDF only came forward with properly budgeted plans in 2001.

Considering the overwhelming problems confronting the Estonian defence
planners and their lack of respective experience in the first years of independence, it is very understandable that the Estonian military leadership opted for more or less an exact copying of the Finnish defence organisation to Estonia which, however, was not the purpose of the Finnish assistance (Haario, 2001). 'The Finnish solution' was considered among the Estonian military leadership as a cheap, but very efficient way of setting up national defence.

This approach did not pose any serious problems until Estonia started looking seriously at the NATO membership option in 1993. Then it was considered very important to develop the EDF in accordance with 'NATO standards' (though not quite knowing what they were). The nomination of General Alexander Einseln as the Commander-in-Chief was expected to serve that purpose. Omitting his distrust of Finnish advice arising from political considerations and the respective reorganisations of the EDF, he succeeded in opening channels for bringing Western military 'know-how' to Estonia even before the PfP Programme reached that stage. For example, the establishment of the Estonian Peacekeeping Company (a creation of General Einseln) opened one such tacit channel, as the training of Estonian peacekeepers is based on that of the Royal Marines. Despite these 'tactical' successes, General Einseln did not come up with a general and feasible vision of the Estonian defence. In other words, he proposed no alternatives to the implementation of the same principles in defence organisation as in Finland (i.e. total defence).

After the resignation of General Einseln, the EDF returned to its earlier thinking. It found its formalisation in new strategic level documents. Total defence has been stipulated as a basis of Estonia’s national defence in the document called 'The National Military Strategy', adopted in February 2001. It contains many features characteristic to the defence concepts and military thinking of Estonia's Scandinavian neighbours. The threat scenarios, however, are similar or practically identical to those described in the Report by the Council of State to the Finnish Parliament ('European Security and Finnish Defence').

**Estonian-Finnish defence cooperation and the small states theory**

Looking at the mixed (though largely very successful) record of the Estonian-Finnish defence cooperation from an angle of Estonia’s behaviour, one can see some intriguing features attributed to the behaviour of small states. In particular, it has presented empirical, although sometimes contested, evidence enabling discussion (Duval & Thompson, 1980) of non-verbal conflictual behaviour attributed to small states by Maurice East (1973).

The concept of non-verbal conflictual behaviour or, in other words, high-risk behaviour is based on two opposite assumptions about the relationship between the size of the administration of the small state, limited resources and its foreign policy behaviour. The traditional assumption is that having few resources available for foreign policy, small states try to pur-
sue more cautious and low risk behaviour. The alternative model foresees the very same reasons forcing small states to resort to non-verbal conflictual behaviour. The explanation of such a claim is that the small administration does not allow small states to perceive ongoing undesired foreign developments in time. That leads to a delayed reaction, which, in turn, requires radical activities to protect small states’ interests (East, 1973, p. 558-560).

On the basis of the presented empirical evidence, one can argue that Estonia has demonstrated quite a high level of non-verbal conflictual behaviour in defence cooperation with Finland. The process that occurred from 1993-1995 in the EDF and its impact on the whole cooperation could be interpreted in this way: it was high risk to Estonia (affecting the main source of defence assistance) and it was accompanied by very limited verbal action between the two states. Having identified alleged or possible problems with the implementation of Finnish advice, Estonia acted. It can, however, be questioned whether relevant consultations with Finland would have been possible at all as Finland is a small state too and thereby it is ought to prefer reacting to verbal behaviour in areas crucial to its interests.

The alleged decline in the Estonian-Finnish cooperation since 2000 is most likely caused by the very same problem. As Estonian long-term defence planning and main effort proceed in the NATO integration framework, it is clear that the nation’s political leadership expects adequate results in the EDF development. If they are not there, acts will follow. Therefore the dismissal of Lieutenant General J. Kert in 2000 without proper explanations to the Finnish side as well as the relevant NATO-related comments fall into the same category as the events of 1993-1995, although in this case it must be said that the problem was not the Finnish model as such, but rather the lack of progress in the NATO direction.

Another aspect that is suggested by the evidence is Estonia’s very limited administrative capability that has led to behaviour as described. Estonia’s emotional sentiments combined with the small size of its administration (both military and political) did not allow it to understand fully all aspects of the Estonian-Finnish defence cooperation and increased the role of high-ranking individuals in this process. Similar findings have been made by B. Thorhallsson concerning the administrative workings of the Icelandic administration (Thorhallsson, 2002, p. 67-68).

Additionally, Estonia’s reliance on the West/USA/NATO in getting ‘approval’ of the Finnish-style defence arrangement is reminiscent of the relationship between the small states and the EU Commission in the EU (Thorhallsson, 2000, p. 133).

To sum up, one can say that whereas Finland has provided an extremely important contribution to setting up Estonia’s defence, the latter has been very slow to perceive both opportunities and constraints associated with it in a manner typical of the small states. Estonia’s behaviour can be described as being very unsure about the utility of its efforts in building up national defence as a means to dissuade potential aggressors. These efforts rather could have been viewed as
facilitating a solution of the military security problem through integration. Such an approach to defence issues coincides with the Robert Keohane’s (in Väyrynen, 197 1 p. 98) definition of small states as entities not quite believing in their ability to have a significant impact on the system. Simultaneously, Estonia has done everything it could, while not jeopardizing its core values, to avoid alienating the strong Western powers (Papadakis & Starr, 1987, pp. 424, 429) that probably have the decisive voice over Estonia’s membership in NATO.

References


Section III

Developments in the Security Environment of the Baltic States

For the three Baltic States developments in a wider European security environment are of obvious interest, especially at time when invitations from NATO for all three states to join the Alliance are pending.

An invitation for Romania to join the Alliance is also pending. It would render a vital southern dimension to the expansion and make the Alliance a substantially more universal European security organisation than if an expansion would only have a northern dimension.

The first article in this section therefore throws some light on Romania’s way towards NATO. The article is written by the Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Romania, His Excellency Mr. Ioan Mircea Pascu, Ph.D.

The topic of the second article in this section is the relation between NATO and Russia in the wake of 11 September 2001. The article discusses the new relations against the background of the post-Cold War setting then to focus on the new NATO-Russia Council. Finally it discusses the implications of these new tendencies for the Baltic States and their NATO accession.

The article is written by Dr. Janina Šleivytė, who is the Deputy Head of Defence Policy Division in the Defence Policy and Planning Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence. She is also a doctorate student of the Royal Military
College of Science of Cranfield University in United Kingdom. It needs mentioning that the article was submitted immediately before the NATO-Russia Summit in Rome 28 MAY 2002.

The third article analyses Russian national security strategy in its formal form based on the existing official documentation. Against this background the question is asked: Are Russian national security strategy and the expansion of NATO compatible concepts? The article admits the obvious that the relevance of basic planning documents like the Russian Military Doctrine and the National Security Concept to President Putin’s seemingly pragmatic foreign policy can always be discussed. However, as these documents together with the Foreign Policy Concept form the basis, from which all state agencies are expected to conduct their policy planning and implementation it must be assumed that if the recent change in President Putin’s attitude to the West is indeed a change of paradigm in Russian policy, then the basic documents should certainly reflect this change.

The article is written by Captain Lisa Vining of the US Army, who is a graduate of the Baltic Defence College, on the basis of her major thesis at the Senior Staff Course Class 2001/2002.
The Romanian Armed Forces – Ready to NATO Integration

By His Excellency Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Romania Mr. Ioan Mircea Pascu, Ph.D.

Since December 1989, after the Revolution, Romania took a final and irrevocable turn towards the Western democratic values, the only ones able to offer a normal course of development for our society. The willingness of most Romanian people to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) comes as the natural choice of our state to develop freely and defend its fundamental interests; the fact that Romania has been the first non-NATO state that signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme in early 1994 clearly illustrates the Romanian commitments in this respect. It also means a willingness to prevent and find solutions to the new risks and threats to international peace and stability.

In fact, all states involved in this process of preparation for NATO membership share similar values and programs meant to help them meet the requirements that come with the status of a full member of the Alliance. The summit of the candidate states that took place in March 2002 in Bucharest, Romania, under the meaningful name “The Spring of the New Allies” showed the importance of solidarity and co-operation among states as compared to the competition before previous round of enlargement. During the summit, the strategic importance of NATO’s southern flank was confirmed against the concern to make best use of the axis ‘Central Asia-Europe’ through the Balkans.

Each state is ultimately assessed strictly by its performance and membership is granted individually. In view of this, Romania is fully involved in an accelerated process of preparation for NATO membership, in agreement with the 3rd cycle of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and with a legally sanctioned priority program.

Romania’s commitment is supposed to develop modern, professional, flexible armed forces meant to ensure not only the defence of its own borders, but also to represent the state in NATO and EU-led peace support operations abroad. In
this way, the military organization will be adapted to the international environment, where soldiers from different states co-operate within multinational forces for missions such as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo or Afghanistan. After September 11, 2001 Romania’s efforts also focus on the participation in the international coalition in the fight against terrorism and it acts as a de facto ally of NATO contributing with a military police unit and a C-130 Hercules aircraft to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Actually, Romania still remains the only NATO-candidate state contributing with military troops in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Moreover, after 15 July 2002, Romania will increase its participation in Afghanistan by the deployment of a 400-personnel battalion and a 70-personnel NBC company there.

The actual military force structure was established by the document ‘Force Programme 2003’, according to which the organization takes into account the commitments and the security risks we have to face. Starting in 1989, the number of military personnel was reduced from 319,000 to 132,000, of which 19,400 officers, 28,300 NCOs, 20,500 enlisted on contract, 32,800 conscripts, and 31,000 civilians. By 2007, the Romanian Armed Forces will count about 90,000 personnel. Cuts, mainly done in the territorial and reserve forces as well as in infrastructure, will be translated into resource savings necessary to train and modernize the armed forces.

Starting this April, until the end of 2002, the total strength will be reduced by approximately 2,300 officers, 700 non-commissioned officers (NCOs), 2,700 civilian personnel and 2,000 conscripts. In the meantime, in order to achieve a normal pattern of the “ranks pyramid”, 2,900 NCOs and 3,400 sergeants enlisted on contract will be employed. Moreover, Romania will further seek to develop its capabilities to participate alongside NATO forces in crisis management operations, as well as to improve its air and maritime transportation capacity. By the end of next year, the Romanian troops, ready to contribute to collective defence missions, will amount to one mechanized brigade, one mountain troop battalion, one paratroopers company, 12 aircraft, one frigate, one EOS/SEAL group, and four artillery carrier ships. More than 1,000 soldiers will be able to join peace support operations. In this respect, special attention will be paid to the specific professional training and to the English language training.

The overall process of preparation for NATO membership also includes the establishment of a National Defence University, planned to open in the autumn of this year. In addition, we focus on the implementation of the Communications and Information System, and by the year 2004 the integrated air image will be ensured, acknowledged at national level and connected to NATO’s air surveillance system.

The military reform is carried out not because it is a NATO or EU requirement, but rather because it is necessary for the growth of a modern, democratic, stable and prosperous Romania. This is true also for the other candidate states and
for NATO member states whose armed forces undergo similar reform processes.

All these efforts involve sacrifices, a high degree of responsibility, and have economic as well as social costs, which have to be supported both by the Armed Forces and the entire Romanian society. The Romanian Government is well aware of all these costs and fully assumes to pay them, with the deep belief that the situation in which Romania is not be invited to join NATO will bring about even higher costs. The annual average budgetary burden required to carry out the military reform and to ensure the accomplishment of the Armed Forces’ missions in the period 2002-2005, will be 2.38 percent of the GDP.

The assessments made by the NATO teams regarding Romania’s preparedness for membership show that we are on the right path. The encouraging message for Romania is to continue and further develop the process in the direction, which we have undertaken.

For the states, which will be invited to join, the efforts made so far represent only the beginning of a much harder way ahead. Our strong hope is that Romania will be one of those states. This is why we are continuing at an even faster pace, so that we can offer guarantees to the NATO members during the process of parliamentary ratification of the decision to be made in autumn this year. At the same time, we will be required to prove that we are able to assume additional obligations and responsibilities.

However, this time, unlike in the “Madrid stage”, we can talk about concrete progress, not only about expectations - more or less realistic. The Romanian contributions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, Romanian facilities made available for the rotation of the U.S. troops in Kosovo and the MAP are visible measurement units by which to assess Romania’s capacity to effectively contribute to the missions of NATO, even before becoming a member. Such proofs were not available before the Madrid Summit, but are obvious now.
NATO/US-Russia Relations after 11 September and their Implications for Baltic Security

By Dr. Janina Šleivytė

'(...) admission of the Baltic States to NATO accompanied by the simultaneous deepening and expansion of allied relations between Russia and NATO will be a test of strength for these new relations and a test of maturity for political elites. Not one at the expense of the other, but two parallel processes'.

Dmitri Trenin, Deputy Director, Carnegie Moscow Centre

Introduction

This paper is intended to be an overview of NATO-Russia relations in the wake of 11 September and is aimed at outlining their new trends, as well as their impact on Baltic security aspirations. The article will cover four areas: firstly, Russia-NATO relationship in the post-Cold War environment; secondly, its new developments in the aftermath of 11 September; thirdly, the emerging new NATO-Russia body - 'NATO at 20'; and finally, the implications of these new tendencies for security of the Baltic States, first and foremost, for their accession to NATO. The paper contemplates what the grounds are for Russia's rapprochement with the West, what kind of real goals Russia is seeking to attain in its relations with NATO, whether NATO enlargement is becoming a diminishing problem for

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Russia, and if there is sufficient basis for sustainability of the new quality of NATO-Russia relationship.

For most of the past decade, Russia’s relationship with NATO, its long time principal adversary, has oscillated between resentful co-operation and outright hostility, when suspicion, uncertainty and negativity were their prevailing features. Russia never quite believed the West’s assurances that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created as a counterweight to the Soviet Union and its expanding empire, ceased to be a foe for Russia.

By saying NATO, one would mean 19 states, each with its own weight and influence, but among which the United States of America unquestionably is dominating. The key to the success of NATO’s transformation to meet the security challenges in the 21st century will be US leadership. A major strategic issue between the USA and Russia is the future evolution and enlargement of NATO. That is to say, one cannot look at NATO without looking at the USA. Although one would not equate NATO-Russia relations to US-Russian relations well before 11 September: Putin abandoned the strong rhetoric characteristic of his first few months in the office by spring 2001, and gradually shifted towards a co-operative approach.

Beyond that, however, 11 September does appear to have cast a clarifying light on an area of overlapping interests between the Cold War adversaries. Both states finally seem to have found at least one common objective: fighting international terrorism. Moscow is likely to be renouncing a zero-sum approach in international relations. Since the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., the Russian leader has shown ruthless pragmatism in seizing the opportunity to turn Russia into a useful partner of the USA and NATO. As a result of the change in US-security priorities and Russia’s recent evolution, heightened against terrorism, a window of opportunity is opening for progress in many areas of the US-Russia relationship, not least NATO.

11 September has created an entirely new context for NATO-Russia relations. The co-operative pact is still in the proc-
ess of taking shape, but harsh distrust is being replaced with co-operation, and major changes are apparent in the policy on both sides. Only in January 2001 President Vladimir Putin in a speech warned that NATO’s expansion into the Baltic States, which Russia still considers as its sphere of influence, would be a ‘serious matter.’ Right in the aftermath of the 11 September terror attacks against the USA, the Russian President has heavily toned down the Kremlin’s objections, now saying only that enlargement is pointless.

Putin used to state that Russia and its European neighbours had to learn a new language of trust and that Moscow was keeping a close watch on NATO’s changing role as a more political body. ‘(...) One can take another, an entirely new look at this (...) if NATO takes on a different shade and is becoming a political organisation,’ Putin said, adding: ‘Of course we would reconsider our position with regard to such expansion if we were to feel involved in such processes.’

For its own part, NATO took advantage of an invaluable opportunity to involve Russia in a broader security issues by offering Russia a new format of co-operation aimed at widening the relations between Moscow and Brussels and giving Russia an equal voice in a so-called forum of 20. New footing for NATO-Russia co-operation opened a great potential for the Baltic States in expanding their mutual relations with Russia and opened good perspectives to advance towards their ultimate security goal, which is to join NATO. The emerging NATO-Russia partnership should further solidify a Russian commitment to western values. This is, without doubt, of direct contribution to regional and Euro-Atlantic security.

1. Russia-NATO relations in the post-Cold War setting

By and large, the underlying tension in NATO/US-Russia relations since the break-up of the Soviet Union, was the US-hegemony in the world, or uni-polarity in power politics. Russia was upset by its marginalized status, which was openly demonstrated by NATO during the Kosovo air campaign. Moreover, perspectives for the further NATO expansion, and NATO’s new Strategic Concept, caused an outcry in Russia. This was reflected in Russia’s main strategic documents – its new National Security Blueprint (Concept) and Military Doctrine, which were drafted at the height of the Kosovo crisis and took effect in January and April 2000, respectively, and to some extent echoed in its Foreign Policy Concept, adopted in June 2000.

Russia tried for as long as possible to resist NATO’s embrace of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, former members of the ‘Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance’ (The Warsaw Pact). But Russia’s concerns were not solely caused by NATO’s eastward expansion; no less were they the result of the NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which implies NATO’s evolving ‘Out-of-Area-Operations’ to respond to ‘regional crises (...) at the periphery of the Alliance’. Once NATO had enlarged, the periphery
of NATO also became the periphery of Russia, an area that the Russian government considered to be "within its legitimate sphere of influence".5

Russia's uneasy acceptance of the first round of NATO expansion was based in part on the assumption that Russia, being a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, held a veto over NATO's missions beyond collective self-defence of its members. From Moscow's perspective, the assertive stance by NATO in Yugoslavia, particularly the use of force outside the area of application of the Washington Treaty without a mandate of the UN Security Council, denied Russia the right of veto. It is important to note that scepticism with regard to NATO after the first round of enlargement grew into 'thinly-veiled hostility' towards it in the wake of the Kosovo crisis, marking a turning point in the US-Russian relations.6 Suffice it to compare the 1997 and 2000 versions of Russia's National Security Concept or the 1993 and 2000 versions of the Military Doctrine.

According to Dmitri Trenin, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, the main problem the Russian elites have with NATO, lies in 'traditional geopolitics'. They see the aim of the West in extending its sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe as the removal of their hope that sometime in the future, when Russia becomes economically strong and powerful, she will be able to restore her 'natural' sphere of influence.7 Thus, the reason for Russia's disapproval of NATO lies, as the President of the Czech Republic Václav Havel has put it, in the problem of its own 'identity or self-understanding'.8

For its part, the Russian government has realised by now that it has no real veto power over NATO decisions: economic weakness limits Russia's ability to respond.9 Furthermore, its argument about the 'red line' running 'along the former Soviet border' is not particularly convincing.10 The hard truth is that, Russia's objections notwithstanding, the Baltic States are likely to be invited to join NATO at the Summit of the Heads of State and Government in Prague 21-22 November 2002.

One lesson from the recent past: Russia's harsh reaction against the membership bid of the Central European states, to borrow Trenin's phrase, 'did contribute to the latter's smooth admission to NATO'.11 Finally, as Trenin brilliantly puts it, NATO enlargement is 'a relatively peripheral matter, both for the Alliance and for Russia'. What remains of central importance, is 'the nature and quality of the relationship between the two'.12

2. Post-11 September developments

'The most far-reaching geo-strategic effect' of 11 September is likely to be the change in US-Russian relations. Russia's realignment is comparable to 'the historic post-World War II change, when Germany became solidly anchored into the European and North Atlantic communities.'13

John L. Helgerson, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.
2.1. Basis for US-Russia rapprochement

This change is widely viewed as historic. "No Russian leader since Peter the Great has cast his lot as much with the West as Putin has," said Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Dem.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The broader picture of the US-Russian accommodation looks extremely positive. The rapprochement is just one element in a broad realignment in the US-foreign policy sparked by the 11 September tragedy - overnight priorities were redefined, resources reallocated and troops redeployed. For the USA, the war against terrorism "has taken precedence over all other foreign policy issues, even the promotion of democracy and free markets".14 Many of the tensions that defined the US-Russian relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union have been subsided. The new tone was set on 11 September, when Putin phoned the President of the USA, George W. Bush, to offer his condolences. It was the first sympathy call Bush received from a foreign leader.

Political analysts used to portray the tragic events of 11 September as a new era in Russia's path to the West. To validate this approach one should try to answer a fundamental question: whether what is happening is a 'revolutionary change' or just a 'pragmatic radicalisation of continuing trends'.15

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks Russia faced a difficult choice. The dilemma was formulated simply - to join the USA in the battle, or to sit it out. The stakes were high indeed. The 11 September tragedy did not turn the world upside down. The issues of September 10 did not disappear on September 12. All the old problems, just to mention NATO's eastward expansion, the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, strategic arms cuts, Iraq, Iran, etc., still await their solutions.

President Putin's meetings with NATO's Secretary General Lord Robertson in Brussels and Moscow, and several meetings with President Bush during the same time frame in October-November 2001, demonstrated a distinct warming in ties between NATO and Russia and put NATO/US-Russia relations on a new footing. These are breathtaking developments of policy, which could hardly have been imagined prior to the 11 September atrocities. They provide an excellent illustration of how rapidly the world is being transformed in response. Russia, like every other state, calculates how to pursue its interests in such a rapidly changing environment.

To begin with, since the very first months in office, President Putin wanted Russia to be a bigger player on the European stage and sought a greater role in decision-making on international matters. He seemed, however, to understand that the state's economic status and the well being of the Russian population was more important than its 'greatness syndrome'.16 The fundamental goals of Putin's pragmatic foreign policy are economic growth and Eurasian stability. His first priority has been to rebuild the Russian economy. He needs to do much at home to achieve
economic growth, but he cannot do this without help from the West.

Putin has a clear idea about how weak Russia is and understands pretty well that there is neither a Russian way out, nor a ‘special’ Russian model. Internally Russia can find strength neither from economic nor from military points of view. Thus Moscow indeed did not have much of a choice; its ‘special way’ endorsed earlier may irreversibly make Russia a third world state. Putin’s modernization drive is supported by the fact that both the elites and the wider public in Russia are beginning to give up the illusion that there is a unique ‘Russian way’ to develop. Russia cannot be modernized to European standards without building new relations with the West. In Trenin’s view, Russia is faced with a choice between three options: self-isolation (‘great Russia’), revision of the ‘outcome of the Cold War’ (the so called ‘Oriental choice’), or integration into Europe. Putin’s key desire is to improve the relations with the West.

Moscow’s greatest problem with NATO enlargement lies in its inability to integrate itself in the Euro-Atlantic security framework. Putin’s primary fear about the consequences of NATO expansion is that Russia will be strategically isolated from Europe, East and West. An alliance with the USA and NATO allows Russia to make its contribution into the ‘new venture with military-political hard currency’.18 Most importantly, it paves the way for full-scale integration with the West on better conditions. If Moscow goes for it, Russia may expect to reinforce its positions with regard to NATO, make the USA more sensitive to Russia’s security interests, etc., but first of all, Russia’s new image in the USA and Europe will truly become its invaluable asset. Simply put, Russia’s sudden willingness to establish closer ties with the West is the result of strategic calculations aimed at modernizing Russia. What Putin did, in Trenin’s words, ‘was to start bringing his foreign and security policy in harmony with ‘Russia project’ at home’.19

By and large, the warming between the USA and Russia grew out of a pragmatic realization that the two states needed each other. From the perspective of US-national interests, several fundamental factors have changed with respect to Russia’s position in this new environment. First and foremost global terrorism as a core threat brings into focus US common interests with Russia, which are counter-terrorism, stability in Eurasia, and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.20

The US interest in closer ties was obvious: Russia knew Afghanistan better than any other state because of the occupation by the USSR during 1979–1989. Moscow also had influence in the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, which have airfields and military bases near the Afghan war front. For their part, Russian leaders were pleased to see that Washington was giving top priority to the fight against terrorism, a long-standing problem on many fronts in Russia. After 11 September, the USA immediately relieved pressure on Russia over its suppression in Chechnya.21

Putin’s recent efforts have been stunning. The Russian President took a major gamble after 11 September, putting aside the main disagreements and offering full
Russian support to the US-led coalition in the fight against terrorism. This resulted in a number bold steps: joining the anti-terrorism coalition, allowing the USA to use Russian air space and not blocking for the US use of air bases in the former Soviet Union Central Asian republics, as well as providing significant material, logistical and intelligence support for the campaign to oust and eliminate Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and boost its local enemies, the Northern Alliance. All this proved to be a material expression of Russia’s turning to the West.

Some Russian and western commentators have argued that since the terrorist attacks against the USA, Moscow’s contributions have proven operationally more important than those of most NATO allies. The balancing act that the Russian President is seeking to perform is perfectly illustrated by the shutting down of Russian bases in Cuba and Vietnam, disregarding the protests of its former allies. Moreover, Putin’s recent acceptance of the US military presence in Georgia, a former Soviet republic from which Russian troops are grudgingly withdrawing, is noteworthy. Politically it was bad enough having US troops in the former Soviet Union Central Asian republics, but to have US helicopters and special forces’ trainers arriving right on the border of strife-torn Chechnya was perceived as a blatant provocation. That is certainly how the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov initially portrayed it, not to mention most of the members of the Russian State Duma (The Russian Parliament’s Lower House). But President Putin has refused to be alarmed.

More than that, Putin’s agreement to allow US troops to be deployed in Central Asia and the Caucasus has rendered obsolete the concept of the whole post-Soviet territory as a Russian sphere of exclusive influence. In every mentioned respect he can be portrayed as a remarkably successful ‘poker player with lousy cards’. Despite an inherited ruined economy, a demoralised military establishment and a vast arsenal of rusting nuclear missiles, he has made his way back to the top table of world diplomacy. Russia is also showing many indications of shifting its attitudes in the Middle East, not least over Iraq. According to Mikhail Margelov, Head of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Federation Council (The Russian Parliament’s Upper House), Russians were never blind to Saddam Hussein. They do not have any illusions. But they do have interests to be protected, especially in the oil sphere. Suffice it to mention that Iraq is a state that owes Russia some 8 billion US dollars, and several Russian oil companies have lucrative contracts to export Iraqi oil for food under United Nations auspices. Moscow certainly does not want any action that leaves Iraq ruled by fundamentalists, or stokes the conflict between Kurds and Arabs. But apart from that, it sounds as if the only question is cash. Putin’s advisers are also keen to present Russia as an alternative to the Gulf States in the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a source of energy supplies. The Americans realise they are approaching a period when many Arab regimes will fall,” says Sergey Karaganov, Chairman of the Coun-
2.2. Revolutionary change or pragmatism?

Bearing all these developments in mind, what were the changes following the 11 September? It could be argued that the roots of a better Russia–NATO relationship pre-dated 11 September. From the very start of 2000, albeit with very mixed signals regarding Russia’s pro-western orientation, the newly elected President Putin paved the way for more constructive co-operation. As a result, already in May 2000 the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) resumed its work, which Russia had ceased in protest over NATO’s air campaign in Yugoslavia, and furthermore gradually expanded its agenda to include a wide range of issues of mutual interest. The opening of NATO’s Information Office in Moscow in February 2001 followed this.

According to Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, as well as to Putin’s view, expressed in many speeches during 2000-2001, it was stated that the most serious security challenges for Russia lie not along its western border, but along its southern periphery. Largely on this ground perhaps for the first time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia started to refuse its adamant opposition towards NATO enlargement and appears to have chosen a non-confrontational policy with the West. Putin’s numerous meetings with Western European and US counterparts in 2001 serve as the reaffirmation of his desire for Russia to be part of Europe.

The very start of warming up in US-Russia relations took place during the Putin-Bush summits in Ljubljana and Genoa in June and July 2001 respectively, when, in Bush’s words, he was looking into Putin’s eyes and seeing his soul. The Ljubljana Summit has also proved to be the first test of the pro-western course in Russian foreign policy. Despite Bush’s National Missile Defence (NMD) plans and his endorsement of NATO’s expansion eastwards, Putin managed to maintain a rather mild and constructive stance.

The Russian President reacted along similar lines to the famous Bush’s speech in Warsaw, where he presented his vision of a Europe ‘whole and free’, which was supposed to be implemented through robust enlargement of NATO. Just a few months later, the terrorist attacks against the USA became the focal point of the Russian political scene.

On the whole, it should not be underestimated that a more co-operative agenda has been on display well before the 11 September atrocities. What is clear so far in Russia’s relations with the West, according to Alex Pravda, Director of St. Antony’s College Russian and East European Centre, is a great deal of pragmatism and radicalisation of the co-operative strategy rather than a revolutionary phase. Therefore one should not look at 11 September as a dividing line or a point of radical turn, but just the logical continuation of what was already in motion.

Taking a more critical view, is there sufficient basis for optimism regarding Russia’s rapprochement with the West?
First, as it was stated earlier in this article, the unity proclaimed on both sides in the cause of combating terrorism does not reduce their old differences. This conversion is largely illusory, as Putin’s basic position has not changed. Since taking office, his primary ambition has been to restore Russia’s greatness and its leading role in the world affairs. Second is his call, repeated on many occasions prior to 11 September, for a reordering of the strategic and security relationships between Russia, Europe, and the USA. It is worth emphasising that since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has championed the dissolution of NATO or its subordination to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

For the USA, Bush has shown no inclination to articulate the desirability of a long-term US-Russian alliance as something that is strongly in the national security interests of the USA. It could be said that in the run-up to the Crawford Summit, Texas in November 2001 and after it, the Bush Administration’s policy toward Russia has been ‘heavy on symbolism and light on substance’\(^{27}\). The case is that the USA does not need a universal partnership with Russia, except in some spheres such as terrorism and nuclear disarmament, but in the area of global security Russia can be only an assistant, not a partner. Also in the field of economics there is not much grounds for co-operation. Besides, the US politics is very controversially received in Russia: about 60% of Russians are naming the USA as a partner and equally the same percentage of them - as an enemy. The USA is still being considered a source of trouble for Russia.\(^{28}\)

The war against terrorism, as Vladimir Frolov – a former Press Attaché at the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the USA in Washington, D.C. and now Advisor to the Chairman of the State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee – puts it, is ‘too narrow a basis for a US-Russian alliance to emerge and endure’. The parties cannot even agree completely on a definition of terrorism, and Russia’s practical contribution to the US anti-terror campaign is ‘likely to diminish substantially beyond the Afghan theatre’.\(^{29}\) Already now Moscow is painfully learning that its co-operation on Afghanistan does not give Russia any special rights with Washington, nor makes it the most important relationship in the world for the USA.

To conclude this discussion the following observations could be made. During the 1990’s Russia’s often chaotic, security policy process had nonetheless sustained two consistent themes: the primary threats to Russian national interests were the failure of domestic economic reform, as well as instability and terrorism in Eurasia. Therefore, with the change in focus, the scope for common national interests expanded and became more central to both states.\(^{30}\) 11 September provided only a brilliant opportunity for Russia to capitalise on her security needs, to maximise resources in her weight at the global stage. The positive atmosphere of the alignment with the USA gave Putin the chance to complete the pro-western U-turn in this foreign policy much quicker than it was presumably planned without losing face internationally and precluding somehow anti-western alarm at home. To subordi-
nate temporary losses for the sake of vi-
sion, ‘not to waste momentum and with-
draw tactically’ in order to create an im-
age of Russia as a more credible partner –
is Putin’s motto.31

Common interests do not ensure co-
operation, but they do create the oppor-
tunity, and the incentive. At best, the anti-
terrorism coalition provides a useful frame-
work for a new pattern of serious US-Russian cooperation to take hold. The prac-
tical policy objective is now to con-
struct a workable legal framework for
‘maintaining the current co-operative
momentum and reducing the corrosive
effects of differences’ that will inevitably
emerge further down the road.32

2.3. NATO enlargement and
Russia – a declining problem?

‘(...) perceptions are stubborn things,
especially when they have a history be-
hind them. They can persist long after
the reality they once reflected has
changed’. 33

Michael Evans, Defence Editor, The
Times, London, UK.

It is worth mentioning that, accord-
ing to the public enquiry held in May
2001, the expansion of international ter-
rorism and Islamic fundamentalism occu-
pies the first place in the list of threats to
Russia, the second - low competitiveness
on the international market, the third –
increasing scientific and technological
backwardness with regard to the West,
and only in the fourth place – NATO
enlargement eastwards.34 But despite Rus-
bia’s changing perception vis-à-vis NATO,
the expansion of NATO is still probably
the biggest and the thorniest issue in
Russia – NATO relations.

As expected, the Bush Administration
intends to expand NATO in a ‘Big Bang’
scenario: At the Prague Summit in No-


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vember 2002 NATO should invite seven
new members, including Slovenia,
Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ro-
mania and Bulgaria. Does the apparent
determination of President Bush to press
ahead NATO enlargement to include the
Baltic States, at least not infuriate Presi-
dent Putin? That would have seemed in-
evitable not long ago, but today Russia
seems to be having less reason to mind
even if the Baltic States are invited to join
NATO. By most accounts, expansion is
presented as a mistake but as an internal
issue of NATO.

The Russian Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs Igor Ivanov, who reiterated Russia’s
opposition to enlargement during his visit
to Lithuania in March 2002, said that
Moscow could not ban any sovereign
state, including the Baltic States, from
joining this or that organisation. But he
gave a warning that if there was no agree-
ment and NATO followed its old path of
‘mechanical expansion’, Russia would be
forced to take measures to protect its in-
terests. But he did not specify which. If
an agreement could be reached at the
Rome Summit on 28 May 2002 that would
make Russia and the NATO member states
partners, then, to quote Ivanov, ‘naturally,
many questions of European security will
be regarded differently’.35

What are the grounds for changing
Moscow’s attitude towards NATO? First
of all, few among Russian policy makers
believe that NATO’s move eastwards poses
a direct military threat to Russian security. More precisely, it is not a question of danger, but a question of pride, and it constitutes largely a psychological and emotional threat.

Secondly, Russia’s bullying in the past proved counter-productive. The more the Kremlin resisted that NATO should stay away from ex-Soviet states, the more it underlined their need for security.

Thirdly, this shows Putin’s dislike of loosing battles. Taking into account that NATO for the first time in its history will move beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union, the forthcoming Baltic invitation to join NATO is considered among NATO analysts as a failure of Russian policy. What is more, if NATO decides to proceed with a big enlargement, inviting seven aspirant states as a result, Russia’s line of contact with NATO members will stretch practically from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. For this reason Putin needs to lessen the blow and take account of such events well in advance so that they will not be perceived as a defeat for him personally or as a defeat for Russia.

Fourthly, Russia’s softening line unquestionably reflects Russia’s much friendlier relations with NATO and a growing sense that the real security threats to Russia are concentrated on its southern and far eastern borders, not the western borders.

Last but not least, Russian political elites have realised that NATO will never be the same again. They perceive that NATO in fact no longer matters that much militarily anyway. Russians now see NATO more as a political outfit rather than Europe’s nuclear guarantor. As stated by Quentin Peel, International Editor of the Financial Times: ‘There is a crisis of identity in NATO’, they say; it has not been used in Afghanistan because the machinery is extremely conservative.46 Referring to Afghanistan, they argue that, when it comes to waging a real war, the USA, as in the Gulf War 11 years ago, will make their own plans and pick their own allies. For this reason the Russians would prefer dealing directly with the USA than with NATO and that includes also their former satellites.37

Specifically on NATO’s further transformation, the Kremlin thinks, Russia would certainly have something to offer as an ally, both by virtue of its geography and with some of its military assets (for example, heavy-lift aircraft). But there are some worries here. One is Russia itself, where many officials especially those from ‘power ministries’ are deeply unenthusiastic about the sorts of co-operative policies they would have to implement to work alongside NATO. Beside this, although Putin enjoys a strong domestic position, which allows him far greater flexibility and space to develop substantial relations with Brussels, he faces the task of selling this policy to ordinary Russians, in particular with regard to the previously created public opposition to NATO enlargement.38

In accordance with the polls conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre in the beginning of 2002, more than half of the Russians asked (56%) believe their state has reasons to fear the NATO states. Only 30% of Russians surveyed said they believe otherwise. The poll
showed that 58% of respondents consider that NATO states have no reason to fear Russia and 28% of the interviewed believe they have such reasons. 48% of these persons would be negative about the idea of a former Soviet Union republic entering NATO. 59

Among the other worries are the legacies of Russia’s empire, in the form of client states still wedded to bad habits of the past. Belarus, for example, on paper Russia’s closest ally, stands accused by the USA of training Iraqi air-defence forces and selling weapons, including Russian-made, to Iraq. Although Belarus denies this, the Kremlin’s silence on this matter has been telling.

Putin called for a revision of external threats. He spoke in favour of creating a new security architecture in Europe, saying that the current security system does not ensure security at all. Putin knows that he cannot block NATO’s advance, but he can reasonably hope to change NATO itself into a more political organisation, which Russia might one day join. The more political NATO becomes, the more Moscow can influence decisions within NATO.

### 2.4. Can Russia Join NATO?

Whether NATO enlargement process should eventually lead to a Russian membership of NATO remains nonetheless an unresolved issue. This is a two-fold question. On the one hand, the provisions of the NATO enlargement study – general aims such as promoting stabilisation and democratisation – offer no grounds for excluding Russia. To rule this out is to reinforce the belief in Moscow that NATO is being expanded as anti-Russian alliance. 60 On the other hand, admission may make sense only as the symbolic ritual for including Russia in the western world. Ironically enough, the three new NATO members (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) and the seven aspirant states now seeking membership, the Baltic States in particular, want security against Russia. From a practical viewpoint, Russia’s inclusion in NATO would only undermine NATO as a military organisation, the main purpose of which is still collective defence against external threats (Article 5). And it would be naïve to believe that NATO could ignore all the necessary military requirements for membership, and admit Russia as ballast. Moreover, Russia itself does not need such a role. 41

The Russian leadership declared many times that Russia is not going to join NATO neither as it stands today nor in the near future. Its own armed forces could scarcely be integrated into the NATO machine, involving intrusive inspections, compatible equipment and unity of military command. A Russian veto over NATO operations would be unacceptable. But membership of a new, more flexible security arrangement is conceivable. According to Secretary of State of the USA Colin Powell, the US relations with Russia have experienced ‘a seismic sea change of historic proportions’ in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks on the USA, and Russia’s eventual membership in NATO is not “beyond consideration”. 42

Above all extending membership for Russia would, however, mean emptying
NATO of its collective defence substance and turning it into another OSCE, at least in the eyes of the allies in Western Europe. As former Secretary of State of the USA Henry Kissinger puts it:

"The proposition that NATO may eventually include Russia confuses all parties. For Russia is in, but not of, Europe; it borders Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, and it pursues policies along these borders that are difficult to reconcile with NATO objectives. Russian membership would dilute the Alliance to the point of irrelevance."

Even if NATO would be transformed into a political European organisation, in which Russian membership would currently make practical sense - this would take years. First, her policies in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Chechnya are incompatible with NATO membership. Second, she is too big and her problems are too intractable for Putin to achieve a broad Russian integration with western economies any time soon. Therefore Russia and NATO should rather focus on seeking better ways of working together to address the problems of the post-Cold War era.

As for the form of Russia's involvement in European security structures, Russia seeks to become an equal partner of NATO in the creation of a new system of European security. To quote Colonel-General Yury Baluyevsky, First Deputy Head of the Russian General Staff, 'it must be a full-fledged partner with the right of vote.' Ideally, Russian defence and security elites would like NATO to be a political, and not a military organisation with which they 'would collaborate with due consideration for changes in the world and new realities.' Simply put, Putin and his national security strategists have changed the tactics of their actions: instead of unconditionally opposing NATO expansion, they suggest to create a united security system in Europe and to expand co-operation in security area.

3. The Council at 20

The co-operative spirit demonstrated by President Putin in the aftermath of 11 September strongly suggests that NATO has a valuable 'window of opportunity' to take a qualitative step forward in the NATO-Russia relationship. It could be stated clearly that Russia's foreign policy today is largely Putin's foreign policy: He is the author and the main actor. Putin is obviously far ahead of other players in the Russian defence and security community.

Putin is criticised for the numerous concessions offered to the West, especially to the USA, without receiving something real in return. In the view of the critics, Putin has fallen into the same trap as the two previous leaders - Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev. Russia's contribution to the Afghanistan campaign and its loyal attitude to the US military presence in Asia and Trans-Caucasus will further increase the price. Moreover, the need to deliver concrete achievements becomes increasingly important as the Prague Summit approaches and the issue of NATO enlargement begins to loom larger. Analysts say that a carefully considered and co-ordinated package could help Putin
bridge the gap with the more conservative elements of his security elite by showing that he is getting something substantial in return for his pro-western policies.

Both western and Russian officials are currently exploring many promising ideas and sketching the outlines of a new Russia-NATO Council, often called the 'Council at 20' or 'NATO at 20', the accord on which will be signed at the NATO-Russia summit in Rome, Italy, 28 May 2002. They are discussing ways to ensure that the 'Council at 20' will not compromise the rights of NATO members to have autonomy to make NATO's decisions 'at 19', including admitting new members, sustaining NATO's integrated command, and maintaining the strong coherence of its common values and practices. These details are the most crucial, but keeping the broader view in mind is also important: the question of the NATO-Russia relationship is every bit as much about NATO's dilemmas as Russia's problems. What is NATO's purpose without relevance to the security threats that face the world now at the beginning of the twenty-first century?

Given the sources and substance of new threats, can NATO be effective without somehow solving the problem of a cooperative relationship with Russia? The question is, however, posed not only to NATO but also and even to a bigger extent to Russia. NATO is not merely a pragmatic alliance of sovereign states. It is based on the trans-national values, practices, and institutions of its members that enable them both to work together and to sustain a level of assurance about one another's intentions that makes meaningful security co-operation possible. NATO should take Russia seriously, but if the Russian leadership continues to approach NATO along the same lines as it did during the 1990's that will not suffice.

It could be noted that through the history of NATO-Russia relations this is the second rapprochement between the former adversaries. The first one was in 1997, when signing the 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation' and creating the 'Permanent Joint Council' (PJC), took place with the aim of developing a strong, stable and enduring partnership. This was supposed to be achieved through the mechanism of consultation, co-ordination and, if appropriate, joint decisions and joint actions. In between these two rapprochements, NATO-Russia relations experienced their ups and downs. Just to mention pressing security challenges triggered by the Balkan conflicts, especially the Kosovo crisis, the two Chechen wars, and the currently US-led international coalition's war against terrorism.

Under the current NATO-Russia partnership offered to Russia five years ago partly to assuage its anger over NATO's enlargement, there are regular set-piece meetings between Russia and NATO on what is called a '19 plus one' basis. In other words, Russia sits on one side of the table, while the USA and its 18 allies sit on the other.

What were the main reasons that made both sides become frustrated with each other? Dmitri Trenin argues that the
Founding Act per se was 'neither fundamentally flawed nor necessarily doomed' but from the very outset, the partners' attitudes 'were not particularly conducive to its success' as both sides were reluctant to overcome the Cold War stereotypes.\(^{46}\) Russia, seeking to restore its great power status in a multi-polar world, tried to drive the vote between NATO's North American and European allies, i.e. to play Europe as an antidote to the US predominance in the world. NATO, in turn, being cautious that the PJC might overshadow the North Atlantic Council (NAC), denied the opportunity for the Russians to influence NATO's policies before decisions had been taken. That is to say, the nineteen plus one format turned into a nineteen versus one, and the two years of the PJC functioning has not left a good working model for closer co-operation.\(^ {47}\)

What the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair and other NATO leaders are proposing is to address Moscow's complaint that it had no voice in the PJC where decisions were usually pre-ordained by the nineteen allies. 'NATO at 20', fully separated from the NAC, is supposed to focus on a restricted list of politically 'softer' issues ranging from anti-terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, management of regional crises and peacekeeping to search and rescue efforts. That is not to say that the 'Council at 20' without the pre-conditioned NATO's position will give Russia a veto over NATO's decision making. As the Secretary of Defence of the USA Donald Rumsfeld has remarked, that NATO should not elevate a non-candidate Russia to a status above that of proven partners and aspirant states.\(^ {48}\) NATO will continue to function 'at 19' by retaining its prerogative to undertake independent actions and decisions on any issue consistent with its responsibilities under the Treaty of Washington from 1949. But that is nevertheless to say that Russia would take its place at the table alongside the full-fledged members of NATO at the meetings chaired by Lord Robertson; at least some of the time, Russia would be part of the process of compromise and give-and-take through which NATO arrives at joint decisions.

To put it simple, NATO and Russia are approaching a consensus that will allow Russia, albeit to a limited extent to influence NATO policy. According to Lord Robertson, the new Joint Council will give Russia equal rights, together with other NATO states, to take part in the decision-making on specific issues. But although Russia and the nineteen NATO states under the new arrangement would meet formally as equals and decisions would be made by consensus, that equality would be limited. NATO would be able to withdraw an issue from discussion if no agreement were possible and take it to its governing body, the North Atlantic Council. Russia would in fact have the same option to withdraw an issue, though the conditions, under which an issue would be 'retrievable', as it is called, are still being discussed.\(^ {49}\) Thus the accord gives Russia 'more of a seat in the NATO door, than the broader influence on NATO policy' that some western officials held out in the autumn of 2001.\(^ {50}\)

There are many debates going on about the 'Council at 20', whether it is continu-
ity or dramatic change, and whether it will lead to new relations in the long run. It could be stated that for the time being there is more shift in NATO policy in terms of security priorities than in Russia’s course of action. NATO’s development towards closer relationship with Russia shows first of all a radical shift in NATO’s perception. Apparently, the terrorist attacks on 11 September accentuated the declining US interest in NATO and Europe, as well as the increasing capability gap between European allies and the US. More precisely, 11 September made clear the de facto functioning ‘division of labour’ between them. In the light of these events, some adjustments in NATO’s identity and mission should be made. If NATO is to remain a viable and valuable organization, it needs to adapt to its new security environment.

What matters more than the specific items on the initial list is the communality of interests and the commitment of both sides to make this limited partnership work. If that is achieved the list can be expanded. This new mechanism, according to Lord Robertson, is supposed to be a central pillar in the global struggle against terror.

Many of these tasks are related to areas outside Europe and the transatlantic zone, i.e., outside the traditional zone of NATO’s area of interest. Thus, interesting enough, co-operation between Russia and NATO should be developing ‘in the context of globalisation of NATO and the build-up of its out-of-area operations’ (outside the responsibility zone defined by the Treaty of Washington of 1949) – something Russia strongly resisted in the recent past.

**Different views and challenges**

Narrowing of positions on a number of issues notwithstanding, opinions within NATO and in Russia with regard to a new format of co-operation are not in harmony. Beyond this most immediate task, deeper questions remain for NATO to answer:

- How can NATO best take advantage of the current political climate to deepen the NATO-Russia partnership over the long term, dispel outdated stereotypes of NATO among the Russian public and elites, and nurture, in Putin’s words, the ‘European vocation’?
- What reforms can NATO undertake without jeopardising the interests of NATO candidate states and other partners?
- And perhaps the most crucial question: can NATO establish a ‘Council at 20’ relationship with Russia and still remain NATO with its previous power and substance?

The main challenge for Russia, provoking much resistance from NATO’s side, is that she wants to be integrated with NATO’s security issues and is promoting NATO’s development into a political organisation, equal to those existing in Europe (the European Union (EU), OSCE, etc.), without giving NATO a monopoly. Besides that, Russia is seeking to enshrine the principles of the United Nations Security Council within the new body, effectively making it less of a NATO forum. Ahead of the Reykjavik
Summit in May 2002, Moscow has been bargaining hard to win considerable influence and perhaps quicken NATO’s evolution from a military machine to an umbrella force for wider, regional security.

A widely spread view among Russian politicians is that the new NATO-Russia Council is a purely cosmetic mechanism that scarcely meets the reality of the age or Russia’s interests. According to the view of Andrey Fedorov – the Deputy Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, ‘NATO at 20’ is more a bureaucratic thing, as Russia is out of decision making approaches. The NATO proposals cover only the form and procedure, rather than an essential change, Ivanov said. NATO officials also acknowledge that the new agreement fell far short of what the Russians had sought: real influence on a range of NATO deliberations outside NATO’s core mission of collective defence (Article 5). The Russians have realised that the best way to deal with this is to get inside and try to work the system by pushing the process along. The accord starts with a limited agenda, in the hope that over time, the parties can advance from small steps into something broader.

For NATO’s part, not everyone is delighted by this development. The new members in Central Europe are worried, having joined NATO primarily to escape Russia’s influence. And nine states more, including the three Baltic States, are still waiting to join. The USA applied the breaks to what some allies, including the new NATO members, feared was an ill-considered rush for a new partnership, which could hand a non-member the power of veto over NATO’s actions.

On the whole, NATO’s experience of the last decade suggests that institutions, however ingeniously devised, are only as effective as their members want them to be. If the will exists for practical cooperation between Russia and NATO, the ‘Council at 20’ will become an important part of a deepening relationship. If that should evaporate, then such a body will simply turn into a pointless tee club. To make the Russia-NATO relationship sustainable, it is important that their improvement is not limited, as it happened in 1997, to an attempt to minimize damage. The time has come for both sides to start considering relations with each other as a central problem.

4. Implications for the Baltic States

Since 1991 NATO has undergone major transformations. NATO is faced with tremendous challenges, and the process of its transformation will not be completed with enlargement. The Baltic States will thereby also participate in the transformation processes as members. Therefore, it is important what kind of NATO they would like to see in a long-term perspective. The new NATO-Russia relationship to be inaugurated at the Rome Summit, 28 May 2002, significantly elevates Russia’s role within NATO. Although discussing the possible scenarios of NATO’s transformation is beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that NATO’s further developments will be affected by the for-
ign policy priorities of the USA and Russia, which are also undergoing change.

NATO-Russian convergence after 11 September raises doubts in the Baltic States, whether NATO will remain a real security guarantor. An increase in Russian influence could mean that the Baltic States, even as NATO members, could remain in the sphere of Russian interests. Hence, the Baltic States would view with caution NATO’s transformation into an organization of political security. The Baltic States need assurance that in the immediate future the defensive functions of NATO will not lose their importance and Russia will not be provided with significant influence in NATO decisions that would affect Baltic security.

In order to define the interests of the Baltic States from a global perspective, not only in the pursuit of NATO membership, but also those as members of NATO, it is important to answer the following questions: What kind of NATO would they want to belong to? In which role do the Baltic States perceive the USA and Russia within the global security system, their mutual relations, and their impact on NATO?

There were voices talking about trade-offs in the transatlantic agenda between the new priorities and the old ones, that Russia will not be fighting international terrorism in the US-led alliance, and that the West, especially the USA, will have to pay a certain price. Moscow never trades empty-handed. Putin has already gained a first service in return - free hands in Chechnya. Apparently, he would like to have the next service in return: Confirmation that the Baltic States will be left behind the NATO door. Putin used to say that Russia opposed the mechanical enlargement of NATO, but he appears to come to terms with what he cannot block. ‘Every country has the right to decide its own security’, - he repeated this phrase on various occasions by adding that the Baltic States in NATO will not enhance the security of the USA or Europe and it will definitely make Russians feel more vulnerable.

It is clear that Russia’s rapprochement to the West following the 11 September terrorist attacks against the USA has only seemed to reinforce the rationale of the enlargement process, as well as improve the chances for membership of the Baltic States. Acts of aggression are a direct proof that NATO’s enlargement, aimed at expanding the zone of stability and predictability and enhancing common security, should proceed even more actively. If NATO is going to meet new threats to its security, it needs to build the broadest and strongest coalition possible of states that share its values and are able to act effectively together with NATO.

Expansion options range from minimal to big. In his message to the participants in the Bucharest Summit in March 2002, NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson said to the 10 member states of the ‘Vilnius Group’, that the number of states invited could range from ‘one to nine’, dependently on how candidates will meet the preparation criteria. Deputy Secretary of State of the USA Richard Armitage passed at the same summit a written message from President Bush to
the participants saying that the USA was committed to remove ‘the remaining divisions of Europe.’ He made it clear that President Bush was leaning heavily towards a larger number: ‘The United States looks forward to the most robust possible accession to the NATO membership at the summit in Prague’.

There are various motivations in favour of enlargement. The State Department, taking a wider political view of NATO’s future role, thinks enlargement is about expanding the security and stability of Europe. For some NATO states enlargement is about completing the postwar unification of Europe and ending a division that pitted two ideologies against each other. For others, enlargement simply continues the process in which NATO is being transformed from a collective defence organisation into a political security organisation designed to carry out crisis management and peacekeeping.

Lithuania appreciates and supports the new positive trends in the development of the NATO-Russian dialogue. In no way will the Russia-NATO rapprochement compromise the security interests of the Baltic States. On the contrary, engaging Russia in the specific areas of mutual interest should serve the purpose of confidence building in her relations with NATO, as well as increasing stability in the region. It is also an opportunity for the Baltic States, as future members of NATO, to enhance their relations with Russia in accordance with NATO policies and existing instruments and to contribute significantly to further improvement of NATO – Russia partnership and co-operation.

However, growing larger, expanding eastwards and coming closer to Russia, NATO must beware not to undermine NATO’s great strength; its cohesion and military backbone. Membership, and the pledge of mutual defence as stated in Article 5 in the Treaty of Washington, must be taken as seriously as before. As for Russia, NATO has reason to tread carefully. USA, NATO and Russia share many common interests; Understanding the importance of introducing stability and substance in Moscow’s relationship with all key Western structures and instruments, President Vladimir Putin sees good reasons for Russia to co-operate with NATO. But no NATO deal with Russia can be a ‘bribe’, real or perceived, to Moscow for abiding enlargement.

Conclusions

It could be said that for the time being it is too early to make conclusions both on the sustainability of Russian foreign policy and on the Russia-NATO/US relationship; only some discernible trends are important to be set.

It cannot be seriously disputed that since the tragic events of 11 September the US-Russia relationship has improved considerably. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Russia and the NATO allies share vital security interests. 11 September created a chance for Russia and NATO to stabilise their relationship and even to work together on mutual problems stemming from globalisation, including terrorism.

In his annual policy speech to the state on 18 April 2002, albeit being cautious
when talking about the pro-Western shift in his policy after 11 September, Putin stressed that Russian foreign policy will be directed towards integration with Europe, and the key priority will be to ensure strategic stability in the world. He stated: ‘(...) for this purpose we participate in the creation of a new security system, maintain permanent dialogue with the USA, and work for changing the quality of our relations with NATO’.

The evolution of the relations between Russia and NATO is a two-way street, and it reflects mutual interests. On the one hand, starting from 2000, the Western states have resumed their search for ways and forms of association between Russia and the West. On the other hand, the new Russian leadership has openly proclaimed the course for integrating Russia into the Western economic, political and military systems. It is clear that co-operation between NATO and Russia is beneficial and both parties are somehow bound to interact with each other. By and large, interaction between Russia and the western partners is based on the assumption that the West’s long-term interests will require it to keep Russia within the co-operation field, and Russia’s long-term interests will require Russia to stay within this field. One more important point: the condition of US-Russia relations as a whole, will have an obvious impact on how Moscow deals with NATO in the future.

To succeed in his quest to the West, Putin will have to offer a substantially redefined and modernized concept of Russia’s national security interests to make them much more congruent with Western interests in general. Bringing Russia closer to NATO will necessitate further fundamental changes in Russia’s foreign and security policies. This will undoubtedly be time-consuming and will require perhaps a change of the generation of people empowered to implement this policy. It will be necessary to create a new strategic culture, a new organization, new forms and new principles of these policies. In short, it will not be quick, cheap or easy. But the journey can be as important as the destination.

Success in common interest areas in the format of 20 states may help to prevent a reversal to the traditional geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia. The body will neither give Russia the ability to veto any NATO action in any area, nor will it be a back door to NATO membership. The motto is ‘not Russia to NATO but Russia with NATO’. At the same time Russia should learn to play in one team with NATO as a field player. While in the beginning Russia’s role in the ‘Council at 20’ will be considerably limited, Russia will nonetheless have a bigger say than so hitherto in NATO matters and will therefore simultaneously impact NATO’s future. This influence may even increase as soon as the NATO allies expand their trust in Russia.

Although the West cannot expect Putin to be an easy partner, the pragmatism that has characterized his political approach so far will possibly push him to keep things on a reasonably balanced and predictable course. Therefore it is not likely that NATO expansion will set back the rapprochement in Western-Russian rela-
tions. Moscow will apparently disagree with the course but leave it for NATO to decide. However, it would be misleading to perceive that Russia should give a green light to any NATO activity.

NATO still has to choose a clear and resolute mission. What is more, it is necessary to have a clear vision of what can be expected from the NATO-Russia relations. Successfully designed and once operating the new mechanism should decrease Russia’s resistance and encourage some European NATO member states to decide in favour of further enlargement of NATO and to change somewhat hesitant position about the acceptance of the three Baltic States because of the ‘Russian security interests’.

NATO enlargement will contribute to the further improvement of the NATO-Russia dialogue. Being NATO members, the Baltic States would give their positive contributions. They are prepared to build further co-operative ties with Russia based on the rock-solid foundation that NATO membership will provide. It will be a relationship of the same constructive nature as Russia now shares with the two current European NATO allies on her border – Norway and Poland.

NATO policy makers stand before an opportunity without precedent in history to bring the Baltic Sea – Black Sea region permanently within the western world. The Prague Summit in November 2002 will help balance NATO’s enlargement agenda, bringing its Baltic Sea and Black Sea directions in harmony with each other and with the requirements of the post-11 September world. NATO will in one way or another adapt itself to the new conditions. NATO is transforming and will continue to transform itself into a different organization from both political and military points of view in order to protect its members from the new security threats, nearly all of which come from beyond Europe.

Fostering improved NATO-Russia cooperation can induce further democratic market and military reform in Russia and contribute to the improvement of Russia’s relations with its neighbours. Failure of NATO-Russia reconciliation would waste the opportunity created by the recognition of the common threat to security posed by global terrorism.

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By Captain Lisa Vining, US Army*

INTRODUCTION

From its first conception, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established itself as an institution that is open to new members. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty reflects this openness to new members and states “the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty”. Throughout history, NATO has steadfastly reaffirmed its commitment to this open door policy. Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, seven countries have joined the initial twelve signatories: Greece and Turkey in 1952, Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982 and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999. Today NATO membership is among the top foreign policy goals of many Central and Eastern European countries. Nine countries§ are members of NATO’s membership action plan (MAP), which gives them official recognition as candidate countries to NATO. Additionally Croatia, although not formally a member of MAP, has expressed a strong interest in NATO membership and has made significant progress toward that aim.

Russia, on the other hand, has traditionally remained a staunch opponent of the eastward expansion of NATO. This deep-rooted animosity toward NATO is historically justifiable, as NATO was born of the Truman Doctrine, which was initi-

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NATO expansionism escalated as the Russian Duma, the lower house of parliament, overwhelmingly approved two anti-NATO declarations, calling for all Russians to participate in a national “day of protest” against the alliance’s planned eastward expansion. These declarations cited NATO’s expansion plans as “the creation of the largest military threat to our country over the past 50 years.”

From the Russian standpoint, these fears were validated when NATO intervened militarily in Kosovo, both without a United Nations mandate and in spite of heated Russian objections. To the Russian government’s further alarm, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept in 1999, proclaiming the possibility of conducting operations beyond the limits of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Russian government perceived all of these actions as attempts on behalf of the United States to minimize Russia’s international stature and influence. As Russia severed relations with NATO’s Joint Permanent Council, it seemed that irreparable damage had been done to NATO-Russian relations. As Doctor Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chair of the Defense Committee of the Russian State Duma stated on February 2, 2000, “the initial hopes and plans of the early ‘90s are dead. Relations have been severely damaged during recent years. And while Russia is not completely innocent in this—it did some things wrong—the major fault lies with the West, and the United States in particular. The use of force in Yugoslavia, in clear violations of the United Nations’ charter as well as various bilateral agreements with Russia, shows the new face of NATO.”

Not only did NATO’s intervention in Kosovo signal to the Russian government that it had lost its equal footing with the United States as a superpower; it also signaled to Russia that its rights as a sovereign state were not absolute and uncontestable. Russia, as one of the two remaining empires in the world, relies upon the concept of sovereignty which ensures that a state holds “supreme decision-making authority both within its territory and over its citizens.” The concepts of sov-
ereignty and the denial of any political authority above the individual state have governed international relations in modern times and ensure that states have the absolute authority for self-government. Any challenge to the incontestable right of a state's sovereignty would therefore automatically constitute a threat to Russia. If NATO was able to intervene in Kosovo without a mandate from the United Nations, could NATO eventually seek to legitimize similar operations in Chechnya? Also in the wider sense, if a Russian veto in the United Nations Security Council was unable to cease NATO's intervention into the affairs of Kosovo (a sovereign state), then Russia had effectively lost the last remaining forum in which it could deal with NATO as an equal partner.

Russia's opposition to NATO expansion, however, seems to have somewhat softened after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. On October 3, 2001 Putin declared that Russia would be prepared to reconsider its opposition to NATO expansion into states of the former Soviet Union. Putin confirmed that the face of global politics had experienced a complete change after the terrorist attacks in the United States, and that combating terrorism would now be a top priority of international relations. Does this statement mark a significant concession and change in attitude on behalf of the Russian Federation, or is it merely a guise designed to achieve a second set of hidden objectives?

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the continued expansion of NATO eastward is actually compatible with Russia's security strategy as outlined in its National Security Concept and Military Doctrine. This article will also analyze the possible motivation behind recent perceived changes in Russia's attitude toward NATO expansion.

This article's evaluation of the compatibility between Russian security strategy and NATO expansion will be conducted in five separate sections. The first and second sections will be devoted to the description of key elements of the Russian security strategy. This will be accomplished through descriptive analyses of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation in sections one and two, respectively. In addition to summarizing the main concepts expressed in each document, these sections will analyze the significance of their contents and will strive to explain the Russian government's motivation for their inclusion in the documents. The third section will outline the primary threats to the security interests of the Russian Federation today. The fourth section will analyze how an expanded NATO would impact on Russia's security interests. In this section, I will prove that an expanded NATO is actually in Russia's best interest. A fifth and final section will discuss possible motivations behind the perceived softening of the Russian government's attitude toward NATO expansion. This section will put the conclusions made in the above sections into perspective with recent events. This discussion will be based solely upon recent statements made by Russian officials and will not rest upon any offi-
cial documentation, as no amendments have been made (or even suggested) to the Russian National Security Concept or Military Doctrine.

This article assumes that NATO has evolved beyond acting solely as a collective defense organization into acting as a cooperative security organization. As such, this article assumes that the expansion of NATO is valid, as by its very nature, a cooperative security organization must expand to provide for an expanded sphere of stability. This necessary expansion could manifest itself as either a physical or functional expansion. A physical expansion would be characterized by an increase in the number of member states, whereas a functional expansion would be characterized by an increase in the types of possible memberships in the organization. It is noteworthy that NATO has experienced a physical expansion only three times since the armed coup attempt in Russia in October 1993. These physical expansions were the additions of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as full member countries in 1999. All other

NATO expansions in recent history have been functional expansions designed to increase the different types of relationships that countries can have with NATO. These functional expansions include the creation of the Partnership for Peace Program in 1994, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in 1997 and the NATO-Ukraine Commission in 1997.

An additional characteristic of the cooperative security system is that instead of striving to regulate the behavior of states outside of the security system (as in collective defense), the cooperative security arrangement strives to regulate the behavior of the states within its own system. A wider membership in this security community, therefore, must mean a wider sphere of stability. The characterization of NATO as a cooperative security organization is validated by the contents of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, drafted and approved during the Washington Summit on 24 April 1999. This Strategic Concept defines its approach to security in the 21st Century in the following manner:

“The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively.”

The characterization of NATO as a cooperative security organization is further legitimized by the invocation of Article 5 after the terrorist attacks on the United States on the 11th of September. This event marks the first time in history that NATO has invoked Article 5 and against a non-state actor.

The intention of this article is to analyze Russian security strategy predominantly as it relates to the eastward expansion of NATO. It is not the purpose of this article to provide the reader with a detailed analysis of all aspects of Russia’s security strategy and threats to Russia’s security interests. This article will therefore discuss the Russian security strategy in gen-
eral terms and will limit the analysis of Russian security strategy to an analysis of the Russian National Security Concept and the Russian Military Doctrine. As this article assumes that NATO has now evolved into a cooperative security organization, it will not debate the merits of NATO expansionism. It will accept the fact that by their very nature, cooperative security organizations must expand in order to expand their spheres of influence and stability. This article, therefore, will accept the expansion of NATO as an inevitable fact, and it will compare the security interests of Russia with the conditions that will exist after NATO expansion.

**SECTION ONE - NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

This section will provide a descriptive analysis of the Russian National Security Concept. The section will begin with a brief introduction to the background that led to the adoption of Russia's new National Security Concept. The contents of this document will then be analyzed in order to provide the reader with the significance of the document’s contents, as well as to outline the main concepts of this document. As the Russian National Security Concept is one of the pillars of Russian security strategy, the results of this analysis will reveal key conclusions about Russia's primary security interests.

On January 10, 2000 Vladimir Putin signed Decree Number 24, which replaced the National Security Concept of 1997 and enacted the new National Security Concept of the Russian Federation. In order to fully understand the significance of Russia’s new National Security Concept, it is important to briefly discuss the nature of the 1997 Concept and the events that led to its revision.

Due to the turbulent nature of Russia’s post-communist development, it lacked an official national security policy until 1997. Prior to 1997, Russia’s only official security policy document was its 1993 military doctrine. The period of economic and political development from 1993 to 1997 marked a struggle for competing demands on the Russian political scene. On one hand, President Yeltsin and his elite circle of followers strove to cooperate and integrate themselves into the international community. Yeltsin’s opposition, on the other hand, favored a more traditional, hard-line security policy. The National Security Concept of 1997 struck a compromise between these two opposing political camps. The more liberal members of the Yeltsin administration ensured that the 1997 Concept listed the primary threats to Russian security as internal threats stemming from a wide variety of economic and social problems. The primary instruments to deal with these threats were logically economic instruments. The more conservative opposition to the Yeltsin’s liberal policies, however, ensured that the National Security Concept clearly articulated that Russia was a partner on equal footing with other members of the international community. The 1997 Concept did articulate NATO enlargement as a key problem for Russia, but it also maintained
that “partnership” with the West was the key instrument in ensuring Russian national security objectives.

The key turning point in Russian security policy came in 1998 and 1999 with the NATO intervention in Kosovo. Russia’s conservative right judged the NATO intervention in Kosovo to be the final evidence that Yeltsin’s security strategy of cooperation and integration with the West had failed miserably. Even Russia’s veto in the United Nations Security Council was not strong enough to prevent NATO from acting unilaterally in Kosovo. This fact illustrated clearly that Russia could not rely upon their veto power as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to maintain any degree of control over NATO missions beyond collective self-defense of members’ territories. Once NATO demonstrated the will to conduct humanitarian interventions without a United Nations mandate, however, it clearly demonstrated that Russia was not able to exercise any control over NATO missions. This loss of control over NATO operations, coupled with an eventual expansion of NATO, constituted a grave potential threat to Russia’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

The conservatives in the Russian government also pointed to the worsening economic situation in Russia during 1998 and 1999 to further justify a more traditional national security concept. Although the roots of this crisis lay in poor internal economic policies, the crisis was initially caused by the vulnerability of the ruble to speculative international financial markets. The conservatives used this fact as further evidence that only a less “Western-dependent” economic policy could provide for Russia’s stability and economic well-being.

On 10 January 2000 Vladimir Putin signed the new National Security Concept of the Russian Federation. The new National Security Concept of 2000 outlines the Russian government’s views on Russian security assessments, interests, and policies. The adoption of this concept represents the conclusion of a long-term process that reflects the concerns and conclusions of a wide range of political figures. The draft form of the Concept was approved by the Russian Security Council in October 1999 and was published in November of 1999. Concurrently, a draft military doctrine was published in October 1999.

The most significant change in the new Concept is the heightened importance of external threats and the expansion of the various types of external threats to Russian security. The Concept, however, still details a large number of internal threats to Russian security. It uses these threats largely to legitimize the development of a reform policy in Russia with emphasis on the role of the Russian state in safeguarding social, political and economic life.

The new Concept prefaches its discussion of Russian national security interests with a brief discussion of the nature of the world community today. The Concept clearly outlines that today’s system of international relations is characterized by two mutually exclusive trends. The Concept outlines the first trend as the increasingly multilateral nature of in-
international processes. The Concept outlines the second trend, however, as the counterproductive tendency of Western countries, led by the United States, to seek domination over international relations. This trend sees the United States acting increasingly in a unilateral manner, using military force in violation of international law. The Concept further notes that the tendency to ignore Russia’s interests serves to undermine the global security community and slow down positive changes in international relations. As previously noted, this significant departure from the 1997 Concept makes it clear that Russia perceives the prospect of unilateral action by NATO as a threat to its sovereignty. If NATO successfully intervened in Kosovo without a United Nations mandate, what would stop the organization from interfering in the affairs of other sovereign states? From Russia’s perspective, this type of behavior challenged the very norms upon which modern international relations were based. Since the 1600s, international relationships have been founded upon the so-called Westphalian system. This system is a states-system, which is based upon three principles. First, all sovereign states are not subject to any higher political authority, and every king (or head of state) is independent and equal to every other king. Secondly, outsiders have no right to interfere in a sovereign state’s internal affairs. Finally, a balance of power should exist, which would prevent any hegemon from arising and dominating other states. The fact that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo challenged the supposedly absolute and incontestable rights of a sovereign state was extremely alarming to Russia. Russia’s new Concept was largely a response to this alarming trend.

The 2000 National Security Concept of the Russian Federation reveals substantial changes in Russia’s assessment of its external environment and external threats to Russian security. Unlike its predecessor, the new Concept no longer states that there is no threat to Russia from external actors. On the contrary, it articulates a detailed list of external threats, including the following:

- efforts of individual states and international organizations to diminish the role of existing international security mechanisms, above all the OSCE and UN
- the weakening of Russia’s political, economic, and military influence in the world
- the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO’s expansion to the East
- the possibility of the appearance of foreign military bases and large military on Russia’s immediate borders
- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means
- the weakening of the integration processes in the CIS
- initiation and escalation of conflicts on the borders of Russia and the CIS
- territorial claims against Russia

Furthermore, the new Concept clearly states that the level and scope of the threats in the military sphere are growing. Immediately following this statement, the new Concept articulates that “NATO’s transition to a strategy of using military force
outside of its zone of responsibility and without a United Nations Security Council resolution threatens to destabilize the entire strategic situation in the world." In response to this "increased level and scope of threats in the military sphere," the new Concept devotes itself primarily to an enumeration of these threats and a description of how the military instrument should deal with these threats. Instead of the broader political discussion of threats that one would expect to find in a security concept, Russia's new Concept has become a much narrower concept of security, which deals predominantly with military threats and military responses. It is therefore logical that the heightened importance of external threats and military solutions renders the Russian military doctrine a document of increased importance to Russian national security policy.

Additionally, it is noteworthy that the Concept lists the "protection of the lawful rights and interests of Russian citizens abroad with the use of political, economic and other measures" as a key component of its foreign policy. This clearly illustrates that Russia perceives its interests and responsibilities as extending to those citizens living outside of its own borders. This point is of particular interest to the Baltic states, which are home to a significant number of Russian nationals.

The 2000 National Security Concept details primary internal threats to Russian national security as:

a. the current weak situation in the Russian economy
b. the polarization of Russian society and the spread of crime
c. the growth of organized crime and terrorism
d. the aggravation of national relations

The inclusion of the "grave threats" posed by organized crime, separatism and terrorism is most likely used in the new Concept to solidify Russia's right as a state to respond to its own internal issues. This is another response to what Russia views as an alarming tendency of NATO to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states.

Since the new National Security Concept has devoted greater attention to external threats facing the Russian state, it is logical that the new Concept accordingly emphasizes the use of traditional security instruments to cope with threats. The Concept lists the top five tasks for the provision of the national security of the Russian Federation as:

a. The timely detection and identification of external and internal threats to national security of the Russian Federation;
b. The realization of short- and long-term measures to warn against and neutralize internal and external threats;
c. The security of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and the security of its border areas;
d. The improvement of the country's economy, the implementation of an independent and socially oriented economic policy;
e. The overcoming of the scientific and technological dependence of the Russian Federation on external sources

It is also noteworthy that in an age when most nuclear powers are moving
away from the relevance of their nuclear arsenals to the safeguarding of their national security interests, Russia’s new Concept actually appears to expand the scenarios in which they may be used. In the 2000 National Security Concept, the possible use of nuclear weapons are mentioned in the following context:

a. The most important task of the Russian Federation is to implement deterrence in the interests of preventing aggression of any scale, including the use of nuclear weapons against Russia and its allies.

b. The Russian Federation must possess the nuclear forces capable of delivering the needed amount of damage to any aggressor state or coalition of states under any circumstances.

c. The Russian Federation will use all forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case of the necessity to repel an armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or have proven ineffective.

This Concept differs from its predecessor most significantly in that the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons appear to have widened. Whereas the previous Concept allows for the use of nuclear weapons only in extreme situations, the new Concept appears to allow for the use of nuclear weapons in smaller-scale “crisis situations” which do not necessarily threaten its sovereignty. This change is most likely a direct result of Russia’s need (also articulated in the 2000 National Security Concept) to “defend itself from air attacks.” Kosovo proved to Russia that it lacked the technology necessary to defend itself from a similar, NATO-led air attack, and Russia logically concluded that its only possible means to defend itself from such an attack would be to resort to nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, the following are the most significant points in Russia’s National Security Concept:

a. Russia’s 2000 National Security Concept marks a significant departure from its 1997 Concept. The contents of the new Concept make it clear that Russia perceives the prospect of unilateral action by NATO as a threat to its sovereignty.

b. Although one would expect the National Security Concept to deal with a broader political discussion of threats to Russian national security, the new Concept instead devotes itself primarily to a description of the “increased level and scope of threats in the military sphere.” Russian security policy has therefore now become a much narrower concept of security, which deals predominantly with military threats and how the military instrument should deal with this threat. Included in this military response to possible threats is an increased discussion of the conditions for the possible use of Russian nuclear weapons.

c. The inclusion of the “grave threats” posed by organized crime, separatism and terrorism is used in the new Concept to preserve Russia’s sole authority to respond to its own internal issues.

d. The heightened importance of external threats and the military instrument necessary to deal with these threats renders the Russian military doctrine a document of increased important to Russian national security policy.
e. Russia’s very realistic perception that it could not defend itself from a large-scale NATO attack has led it to increase the scenarios in which it could possibly use nuclear weapons.

f. Russia perceives its interests and responsibilities as extending to those citizens living outside of its own borders.

SECTION TWO-
MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

This section will provide a descriptive analysis of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. The section will begin with a brief introduction to the background that led to the adoption of Russia’s Military Doctrine. The contents of this document will then be analyzed in order to provide the reader with the significance of the document’s contents, as well as to outline the main concepts of this document. As Russia’s Military Doctrine is one of the pillars of its security strategy, the results of this analysis will reveal key conclusions about Russia’s security interests in general.

On April 21, 2000 Vladimir Putin signed Decree Number 307, which replaced the 1993 Military Doctrine and enacted the new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Russia’s new Military Doctrine was published in provisional form in October 1999, and on November 4, 1999, Yuri Baturin, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, held a conference to discuss the document’s ongoing revision. At this conference, he outlined the international developments that had rendered the previous Military Doctrine obsolete and described three primary conditions, which had unfavorable implications for Russia. First, Baturin described NATO’s potential expansion to the east as presenting a direct threat to Russian security. Russia also faced opposition to the integration process within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as attempts to limit its influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Secondly, new military dangers had surfaced, and tensions on Russia’s borders and in historical conflict areas had increased during the preceding three years. Finally, the socio-economic environment in Russia had deteriorated, forcing a change in structure of the ministries and a review of their roles. This restructure was accompanied by a significant reduction in the combat readiness of the armed forces due to insufficient funding.

It is noteworthy that the draft update of Russia’s Military Doctrine was actually published before the new National Security Concept was developed. This is contradictory to the usual development of a national security strategy, which would traditionally see the development of a security concept first, in order to outline the broader political picture. Traditionally, the military doctrine would be developed after the security concept, and it would further define military threats to security and the military response to these threats. The fact that the Russian government developed its Military Doctrine prior to its National Security Concept is an indicator that the regime currently views security in very narrow “military”
In the "military-political principles" portion of its military doctrine, Russia outlines the various threats it perceives to its national security interests. It is noteworthy that in the 1993 draft of its Military Doctrine, Russia initiates the discussion of the political-military principles of its military doctrine with the statement that today's military-political situation is defined by two fundamentally contradictory trends. The first trend represents the tendency toward the development of a unipolar world dominated by one superpower that uses the military instrument to resolve world policy issues. Although not overtly stated in its Military Doctrine, it is clear that Russia objects to the United States asserting itself as a global hegemon and that it perceives the use of force by the United States in Kosovo as an illegal use of military power to decide world foreign policy. The second trend represents the formation of a multipolar world that is based upon equal rights of peoples and nations, upon balance between national interests of states, and upon the rule of international law. Russia developed its Military Doctrine upon the assumption that only a multipolar world, a world not dominated by the United States or NATO, is able to secure international stability, security and progress.

In stark contrast to its predecessor, the current Russian Military Doctrine does not focus on internal security threats such as social and economic turmoil and regional conflicts on its borders. Conversely, it focuses on perceived external threats to its security, highlighting its concerns about the continuing evolution of a unipolar world in which Russia's importance and influence are increasingly marginalized. As Alexei Arbatov stated, "Before Russia had no enemies... Now, it is clearly stated that one of the primary threats to Russian security is the policies of the United States, which is keen on establishing its position as the world's superpower and expanding its interests around the globe."

Interestingly, the contents of Russia's Military Doctrine focus almost solely on how to reestablish itself as an equal player in a multipolar world, instead of how to
cope with the reality of a predominantly unipolar world.

Also noteworthy is the Doctrine’s labeling of “discrimination against and suppression of rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian Federation citizens in foreign states” as a fundamental external security threat. The reiteration of this point, already clearly stated in Russia’s National Security Policy, clearly illustrates that this is an issue of great importance to Russia.

Of particular significance is Russia’s inclusion of the “use of foreign troops in the capacity of ‘humanitarian intervention’ without a United Nations Security Council sanction, bypassing widely recognized norms and principals of international law” as one of the basic external threats to its security interests. This is an obvious reference to Russian objections to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, which took place both outside of the framework of international law and despite vigorous opposition of the Russian government. The very fact that Russia was unable to hinder NATO’s operations in Kosovo, despite extremely vocal opposition and its withdrawal from the NATO Permanent Joint Council, underscored the fact that the United States did not view Russia as an equal geopolitical force.

The events in Kosovo increased Russia’s concern about its own internal conflicts in Chechnya as well, especially in view of the Western emphasis on human rights as an issue to be justifiably dealt with by NATO forces. If NATO could intervene in Kosovo without a UN mandate in the name of protection of human rights, what then would prevent it from intervening likewise in Chechnya? This fear seemed particularly credible to Russia, especially given the volume of Western protests of human rights violations committed by Russian forces in the Chechen Wars.

Alexei Arbatov further underscored the significant role that NATO’s actions in Kosovo had played in Russian policy. He went as far as to state that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo indirectly led to Russia’s involvement in the Second Chechen War, stating:

“For three years after the first war in Chechnya, which ended in 1996, there was a psychological taboo against the use of military force in cases of ethnic conflict, but NATO aggression in Yugoslavia removed that barrier and changed the Russian psychological climate with regards to the use of force. Russia learned its lessons well from the conflict in Kosovo. You can use force and disregard international legal frameworks. You can disregard the impact of collateral damage on civilians. You can use a massive amount of force against a foe. NATO’s actions in Yugoslavia inspired Russia’s actions in Chechnya.”

Five of the six internal threats listed in Russia’s Military Doctrine relate to terrorism, and the fight against international terrorism has become one of Russia’s top foreign policy priorities. Official Russian statements generally define the terrorist threat as the presence of extremist forces along the southern flank of the former Soviet Union. This so-called “Southern Tier” is viewed as the focal point of instability and Islamic extremism,
containing international terrorist training camps and huge numbers of mercenaries from the Arab countries and Chechnya." The use of the terms "international terrorism" and "Islamic extremism" are used almost interchangeably in official Russian discourse, with both terms being tacitly understood as meaning Chechen rebels. The motivation for this is an obvious attempt on behalf of the Russian government to legitimize its involvement in the Chechen conflict as a vital component of an international campaign against Islamic terrorists.23

This section of Russia’s Military Doctrine opens with a classification of the nature of modern wars according to three basic criteria: military-political goals, means of conducting warfare (conventional to nuclear), and the scale of warfare (local, regional and global).

In this section the doctrine allows for the possibility of world and regional nuclear warfare and argues that a conventional world war "will be characterized by a high probability of escalating to a nuclear level." This increase in the number of scenarios in which Russia could possibly use nuclear weapons is a direct result of Russia’s very realistic perception that it could not defend itself from a large-scale NATO attack.

As stated in Fedorov and Nygren’s analysis:

"Although Russia has the second largest nuclear arsenal in the world, it was not able to stop NATO’s operation in Yugoslavia in 1999, despite the fact that it was regarded as Russia’s principal foreign policy task. But at the same time, the basic and unignorable fact is that Russia is the only power that can physically destroy all the NATO member states by the use of nuclear weapons.24"

Russia further justified its more aggressive nuclear policy during its military exercise “Zapad 99” (“West 99”). This exercise involved five military districts and three fleets, as well as a combined Russian-Belarussian group of forces. The exercise was structured around Russia and Belarus’s response to an attack on the Kaliningrad Oblast from an unspecified military alliance (clearly representing NATO). The exercise culminated with the Russian forces simulating the use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack. The exercise was a clear warning to NATO in the wake of its Kosovo intervention. A clear message was sent that Russia would not rule out the use of nuclear weapons to defend its vital interests, particularly when Russia’s conventional forces would be unable to defend these interests25.

One of the priority tasks of maintaining military security with military-economic means is to provide for the “qualitative improvement of the strategic arms complex.” One of the major tracks in this area is the “implementation of international commitments on reduction and limitation of armed forces and arms, as well as on the maintenance of international security and peace.

In conclusion, the following are the most significant points in Russia’s Military Doctrine:

a. The contents of Russia’s Military
Doctrine are consistent with the contents of its National Security Concept.

b. The fact that the draft Military Doctrine was published before the National Security Concept, coupled with the fact that the National Security Concept itself focuses primarily on military threats and responses, renders the contents of the Military Doctrine of increased importance.

c. This document serves primarily for Russia to reassert itself as a major actor in global security. It can be viewed as the political response to NATO’s ever-increasing role in world politics.

d. Russia’s very realistic perception that it could not defend itself from a large-scale NATO attack has led it to increase the scenarios in which it could possibly use nuclear weapons.

e. Consistent with the contents of its National Security Concept, Russia’s Military Doctrine again lists “discrimination against and suppression of rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian Federation citizens in foreign states” as a fundamental external security threat.

SECTION THREE-
THREATS TO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

This section will elaborate on the threats that the Russian Federation perceives to its national security interests. The descriptive analyses of the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Sections 1 and 2, respectively) provided conclusions about the threats that Russia’s national security interests face today. This section will elaborate upon the primary conclusions reached in the two previous sections.

The following is a summary of the key conclusions about threats to the national security interests of the Russian Federation. This summary is based upon the conclusions drawn from analyses of the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

a. The Threat to Russia’s Sovereignty and Position as an Equal Player in Today’s World. Russia perceives the prospect of unilateral action by NATO as a threat to its sovereignty. Russia is striving to reassert itself as a major actor in global security. Russia’s National Security Concept and Military Doctrine can be viewed as a political response to NATO’s ever-increasing role in world politics.

b. Terrorism, Extremism, and Threats to Russia’s Borders. The inclusion of the “grave threats” posed by organized crime, separatism and terrorism is used in the new Concept to preserve Russia’s sole authority to respond to its own internal issues.

c. Both Russia’s National Security Concept and Military doctrine devote themselves primarily to a description of the “increased level and scope of threats in the military sphere.” Russian security policy has therefore now become a much narrower concept of security, which deals predominantly with military threats and how the military instrument should deal with this threat.

d. Russia’s very realistic perception that it could not defend itself from a large-
scale NATO attack has led it to increase the scenarios in which it could possibly use nuclear weapons.

c. Both Russia’s National Security Concept and Military Doctrine list the securing of rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian Federation citizens in foreign states as a priority.

To a large extent, Russia’s revisions of its National Security Concept and Military Doctrine can be viewed as political attempts to reassert itself as a world power, as a power equal to all others. Russia characterizes the “efforts of individual states and international organizations to diminish the role of existing international security mechanisms, above all the OSCE and the UN” as one of the principal threats to its security. This statement is a direct reference to NATO and the United States, and their ability to act unilaterally, without a United Nations mandate. Further examination of the contents of Russia’s National Security Concept confirms this. Russia’s first point to justify the statement that the “level and scope of threats in the military sphere are growing” is that “NATO’s transition to a strategy of using military force outside of its zone of responsibility and without a United Nations Security Council resolution constitutes a threat to destabilize the entire global strategic situation.”

NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo, as well as NATO’s new (and more aggressive from the Russian perspective) Strategic Concept of 1999, proved to Russia that it was losing influence and stature in the geopolitical arena.

As previously noted, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo represented a threat to the Russian government on several levels. First, it illustrated clearly that Russia had lost its status as a “superpower” and equal to the United States. Secondly, it triggered alarm in Russia because it challenged the notion that Russia’s rights as a sovereign state were absolute and incontestable. In the Russian perception, if NATO was able to intervene in Kosovo without a mandate from the United Nations, it was not conceivable to image NATO eventually conducting similar operations in Chechnya in the name of human rights.

Five of the six internal threats listed in Russia’s Military Doctrine relate to terrorism, and the fight against international terrorism has become one of Russia’s top foreign policy priorities. Official Russian statements generally define the terrorist threat as the presence of extremist forces along the southern flank of the former Soviet Union. This so-called “Southern Tier” is viewed as the focal point of instability and Islamic extremism, containing international terrorist training camps and vast numbers of mercenaries from Arab countries and Chechnya.” The use of the terms “international terrorism” and “Islamic extremism” are used almost interchangeably in official Russian discourse, with both terms being tacitly understood as meaning Chechen rebels. The motivation for this is Russian government’s need to legitimize its involvement in the Chechen conflict as a vital component of an international campaign against Islamic terrorists.
CHECHNYA

The first Chechen war from 1994 to 1996 resulted in a Russian withdrawal from Chechnya. In 1999 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin launched the second Chechen war to reassert Russian power over the breakaway republic and to stop the spread of Muslim extremism into neighboring Dagestan.

Russia's use of elite airborne troops during the second Chechen War proved far more effective than its use of less well-trained troops and conscripts in the first Chechen War. The Russian government, however, is striving to reorganize forces in Chechnya, relying more on a police force than conventional military forces. Russia's plan was for the "Unified Group of Forces in Chechnya (the UGFC)" to consist of police, Interior Ministry troops, Federal Security Service forces and military forces, along with local armed organizations. The dedicated military forces in Chechnya will include 18,000 members of the 42nd Mechanized Infantry Division, which according to Russian General Anatoly Kvaishn, will conduct functions auxiliary to interior ministry troops.

As Russian forces become more successful in their operations, Chechen rebels will become less capable of conducting regular military operations. Instead the rebels' operations will rely more increasingly upon acts of terrorism to further their goals. Russia's ability to control the Chechen border and prevent the rebels from rearming will continue to be the key to success in Chechnya. Supplies and arms to the rebels come through Georgia and Ingushetia where there are ethnic Chechen enclaves. Additionally, in the Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia, an area with a large ethnic Chechen population, there is increased cooperation with Chechen rebels. Georgia has deployed its military into the area in an effort to appease Moscow, but this has produced only minimal results.

DAGESTAN

Chechnya's neighbor to the southeast, Dagestan, is another source of trouble for the Russian government. In several instances, Dagestani fighters associated with the radical Islamic sect of "Wahhabites," participated in joint action with Chechen rebels. In December 1997, for instance, a group of Chechen guerrillas joined the Wahhabi force to attack a Russian armored brigade near Buinask. In May Wahhabi forces seized control of several villages, whereafter the residents of the villages "liberated" by Chechen and Wahhabites declared their independence from Dagestan and formed another "little Chechnya" within the Russian Federation. More recently, forces led by the Chechen military leader Shamil Basaev conducted attacks from Chechnya into Dagestan, yet another step on the road to Basaev's declared goal of creating a united Chechen-Dagestani Muslim state.

CENTRAL ASIA

Ten years after the dissolution of the USSR, all five of the former Soviet republics of the Central Asian region—Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan—are weak or failing states. Even Kyrgyzstan, the most positive example of democracy in the region, has come dangerously close to the brink of division, even disintegration. A particularly significant threat can be found in relation to the security of Tajikistan and stability in the Fergana Valley. The August 2000 advances of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan into Kyrgyzstan and throughout Uzbekistan appeared to confirm the severity of this threat. The Radical Islam movement of Uzbekistan is able to flourish in the social discontent stemming from poverty, as well as from the repressive and ineffective local regime. Additionally, the collapse of the Soviet-era economy has contributed greatly to the production and trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan via Central Asia to Russia and Europe.

Consistent with its narrow definition of security, Russia’s primary response to the deteriorating situation in Central Asia has been a military response. Little emphasis has been placed on the use of non-military means, such as influencing the policies of the friendly regimes and engaging constructive opposition and moderate Islamic circles. Instead, the Defense Ministry is the lead agency in policy making. Due to limited resources, however, the Russian military presence in the area is small. The 201st division in Tajikistan, previously charged with a “peacekeeping” mission, has been upgraded to a permanent military base. Additionally, in mid-2000 the Russian General Staff decided to place a 50,000-strong rapid deployment corps near the border of Russia and Kazakhstan to be used to intervene in an emergency anywhere in Central Asia. Russia will need to invest a significant amount of money, however, before it is able to produce such a capability.

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THE FAR EAST

In addition to its unstable southern borders, Russia’s eastern border in the Primorski Krai area poses significant challenges and threats. The improvement of relations between Russia and China in the late 1980s brought not only the reversal of the lifting of the political, economic and cultural isolation of the Russian Far East from China; it also brought a host of security concerns due to the cross-border flow of people, goods and services. According to an interdepartmental memo of the visa registration service in Vladivostok, the total number of Chinese nationals visiting Primorski Krai increased from 40,000 in 1994 to 73,000 in 1998. The information in this memo is consistent with information from other sources, including that from Russian border service estimates. Of these 73,000 Chinese nationals, about 84% enter Primorski Krai without visas, on tourist permits, which allow for the conduct of cross-border trade and business. On one hand, the possibility of obtaining such visas has led to a drastic decrease in illegal border crossings, visa violations and attempted entries on forged passports. On the other hand, the steady flow of Chinese migrant workers into Russia has led to ethnic conflicts between the 2.2 million Russian residents of Primorski Krai against the 70 million Chinese in the neighboring Heilongjiang province of
China. Local Russian scholars often refer to the “yellow peril,” in describing the demographic disparity along the Russian-Chinese border, which is home to 63,000 Chinese nationals for each Russian on every one kilometer of border territory. This demographic disparity is the main cause of Russia’s perceptions of vulnerability in the Far East.

INCREASED SCOPE OF THREATS IN THE MILITARY SPHERE AND RUSSIA’S INABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK BY NATO

Russia’s military budget in 2000 was approximately $6 billion, about two percent of the military spending of the United States during the same year. By the end of 2005, it is estimated that Russia’s armed forces and security agency structures will be reduced to 600,000. This number will include 470,000 military and 130,000 civilian personnel. These cutbacks are aimed at increasing the levels of training and readiness of Russia’s military forces. Russia’s military reform policies envision Russia possessing a well-trained, mobile, compact, and technologically advanced and effective fighting force by 2010. Even if they are able to achieve this goal, however, they will not be able to compete numerically with the conventional forces that NATO possesses.

Russia’s very realistic perception that it could not defend itself from a large-scale NATO attack has led it to increase the scenarios in which it could possibly use nuclear weapons. Due to the relative weakness of Russia’s conventional forces, Putin has decided to use the country’s nuclear capabilities to deter conventional threats. In doing so, he has actually adopted the same strategy that the United States used during the Cold War. It was then understood that a massive Soviet attack on Western Europe would trigger the use of tactical nuclear weapons or possibly higher levels of nuclear response. The West used nuclear weapons as a critical equalizer to the superior numbers of Russian conventional forces. Russia now has a substantial disadvantage in conventional forces, and by renouncing the no-first-strike policy, Putin signals his intention use the same strategy that the United States did during the Cold War.

PROTECTING THE RIGHTS, FREEDOMS AND LAWFUL INTERESTS OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION CITIZENS IN FOREIGN STATES

Both Russia’s National Security Concept and Military Doctrine list the securing of rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian Federation citizens in foreign states as a priority. The inclusion of this aspect in Russia’s security policy is of great significance to the Baltic States. In Estonia, for instance, ethnic Russians comprise approximately 37% of the country’s 1.5 million residents. In the U.S. Department of State’s “Estonia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998,” it was reported that Estonian noncitizens, particularly Russians, have complained of job, salary and housing discrimination.
because of Estonian language requirements. The inclusion of the protection of Russians living abroad into its security policy is a direct message to the Baltic States that Russia will monitor these issues and will not rule out the use of the military instrument to cope with them.

An analysis of the threats facing Russia reveals the following conclusions:

a. Russia perceives the prospect of unilateral action by NATO as a threat to its sovereignty and its position as an equal player in today’s world.

b. Russia faces a wide variety of actor threats along its borders, which stem from a host of socio-economic, demographic and culture issues.

c. Both Russia’s National Security Concept and Military doctrine devote themselves primarily to a description of the “increased level and scope of threats in the military sphere.” Correspondingly, both documents emphasize the use of the military instrument to respond to these threats.

d. Both Russia’s National Security Concept and Military Doctrine list the securing of rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian Federation citizens in foreign states as a priority. The inclusion of this aspect in Russia’s security policy is of great significance to the Baltic States.

SECTION FOUR - RUSSIAN SECURITY INTERESTS IN AN EXPANDED NATO

This section will present a comparative analysis between the primary threats to Russian security interests and the impact an expanded NATO would have on these threats. The third section’s analysis of the threats to Russian security interests is a prerequisite for this analysis. This section’s comparison will therefore rest upon the conclusions made in the previous phases. The result of the comparative analysis conducted in this section will be the determination of whether or not an expanded NATO would actually be in Russia’s best interest.

The rivalry between NATO and Russia has deep historical roots and can easily be reduced to emotionally charged rhetoric. As the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, Colonel General Nikolai Pishchev stated prior to NATO’s acceptance of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic:

“It is precisely from the West that all sorts of conquerors came to our land over centuries, trying not only to seize vast territories and rich cities, but also to enslave or destroy the people living there.”

If one accepts the premises that Russia sets forward in its 2000 National Security Concept, it is difficult to refute that NATO expansion would automatically pose significant threats to Russia’s security interests. The reader will recall that Russia’s National Security Concept included in the list of external threats the following: the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO’s expansion to the East and the possibility of the appearance of foreign military bases and large military on Russia’s immediate borders.

If the existence of NATO inherently causes a threat to Russian national security interests, then the expansion of the
organization must mean increased threat to these same Russian interests. After all, as Colonel General Pishchev points out in his interview, Russia’s negative reaction to the potential expansion of the world’s biggest political-military alliance to its immediate borders is perfectly understandable. This alliance already possesses four to six times the number of combat forces that Russia possesses, and the expansion of this already dominating alliance would bring the following increased capabilities:

First, NATO’s eastward expansion would most likely extend the NATO area of responsibility 650-750 kilometers to the east, thus substantially reducing the buffer zone between NATO and Russia. Conversely, NATO would gain these 650-750 kilometers of terrain, on which it could then place combat and intelligence assets.

In his assessment, Colonel General Pishchev misses an additional implication to the new terrain that an expanded NATO would cover. Moving the borders of NATO to the east would further threaten Russia by serving the security interests of current member states. A host of small states, currently located on the easternmost border of NATO, would find themselves “buffered” by the addition of new member states to the east. This would allow them to refocus their force structures to meet new security challenges. This refocused force structure could include the possible creation of highly mobile units, special forces and crisis response units. The addition of this capability to NATO would, in turn, further cement the imbalance between NATO’s and Russia’s capabilities and thereby further cement NATO’s dominance. This aspect could then pose a direct actor threat to Russia if these small states were to use these newly created highly mobile forces on Russian territory in, for example, a humanitarian intervention capacity.

NATO’s eastward expansion would bring the alliance a 17% increase in warplanes and access to 290 additional airfields. In Colonel General Pishchev’s estimation, NATO’s tactical aviation assets deployed at current NATO airfields can not reach the territory of the Russian Federation fully armed. The use of additional airfields to the east, however, would give NATO the opportunity to strike Russian targets further eastward.

Upon setting aside emotions and historical grievances, however, an empirical analysis of the effects of NATO’s expansion on Russian security interests reveals many more nuances and implications. This section will present a comparative analysis between the primary threats to Russian security interests and the impact an expanded NATO would have on these threats.

The following comparative analysis—an analysis between the primary threats to Russian security interests and the impact an expanded NATO would have on these threats—will rest upon the conclusions made in Section Three.

THE THREAT TO RUSSIA’S SOVEREIGNTY AND POSITION AS AN EQUAL PLAYER IN TODAY’S WORLD

Russia’s National Security Concept of 2000 prefaces its discussion of Russian
national security interests with a brief discussion of the nature of the world community today. The Concept clearly outlines that today’s system of international relations is characterized by two mutually exclusive trends. The Concept outlines the first trend as the increasingly multilateral nature of international processes. The Concept outlines the second trend, however, as the counterproductive tendency of Western countries, led by the United States, to seek domination over international relations. This trend sees the United States acting increasingly in a unilateral manner, using military force in violation of international law. The Concept further notes that the tendency to ignore Russia’s interests serves to undermine the global security community and slow down positive changes in international relations.48

One could argue, however, that in insisting upon asserting itself as an equal player in a multi-polar world, Russia is in fact refusing to face the reality of today’s U.S.-dominated unipolar world. By insisting upon absolute equality, Russia actually renders itself ineffective in forums, in which it could actually influence NATO policy. For example, by refusing to take advantage of special Russia-NATO institutions such as the Permanent Joint Council, Russia missed an opportunity to influence NATO’s development of its new Strategic Concept. Russia thereby contributed to its own marginalization.49

Initiated by signing of “the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation” in Paris on 27 May 1997, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was designed to serve as a powerful mechanism for consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia. The central objective of this forum is “to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other’s security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none.”50

The PJC further enacts mechanisms for Russia and NATO to solve disagreements through consultations and cooperation. In withdrawing from the PJC following NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, one might argue that Russia effectively removed itself from one of the forums in which it actually had an equal voice with NATO.

An expanded NATO would in no way negatively impact Russia’s influence in the organizations where it already enjoys an equal voice with NATO. Russia would still reap the benefits of its equal status in the PJC, its status as a Permanent Member of the United Nations and its equal voice in the OSCE. Furthermore, the results of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Reykjavik indicate that Russia is now in a better position than ever to achieve a much more meaningful, formal relationship with NATO51. The purpose of the Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting was for NATO to provide guidance in preparation for the Prague Summit on four key issues: development of vital new capabilities, NATO enlargement, creation of a new security relationship with Russia, and development of relationships with Ukraine and
all other Partners. In reference to the creation of a new security relationship with Russia, NATO announced its intent to create the NATO-Russia Council, "where NATO states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest, while preserving NATO’s prerogative to act independently." Clearly, Russia will look to evaluate the balance between "work as equal partners" and NATO’s "prerogative to act independently." The mere fact, however, that NATO has proven committed to establishing a meaningful, cooperative relationship with Russia indicates that NATO expansion and will not occur at the expense of Russia’s position as an equal player in today’s world. On the contrary, Russia appears to be securing a much more meaningful role for itself in the global security system at the precisely the same time as NATO is expanding.

RUSSIA'S UNSTABLE BORDERS

As described in Section 3, five of the six internal threats listed in Russia’s Military Doctrine relate to terrorism, and the fight against international terrorism has become one of Russia’s top foreign policy priorities. Unstable borders threaten Russia on its southern and eastern frontiers, particularly in the areas of Chechnya, Dagestan, Afghanistan and Central Asia.

One could argue that in light of its troubled borders to the south and east, it is absolutely vital to Russia’s security interests to maintain a stable border to the west. A comparison between the effects of an expanded NATO and Russia’s security interests reveal that the eastward expansion of NATO would actually promote a stabilization of Russia’s western border. As President Clinton’s Report of February 24, 1997 to the Congress of the United States on NATO Enlargement points out, NATO membership has historically brought with it heightened regional cooperation and improved relations between neighboring countries. As an example, the report cites the conclusion of a bilateral treaty between Romania and Hungary in 1996. This treaty improved relations between the two countries by reopening consulates, conduct-

ing military exercises and extending mutual recognition of rights of national minorities. Furthermore, Slovakia and Hungary concluded a similar treaty in 1995, and Romania and the Ukraine began consultation on the conclusion of such a treaty in 1997. In light of these historical examples, it is reasonable to conclude that the Baltic States’ membership in NATO would lead to the resolution of conflict areas between Russia and the Baltics, thereby allowing Russia to devote its resources elsewhere, principally to its troubled southern and eastern borders.

INCREASED THREATS IN THE MILITARY SPHERE AND INCREASED USE OF THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT TO RESPOND TO THESE THREATS

NATO’s proven effectiveness and the declining strength of Russia’s military (as outlined in Section 3), has already led Russia to conclude that they will not be able to compete numerically with the conventional forces that NATO possesses.
This conclusion has in turn led it to increase the number of scenarios in which it could possibly use nuclear weapons. Due to the relative weakness of Russia’s conventional forces, Putin has decided to use the country’s nuclear capabilities to deter conventional threats.

The relative weakness of Russia’s military, coupled with planned reductions in Russia’s military, only reinforces the argument that Russia must promote the stabilization of its western borders, thereby allowing it to focus its resources on its southern and eastern borders. Simply stated, Russia has a finite number of military resources with which to respond to conflicts. This further illustrates the compatibility of NATO expansion and Russian security interests.

**THE RIGHTS, FREEDOMS AND LAWFUL INTERESTS OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION CITIZENS IN FOREIGN STATES**

Both Russia’s National Security Concept and Military Doctrine list the securing of rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian Federation citizens in foreign states as a priority. Close inspection of the issue, however, reveals that an expansion of NATO must be compatible with Russia’s stated goal to provide for the interests of its citizens living abroad. In striving to attain NATO membership, aspirant countries are compelled to enact policies that are more positive for ethnic minorities. As President Clinton’s Report of February 24, 1997 to the Congress of the United States on NATO Enlargement points out, several prospective NATO members have adopted laws to mitigate existing nationalistic policies. For example, Latvia and Estonia have handled the sensitive issue of treatment of their Russian minorities well enough to warrant the closing of the OSCE’s human rights monitoring missions in these countries.

If Russia is sincere in its desire to protect the interest of its citizens abroad, then it must concede that its security interests in this issue are actually best served by NATO’s expansion. If Russia does not concede this point, however, it will bring into question whether or not its interest in Russian citizens abroad is even sincere. If not sincere, is it simply used as a “card” to be played when the question of a Baltic membership of NATO is raised?

Alexei Arbatov sums up the dilemma facing Russia today quite succinctly, stating simply that “Russia feels vulnerable to the south, threatened from the west, potentially endangered in the east and progressively inferior at the global-strategic level.”

The comparison of this security dilemma, however, with the effects of an expanded NATO demonstrates that NATO’s eastward expansion and Russia’s national security interests are actually compatible in many areas. The primary benefits that an expanded NATO would offer Russia are in summary:

a. The upholding of forums such as the PJC, the UN and the OSCE, in which Russia already enjoys an equal voice with NATO.

b. The stabilization of Russia’s western border, allowing Russia to focus its ef-
forts on its unstable borders to the south and east.

c. The freeing of Russia’s limited military resources to cope with these same unstable border areas.

d. The furthering of the rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian Federation citizens in foreign states.

SECTION FIVE – PERSPECTIVES ON RUSSIA’S CHANGED ATTITUDE TOWARD NATO EXPANSION

This section will discuss possible motivations behind the perceived softening of the Russian government’s attitude toward NATO expansion. This section will put the conclusions made in the previous phases into perspective with recent events. The result of this analysis will be the discussion of whether Russia is in the midst of a genuine shift of paradigm concerning its attitude toward NATO expansion, or whether Russia is engaging in double-talk and rhetoric. This discussion will be based solely upon recent statements made by Russian officials and will not rest upon any official documentation, as no amendments have been made (or even suggested) to the Russian National Security Concept or Military Doctrine.

When observing the recent relations between the United States and Russia, it is easy to reach the conclusion that Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion has softened after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. After all, Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first foreign head of state to phone President Bush to offer his condolences after the terrorist attacks. Perhaps more importantly, it seems that Russia is prepared to back up their supportive statements with concrete offers of political and military (particularly intelligence-sharing) support.

Previously unthinkable, three of the former Soviet Central Asian republics already host thousands of U.S. soldiers. Moreover, the United States has begun providing anti-terror assistance in the former Soviet republic of Georgia. As of the writing of this article, the Pentagon had already begun providing combat helicopters to Georgia, and it plans to initiate intensive train and equip programs in the country’s mountainous Pankisi Gorge region. Under the framework of these programs, U.S. military experts will train several Georgian battalions to counter the region’s growing terrorist threat. Moreover, while speaking at a news conference in Kazakhstan on 01 March 2002, Putin denied Russia having any serious objects to United States’ plans to deploy military components into the former Soviet republic of Georgia, dismissing the possibility as “no tragedy” for Russia.

Even regarding the sensitive issue of Russian animosity toward NATO, it appears that Russia’s attitude has somewhat softened. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson described the effect that NATO’s unprecedented invocation of Article 5 after the events of 11 September by saying that Russia had previously regarded Article 5 of the Washington treaty as “the quintessential demonstration of NATO’s anti-Russian orientation.” Its invocation in the wake of the events of
11 September, on the other hand, demonstrated how Article 5 could be invoked "in an entirely different context, a context Russia can understand." On some levels, it seems to appear that Russia has learned that it will have to accept the expansion of NATO and that this expansion does not inherently equal an increased threat to Russia.

Do these softened views toward NATO and the West in general mark a significant concession and change in attitude on behalf of the Russian Federation, or is this merely a guise designed to achieve a second set of hidden objectives?

Some scholars argue that even prior to 11 September, Russia had already realized it was necessary to establish closer relations with the EU, Europe and even NATO. This school of thought sees Russia, and particularly Putin, as having been ready for setting aside its grievances with the West, in search of closer cooperation as well as the corresponding economic, political and social benefits. If this is the case, Putin most likely used the events of 11th September as a final argument to settle old disputes in the Kremlin and to win over those who still doubted that closer relations with the West could bring any benefits for Russia.

Perhaps the most powerful argument against this viewpoint, however, is that fact that Russia has initiated absolutely no discussion on the need to update any of the documents that comprise its security policy, most notably its National Security Policy and its Military Doctrine. Why, if Russia is indeed changing its security paradigm and genuinely reconsidering its fundamental opposition to NATO today, is Russia not amending the documents that form the foundation of its security policy to reflect this fact?

In direct contradiction to the above school of thought, a second school of thought argues that Putin is simply taking advantage of the 11th of September to gain several advantages for Russia. This same school of thought would see little likelihood of a long-term change of security paradigm in Russia. Instead this school of thought would expect to see Russia continue with meaningless rhetoric and talk of Russia’s participation in the unified fight against terrorism only as long as it was reaping benefits from this more pro-western stance. Clearly Russia has gained several concessions from the West since the events of 11 September. First, criticism of Russia’s campaign in Chechnya has almost disappeared entirely since 11 September. Secondly, Russia clearly expects to receive concessions from the United States during the disarmament summit. The unprecedented level of cuts to the numbers of nuclear weapons are absolutely necessary, as Russia simply can not afford to maintain the large nuclear arsenal it currently possesses. Finally, Russia will expect, to some degree, to resume its previous status as an important party to European security issues. Russia will insist that its voice no longer be marginalized, as it was during the NATO intervention in Kosovo. Clearly, Russia has already begun to reap some of these benefits of its support to the campaign against terror. For example, the Chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schroder, stated the following about Russia’s operations in Chechnya:
“Regarding Chechnya, there will be and must be a more differentiated evaluation in world opinion.” This is a dramatic departure from Germany’s usual harsh criticism of Russian human rights violations in Chechnya, including the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets, torture and murder. Chancellor Schroder even responded to Russia’s restrictions on independent press coverage of the Chechen conflict and restrictions on visits of international agencies such as the OSCE by conceding that “silence on Chechnya is the price for this new solidarity (referring to solidarity in the campaign against terror).”

This argument would explain why we have seen no discussion in the Russian government on the need to update its National Security Policy and its Military Doctrine. Why change the security documents if the recent softened attitudes toward NATO will be maintained only as long as Russia perceives it has something tangible to gain?

In light of the significant, and admittedly somewhat justifiable, historical grievances that Russia has against NATO, it is probable that the true roots of Russia’s changed attitude toward NATO most likely lies somewhere between a true change in paradigm and pure opportunism. It does seem to appear that on some level Putin, and perhaps the remainder of his government, have begun to see NATO as an organization that no longer exists for the sole purpose of countering Russia. The events of 11 September have indeed promoted some conciliatory action on behalf of Russia, such as the acceptance of U.S. troops on the soil of the former Soviet Union and a somewhat softened attitude toward NATO expansion. Clearly Russia expects that it deserves to gain some concrete measures in exchange for these concessions. These expected concessions include at least non-inference in their operations in Chechnya, needed and unprecedented reductions in nuclear armaments and the right for its voice to carry more weight in European security matters.

The inactivity on the Russian side, however, to move to amend any of its primary security documents (all of which are decisively anti-western and anti-NATO in nature), most likely betrays a “wait and see” attitude on behalf of Russia. It is after all only natural that the years of conflict between NATO and Russia have led to deep skepticism on both sides. It could take decades to overcome this skepticism, but on some level, it does appear that NATO and Russia have at least started what one might hope would be a new confidence building phase, which will lead to a more constructive relationship between them. As mentioned previously, Russia will carefully evaluate the balance that the newly created NATO-Russia Council strikes between “work as equal partners” and NATO’s “prerogative to act independently”.

In the wake of the events of 11 September, the world has witnessed many indications from Russia that it may indeed be in the process of changing its attitude of animosity toward Russia. Instead Russia may be ready to begin the building of a more constructive and cooperative relationship. On the other hand, as Russia has not even begun to discuss amendments to the extreme anti-NATO language con-
tained in its primary security documents, one could be led to question whether or not Russia’s seemingly conciliatory statements stem from simple opportunism. Clearly Russia has gained some important victories in the wake of 11 September, most notably where its Chechen policy is concerned. The main question now becomes “Is Russia sincerely ready to change its security paradigm, or are we simply seeing more of the same old rhetoric?” It is entirely possible that a new era of change has dawned upon NATO-Russian relationships, but it will take many years to overcome the decades of animosity between these two parties.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

This article’s evaluation of the compatibility between Russian security strategy and NATO expansion was conducted in five separate sections.

The first and second sections provided descriptive analyses of two of the pillars of Russian security strategy; the Russian National Security Concept and the Russian Military Doctrine. An examination of the contents of these documents revealed several key conclusions about Russia’s primary security interests. The fact that the draft military doctrine was published prior to the development of the National Security Concept, coupled with the fact that the National Security Concept focuses predominantly on military threats and responses, renders the Military Doctrine a document of increased importance.

It is noteworthy that the contents of these documents are absolutely compatible, as they both contain similar assessments and conclusions about the threat that Russia faces today. First, both documents can be viewed as messages delivered to the West with the intent of reasserting Russia as a major actor in global security, and both documents bear a decisively anti-western, particularly anti-NATO, nature. Secondly, both documents reveal that Russia is increasingly aware of its inferiority in comparison to NATO and that Russia is prepared to compensate for that by increasing the number of scenarios in which nuclear weapons could be used. Thirdly, both documents place increased importance on the role of external threats, although they still highlight internal threats such as terrorism and socio-economic deterioration. This increased awareness of external threats, predominantly NATO, stems from Russia’s inability to prevent NATO’s intervention into Kosovo without a United Nations mandate. Finally, Russia articulates in both documents that it perceives its foreign policy interests as extending to citizens of Russia living abroad. This has implications for the Baltic States in general.

The third section provided the reader with a description of the primary threats to the security interests of the Russian Federation. First, it is clear that Russia does perceive the prospect of unilateral action by NATO as a threat to its sovereignty and position as an equal player in today’s world. Secondly, Russia faces a wide variety of actor threats along its borders, which stem from a host of socio-economic, demographic and cultural issues.
The fourth section provided a comparison between the primary threats to Russian security interests and the impact an expanded NATO would have on these threats. This comparison revealed that although it is unavoidable to conclude that NATO expansion does offer more terrain and capabilities to the Alliance, it does not necessarily equate to an increased threat to Russia. In fact there are many instances in which NATO’s expansion would actually provide benefits to Russia. These instances include the stabilization of Russia’s Western border (freeing Russia’s limited military resources to cope with already unstable border areas) and the furthering of the rights, freedoms and lawful interest of Russian citizens abroad. The final result of the comparison conducted in the fourth section determined that an expanded NATO would actually be in Russia’s best interest.

The fifth section discussed possible motivations behind the perceived softening of the Russian government’s attitude toward NATO expansion. This section put the conclusions made in the above sections into perspective with recent events. The result of this analysis determined that Russia might actually be starting the process of changing its attitudes toward NATO expansion, thereby changing its entire security paradigm. The fact, however, that Russia has made no move to amend its primary security documents—the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine—indicate that Russia may merely be engaging in rhetoric and opportunism to gain as much as possible in the wake of the events of 11 September. In any case, it will most likely take years to overcome the decades of conflict between Russia and NATO before Russia can claim a complete shift of security paradigm.

In conclusion, this article has demonstrated that although Russia’s security policy documents state NATO expansion explicitly as a threat, the opposite is in fact true. NATO expansion will be very positive for Russia, primarily because it will serve to stabilize Russia’s Western border, freeing Russia’s limited military resources to cope with these unstable border areas. Additionally, NATO expansion will serve to further the rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian citizens abroad.

Whether or not Russia has accepted this postulate, however, remains to be seen. Despite the current seemingly more progressive attitudes in Russia today concerning NATO and NATO expansion, there has been no move to amend any of their official (and extremely anti-NATO) documentation. In light of recent developments, it is possible that former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott was correct in his argument that “today a partnership with NATO holds out the promise of something better both for Russia and its neighbors—true security and stability, based on cooperation rather than on subjugation and intimidation.” The only questions that now remain are how long will it take to reach this new partnership, and will it be reached at all?

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3 The Nine MAP members are: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia and Albania.


8 Buzan, Barry. pg. 67.


10 Wallander, pg. 2

11 Wallander, pg. 2

12 Wallander, pg. 1


20 Translated from Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Decree Number 706 of the President of the Russian Federation. 21 April 2000.


31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

34 The Ferghana Valley is terrain that covers portions of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
37 Ibid.
38 The Primorski Krai is located at the juncture of Russia, China, and North Korea.
39 The flow of Chinese migrant workers remained steady at approximately 7,000 to 8,000 workers per year between 1994 and 1998.
52 Ibid.
59 The United States currently has military forces in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
62 Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson. The “Welt Am Sonntag Forum.” Berlin, Germany. 1 October 2001.
63 Ibid.
Section IV

Defence Structures and Doctrines

The section on defence structures and doctrines is perhaps the most extensive one in this issue of the Baltic Defence Review. It covers issues, which rest at different ends of the spectrum of the subject matter, from the Chechen wars to the Revolution in Military Affairs and to engineering in Peace Support Operations. Nonetheless, the overarching and unifying factor is that all of them explore in detail the questions related to the ways that the military tool is shaped and employed.

The topic of the first article in this section is the concept of operations and the conduct of the adversaries during the two Chechen wars. The article discusses violations of international humanitarian law on both sides of the conflict and investigates the consequences for international law in a political perspective.

The article is written by Mr. Ib Faurby, who is a special advisor to the Royal Danish Defence Academy.

The second article is indeed very a comprehensive and by far a unique attempt to assess the implications of the contemporary trends in military affairs for the Baltic States. Major Mike Patrick of the Canadian Defence Forces, who is a graduate of the Baltic Defence College, has undertaken the task of examining the nature of the Revolution in Military Affairs, its characteristics and peculiarities in order to define the challenge of this phenomenon posed to the military establishments of the three Baltic States. His account of how well the Baltic States are positioned to meet this challenge and the recommendations on what needs to be done in the future deserve special attention of the reader.
In the third article, Major Jyrki Raunio of the Finnish Defence Forces, who is also a graduate of the Baltic Defence College, gives a very detailed appraisal of the engineering requirements in the Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and puts the engineering capabilities of the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) into this general context, thus essentially questioning the deployability, sustainability and operational effectiveness of the BALTBAT if it is ever deployed to a PSO as a unit and in its current shape. His recommendations should be of interest to those who hope to see this multinational unit and one of the most prominent projects of military co-operation between the Baltic States making a contribution to the international operations as a coherent force.
International Law, Human Rights and the Wars in Chechnya

By Ib Faurby*

During the two Russian-Chechen Wars (1994-96 and since 1999) extensive violations of international law and human rights have taken place. The purpose of the following article is to give a brief overview of the nature of these violations and, even more briefly, to discuss the implications for international law and the observance of human rights in intra-state conflicts.

Background

When the Soviet Union dissolved in late 1991, Chechnya (until then the major part of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic in Northern Caucasus) declared its independence. During the following three years Moscow made some half-hearted attempts to force Chechnya back into the Russian Federation, but those attempts were mostly ignored in the rebellious republic.

Then in December 1994, after the failure of a Russian supported attempt by the pro-Russian opposition to overthrow the separatist regime, a Russian military intervention by the regular forces took place. It lasted until August 1996, when the Russian forces suffered a humiliating defeat and the Khasavyurt Agreement brought an end to the hostilities.

In January 1997, the Chechen Chief of Staff, Aslan Maskhadov, was elected president in an election, which international observers characterised as “free and fair”. A peace treaty was signed between Maskhadov and the Russian President Boris Yeltsin in May the same year. However, due to the devastations brought about by the war, the absence of the promised Russian war reparations, external meddling by Islamic radicals, escalating crime and inter-Chechen rivalries, Chechnya degenerated into chaos, which Maskhadov was unable to control.

Contrary to Maskhadov’s policy, the Chechen “field commander” Shamil

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Basayev and his foreign brother-in-arms al-Khattab lead an attack into neighbouring Dagestan in August 1999, in order to support radical Islamic groups there and with the declared purpose of establishing a Chechen-Dagestani Islamic Republic. The attack was repelled by the Russian and local Dagestani forces. Moscow, however, lead by the new Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, used the crisis as a pretext for a new war against Chechnya, allegedly in order to combat “international terrorism”, but clearly with the purpose of forcing Chechnya back into the Russian Federation.2

The new war, though several times declared over and won by Moscow, continues as a guerrilla war with considerable losses on both sides and with no prospects for an early political solution.

**International Law**

During both wars massive violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law have taken place. These two bodies of law are defined in the following way:

Human rights law consists of international conventions and declarations, most of which have become customary international law binding all states and having general applicability; and

International humanitarian law only applies to armed conflicts - international or internal conflict.1

The number of international conventions and other relevant documents on human rights is large. They include:

- The Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948
- The Convention for Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide from 1948
- The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from 1966
- The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment from 1984
- The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees from 1951 and its Additional Protocol from 1967
- The Convention on the Rights of the Child from 1989

In a regional, i.e. European, context there is - after Russia’s membership of the Council of Europe in February 1996:

- The Statute of the Council of Europe,
- The European Convention on Human Rights and its additional protocols as well as
- The European Convention Against Torture, Inhuman and or Degrading or Punishment from 1987.

Besides these legal documents there is also a number of so-called “politically binding” documents, primarily drawn up within the CSCE (the OSCE since 1994). These are the Helsinki Final Act (1975), the Vienna Final Act (1989) and the Paris Charter (1990) as well as the Copenhagen and Moscow Documents on the Human Dimension (1990 and 1991). Furthermore, there is the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, signed in Budapest 1994 less than a week before the first Russian-Chechen war.

As for international humanitarian law, which applies to armed conflict between states, the most important texts are the
four Geneva Conventions from 1949 and the two Additional Protocols to these conventions. Only the common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II from 1977, which specifies the principles of the common article 3, applies to internal conflicts such as the Russian-Chechen conflict. However, there can be no doubt that Additional Protocol II does apply to that conflict. The Russian Constitutional Court has also confirmed this in a ruling in July 1995.

Finally, with the decision to establish the International Criminal Court under the auspices of the UN, which is to come into force from 1 July 2002, there is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This statute clearly defines what constitutes the most serious crimes of concern to the international society, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.

Documents of Violations

The massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law during the two wars in Chechnya are extremely well documented by inter-governmental and governmental institutions as well as by highly respected non-governmental organisations. They include, just mentioning the most well known:

- The Russian President’s Human Rights Commission
- The U.S. State Department’s Annual Report on Human Rights Practises
- Numerous reports from Committees of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
- Weekly Situation Reports from the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya during the first war (unpublished)
- Reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross
- Numerous reports from Human Rights Watch
- Reports from Amnesty International
- Reports from Médecins sans Frontières
- Numerous reports from the Human Rights Centre “Memorial”, the most important Russian human rights NGO
- Reports from the Dutch Pax Christi, to mention one of many respected national NGOs from the West.

- Finally, The Danish Refugee Council’s has produced very useful Situation Reports, particularly about the conditions of internally displaced persons.

It is beyond the scope of this article to quote systematically from these very detailed reports. However, they do exist and prove in gruelling details the systematic and very serious human rights violations, which have taken place.

Types of Violations

Both parties to the war have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law. In the West, this has sometimes led to the attitude that both parties are equally guilty. The Russian side continuously draws attention to violations by the Chechens - something, which has not been avoided by some of Western media, commentators and politicians.
It is, however, beyond any doubt that during both wars the Russian forces committed both the largest number and the most serious violations. That is the unanimous conclusion of several of the above mentioned reports, including reports by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the U.S. State Department, the Russian Presidents Human Rights Committee (in 1996) and Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International as well as other humanitarian NGOs.

To quote from a report by the Legal Affairs and Human Rights Committee Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, dated April 2000:

"...the scale and number of human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law on the Chechen side cannot even remotely compare to those of the Russian side, which are of much greater magnitude, and, due to Russia being a state party to the European Convention on Human Rights and thus bound by duty to protect the rights she is violating, much more serious".14

Among the most serious violations by the Chechens there were two hostage actions during the first war in Budjonnovsk and Kizlyar, which included the murder of hostages. These reprehensible acts must be condemned, but it should not be forgotten that in both instances Russian forces themselves killed most of the hostages.15

There have been numerous other cases of hostage taking in Chechnya, though it has been difficult to ascertain to what extent they have been cases of individual crime or part of a deliberate policy on behalf of the Chechen authorities.

Chechen violations include fighting in and from the residential areas and thereby exposing the civilian population to the Russian counter attacks. That was the case during the extended battles of Grozny as well as the battles in and around many towns and villages.16

There are also reports about the Chechen fighters having executed, physically molested or threatened the execution of village leaders and others who would not co-operate with them or who co-op- erated with the Russian authorities or the Russia-installed Chechen administration.17

The Russian side has also claimed that Chechens kept prisoners of war or other captives as slaves or in slave-like conditions.

Finally, there have been Russian claims that the Chechen fighters have tortured or in other ways maltreated Russian prisoners. There are, nevertheless, many instances where former Russian prisoners have said that they were well treated by their Chechen captors.

The nature and extend of the Russian violations of humanitarian international law and human rights law are, as mentioned, well documented. The list is long and includes almost all categories of human rights violations.

The Russian conduct of the war has shown that the purpose is not the claimed fight against international terrorism, but a collective punishment of the Chechen people.

During both wars, there have been numerous instances of disproportionate and indiscriminate bombing of the civil-
ian population (the most striking - but certainly not the only - example being the destruction of Grozny during both wars).

Already on 6 January 1995, the International Court of Justice denounced the indiscriminate use of force by the Russian army against civilian targets in and around Grozny. The court stated that “the Russian army violated the right to life of unarmed civilians on a massive scale”. 18

The Russian President’s Human Rights Commission, of which Mr. Sergej Kovalyov was chairman at that time, estimated that the original battle of Grozny during the first war cost 27,000 civilian lives. 19 Due to censorship and other restrictions there are no figures for the loss of civilian lives in Grozny during the second war. 20

In both wars immense destruction was served on towns and villages throughout Chechnya. “The attacks on populated areas must be characterised as a war against the civilian population”, wrote the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya in a report in March 1996. 21

Russian forces often surrounded towns and villages and their populations were threatened with attack if they did not hand over an arbitrary number of weapons or pay considerable sums of money to the Russians.

A particularly gruelling example is the town of Samaskij, which twice during the first war was the scene of massacres on women, children and elderly men. The Russian human rights organisation “Memorial” has documented the killing of more than one hundred civilians in Samaskij during the attack in April 1995. 22 Almost one year later, in March 1996, 174 persons were killed and approximately 200 men taken to the so-called filtration points. Many houses were set on fire. 23 A similar massacre took place in Sernovodsk in March 1996.

Other examples abound from the second war. 24 During the first 18 months there were three cases of mass killings of the civilian population by the Russian troops, which have also been particularly well documented by the Russian and international NGOs. 25 A number of suspected mass killings during the same period should be added to this as well as the revelation of a mass grave at a village less than a kilometre from the main Russian military base at Khankala in the eastern part of Grozny. 26 Bodies were found, several of which were the persons who had been taken into custody by the federal forces. 26 Besides mass killings, there are numerous well-documented cases of summary executions of the individual Chechens - men, women and even children. 27

From both wars there are reports about columns of refugees being attacked by aircraft, helicopters and artillery as well as by soldiers with light arms. Russian helicopters have also attacked refugees trying to cross the mountains into Georgia. In many cases Russian officers have been demanding payment in order to let civilians escape from areas under attack. Likewise, Russian border troops have been demanding payment for letting refugees pass the border from Chechnya into neighbouring Ingushetia.

During both wars Russian authorities established so-called filtration camps where boys (from 10 years old and upwards) and men - and occasionally women as well -
have been arbitrarily interned ostensibly in order to check whether or not they were “terrorists”. Conditions in the camps were primitive, not to say inhuman. In some cases the interned have been placed in unheated boxcars. Supply of food and water has been insufficient. The Council of Europe has, among other things, criticised that the interned have not been giving any legal counsel. Drawing on interviews with former detainees several international humanitarian organisations claim that internees have been tortured and raped. The two following illustrations are from a Human Rights Watch report from 2000:

“Detainees at Chernokozovo were beaten both during interrogation and during night time sessions when guards ran utterly amok. During interrogation, detainees were forced to crawl on the ground and were beaten so severely that some sustained broken ribs and injuries to their kidneys, liver, testicles and feet. Some were tortured with electric shocks”.

“The majority of former detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that they were only released after their families had paid substantial bribes to their Russian captors and predatory intermediaries, ranging from 2,000 rubbles to US $ 5,000”.

During both wars the Russian forces have been pillaging and stealing Chechen property, often carrying it away in military vehicles and storing it at military bases until it could be transported out of Chechnya. Russian officers have clearly known about this without intervening to stop the traffic of stolen goods.

In direct violation of international humanitarian law Russian civilian and military authorities have obstructed the work of humanitarian organisations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, whose access to detainees and victims is guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions.

Finally, Russian authorities have been very negligent in bringing legal proceedings against officers and men alleged of having committed human rights violations and war crimes. This has been severely criticised by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Already during the first war the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights stated that it was “unacceptable” that there was no investigation or legal proceedings against the Russian soldiers who were suspected of violations of human rights.

This criticism has been repeated during the second war. In January 2001 the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights wrote:

“... the key problem from a human rights perspective remains the lack of accountability for crimes committed by federal servicemen and the personnel of law-enforcement agencies against civilians and the resulting impunity which in turn, encourages further human rights violations by the Russian federal forces operating in the Chechen Republic and leads to unnecessary and unacceptable suffering among the civilian population”.

Thus, there can be no doubt about the seriousness and scale of the Russian violations. To quote once again from the April 2000 report from the Committee on Le-
gal Affairs and Humans Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe:

"The Russian side has continued its indiscriminate and disproportionate military campaign in the Chechen Republic, including direct attacks on the civilian population. The Russian federal troops have committed - and apparently continue to commit - grave human rights violations and even war crimes. Peaceful civilians have been - and still are - at risk of being shot dead, raped, arrested and arbitrarily detained, tortured and ill treated; their homes destroyed and looted... Most violations of human rights by the Federal troops in Chechnya go unreported, due to the restrictions imposed on the free movement of journalists in Chechnya, and the non-admittance of non-governmental human rights organisations, and stay unpunished."

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**The most serious violations**

It must be emphasised, that this article is not just about what is euphemistically called "collateral damage", something which, regrettably, occurs during all armed conflicts. More than anything else the article is about deliberate and systematic violations of international humanitarian law and of the rights of civilian non-combatants.

The legal definitions of the most serious crimes are as follows:

Genocide (as defined in Article 6 of the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court and Article II of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide) is

- characterised by the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such

Crimes Against Humanity (as defined in Article 7 of the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court) are

- characterised by part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population

War Crimes in Non-international Armed Conflicts (as defined in Article 8, 2 c and e of the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions) include

- wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment of persons protected by the Geneva Convention as well as extensive destruction of property, not justified by military necessity, and the taking of hostages.

It is not the purpose of this article to analyse whether or not the Russian violations in Chechnya can be characterised as genocide. The accusation of genocide is very serious and should not be used lightly. The definition of genocide requires that there has been an intention to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. To determine whether or not that has been the case during the two Russian-Chechen wars necessitates an in-depth legal and empirical study.

However, it seems from the reports, referred to above, that there can be little doubt that the Russian forces in Chechnya have committed serious violations, some of which clearly fall within the definitions of crimes against human-
ity and war crimes. Furthermore, the Russian conduct of the wars is in violation of the Statute and the Conventions of the Council of Europe, as has been stated in numerous reports from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

**Russia’s Responsibility**

In the international debate over human rights violations in Chechnya, the Russian representatives have continuously referred to violations by the Chechen side as justification for the Russian acts. Many Western governments seem, at least in their rhetoric, in part to have accepted that justification. However, as Legal Affairs and Human Rights Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has written:

“The scale of Russia’s military intervention in Chechnya was and is of such a magnitude that it cannot be justified in terms of an anti-terrorist operation, and must in itself be condemned as a violation of human rights and international humanitarian law.”

The Chechen violations cannot be used as justification for Russian violations. It is Russia who is signatory to international conventions and other legal instruments concerning the conduct of war and the protection of human rights. It is Russia, who, by signing these instruments, has committed itself to a set of legally binding norms.

In a report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Lord Judd has stated it this way:

“While recognising that human rights violations have been, and are still, perpetrated by both sides in the conflict, the assembly considers that membership of the Council of Europe requires a commitment to a higher order of conduct. The Assembly cannot accept that a member state’s failure to comply with the organisation’s standards is justified by the behaviour of its adversaries.”

**International Reactions**

During both Russian-Chechen wars Russian political leaders repeatedly claimed that the conflict was an “internal matter” for the Russian Federation, in which other states had no right to meddle. What was even more remarkable and discouraging was that several western leaders seemed - openly or tacitly - to accept this argument.

Treating human rights law and international humanitarian law as “internal matters” is not just politically problematic, but it is in clear contradiction of well-established international law.

“Indeed, the most fundamental norms of human rights law and international humanitarian law are now considered legally binding upon all states as part of customary international law. The norms are obligations of all states towards the international community as a whole.”

This view has been confirmed by several resolutions by the UN General Assembly and as well in rulings by the International Court of Justice. The World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna adopted a strong testimony to this view in 1993. In the concluding Vienna Decla-
ration and Programme of Action, which were unanimously adopted by all member states of the UN, it is unequivocally stated that, “the promotion and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community”.  

In a European context, this view has been reaffirmed through declarations made within the context of the CSCE/OSCE beginning with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. In the 1991 Moscow Document from the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE it is stated that “issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are of international concern, as respects for these rights and freedoms constitute one of the foundations of international order” and the participating states “categorically and irrevocably” declare “that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned”.  

It is beyond the scope of this article to analyse the motives and goals behind the reluctance of the international organisations and western governments to take stronger action in relation to the Russian violations. But clearly, Russia’s great power status and importance for international security has played an important role.

Similar violations by smaller and less important states would not have gone unchallenged. The seriousness and magnitude of the atrocities committed by the Russian forces in Chechnya are no less than the violations committed by military and paramilitary forces in the Balkans, for which the international community brings accused war criminals to trial in The Hague.

For the western states, the policy - sometimes referred to as “Russia First” - was motivated by considerations of Russia’s importance for international security in general and the hope of Russia’s cooperation in arms control, and the situation in the Balkans in particular, as well as Russia’s tacit acceptance of NATO enlargement.

These motives are both serious and legitimate. The point is certainly not that such considerations should have been thrown over-board. The question is instead, why it was not possible to strike a more balanced policy, which was based on respect for international law and human rights as well as on considerations of western security interests. It would indeed be sad, if one had to conclude that no such balance is possible.

Even so, many in the West, including western political leaders, seem to have believed that President Yeltsin personally was the guarantee for political and economic reforms in Russia and thought that any criticism of him and his policies would weaken the democratic forces in Russia and threaten to bring extreme nationalists and communists to power. However, weak western reactions - particularly during the first war - were a great disappointment for the democratic forces, which opposed the war. To quote the leading Russian human rights advocate:

“If Kohl and Clinton had taken a different stand”, on Chechnya, “a principled,
uncompromising, honest stand, the war would not have gone on like it did. But they were thinking of Yeltsin’s prestige, they were afraid of political chaos in Russia. This lack of principles was paid for with tens of thousands of human lives”.

Similarly, during the second war many western leaders seemed to see President Putin as the person who could bring stability and liberal economic reforms to Russia. After September 11, 2001, Putin furthermore is seen as an important partner in the fight against terrorism.

However, there can be little doubt that western caution served to confirm Yeltsin’s belief that he could continue the first war and initiate the second war without any major international consequences. Similarly, it seems to be President Putin’s belief that the new war can be fought at limited costs to Russia’s international position. This has been confirmed by almost total absence of western interest in human rights violations by Russia in Chechnya since September 11, 2001.

**Conclusion**

In half a century since the Second World War, human rights have come to play an increasingly important role in international relations. A large number of treaties, declarations and other documents have been drawn up and ratified by the majority of states and, as mentioned, have become part of customary international law. Furthermore, in the years following the end of the Cold War human rights language has found its way into the foreign policy declarations of many governments.

The widespread reluctance to challenge the human rights violations, committed by Russia in Chechnya, has, however, had serious consequences for international law. It has been demonstrated clearly that large and politically important states can defy international law with impunity. This should not surprise anyone, but it is a sobering reminder in a time where ritual declarations of commitments to human rights have become politically popular.

More specifically, the willingness of the Council of Europe to admit and uphold the membership of a state that continues to violate the Council’s Statute and Conventions is a testimony to the demise of what for long has been considered to be the world’s most effective human rights regime.

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4 To be found on http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute
6 To be found on http://www.state.gov
7 To be found on http://www.cor.fr
8 To be found on http://www.icrc.org
9 To be found on http://www.hrw.org
10 To be found on http://www.amnesty.org
11 To be found on http://www.msfr.org
12 To be found on http://www.memo.ru
13 For example Rieks H.J. Smeets and Egbert G. CH. Wesselink, Chechnya One Year of War. A Pax
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16 Ibid.


22 Samashki. Moscow: Memorial, 1995. (To be found on http://www.smn.co.jp/chechen/).


34 Doc. 8700, op.cit.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.


38 Humanitarian Intervention, op. cit., p. 52.

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40 Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE. To be found on http://www.osce.org


The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for the Baltic States

By Major Mike Patrick*

This article is based on a paper undertaken in fulfilment of the major thesis requirement of the Senior Staff Course 2001-2002 of the Baltic Defence College. For the most part, it represents a synthesis of the existing material concerning the body of military, technological, organisational, and doctrinal advancement commonly termed the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA - see the definition below) analysed against the current situation in the three Baltic States. This analysis is aimed at identifying both the ramifications of the revolution in military affairs for the Baltic States and recommendations to mitigate against them.

Since the allied victory over the Iraqis in the Gulf War, there has been a great deal of discussion concerning a RMA: what it is; whether one has occurred or is in the process of occurring; whether it can be sought or does it/will it simply take place despite active pursuit. Immediately one tends to associate any notion of RMA to the lone remaining superpower, the United States of America (U.S.A.). It is widely believed that, if an RMA has indeed taken place, then they are the sole masters. Conversely, if an RMA can be actively sought, it is assumed that it will be the U.S.A. who achieves this goal. However, often absent from the debate is the implication of the RMA, be it in-progress or inevitably approaching, upon small states. This paper will examine in detail the RMA with a view to determining its implications for specific states, which lack the various advantages of the U.S.A. These implications will lead logically into a discussion concerning both the options available to these states and the consequences associated with these options. Ultimately, recommendations will be made for the adoption of the most suitable course of action including a suggested methodology for implementation.

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The Baltic States – Requirement to Change

The Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are currently undergoing a period of significant military change. Following comprehensive reviews to their respective armed forces’ structures, they are now in the process of aligning their forces consistent both to Western military structures and the realities of their geopolitical and economic situation. Undoubtedly, the major impetus for this reform has been the three states’ desire to join international organizations (most notably The North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Indeed, it is only through these apparatus that these states believe their security can be assured.

Notwithstanding the benefits of belonging to collective defence and economic alliances, such membership will also pose challenges to the Baltic States. Though it is not the purpose of this article to argue the merits of any alliance, the decision to vie for such membership has virtually ensured that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will set themselves on a path of perpetual military change which will, in all probability, necessitate a pursuit of the RMA; a concept that will be discussed later in the article.

Why Change?

Though it is a truism that change is a constant, institutional change is often avoided due to its tendency to interrupt operational continuity and the sense of uncertainty that it often causes. However, many Western militaries currently find themselves in a state of constant flux as they chase a necessarily elusive end state. There are two main reasons why the Baltic States will likely find themselves in a similar position: maintaining/attaining a credible self-defence capability and the requirement to maintain interoperability within alliances. In order to illustrate both of these premises, use will be made of NATO’s membership requirements. At their basic level these requirements may be summarized as follows:

a. each state must have credible defence capability;
b. each state must maintain a (portion of its) force for Article 5 collective defence and for Peace Support Operations (PSO); and
c. each state must be prepared to act in the capacity of a Host Nation (HN).

Each of these three points begs the dual question: what capability and how much of it?

Credible Defence Capability

The Baltic States have often been referred to as indefensible due to their small geographic area and limited population. While this point is quite arguable there is some merit in the opinion insofar as limited resources must also be a limiting factor in defence. Taken in total, the area of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is the rough equivalent of the size of Southern California. This lack of strategic depth makes a very challenging situation, which is only compounded by
a population, which totals 7,419,082 inclusive of all states\(^2\). It is, therefore, not surprising that each of these states have opted to adopt a doctrine based upon total defence.

Fundamentally, this doctrine notes ‘the enemy will be actively and passively resisted to the full territorial extent of the state by employing all resources available\(^4\). Such a doctrine necessitates that a large portion of the population must undergo military training and, as such, lends itself to a conscript/reserve-based system. However, such a system is challenged by the time required to assemble reserves in periods of crisis. The need for some standing rapid-reaction forces, and/or ‘hot reserves’ have, therefore, also been incorporated into each of the Baltic States’ force structure.

As mentioned earlier, the future force structure of each state is also based on what they can afford within their current budgets. It must be noted that all three Baltic States have committed themselves to expenditures for defence, in line with NATO recommendations, of two percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\(^5\)

While there is much to be done in terms of basic infrastructure and armament in fulfillment of their stated defence goals, such a commitment would seem to bode well for capability based expenditures once the basics have been attained. Notwithstanding, inside of this financial ceiling, a maximum force structure appears to have been costed.

What is perhaps most interesting is the size of the standing forces or ‘hot reserves’ that have been chosen by each state: Estonia can call upon one professional battalion – Estonian Battalion (ESTBAT) and will maintain an infantry brigade as ‘hot reserve’; Latvia will establish a single regular force infantry battalion – Latvian Battalion LATBAT); and Lithuania will form a regular force mechanized brigade. Figures One through Three below depict the envisioned end state of the armed forces restructuring for each state. These are the military forces, which are deemed by their respective states to offer a credible defence given the current geopolitical situation:

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**Article 5 Operations and Host Nation Support**

The major hurdle to such tasks, aside from force generation issues, lies within the realm of interoperability. Simply put, interoperability is the ability of different forces to act in a unified, cohesive and complementary manner. It is this concept, which makes operations within a coalition framework possible. To return to the question of what capability and how much it would seem obvious, that in terms of capability the greater, either the similarity or the complementary nature of a given capability is, the higher the potential for interoperability is. Moreover, the higher the level of interoperability, the greater the effectiveness of a coalition will be. It would also seem logical that the converse holds true.

To achieve interoperability goals, each of the Baltic States has undertaken, as a part of their respective Partnership for Peace (PfP) Planning Review Process (PARP), steps to adopt the standardized
NATO agreements (STANAG). As an example, stated within the Lithuanian PfP PARP for the year 2000, the following interoperability priorities were set:

a. English language training;
b. NATO doctrines and procedures;
c. Consultation, Command and Control (C3);
d. logistics; and
e. air space defence.9

Most striking about such priorities is that they appear to be open-ended in nature. That is to say that there does not really seem to be any firm end state that can be attached to them. This is due to the simple reason that NATO, as all organizations, is constantly undergoing an evolutionary process. The corollary, however, is that changes within the organization will necessitate similar changes for its member states.

The Impetus for Change

Structure Versus Capability

Referring to Figures One through Three above, it should be noted that at
The problem, it would seem, is that the Baltic States have for some time now been militarily fixated upon structure and not capability. A simple study of the evolution of the armed forces of the Baltic States underscores this tendency. As an example, Estonia’s initial concept for ground forces was to field a mechanized division based upon the model of the Soviet motor-rifle division. This changed to an organization comprising of three infantry brigades inside a total defence framework. Finally, they have arrived at the structure presented above.11

The argument can be made that there is a dichotomy between what structures can currently be afforded and what defence capability it will allow. While this is true it is, again, an example of focusing on structure before capability. Will, for example the Lithuanian Armed Forces funded for their structure and acting inside of the total defence doctrine, be able to accomplish the mission that it will be assigned? The answer, of course, is dependent upon the capabilities of the Lithuanian Armed Forces and the threat that
they must counter and not upon their structure. Therefore, we may rhetorically ask which of the Baltic States has it right and, if it is correct today, will it remain correct in the future?

The Ramifications of Interoperability

As alluded to above, a commitment to interoperability within an alliance is tantamount to a commitment to constant change. Of particular interest for the Baltic States should be the example of the second interoperability priority listed above; that of doctrine and procedures. This is a vast subject but one whose continued change will undoubtedly have far reaching consequences for the Baltic States.

Most notably, a large number of Western states are seeking to exponentially increase their own military capabilities through the development and introduction both of advanced technology and war-fighting concepts. It is believed that at some point this trend, termed the RMA, will result in a fundamental discontinu-
ility in the manner in which defence is undertaken. Such technological change currently has, and will continue to have, an impact upon doctrine and organization and, therefore, issues of interoperability. The willingness and ability of the Baltic States to keep pace with this revolution will have a direct impact not only upon the credibility of their own defence, but also upon their level of interoperability and, therefore, usefulness within an alliance.

The Baltic States are currently undergoing a period of fundamental change within their respective armed forces. Unfortunately, it would appear that these reorganizations are largely concerned more with structure than capability. Resultantly, there must be some question as to whether the goal of achieving a credible defence capability will be achieved. Moreover, the commitment of each of the Baltic States to join NATO carries with it the burden of remaining interoperable within a perpetually changing organization. The most dramatic example of this change is embodied by the desire of alliance members to achieve increased capability through the development and fielding of advanced military technology. This pursuit of the RMA holds a dual potential for the Baltic States. That is to say that while a failure to follow its trends will likely result in a decreased level of interoperability (and therefore importance/usefulness within alliances) the pursuit of the RMA will likely not only maintain the Baltic States’ level of interoperability but, more importantly, may also negate the arguments concerning the credibility of their defence capability.

**Revolution in Military Affairs**

A significant amount of debate surrounds the concept of Revolution(s) in Military Affairs; what it is, whether one is occurring, or whether one will occur. This debate is of particular importance within the Western World as it carries with it enormous implications for future defence policy. While not alone, the U.S.A. is leading the way in the development and employment of RMA-type technology and thus may serve as a model. Their pursuit of an/the RMA has not only entailed the expenditure of significant funds for the associated technology, but is also presently impacting directly upon their armed forces’ organisation and command. The actions and decisions taken by the U.S.A. will have far-reaching consequences, not only for her potential adversaries, but also for her allies insofar as they want to remain relevant within the alliance. Understanding the debate is the first step in understanding the consequences. This chapter will seek to clarify the issues of the RMA debate and outline the implications of not entering into it.

**What is a Revolution in Military Affairs?**

Marshal N.V. Ogarkov of the Soviet Union’s General Staff first put the concept of the RMA forward in 1982. Essentially, he meant to describe the effect of modern technology on the conventional battlefield. Since this time, however, the term has expanded to include both his-
historical and modern contexts thereby making the debate more complex. Within the ongoing debate the term RMA, dependant upon context, now exists both as a general and definite concept. For this reason, it is possible to speak of an RMA, most often in a historical context, and the RMA as a goal to be achieved. The latter can be somewhat misleading as it implies a singular occurrence; which is likely not the case. Notwithstanding, both instances share the same characteristics and may be defined as:

"...a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by advances in military technology which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and organisational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations. Advances in military technologies do not in themselves constitute an RMA; rather, a 'revolution' requires that new technologies lead to, or become reflected in, dramatic doctrinal and organisational change."¹³

Scholars typically point to a number of examples to illustrate the concept of military technology, which precipitated an RMA. Such items as the longbow, the canon, the aeroplane and the nuclear bomb usually head the list.¹⁴ However, as noted above, the emergence of new technology is not sufficient. Often missing in these illustrations is a description of the doctrinal and organisational changes, and their associated implementation timeline, that have made these revolutionary technologies RMA. Only in hindsight is it apparent that these RMA were, in the vast majority of cases, slow in coming about.

To illustrate, the first mass military use of the longbow was undertaken by King Edward I who conscripted Welsh bowmen for the Battle of Falkirk (1298) against William Wallace. With an effective range in excess of 220 yards and the ability to loose, accurately, between eight and ten arrows per minute, the Scots under Wallace had little hope of protection and, significantly attrited, ultimately failed in battle. The successful defeat of the Scots at the hands of this technology led to its rapid and widespread adoption within the English order of battle. Subsequent monarchs reinforced the importance of this weapon. Most demonstrative of the longbow's dominance of English warfare, however, was the reconfiguration of their armies in which up to eighty-five percent of a given fighting force was comprised of archers. This, however, was generations in the making.¹⁵

Presently, the RMA is taken to encompass three military technical advances.¹⁶ First among these is the notion of using technological means to gain knowledge of all pertinent aspects of information about an enemy while, at the same time, denying him the ability to do likewise. The essential premise of this 'information dominance' is that further development of existing capabilities will allow a military force to achieve complete coverage, in all aspects, of a given area of influence or interest. The goal here is complete surveillance in real-time and, resultantlty, a dramatic decrease in the time necessary to execute the military decision process.

The second concept is that of achieving Command, Control and Communication (C3) abilities, which exceed that of an enemy. This implies technology,
which can abbreviate the time required to sense a target(s), to discriminate it from others, to determine its level of threat, or value, and ultimately to decide its fate. This theory has come to be referred to as 'battle space dominance'.

Completing the RMA is the idea of 'weapons superiority'. Simply put these are weapons, which combine precision guidance with distance. The use of such weapons affords the ability to strike specific, individual, targets accurately over large distances. Collateral damage is therefore minimised while increased standoff ranges offer greater protection to friendly forces. It is apparent that all three of these concepts are complimentary in nature. If they can be combined in an effective manner and are accompanied both by organisational and doctrinal changes, they would indeed produce a system with profound implications to modern warfare.  

Is the RMA, then, on the horizon? Certainly, this would appear to be the case if one were to take the statements of its proponents at face value. As an example, in Joint Vision 2010, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, has stated: "By 2010, we should be able to change how we conduct the most intense joint operations...Information superiority and advances in technology will enable us to achieve the desired effects through the tailored application of joint combat power. Higher lethality weapons will allow us to conduct attacks concurrently that formerly required massed assets..."
While at the time of writing this may have appeared to be a certain future, such is not the case today. Unfortunately, General Shalikashvili’s vision remains out of reach well beyond 2010. As previously alluded to, if the components can be made to work as envisioned both separately and as a functioning, integrated system, then it is quite possible that an RMA will occur. What we are seeing today, however, is technological innovation, which, far from being revolutionary, is focusing on incremental change to existing technology. This change, because of its incremental nature, will likely not be sufficient to fundamentally alter the way in which warfare is conducted in the near term. Therefore, it would appear that if a RMA is on the horizon, it is on the distant horizon.

Semantics or Policy Objectives?

From an observer’s point of view the debate seems to take on a semantic quality. That is to say that while it is clear what an RMA is and it is equally clear what the intent of the RMA is; is the RMA, as the term is used presently, really an RMA? In fact, the point is moot. Whatever the RMA truly is, is irrelevant for several key reasons.

Firstly, the further pursuit of the technology, organisational changes and doctrinal development which comprises the RMA seems to be becoming a policy objective of the U.S.A.. Currently the Secretary of Defence of the U.S.A., Donald Rumsfeld, is in the process of conducting a review of the armed forces’ capabilities which may well initiate both an investment in technology which ‘skips a generation’ and a fundamental re-organisation of the standing force.

Second, the RMA debate has entered the Western World’s mainstream military to such an extent as to become de facto doctrine. Middle powers such as Sweden, Canada and Australia are all active participants, not only within the discussion of the RMA’s potential, but are also actively developing technology similar to that of the U.S.A. While it remains to be seen if this will spur formal doctrinal changes, the fielding of this RMA-type technology is already altering their military organisations.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the technology currently possessed by the U.S.A. has proven to be the best in the world and, while it does not currently afford them the dominance desired, it comes sufficiently close so as to place all other potential adversaries’ conventional forces at a distinct disadvantage.

Implications of the Revolution in Military Affairs

It stands to reason that if the U.S. military technology is superior to all others, then a technological capability gap must exist among her allies. Moreover, as the U.S.A. continues to develop and field new technology, doctrine and organisational structures, this capability gap is sure to widen. This raises the question of interoperability within alliances.

An allied, or perspective allied, state’s approach to the RMA (its acceptance, its implementation or its rejection) will di-
rectly influence their position within an alliance containing states which are pursuing the RMA. Insofar as some states are either unwilling or unable to participate, they will likely find themselves incapable of cooperating in a meaningful manner. Taken to its logical conclusion; failure to follow the RMA may result in marginalization both militarily, and possibly politically, within an alliance.

It is conceivable that anticipated developments in technology leading to the fusion of information dominance, battle space dominance and weapons superiority may serve as the catalyst for an RMA. However, such technology does not currently exist nor is it likely to be developed in the near future. Notwithstanding, the willingness both of the U.S.A. and other, middle power, states to actively pursue the RMA has ramifications for the entirety of the armies of the Western World. Those states who are allied, or aspire to be allied, with such states but who either choose not to or are otherwise unwilling to enter into the RMA will find themselves at an increasing disadvantage.

**RMA Trends of the Front-Runner**

The U.S.A., and indeed the majority of the Western World, believes that the next RMA, also known as the RMA, will be broadly based upon three inter-related technology based concepts; information dominance, battle space dominance and weapons superiority. An RMA is not only predicated upon changes in military technology, but must also see a change in doctrine and organization that, taken together, fundamentally alter the manner in which wars are fought. As we have seen, the RMA has yet to occur and indeed is likely not to happen in the near future. Notwithstanding, the U.S.A. is actively seeking the RMA and, in order to fully comprehend its impact, it is necessary to examine the trends established in their pursuit of this phenomenon. This chapter will examine the technological, organizational and doctrinal trends being pursued by the U.S.A. These trends also come with an associated cost, an understanding of which is necessary to the discussion.

**Technology Based Trends**

**Information Dominance**

Simply put, information dominance seeks to gain all possible data about an adversary, the terrain, the environment and one’s own forces while attempting to deny the same to the enemy. There are three components to this concept. Foremost, the base is formed by the necessity to gather information concerning the enemy’s whereabouts and disposition with sufficient accuracy to conduct an engagement of the located assets. The second aspect is a system of command and control that permits friendly forces to know both where the enemy is and where they, themselves, are. Finally, there needs to be a system which denies the enemy the ability to detect friendly forces by disrupting his sensing assets, his communications and his system of processing information and acting upon it.²⁴ Such capacity to deny
information forms the protective side of information warfare and runs the gamut from low/no technology measures such as camouflage, dispersion and concealment to high technology measures such as various electronic counter-(counter) measures and meaconning (the ability to actively confuse a guidance system).  

Whereas before the trend in modern militaries was to incorporate the power of individual computing devices into warfare, today the trend has evolved into network-centric warfare. More simply, this is the realisation that the power of the individual computer is insignificant compared to that of a robust network of computers. The collection of information through various sources (known collectively as ISTAR or Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) is easily shared via a Command and Control/Communication/Computer (C2/3/4) network among those who require it; from the level at which the task originated to the individual soldier. This, in turn, should aid in facilitating speedier decision-making.

**Battle space Dominance**

Battle space dominance is the concept referring to a given force’s degree of control over the dimensions of the area in which battles may be conducted. Following logically from the technology, which permits a force to achieve information dominance is the desire to act decisively upon the collected data. The development of technology in this field seeks to link, as closely as possible in time, the sensor and the shooter. Ultimately what is envisioned is the instantaneous engagement by appropriate weapons systems of a target, which fits given parameters.

Accordingly, the trend of the U.S.A. has been two fold. Primarily, the automation of command functions through various Command and Control Information Systems (C2IS) has been undertaken with a view to decreasing the time required to make a decision. Such systems are far from new and are now entering their third decade. Second is the actual linking of the sensor and the shooter and thus achieving near instantaneous engagement. This capability has only recently emerged in field-useable form and presently consists of technology such as unmanned aerial vehicles armed with smart munitions.  

**Weapons Superiority**

From the point of view of the U.S.A., the issue of weapons superiority may be discussed along two interrelated but distinct lines; platforms and weapons proper. In the case of the former, it has long been realized that the issue most affecting modern weapon platforms (be it the individual soldier or the main battle tank) is their overall deployability. As a largely expeditionary force, and one concerned with global power projection, the U.S.A. must ensure that their platforms can be rapidly transported, and effectively employed, in any one of a number of world regions. For this reason, the trend within this branch of weapons superiority is the design (or training) and fielding of lighter, faster, more stealthy and robust systems. Platforms, which incorporate these characteristics, it is felt, inherently lend themselves to rapid deployability, wider employment and increased lethality.
The second aspect of weapon's superiority relates to the characteristics of the weapons themselves. Once an enemy's vital assets have been located, all that presumably remains is to affect them to a desired level (suppress, neutralize or destroy). However, factors such as distance, collateral damage and force protection complicate the matter. The trend, therefore, has been towards the development of smart munitions. These weapons are generally characterized, in their present form, as having long ranges (thereby offering both the possibility to strike remote targets and enhance friendly force protection through stand-off) accuracy (through a number of guidance systems) and lethality. In their envisioned forms, though the characteristics remain unchanged, their nature and delivery may become radically different. Future(istic) armament such as direct energy weapons and various space-based munitions, however, remain mainly theoretical.  

**Technological Trend Integration**

While it can be said that trends are being actively followed, it must be born in mind that, as with all innovations developed in isolation (and often in competition) there are obstacles associated with integrating the various advances into a true 'system of systems'. The problem for the U.S.A. would appear to lie in the ability to tie the technology together. A larger armed force, a mix of effective but less technologically sophisticated weapons platforms with newer and emerging technologies and the requirement to operate jointly has created a great challenge:

"Traditional barriers between the services may need to be broken and policies revised. For example, loopholes that now...permit the services to develop C4I capabilities independently, with limited regard for integrating the needs of other services, may need to be eliminated. The C4I and ISR communities will both need to find ways, where practical, to integrate requirements and field integrated system capabilities. And computer resources that are part of weapons systems may need to be linked to the overall C4ISR network, requiring the development of new software policy, an area for which responsibility and oversight appear unnecessarily confusing."  

**Trends in Organizational Change**

As noted above, the fielding of lighter, more deployable weapons allows for an increased lethality. The corollary, then, is that a smaller sized fighting force should be able to achieve similar amounts of combat power and operate within an Area of Operations (AO), similar to that of a larger but less technologically advanced force. In this respect, the U.S.A. is moving towards this very concept with the implementation of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) concept. This brigade is comprised of a common fighting vehicle fleet (based upon the GM Diesel Corporation LAV III) armed with a full array of direct and indirect fire weapon systems. In-service C2ISR and ISTAR capabilities have also been included into the organization giving it substantially greater capabilities than that of existing brigade combat teams. The whole organization is rapidly transportable in smaller C-130 cargo aircraft and is antici-
pated to form the vanguard for major-threat theatre deployments. While the units have yet to be 'stood up' operationally, the vision as outlined by General Shinseki is clear:

'The interim brigades fill two primary purposes. One is to fill an operational requirement that exists today in our formation. And the second one is it's the vehicle for developing our doctrine, our organisations, our future requirements, not the least of which is growing training programs and leader development programs, so that before the end of this decade, when the objective force does arrive, that we've got the leadership in place to maximize the potential.'

Evident in the above statement is that this organization is, in fact, a trend and not an end state. While it will no doubt be of generally greater combat value than the light forces currently available for rapid deployment within the same timelines, there is less certainty about its existence/value in the long term. It would, therefore, seem valid to say that while the U.S.A. know what they want from their force, they do not know if the IBCT is it. However, this organization offers the U.S.A. the best opportunity to establish doctrine, which drives technology.

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**Trends in Doctrine**

Quite simply, doctrine, in the military sense, is the rules governing the way in which a force conducts operations at all levels. It is a codification both of what has historically worked and what is expected to work in the future. While it is true that the doctrine of the U.S.A. is continually being examined for relevance and updated to account for new security dimensions, it is far from making major forward leaps.

Unfortunately, operating within the U.S. RMA trends, there appears to be a certain amount of circularity. As an example (and any combination of trends will likely yield the same result) trends in information dominance have led to the requirement to acquire longer ranging, more precise weapons. Increased weapons superiority has enabled battlefield dominance. This, in turn has established the trend to organize smaller, more lethal forces. Finally, the reduction in the size of units implies larger areas of operation thereby highlighting the need for increased information gathering capabilities; and so on.

Again referring to General Shinseki's statement above, it is evident that today's equipment and organizations are, for the most part, driving tomorrow's doctrine. Notwithstanding, the mere fact that military theorists both in and outside of the armed forces of the U.S.A. are engaged in debate about such things as the RMA, non-linear battle, the less-dense battlefield and dominant maneuver, to name but a few, underscores the desire to advance doctrine beyond the pace of technology. Unfortunately such theories are not, of themselves, trends but rather educated conjecture. Moreover, if a trend can truly be said to exist within this area, it is found within the attempt of the U.S.A. to reverse the tendency of equipment driving doctrinal development.
Impact - General

As technology becomes more sophisticated so must those who operate, maintain and exploit it. Two major impacts are readily identifiable from the technology-based trends discussed above. First, the introduction of such advancements will require a surge, and likely sustained amount, of training specific to the technology. An increased level of sophistication will reinforce the notion of specialization within a given field. A greater burden will, therefore, be felt both by those responsible for recruiting suitable applicants and those responsible for instructing them. Secondly, there will be a knockon effect for everyone who is associated with these new technologies. While a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that firstorder decisions regarding the fielding of new weapons, for example, would require second and third order decisions concerning their sustainment.

Finally, through the examination of the organizational and doctrinal trends established by the U.S.A. in their pursuit of the RMA, two potential pitfalls have been identified. Primarily, it is the tendency for technology to drive organization and doctrine. However, as the pace of technological innovation increases, so too must the organizations that deal with it. The impact of such a situation is rapid and continuous change. The corollary is a lack of stability and, potentially, effectiveness. Clearly, then, changes associated with the RMA must be managed. Additionally, sub-organizations cannot be left to 'change' on their own. Such a situation will only confound the later attempts to tie capabilities together.

Impact - Cost

The RMA has attached to it a significant price. For the U.S.A. the vast majority of expense is incurred as a result of the necessity to fund the research and cover the developmental costs of emerging technologies. As may be imagined, the only trend of significance within this area is one of ever increasing expenditures. Taken in sum, the Department of Defence of the U.S.A. is currently devoting approximately 20 percent of its total budget to RMA technology; this compared to 15 percent spent on similar acquisitions in fiscal year 1985. In fiscal year 2000 total calculable expenditures for the RMA amounted to 54 billion U.S. dollars. Of note, these figures do not take into consideration the cost of 'cultural and doctrinal' change.

To be fair, it is exceedingly difficult to make a valid comparison based upon the expenditures of the U.S.A. In order to maintain the size, type and quality of forces demanded, both explicitly and implicitly, of the remaining super power a certain economy of scale must prevail. Moreover, if one wishes to be the leader in a field then one must be willing to foot the costs associated with innovation, trials and fielding. Finally, while it is easy to become fixated on the magnitude of the figures, it must also be born in mind that the potential envisioned pay-off, continued hegemony, is equally large.
Because the RMA has yet to be realized it is, perhaps, only possible to identify the trends within it. The front-runner in the race, the U.S.A., is advancing along several technologically based trends. These trends have, in turn, established organizational and doctrinal trends, which seek to take advantage of the existing and anticipated technology. All of this comes with an associated price. This chapter has examined the technological, organizational and doctrinal trends of the U.S.A. with a view to determining their overall impact.

**Capacity to Absorb The RMA**

At first glance, it is easy to assume that smaller states have little chance at maintaining pace with, or even following at a distance, the RMA. Therefore, having examined the RMA trends of the U.S.A., the question must now be answered; what is the capacity of other states to follow these trends or, put another way, what is their capacity to absorb the RMA? In order to adequately determine such an answer it is first necessary to establish factors against which such a capacity may be measured. This presents a certain amount of difficulty due to the novelty of this phenomenon.

As a fairly new concept, very little has been written on the specific parameters that would define a state’s ability to absorb the RMA. However, a sampling of the available literature, most notably that of Dickens and Lawlor indicates that the capacity to absorb military-technological advances can be examined under four broad factors: the technological dimension, the operational dimension, the organizational dimension and contextual criteria. It is self-evident that such factors are measurable only in a comparative manner. For this reason, this chapter will examine the notion of a given state’s capacity to absorb the RMA and will briefly highlight this concept using examples from the middle power state of Canada. It does so with the aim of highlighting the fact that the RMA is not dependent solely on a state’s size nor can it simply be purchased.

**Factors Defining Capacity to Absorb the RMA**

**The Technological Dimension**

Technological advance is, arguably, the centerpiece to the current RMA; although what specific type(s) is currently examinable, as discussed in the previous chapter, only in the form of trends and, indeed, will likely defy definition except in retrospect. Nonetheless, a state cannot advance militarily without possession and understanding of modern technologies. Though it may seem to be a simple case of purchasing innovation, it is held that states, which must do this, vice developing it internally, will not be able to use it to its maximum. This is due primarily to the notion that development leads to greater levels of understanding and, resultantly, an increased ability to refine the technology itself. Consequently, the technological factor is hinged upon a state’s ability either to afford to purchase, or preferably develop, technology consistent with RMA trends.
The Operational Dimension

Where military-technological deficiencies are known to exist or where procurement or development is ongoing, there remains a necessity to provide the framework in which the technology will be employed. While this in itself will not alleviate deficiencies, it does prepare the ground for their resolution. Specifically, a given state's military doctrine must recognize both technological deficiencies and potentials. This is especially true where the technology is currently in service either among allies or potential adversaries. Moreover, this doctrine should seek either to incorporate guidance for the use of new technology or, at least, allow for its eventual fielding.\(^4^3\) The operational factor, therefore, is based upon a state's ability to develop and implement doctrine, which incorporates RMA trends.

The Organizational Dimension

The attempt to implement any form of innovation will depend directly upon the will of the organization. In the case of a nation's armed force, this must refer both to the government and the military itself. In the case of the former, the political leadership must both demonstrate a will and dedicate resources. Given that this will occur (as any other possibility must result in failure) the military must implement innovation through its leadership, its force structure and its members.

Focusing specifically upon the military leadership, they must clearly affirm their commitment to innovation (most often accomplished through some form of official document). The force structure must be organized both to test and accept innovation (such concepts as battle-labs or committed research and development branches are examples). Finally, it is held that, in terms of membership, the level of professionalism, the size of a force, and the terms of conscription (if applicable) will all contribute to a state's ability to implement innovation.\(^4^4\) Therefore, the organizational factor details the existing mechanisms for implementing institutional change.

Contextual Criteria

A society which is technologically illiterate can not hope to have its military develop along RMA trends, however, any given state's level of technology is often dependant upon items which are only partially within its control. The final factor used in assessing a state's ability to absorb the RMA is based upon several societal-based criteria: industry, academia and civil-military relations.\(^4^5\)

The industrial sector serves as a contributor to technological advancement in two major ways; as a provider of goods which increase a society's technological literacy, thereby impacting directly upon the knowledge base of the military, and as an organization which seeks to profit from technology based sales to the military. A state's academia will have a major influence upon its ability to absorb the RMA insofar as they are involved in the theory, research and development of these trends. Indeed, it is assumed that the greater the interaction between a given state's military and its educational institutions, the greater the potential to ab-
sorb RMA trends should be. Finally, insofar as all other factors are concerned, there must be a minimum level of willingness on the part of society to have their military advance technologically. For this reason, the degree to which a state maintains favorable civil-military relations would seem to be indicative of their military's potential to incorporate innovation.\(^6\) In sum, the contextual factor seeks to assess those components of society, which will influence a military's ability to follow RMA trends.

**A Middle Power Example**

**Why Canada?**

To use any one state as a model for another, or an entire region, is to risk making false analogies. However, in the case where one is dealing with a topic of some novelty and, this, in the context of relatively 'new' states, it is useful to attempt to make comparisons. Canada shares several similarities with the Baltic States. Primarily, Canada has often been deemed as being undefendable because of the low population-to-landmass ratio. Additionally, the intentions of the respective governments vis-à-vis the employment of their state's armed forces are similar. That is to say, that beyond the defence of the sovereignty of the state, there is a real desire to make use of the military as a tool of foreign policy through such things as international disaster relief and peace-keeping/making operations. The Government has clearly indicated that Canada is to play an active and independent role in the world, and that it will give increased prominence to advancing human security in our foreign and defence policy.\(^7\)

However, as both Canada and the Baltic States can only (or choose to) afford to maintain a small armed force, both consistently face the possibility of being marginalized on the world stage. For these reasons, Canada has consistently sought a greater return for its defence investments. Though it is far from certain, the pursuit of the RMA may provide a potential solution to its problems. At first glance, it would appear that the same items, which Canada holds in common with the Baltic States, would also limit its capacity to absorb the RMA phenomena. To the contrary, these are precisely the items, which make the pursuit of this phenomenon all the more important.

**Technological Basis for the RMA**

Canada has a large technologically based industrial sector, which, among other things, specializes in information technology.\(^8\) Although its defence oriented industrial base is quite small compared to the U.S.A., it should be noted that international agreements allow these neighbors favorable access to each-others markets. As a result, Canada is not necessarily obliged to develop, in isolation, militarily technology. Notwithstanding, a significant amount of money is invested annually in Canada's research and development institutes; both military and civilian. The results of such research are of mutual benefit to both the military and civilian population.\(^9\)

**Operational Basis for the RMA**

The Canadian Armed Forces (CF) may be said to have a pragmatic, yet forward-
looking approach. While it is cognizant of the fact that it is far from being a military world leader, Canada is likewise aware of its goals and responsibilities both domestically and abroad. For that reason, its military has been charged with maintaining a doctrine that is valid and continuously reviewed. Capability ‘deficiencies’ within the CF do not necessarily limit doctrine. Emphasis is placed both upon current reality and future ambition. Generally, all levels of doctrine are reviewed based upon a standard cycle in order to ensure that an adequate pace is kept both with the doctrine of Canadian allies and to keep abreast of trends. Emerging concepts, those which are not yet proven or which have not been sufficiently investigated so as to be incorporated into official doctrine, or issues which are felt worthy of attention, are dealt with both by professional bodies and, where appropriate, in a widely distributed forum.

**Organizational Basis for the RMA**

As mentioned above, the Canadian Government can be said, in general terms, to view its armed forces not only as a means of protecting state sovereignty but also as a tool of foreign policy insofar as it aids in advancing both the will and values of the Canadian public abroad. As such, the goals and policies of the nation towards its defence establishment are enunciated periodically in a ‘white paper’. In turn, the military leadership provides guidance to the individual services for their progression.

In specific terms, the Canadian Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS) enunciates yearly his specific direction in a published document entitled ‘Defense Planning Guidance’. This document serves as guidance to the Service Chiefs for the prioritization of equipment purchases, training priorities and facility upgrades among other things.

Of perhaps the greatest importance, however, is the military leadership’s realization that rate of change within the military is increasing and that this, by its nature, is accompanied by an amount of uncertainty. Two specific organizational measures have been established to mitigate against this uncertainty. Primarily, direction in the form of a visionary publication known as ‘Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020’ has been published. This document seeks to provide, for all members of the CF ‘a roadmap on how best to implement Canada’s Defence Policy in light of current emerging defence challenges’.

Secondly, and of great value in an uncertain environment, the CF, as an institution continues to rely upon its ability to establish professionalism in depth. That is to say that it has mandated minimum training levels for its membership, set professional benchmarks, established incentives and enabling mechanisms for personal development and encouraged its members to openly debate military theory and concepts in a number of forums. Ultimately, it is believed that such actions will aid in facilitating institutional change.

**Contextual Basis for the RMA**

While, the industrial capacity has been touched upon previously, it should be noted that Canada cannot be said to be
characterized as having a significant defence industrial complex. Notwithstanding, that which does exist is very much involved in the high technology aspects of this industry. Moreover, this industry is well organized both as a lobby and an advisory body. However, of perhaps greater significance when speaking of Canada’s contextual factors for absorbing the RMA is the level to which academia are involved in the defence debate. To this end, it is beneficial to highlight two of several examples.

Primarily, at the strictly academic level, there exists a body known as the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS). The CISS provides the forum for, and is the vehicle to stimulate the research, study, analysis and discussion of the strategic implications of major national and international issues, events and trends as they affect Canada. This institute is held in high regard and is often asked to comment critically upon policy within the mass media. Secondly, best categorised as a policy group, there is the Conference of Defence Associations whose mandate is ‘...to contribute to beneficial defence policy and effective armed forces. It seeks to achieve this objective through a combination of advice to government and public information.’ Taken as a whole, it may be said that Canada has a well-developed academic basis for the absorption of the RMA.

However, if there is a major failing within Canada vis-à-vis the contextual factor, it lies in the present state of civil-military relations. Canada, though it has a long tradition of military service, has never placed a premium upon its armed forces. A lack of visibility within the day-to-day public and some significant incidents involving scandals both at the unit and individual level have, in recent times, led to erosion of public confidence. Resultantly, there has been a level of scrutiny applied to the Canadian Forces, which is without precedence.

The premise that small states are simply unable to follow the RMA is fallacious. In order to accept or refute such a notion, it is first necessary that the state(s) are examined in light of their capacity to absorb the trends of the RMA. For the purposes of this paper, this capacity has been examined under four factors: the technological dimension, the operational dimension, the organizational dimension and contextual criteria. Using the example of Canada, it has been demonstrated that a middle power, one that arguably shares some similar characteristics to the Baltic States, can have a high capacity to absorb the RMA. It is unfortunate that the factors and example outlined above are not more quantifiable. However, it is evident through the application of the Canadian example to the factors that it would indeed be a gross oversimplification to say that either the size of a state, its armed forces or their budget will be individually responsible for that state’s ability or inability to follow the RMA.

The Baltic States’ Capacity to Absorb the RMA

It is an easy thing to say that the RMA may hold the key for the Baltic States to attain a credible defence capability while assuring their relevance within the interna-
ational alliances. However, as it has been illustrated previously, this is a concept that cannot simply be purchased and, indeed, its pursuit is dependant upon a number of factors. In order to determine whether the pursuit of the RMA is a valid option for the Baltic States, it is first necessary to measure the states against these factors. This chapter will seek to determine the capacity of the Baltic States to absorb the RMA.

Technology in the Baltic States

The current level of technological innovation within the Baltic States must be viewed as low by Western standards. In fact, with the exception of Lithuania, this portion of industry is sufficiently small so as to not be accounted for as a percentage of national industry. That is not to say that this aspect is entirely absent, however, the reality is that having regained independence, the Baltic States found themselves in an economic zone, which was already highly technologically developed. A general inability to operate competitively in this environment, at least in the short term, would, therefore, seem to be a regional characteristic.

Notwithstanding the above, the Baltic States are very aware of this technological deficit and have each taken remarkable steps to reduce its impact and, indeed, have instituted some major technologically oriented policies. As an example, Estonia in 2000, declared access to the internet to be a human right. Resultantly, by the end of 2002, approximately 300 public access internet stations will be made available. Similarly, Latvia has in 2000, increased public funding for information technology education by 20% and is actively marketing itself as state in which expansion-minded high-tech industries should be interested. Finally, Lithuania, which boasts the regions most developed technology based industrial complex, has dedicated itself to building upon this foundation through government-sponsored incentives and an increased emphasis upon research and development.

The Baltic Operational Dimension

As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the operational factor seeks to detail a given state’s ability to develop and implement doctrine, which incorporates RMA trends. For all of the Baltic States this is problematic. Chapter Two highlighted the fact that the respective states’ armed forces restructuring process was focused upon structure over capability. Nowhere is this more evident then when one examines the Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) organizations. Though it is entirely understandable given the lack of organizational maturity and the enormity of the restructuring process, there does not appear to be anyone actively paying attention to future trends. Moreover, the state of current doctrine, that which the existing military is supposed to operate under, within each of the states is poor.

To illustrate concerns over future doctrine development, the Latvian Armed Forces’ TRADOC organization is planned, by 2005, to have under its full command two national-level academies and four training centres comprised of 15 distinct units/schools spanning the three services. Its responsibilities, aside
from those associated with the relationship of full command and training will presumably also include the development and implementation of doctrinal concepts. All of this is anticipated to be accomplished by 59 staff. To highlight issues concerning current doctrine, Estonia has taken as its starting point for operational level doctrine, the Baltic Defence College Operational Manual. This is a teaching manual, constantly under revision and represents the experiences and doctrine of a number of participant states, except the Baltic States.

The Organizational Dimension of the Baltic States

The political will to implement and dedicate resources to change may be viewed as a strong point within the Baltic States; although there is the potential for this to diminish. Currently, each of the Baltic States holds the goal of NATO membership as a part of national policy. The demands of this organization have been a primary force for initiating change within the respective armed forces. Additionally, each state’s government have accepted defence expenditures of two percent of GDP at least to the end of the restructuring period. Interestingly, no opposition parties within the Baltic States seem to have contrary policies within their platforms. Such unified political regard for National Defence is rare among Western (NATO allied) states. There is, however, a risk that either the attainment of membership within NATO or the finalization of the current military restructuring is, at least at the political level, seen as an end in itself. Beyond this point, the commitment of government to implementing and dedicating resources to change is, therefore, difficult to define.

Militarily, as each of the Baltic States are currently undergoing sweeping changes, it is likely that the leadership is both open and committed to continued innovation. Notwithstanding, similar to the above noted shortcomings within the respective TRADOC organisations, not one of the respective militaries currently have an organization dedicated to seeking innovation. There is however, a positive opportunity that exists in the present situation. Specifically, the Baltic States have a unique chance to move from their current structure to their planned end state over a relatively long timeframe. The proper study of this change, its mechanisms and problems may well afford them an insight that will make continued evolution considerably easier.

Some mention must be made of the likely challenges posed to institutional change by a conscript based system. Primarily, it would seem logical that the introduction of the type of technology envisioned by the RMA will require both initial and continuing training in order to maintain proficiencies. Likewise, changes in doctrine are accompanied by the necessity not only to instruct the force in these changes, but also to practice their application. Finally, fundamental organizational changes need to be transmitted, in a meaningful way, throughout the military in order to minimize confusion at all levels. The limited amount of training time for conscripts within the Baltic States, combined with underdeveloped
reserve force refresher training plans, only adds to the problem.

The Baltic Contextual Basis

The Baltic States appear to have a high contextual basis for absorbing the RMA. Despite the fact that there is not, generally speaking, a predominant technological industrial base, the Baltic States appear to have embraced information technology on a wide scale as has been noted earlier. In this case, governmental as well as non-technology producing industry, has filled the role normally ascribed to the technology sector. That is to say that these organisations are increasing their respective societies' technological literacy.

The role of the Academia within the Baltic States is, currently, underdeveloped. At present there does not appear to be a great deal of focused interaction between them and the military. Notwithstanding, all three states lay claim to several prestigious universities and/or higher technical institutes, each of which offer a full range of studies up to and including the doctoral level. If nothing else, then, this appears to offer the potential for academic-military co-operation.

Perhaps the most important contextual component within the Baltic States is the overall level of education of the population. As of 1998, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania respectively posted literacy rates of 100% (males 100%, females 100%), 100% (males 100%, females 98%) and 98% (males 99%, females 98%).

Finally, the willingness of the society to see their military advance technologically may be assessed as high throughout the Baltic States for three major reasons. Primarily, national militaries as one of the first institutions established following the Soviet Union withdrawal (and in some cases established to speed this process), enjoy a certain amount of prestige. Secondly, defence related issues have come naturally to the fore due to their importance within the Baltic States' national security goals. Finally, and perhaps somewhat ironically, the institution of conscripted service means that knowledge of the military and its associated concerns are not at arms length from the public.

Objectively speaking, when considering the Baltic States' capacity to absorb the RMA, there are several shortcomings. Specifically, the lack of a technology-oriented industrial base implies that the Baltic States will, in the near term, be forced to seek such products abroad. Perhaps the largest deficiency exists within the states' current inability to produce forward-looking doctrine at all levels. Presently, this is largely due to the lack of maturity and under-staffing of the various TRADOC organisations. There must equally be some concern over the lack of any specific organizations within the respective militaries dedicated to developing future concepts.

Any organization, which bases its defence primarily upon a conscript/reserve system can expect to experience difficulties in implementing innovation. This is primarily due to the requirement both for initial and continuing training for all hardware, doctrine or organizational changes that are to be introduced and the limited time which is available for refresher training of reserves. Lastly, it has
been noted that the role of the Academia vis-à-vis the military is currently underdeveloped.

It is not, however, all bad news. The Baltic States are, primarily due to the efforts of their individual governments, technologically literate societies. Moreover, there is a marked trend within each of the states not only to continue this trend but also to attract the type of industry that would bridge the technology gap noted above. That each of the states has established TRADOC, or similar, organizations is a step in the right direction and one must assume that their true roles will become better defined over time.

Of crucial importance is the support that the armed forces in the Baltic States enjoy both at the political and public level. Such support, though, needs to be nurtured in order to ensure its continuity. Finally, a well-developed education system within each of the states has ensured a well-educated population from which future service-members; policy makers and researchers may be drawn.

**Implications of the RMA for the Baltic States – Conclusions and Recommendations**

The Baltic States are currently undergoing a period of fundamental change within their respective armed forces. This reform is primarily aimed at ensuring a credible, affordable and sustainable defence structure. The driving force behind the restructuring within each of the states is their desire to ensure their security by receiving an invitation to join NATO. It would appear, however, that these reorganizations are largely concerned more with structure than capability. Resultantly, there is some questions as to whether the goal of achieving a credible defence capability will be achieved. Beyond this, the commitment of each of the Baltic States to join NATO, and indeed any other international organization with a defence commitment, carries with it the burden of remaining militarily interoperable. The fact that organizations change is a given one. Within the militaries of the Western World, the trend is to achieve increased capability through the development and fielding of advanced military technology, which is embodied within the concept of the RMA.

The front-runner in the race, the U.S.A., is advancing along several technologically based trends. It is conceivable that anticipated developments in technology leading to the fusion of information dominance, battle space dominance and weapons superiority may serve as the catalyst for an RMA. These trends have, in turn, established organizational and doctrinal trends, which seek to take advantage of the existing and anticipated technology. All of this comes with an associated price. However, such technology does not currently exist nor is it likely to be developed in the very near future. Notwithstanding, the willingness both of the U.S.A. and other middle powers to actively pursue the RMA has ramifications for the entirety of the armies of the Western World. Those states who are allied, or aspire to be allied, with such states but who either choose not to, or are otherwise
unwilling to, enter into the RMA will find themselves at an increasing disadvantage.

While it may seem that small states are unable to follow the RMA, such a notion is fallacious. The ability of any state to absorb the trends of the RMA is based upon four factors: the technological dimension, the operational dimension, the organizational dimension and contextual criteria. It is unfortunate that the factors are not more quantifiable, however, using the example of Canada, it has been demonstrated that a small state, one which arguably shares some similar characteristics to the Baltic States, can have a high capacity to absorb the RMA despite the individual shortcomings in either the size of a state, its armed forces or their budget.

This pursuit of the RMA holds a dual potential for the Baltic States. That is to say that while a failure to follow its trends will likely result in a decreased level of interoperability (and therefore importance/usefulness within alliances) the pursuit of the revolution in military affairs will likely not only maintain the Baltic State’s level of interoperability but, more importantly, may also negate the arguments concerning the credibility of their defence capability.

Objectively speaking, when considering the Baltic States’ capacity to absorb the RMA, there are several shortcomings. Specifically, these deficiencies include: the lack of a technology-oriented industrial base; the states’ current inability to produce forward-looking doctrine; the lack of any specific organizations within the respective militaries dedicated to developing future concepts; a defence based primarily upon a conscript/reserve system and the associated limited time which is available for their refresher training; and the underdeveloped role of the Academia vis-à-vis the military.

That is not to say, however, that the Baltic States are in an overly poor position to absorb the RMA. Primarily due to the efforts of their individual governments, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania each have a technologically literate society. Moreover, there is a marked trend within each of these states not only to continue this trend but also to attract the type of industry that could bridge the technology gap noted above. Each of the states has established a TRADOC, or similar, organization and this is a step in the right direction. Also, the support that the Baltic Militaries enjoy both at the political and public level is advantageous. Finally, the well-developed education system within each of the states ensures a well-educated population from which future servicemembers; policy makers and researchers may be drawn.

Ultimately, it will require a conscious decision on the part of both the military and their political masters to pursue the RMA. The impetus for such a decision should come about through the desire of each of the states not only to gain or ensure a credible defence but also to maintain their continued relevance within international alliances. That the Baltic States have a solid base upon which to absorb the RMA has been outlined earlier. Resultantly, the recommendations outlined will only deal with the noted deficiencies.

In the short term, the Baltic States have little choice but to seek technological in-
novation abroad. There are both benefits and drawbacks to such a necessity. Though the purchase of "off the shelf" technology normally comes at a reduced cost as compared to its deliberate research and development, there are few ancillary benefits. That is to say that it is generally assumed that research and development in pursuit of technology consistent with the RMA will result in spin-off technology of benefit to both the military and other sectors of society.

In the final analysis, then, any recommendation dealing with technology in the context of the Baltic States must deal with finances. Since all states have dedicated themselves to committing two percent of GDP to defence related spending, the purchase of technology is theoretically feasible. Notwithstanding that the Baltic States have a good deal of initial infrastructure and basic armament costs, this is a finite situation. Given that the economies of the respective states remain healthy, and that infrastructure initiatives do not significantly surpass their timelines, there should, beyond the planned time for restructure be a significant amount of funds available to invest in RMA technology.

There is, however, a risk that the support of dedicated funding as a percentage of GDP beyond the completion of restructure and/or the attainment of the policy goal of alliance memberships will evaporate in favour of other types of spending. The logical recommendation then is for the military to strive to maintain or increase their current level of support. Accordingly, the respective militaries should seek to increase both their visibility and image and thereby both their support and perceived value throughout all parts of society.

The importance of having an effective doctrine cannot be overstated as it is both which will not only guide training, but its effectiveness will, ultimately, contribute to the effectiveness of an armed force. Doctrine is in a state of continuous evolution and, as such, some organization must have responsibility both to produce it and also to monitor its change. That each of the Baltic States has either a TRADOC or an organization responsible for doctrine is encouraging. However, it is believed that in order for such organizations to be truly effective in the manner intended by RMA trends, a more clear delineation of responsibilities must take place. If, for example, a military's TRADOC is to be responsible to command units and schools, it must be staffed in an appropriate manner.

Moreover, doctrine must be made to take the long view; both to consider trends and debate their use and validity. It is, therefore, recommended that a dedicated 'future concepts' cell be formed within each TRADOC, or equal, organization. It is important, in the case of the RMA, which the debate concerning its concepts and implementation take on a forces-wide approach. This serves the dual purpose both of education and introduction. There is also the ancillary benefit of polling opinion and refinement of concept. There are a number of ways in which to accomplish such a task. One of the more popular approaches is to establish an armed forces-level professional publication,
which both seeks out scholarly works and engenders debate on the various topics. Another possible option is to establish regular conferences, at various levels, concerning such subjects.

It is currently assessed by each of the Baltic States that a system based upon conscription is necessary to establish a credible defence capacity. While this has some benefits, it likewise causes some difficulties. Ultimately, each of the respective states will amass a large pool of militarily trained people, but training them to use and adapt to technology and doctrine consistent with the RMA will likely take more time than is currently feasible for refresher training. Moreover, there will be an associated cost, which, as the amount of trained and available persons increases, will increase over time.

One possible solution is to opt for a mixture of high and low technology forces. The obvious choice would be to pursue and implement the RMA to its maximum extent within that portion of the forces which serves on a professional basis and rely primarily upon the reserves to fulfill the low-tech role. This is a logical recommendation as it is the professional portion of the respective armed forces that will be used to fulfill the international obligations of alliance membership. Issues of interoperability, as regards RMA trends of other member states, will, therefore, be focused for the main part upon a limited portion of the armed forces. One other possible resolution to the issue is the complete professionalisation of the armed forces. Such a measure will, however, have far-reaching implications not the least of which concerns the issue of finances.

The academia represents a great resource both in engendering debate concerning the RMA and researching its various aspects. This resource is all the more valuable insofar as it has the ability to remain free from the pressure and bias normally associated with bodies that have a vested interest in defence matters. To incorporate this resource, a number of options are possible. At the national level, it is conceivable that an organization of ‘defence associates’ can be implemented. This should be a relatively inexpensive option as it merely entails seeking out academics willing to dedicate time to issues concerning defence. Offering them a forum to air their opinions should prove equally beneficial to all concerned.

Another possible option is to offer scholarships or bursaries, at appropriate levels of study, in return for work which will further the understanding of the aspects of the RMA. There is, within this option, the additional benefit that specialization in such topics will likely produce continued related products.

Finally, each of the Baltic States has a share in an untapped wealth at the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL). Each year, students are required to produce scholarly works as a condition of their qualification. It would seem both logical and appropriate that the Baltic States submit a list of topics that they would like researched to the BALTDEFCOL in order that the students may conduct their investigation. As the BALTDEFCOL maintains a number of subject-matter experts, the quality of student work is easily
judged and, therefore, should be of substantial use to the respective states.

The Baltic States face a number of obstacles in their desire to attain/maintain a credible level of defence while entering into international security arrangements. As this represents significant, sweeping, change it is only natural that there is a tendency to be myopic. What must be realized is that the Western World is pursuing defence capability concepts, specifically the RMA, that will have far-reaching consequences for the international defence organizations to which they belong and, resultantly, for the other members of their alliances. It is a cliché to say that change is inevitable but it is, nonetheless, a truism. Failure to enter into the RMA will have far-reaching consequences for the Baltic States, not the least of which will be a diminishing of defence capability and the possibility of being marginalized both militarily and politically within a given international alliance.

The RMA is not the sole domain of the U.S.A. nor of regional hegemons. Rather it is a concept which has the potential to benefit both small, medium and large states alike. The Baltic States have an opportunity to take advantage of the benefits of the RMA given that they implement a number measures that have been previously outlined. The gains which will be realized in pursuing the RMA cannot easily be quantified; equally, the consequences of avoiding this trend appear grave.

10 Currently, with the exception of war-stock ammunition, averaging along the year 2006.

17 While McCabe advocates three facets of the RMA; information superiority, battle space dominance and weapons superiority, others, such as Per Nilsson (From Brute Force to Brainpower) adds a fourth item; a co-operating system of systems to denote the idea of integrating the separate components.


Ibid. p 32.


22 See, for example, Canadian Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts: http://armyapp.dnd.ca/dsdc-scot/ain.asp or Nilsson, Per. From Brute Force to Brainpower.


24 Ibid.


27 As of December 2001, the U.S. was reported to have Predator UAVs with the ability not only to observe targets but also to laser designate. Moreover, as of the time of writing, two such UAVs operating within Afghanistan have been armed with Hellfire air-to-ground missiles. Barry, J., A New Breed Of Soldier, Newsweek. 03 December 2001. www.msnbc.com/news/666232.asp.


29 Ibid.


31 The LAV III is an 8X8 armoured personnel carrier based upon the MOWAG Piranha family of vehicles.


33 Ibid.


35 This concept deals with the theory that modern warfare will be conducted across all dimensions, throughout the spectrum of conflict and along no fixed lines simultaneously. See, for example, Echevarria, A. Optimising Chaos on the Non-Linear Battlefield, www.cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/sept097/echevarria.htm.

36 An emerging concept which theorises that, among other things, force can be projected and battles fought independent of conventional lines of communication.

37 The theory which postulates that at all levels of war manoeuvre can be conducted in terms of mass effects and not necessarily massed forces.


40 This line of thought and the basic factors listed, while modified, are based upon Lawlor, P.J.
51 The CF, as a whole maintains a CF level as well as individual service level organizations dedicated to future concepts. As an example, within the Land Force, the Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTLS) maintains a Department of Land Strategic Concepts, Army Lessons Learned Centre etc. See for example: http://armyapp.dnd.ca/lf/dtls/main.asp?lang=E. 06 March 2002.

52 The last version, 'Challenge and Commitment' was published in 1994. For complete transcript, please see: www.dnd.ca/eng/min/reports/94wpepaper/white_paper_94.html. 06 March 2002.


56 Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. www.ciss.ca. 11 March 2002.


58 Major economic sectors for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, respectively, are: oil shale, shipbuilding, phosphates, electric motors, excavators, cement, furniture, clothing, textiles, paper, shoes, apparel, buses, vans, street and railroad cars, synthetic fibres, agricultural machinery, fertilizers, washing machines, radios, electronics, pharmaceuticals, processed foods, textiles; and metal-cutting machine tools, electric motors, television sets, refrigerators and freezers, petroleum refining, shipbuilding (small ships), furniture making, textiles, food processing, fertilizers, agricultural machinery, optical equipment, electronic components, computers, amber. CIA World Fact Book (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) 2000. www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/el.htm. 02 April 2002.


64 Ibid footnotes 2, 3, and 4.

65 See, for example,

The purpose of this article is to discuss the current status of engineering at the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) in the context of the engineering tasks when a battalion sized unit is deployed on a Peace Support Operation (PSO) in general. The experiences of Sweden and Finland in Kosovo will be used to demonstrate how this experience can be incorporated into training and equipping the BALTBAT and thus to be more widely used in developing the armed forces of the three Baltic States.

BALTBAT is a combined infantry battalion of the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) with a total strength of 666 persons and being prepared for the PSOs, mounted and led by the United Nations (UN) or other international organizations (composition of the BALTBAT is detailed in Chart 1). Personnel for the BALTBAT are recruited on a voluntary basis (contract for two years) from the conscripts of all Baltic States. The command language is English. Training is conducted in accordance with NATO standards.¹

Engineering support in UN peacekeeping and other operations is provided in two separate ways. These are General Engineering Support Service and Field Engineering. The main focus of General Engineering Support Service is on planning, design, construction and maintenance of buildings and also physical infrastructure, operation of utility plants and provision of fire protection, geographic support and environmental protection. Field Engineering is focused mainly on “combat engineering” tasks such as mine verification, mine clearing and other breaching operations in the PSO area.² This separa-

¹ Major Jyrki Raunio of the Finnish Defence Forces is a graduate of the Senior Staff Course, Class 2001/2002, of the Baltic Defence College
tion of tasks is suited for planning and execution of engineering tasks at the PSO headquarters (HQ) level, but when we are talking about one PSO unit (battalion) it is more appropriate to put both sets of tasks under a common title ‘engineering tasks’.

The basic engineering tasks needed in the PSOs are:

1. Vertical engineering tasks
2. Horizontal engineering tasks,
3. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD),
4. NBC protection,
5. Fire Protection,
6. Snow and Ice Clearance (SNIC),
7. Water purification.

Vertical engineering includes building and maintaining roads, bridges and streets. Horizontal engineering means building accommodation and other buildings plus Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC), electrical works (including generators), protective installations (shelters, protective walls [Hesco or FlexMac type], fences, concertina, etc.), and also maintenance works for existing buildings. EOD tasks include site and road reconnaissance, clearing mines and explosives, mine awareness training, and monitoring local mine clearing. NBC protection tasks are NBC reconnaissance and NBC watch. Fire protection tasks are fire prevention
and extinguishing fires (fire brigade work). Snow and ice clearance tasks are snow and ice clearance from roads and fields and also from roofs of the buildings. The purpose of water purification is to have pure drinking water and water for food preparation.

### Engineering in Peace Support Operations – Tasks and Experiences

This part will address thoroughly the engineering tasks which are an integral part of any PSO with the aim of demonstrating the complexity of the issue and challenges to be met by any state preparing to make military contribution to the peace support effort. These tasks and challenges have to be born in mind when developing the BALTBAT, therefore this part lays ground for the assessment of the BALTBAT engineering capabilities and recommendations on how this area needs to be improved to achieve a success of the project.

The very first area where engineering comes into play is force protection. The overall aim of force protection (security) is to ensure the credibility of the PSOs. There are three phases of threat evaluation against the PSO personnel: a primary threat - directed towards the PSO and the conditions prevailing at the location, a secondary threat - directed towards a home state, and a physical threat - directed towards the PSO personnel. These threats must be evaluated prior to the deployment. The unit Chief Engineering Officer (CEO) must be an integral part of the element which is conducting this evaluation because many of these threats can be minimized by adequate engineering works. As far as vertical engineering is concerned, the priority should be given to the protective constructions: shelters, protective walls (main brands are Hesco Bastion and Flexmac), gun positions, fighting positions and protected guard positions. Each person should have 1.5 m² space allocated within a shelter and the protective value of the shelter should be against a direct hit of a 155 mm high explosive (HE) shell (UN standard). Secondly, general engineering encompasses those engineer tasks, which increase the mobility, survivability, and sustainability of tactical and logistical units in the operational area. Such tasks include construction and repair of lines of communication (LOC), main supply routes (MSR) and patrol routes, airfields, and logistical facilities. Repair tasks dominate in well-developed PSO areas. Construction tasks prevail in less-developed PSO areas. Many PSOs will have difficulties especially during the deployment phase due to destroyed, inadequate or non-existing LOCs, MSRs, seaports, airfields, heliports and logistical facilities. The minimum requirement for mobility varies depending on the operational tasks and size of the units and required national support (self sufficiency). The general engineering capabilities must focus on the basic needs of the troops and support personnel deployed to the operations area. In the UN missions, the engineering support initially relies on national contingents being self-sufficient at a unit level for a given period, normally 60 – 180 days.
Depending on the general situation, military units are deployed with the needed engineering support to develop their respective areas of responsibility. During the PSOs, engineers must be prepared to execute tasks covering the full range of engineering functions. At unit level this will mainly concentrate on mobility, force protection and accommodation. However, the planners should consider all engineer capabilities available, such as multinational forces, contractors, and troop units (including reserve components). The latter requires longer reaction time from active component engineers. Planners always consider the specific capability and availability of the units when building the force, along with facilities available for leasing and infrastructure. In the multinational environment it is an imperative that all national engineering assets are counted jointly. In this process, interoperability has to be considered to ensure that assets are complementary, if not compatible. Engineer planners must also consider personnel or material assets available through contracts, local sources, and private agencies. Engineer operations require large amounts of construction materials, which can be acquired locally and regionally (that is from third parties) or have to be brought from the home state. These materials can be obtained through military supply channels or by contract. In this respect, engineers identify, prioritize, and execute requisition of the required construction material in accordance with the acquisition regulations. Supply units process the requisition, and acquire, receive, store, and transport construction materials.

Intelligence analysis considers the legal impact of the mandate, Terms of Reference (TOR), geographic boundaries, and other limitations both upon the PSO and the belligerent forces. They identify existing and traditional infrastructures. In an unfamiliar environment, analysts should assess other features such as small villages, nomadic camp sites, food sources and food distribution points established by civilian relief organizations, water sources (ground, surface or artesian wells), guard shacks and towers, perimeter fences, surveillance cameras or other warning devices, animal grazing sites, religious monuments, cemeteries, local places of worship, hospitals, boat ramps, local gas stations, and telephone exchanges. In essence, they should analyze the environment to the smallest possible detail. Other factors related to engineering that should be analyzed are: available transportation (dump trucks, heavy engineering equipment and trucks suitable for transporting it), demographics, status of utilities, warehouse storage, and so on. Analysts identify the best case and worst-case time lines of the operation. They consider the effects of weather on mobility, traffic ability, and visibility. The environment may also pose threats to the health of both mission and host nation (HN) personnel.

Where possible, HN capabilities should be identified as soon as possible during the planning phase. Civil affairs personnel play a key role in HN interface. They also assist in establishing procedures for obtaining host nation support (HNS). In many parts of the world, HNS, and capabilities may be limited to providing con-
struction materials. It is important to tap HN regional expertise early in the preparation phase. Contract labour may be available for use in the operational area. If it is available and the usage of local labour is cost effective the usage should be coordinated not only within the PSO unit but also between other contingents (PSO units) and one person in the unit HQ should do it. This person should be located within the S4-branch. Use of contract labour frees engineer troop units to concentrate on their core tasks thus reducing the engineer force structure requirements within the operational area.11

Because engineering factors affect all aspects of the PSO operational success, great emphasis must be placed on engineering reconnaissance. Thorough and timely engineering reconnaissance will give answers to many questions, not only engineering, but also answers to operational questions. This is why engineers should participate in the planning of any new PSO and in the planning of the deployment of any PSO unit. This requires a wide range of engineering expertise from the CEO of the PSO unit, who should have previous peacekeeping experience.

Training and preparation for the PSOs should not detract from a unit’s primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat. The first and foremost requirement for a success in the PSOs is a successful application of war fighting skills. The PSOs are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task compared to national military tasks. However, units selected for the PSO duties require time to train and prepare for a significant number of tasks that may be different from their wartime tasks. The amount of training required and when the training is given will depend on a particular PSO.12 The time required to train units selected for the PSOs varies according to the complexity of the mission and unit. For planning purposes, units require from four to six weeks of specialized training. To be effective, the unit has to tailor its entire training methodology to the formulated tasks. The unit-training programme will depend on whether the primary mission is peacekeeping (PK) or peace-enforcement (PE).13 This was the lesson-learnt in Finland from the 30 years of experience of participating in different peacekeeping missions. There should be one training centre for personnel and units assigned to the PSOs. Although all personnel or sub-units are not trained in such a training centre, it should have the co-ordinating authority over all training matters. It should handle all personnel and co-ordinate logistical assets and tasks (i.e. how to support unit in the PSO operational area).14 All this is applicable to training the engineering personnel of the PSO units as well as introducing other personnel to the engineering tasks and their execution.

Leader development may be the single most important factor in achieving success. The PSOs require skill, imagination, flexibility, adaptability, and patience. This is extremely important for engineering in the PSOs. The PSOs are usually mounted in places where resources might be scarce. This places demands on engineer leaders. Emphasis during training must be placed
on developing these leadership skills, as well as knowledge of the cultures. Individual training for the PSO duties should emphasize the personal characteristics of patience, flexibility, self-discipline, professionalism, impartiality, tact, and inquisitiveness. These characteristics have connotations that may be unique in a PSO environment.\textsuperscript{15}

During normal peacetime training for a planned PSO, especially prior to the deployment to the PSO areas, it is important to include general engineering subjects within the training topics. These engineering subjects are: mine awareness training, construction works/engineering works, NBC protection and fire fighting. This training is for the whole PSO unit, and every soldier should take part in this training, especially in mine awareness training.\textsuperscript{16} Engineering training should concentrate on the EOD tasks, how to use the EOD equipment and mines and to handle Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) in the PSO operational area as well as on cooperation with support elements. In vertical and horizontal engineering, training should concentrate on the use of new construction equipment and heavy engineering equipment (HEE).

Basic peacekeeping training should not concentrate on operational matters, but it should be divided so that each special branch can train their own topics. It is important that different engineers will have their own special training. Although basic training to the EOD personnel should be conducted before basic peacekeeping training, it is important that their skills will be updated and they will be taught how to accomplish the EOD tasks in such a special environment as the PSOs. Also, the NBC personnel and fire fighting personnel need to be trained to work in a PSO environment and they should be cross-trained to some extent. Although construction engineers should have a good basic technical education and work experience, they should also be trained to execute the basic constructional tasks in the PSOs, especially erecting accommodation facilities, electrifying camp areas and renovating and maintaining the existing buildings. One good opportunity to train the construction engineer-

Training will not end, however, when the unit is deployed into its PSO operational area. Individual and unit skills and procedures must be exercised all the time. This is very important for the EOD personnel because they must, at all times be updated about the mines and UXOs that have been used in the operational area. Operational tasks and the way they are conducted must be encompassed in the rotation training, i.e. training of the replacement personnel. This requires close co-operation between peacekeeping unit in the field and the training centre at the home state. To add to the rotation training, a comprehensive lesson-learnt system must be developed and adopted as a part of everyday tactical activities.\textsuperscript{17} The rigorous conditions of the PSOs and demanding tasks constitute a challenge to
the individual qualities and skills, especially in engineering. Not only the EOD personnel, but also construction engineers, NBC personnel and fire fighters must be trained and they must have some work experience before entering into a PSO. This is extremely well applicable to a new PSO, where everything must be prepared and built up from scratch.

Engineering logistics is an important factor that should be given a high priority during general engineering planning. Especially during preliminary engineering planning engineering logistical issues should be kept in mind. Also, engineering logistical questions should be answered during the engineering reconnaissance to a future operational area. In different engineering topics of the PSO, the main engineering logistical factors are the HEE, explosives, EOD (equipment and materiel), generators, water purification equipment, NBC equipment, fire fighting equipment, defensive store materiel and construction material (amount needed, acquisition, transportation and re-supplying). Because this materiel is specific there is a need for an officer who is specialized in engineering logistical issues within the S4-branch. This officer must possess a good knowledge not only about construction engineering, materiel and equipment, but also in combat engineering equipment and materiel.

The experience of the Swedish Battalion (SWEBAT) in Kosovo has proven that it was a correct decision to send the whole engineering company as a part of the SWEBAT to Kosovo, because the engineering tasks that the battalion faced, mainly the EOD and vertical engineering tasks, occupied the company more than enough. The biggest hindrance to company’s ability to conduct its tasks has been a poor knowledge of the capabilities of what the company can do and how it should execute the tasks assigned to it. Also a lack of materiel has hindered the company in accomplishing its tasks, the biggest absence having been the lack of the EOD materiel, especially explosives. This means that more emphasis must be placed at the HQ level to the engineering planning and logistics so that the engineers have the necessary tools and equipment to pursue the tasks assigned to them. This requires foresight in engineering logistics, because the lead-time for logistics is increased for many reasons in the PSOs.¹⁸

To be able to conduct their tactical tasks in the best possible way, it is important that the PSO unit has all the needed infrastructure as soon as possible and that this infrastructure is well maintained in the future. These construction works have to be prioritised and this requires that the unit makes a construction plan. This construction plan must be attached to other engineering plans, such as mine clearing, NBC preparations and horizontal engineering works. This combined plan could be called the Engineering Plan (ENGPLAN). These plans should also include places where different construction material can be acquired. As early as possible a registry of all civilian engineering skills that the personnel in the units possess should be made. This registry will help the engineer leadership to make and execute their plan.¹⁹

Talking about the vital infrastructure, accommodation facilities emerge as one
Table 1: Development of facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTRUCTION</th>
<th>INITIAL</th>
<th>TEMPORARY</th>
<th>SEMI TO PERMANENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site preparation</td>
<td>Clearing and grading for buildings and works, including drainage and soil stabilization</td>
<td>Engineering site preparation, including pavement and building foundations</td>
<td>Installed equipment such as permanent water, power systems (new or repaired)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing, Dining, Administration</td>
<td>Canvas (tents may have wooden framing and floors)</td>
<td>Wood frame structures, movable structures (e.g. containers) and shelters</td>
<td>Wood, brick or container structures including shelters/bunkers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission structures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>Organic equipment, evaporative ponds, pit or burnout latrines, lagoons for hospitals and sewage lift stations</td>
<td>Waterborne to treatment facilities, priority; hospitals, kitchens, bathhouse and decontamination stations</td>
<td>Waterborne to living quarters and other facilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main issues. The UN has laid down some general guidelines for accommodation and other facilities/utilities in the PSOs. Requirements for accommodation may vary substantially depending on geography, climate, HNS, infrastructure and the facilities of contributing states, material and services. The UN has set up some construction standards, which have to be adapted to the specific circumstances of an individual PSO. Also, depending on the national requirements and will to invest in high living standards at the beginning of the PSO, these standards must be adapted. Below is a table that shows how different accommodation related facilities should be developed over time.

PSO troop concentrations generate a need for sewage and waste (liquid and solid) collection and treatment. Installed facilities in the PSO operational areas usually have their own waste water systems but they might not be operational or their capacity may be limited due to technical malfunctions. These systems should be operated and maintained by qualified personnel. PSO units must be prepared to use field sewage facilities for quite a long period.

In establishing the infrastructure for the PSO unit at the operational area, power supply is a part of the engineering responsibilities. Having electric power in needed facilities and utilities is essential for the unit to be able to conduct and support any operations. The PSO unit installations should be well illuminated both inside and outside (the perimeter) at all times for the security/safety reasons. Therefore power supplies must be reliable.
Usually the local power supply nets in the PSO operational areas are out of order or working only partially (current fluctuation and prolonged power blackouts). Therefore, the unit should be self-sufficient regarding electrical power, even when there is a possibility of relying on local power supply. Consequently, diesel generators of different size should be installed and made ready as a back-up. As a basis for calculating the power needs, a 1 kVA (kilo volt ampere) per person norm should be used, plus 10% extra as a reserve (the UN standard). This means that if the total amount of the personnel is 666 (as in the BALTBAT), the total requirement for electrical power is 736 kVA. A unit should have different sizes of generators to be able to meet different operational requirements. All generators should be diesel powered and suited for the NATO F-34 single fuel concept. Maintaining a generator needs some skill, so all the personnel who will be responsible for generators should be trained beforehand.

The first priority for heating is troop accommodations and the second priority is offices, dining rooms and hospitals. Electric heaters should be avoided to minimize generator load and thus minimize overall operational costs. If a PSO unit is deployed to an area of a rigid climate, this should be taken into consideration during the planning phase. Types of heating equipment should be carefully planned before. The following factors should be examined: climatic conditions in the PSO area throughout the year, general type of a heater, needed fuel (type and consumption), spare parts, ease of maintenance and fire protection. The PSO unit should have the basic load of heaters before deployment during training period to gain expertise how to use and maintain them. In some areas of the world more emphasis must be placed on air conditioning than heating. The first priority for air conditioning equipment is hospitals, offices, communication (radio) rooms; the second priority is dining rooms and troop accommodations. Cooling and refrigeration of food is essential in all PSOs. The size and amount of coolers, refrigerators and freezers should be counted before the deployment so that they can hold provisions for seven days. Also the power supply for this equipment should be considered. A multi-powered (gas/diesel plus electricity) equipment gives some leeway for power consumption and supply. The power consumption of air conditioning equipment, refrigerators and freezers should be considered when calculating requirements.

The PSOs often take place in states that have undergone significant turmoil and internal strife, so the environmental protection usually has a very low priority on their national agenda. This does not give a carte blanche for the PSO units and personnel to ignore this issue. On the contrary, they have a special obligation to act responsibly towards the environment of the HN. Environmental protection matters should be incorporated into the planning and training, and the unit should have an environmental protection plan before deployment as well as be equipped adequately so that it can meet the require-
ments of this plan. This plan must be a part of the ENGPLAN. For accommodation and other related purposes the Finnish Battalion (FINBAT) in Kosovo has used different concepts. Main accommodation and office concepts are based on the 20 ft (6 m) container configuration. It is either one 20 ft insulated and heated container that has 15 m² floor space or a “folding” container which forms 45 m² of levelled floor space when folded and, when unfolded, it forms one 20 ft container and has all needed fixtures inside. It can be furnished for different purposes. In the FINBAT, they have this type of container furnished as accommodations, office, kitchen/dining, sauna, laundrette and recreation facilities. Depending upon the included furnishing, it takes 2-6 hours from the placement of this container before it can be used.

The Swedes have produced a study concerning the costs of different accommodation alternatives for a 1000-person peacekeeping unit. In that study one of the basic assumptions was that the unit would be deployed to three camps: one 700-person base camp and two 150-person company camps. Four accommodation alternatives have been looked into: a tent based, container based (based on the 20 ft ISO container module), buildings constructed on site and the type ‘Kosovo’ (a mixture of tents, containers and buildings constructed on site). The study concluded to recommend tent or container accommodation as a basic solution to provide accommodation and related facilities to the PSO units. The tent alternative is more recommendable if the duration of the PSO is short, the climatic conditions are not demanding and/or the transport conditions in the PSO operational area are difficult. The container alternative is recommendable if the duration of the PSO is considered to be long (several years), climatic conditions are demanding (long cold or hot/humid periods). Other factor that might also dictate which alternative should be used is the financial one. In the study the cost of the tent accommodation alternative was 220 million Swedish Kroner (SEK) and the cost of the container accommodation alternative was 346 million SEK. These figures do not include transportation costs.

In horizontal engineering, engineers plan, design, and construct airfields, heliports, and roads in the area of operation (AOO). To ensure these facilities meet proposed requirements, the responsible engineer officer must co-ordinate closely with all appropriate commanders and units. The engineer depends on information about the weight and traffic frequency of using the terrain, facility life, geographic boundaries governing site selection, and the time available for construction as dictated by the operational plan. Detailed planning, reconnaissance, and site investigations are often limited by the lack of time, distance to the operational area and by the tactical situation. However, when time and security permit, the engineers should conduct normal ground reconnaissance and on-site investigations. If this is not possible, they should obtain photographs of the area.

When planning horizontal engineering works engineers usually use the following guidelines;
• Keep designs simple. Simple designs require minimum skilled labour and specialized materials and equipment;
• Use local materials whenever possible. This helps to eliminate construction delays associated with long LOCs and logistics;
• Use existing facilities whenever possible. This helps to avoid unnecessary construction;
• Remember safety factors in design, although time and the operational security risks may place some constraints;
• Build one of the two types of structures - initial or temporary. Initial design life is up to six months; temporary design life is up to two years;
• Whenever possible, phase construction to permit the early usage of the facility while further construction and improvements continue;
• Generally avoid sites with that require heavy clearing or grading;
• Take care to prevent destruction of natural drainage channels, culverts, and roads. Repairs require time and labour far exceeding that needed to prevent damage.  

After the specific requirements for campsites, roads, airfields and heliports have been determined, engineers should prepare the facilities for use as soon as possible. In most cases, the need is critical because the accomplishment of a mission depends on using certain airfields and roads. To obtain these facilities quickly, an adequate investigation of each site and a careful study of the design details are essential.

The PSO mission of the engineer troops can be so extensive and the demand for their services so great that new construction should be avoided, especially with limited engineering assets. Extensive road nets of varying quality and capacity already exist in most areas of the world. Where possible, use these road nets to the fullest extent. In many cases, expansion and rehabilitation of existing facilities is adequate for mission accomplishment.

In either case, it is crucial that the engineers possess the necessary tools, such as the HEE, to fulfill their mission. The HEE used for horizontal engineering are dozers, graders, backhoe loader, excavator and air compressors. There is also a need to transport soil and the HEE, which raises the requirement for hauling equipment. The most common hauling equipment used for construction work is the 5 and 20-ton dump trucks, both of which are organic to most engineer units. Equipment trailers are used to transport heavy construction equipment not designed for cross-country travel. They are also used to haul long, oversize items and packaged items. Composition of the HEE (types and amounts) in each unit should be detailed according to the envisioned need in the operational area. This information has to be gained through the engineering reconnaissance of the future operational area. This is ensures that there will be no need for ‘extra’ HEE and their users in the unit. This is a question about acquisition, transportation and personnel costs. The HEE is expensive to procure and maintain, and also to utilize them to maximum extent. It also needs heavy transportation assets (heavy truck with a low bed) so that they can be moved from one work site to another with a minimum delay.
EOD is another important area that the engineers have to address during the PSOs. The minefields in the PSO operational area belong to the parties who laid them. In theory they will constitute a part of their obstacle plan if the peacekeeping force withdraws. The PSO personnel should not reveal the positions of obstacles to any other conflict party, but they must ensure that they are properly marked. The tasks for the PSO unit is not to clear minefields or obstacles of the conflicting parties, except of clearing such obstacles which pose immediate danger to the PSO personnel and civilians or which hamper the pursuit of the operational tasks. This is the reason to have the EOD capability. The EOD is meant to support the PSO unit (battalion) by providing the capability to neutralize hazards from the conventional UXO, NBC and associated materials, and improvised explosive devices (IED - both conventional explosive and NBC) which present a threat to the operations, installations, personnel, and/or material. The EOD units may also dispose of hazardous ammunition, UXO, individual mines, booby-trapped mines, and chemical mines.

Routine clearing and rapid breaching of the minefields is the responsibility of the unit engineers. EOD provides the PSO unit with a rapidly deployable support package for the elimination of hazards from UXO in any operational environment. The EOD unit serves as a combat multiplier by neutralizing UXO that is restricting freedom of movement and denying access to supplies, facilities and other critical assets.

All EOD specialists should undergo special material/equipment training. The EOD personnel should also receive continuous and sustained technical training and evaluations at their units of assignment. Selected EOD soldiers may also attend specialized training such as technical escort specialist, advanced access and disablement and advanced EOD courses. A limited number of specially selected EOD soldiers should also attend foreign EOD courses. Specifically, countering the UXO hazards with the EOD teams prevents needless deaths, injuries, and destruction of the unit's combat power. During reception, staging, onward movement and integration, supporting EOD teams provide UXO danger awareness and risk management, fratricide prevention, and other safety instruction to all PSO personnel.

The FINBAT engineering platoon has three EOD squads. Engineering Platoons main tasks are isolating, marking and checking the areas where mines or UXOs are assumed to be, conducting road reconnaissance, checking all suspicious objects, demolishing suspicious objects, mines and UXOs, supporting local UN authorities and executing other tasks assigned by the commanders. Also, the Engineering Platoon has one EOD team on ten minutes 'stand by' readiness for emergency situations. During the first year of deployment FINBAT had 237 EOD findings (59 findings in the period of August 1999 to the end of December 1999 and 124 findings from January 2000 to June 2000). This means almost one EOD finding per day. Also, the EOD personnel have been part of the search teams for arms and ammunition (danger of booby traps) on 165 occa-
sions during the same period. They have also been part of investigation teams 277 times, investigating the aftermath of hand grenade and explosive attacks, and also fires and arson cases. The first tasks for the EOD personnel were to check and clear the terrain of campsites and suspicious patrol routes. This was done by two Sisu flails. Flails proved to be excellent equipment for quickly breaching large areas. An area that would have taken a week to clear manually was cleared by flail within hours.36

NBC may well be a feature of the peacekeeping environment either because of the industrial accidents or sabotage or the use of the NBC weapons by the belligerents. Therefore, NBC training must be included into the pre-deployment activities such as equipping the units and training the personnel.37 The main NBC threat in the PSOs is chemical contamination. The personnel can be exposed to it by consuming non-purified water or because of the chemical agents evaporating from the contaminated soil. Also, if the base of the unit is close to a chemical plant that has toxic agents in its storages, there is a substantial possibility for a chemical accident even though the factory is not operating. The NBC questions have to be included already in the planning and operational reconnaissance phases of a new PSO. NBC vulnerability assessment and force protection have to be addressed during the planning phase of a new PSO and it must be integrated into the staff estimate process. The assessment provides units with an estimate of the probable impact of chemical agents on the PSO unit. Using this estimate, commanders can reduce the risks associated with the chemical threat and maximize force effectiveness under the NBC threat alert.38

To be prepared to counter these threats, the unit must be equipped with protective gear and detection equipment. Basic protective gear includes protective mask and protective clothing (protective dress, gloves and foot wear covers). Various armies of the world use different types of chemical protective clothing for individual protection. The type depends on the protection required, but all fall within two major divisions: permeable and impermeable. Permeable clothing allows air and moisture to pass through the fabric. Impermeable clothing does not. An example of impermeable clothing is the special butyl rubber suits worn by some EOD and decontamination soldiers. Most troops use permeable suits. These are known as battledress over-garments (BDOs). The BDOs are usually water resistant, but not water proof and are normally worn as an outer garment. They provide protection against chemical agent vapours, liquid droplets, biological agents, toxins and radioactive alpha and beta particles.39

The most essential protective gear is a protective mask. Protective masks keep the wearers from breathing air contaminated with chemical and/or biological agents. A chemical-biological mask, when properly fitted and worn with the hood, protects against field concentrations of all known chemical and biological agents in vapour or aerosol form. An integral part of the personnel NBC protection is a glove set which consists of an outer glove for protection and an inner glove for perspiration absorption.
During the PSOs, soldiers need to possess the tools to measure radiation level and detect chemical agents. They may use the dosimeters to record cumulative gamma and neutron radiation dosages received and the detector papers to detect and identify liquid chemical agents. Commanders must ensure that the appropriate section, squad, or platoon has personnel trained to operate and maintain the assigned NBC defence equipment. Operation and maintenance of individual and unit NBC equipment are both a leadership and individual responsibility. Not everyone in the unit will be provided with these items of NBC equipment, but any soldier may become responsible for them or need to use them. This is why NBC training must be part of basic peacekeeping as well as pre-deployment training.

In tackling the NBC threat, decontamination becomes one of the most important issues. There are three levels of decontamination: immediate, operational, and thorough. Immediate decontamination techniques are skin decontamination, personal wipe down and operator’s spray down. The aim of immediate decontamination is to minimize casualties, save lives and limit the spread of a toxic agent, to sustain operations, reduce the contact hazard and limit contamination. The aim of operational decontamination is to minimize casualties, save lives and limit the spread of hazardous material, to sustain operations, reduce the contact hazard and limit contamination. The aim of thorough decontamination is to reduce or eliminate the need for individual protective clothing. In PSOs, if the need for decontamination activities arises, there is always fire-fighting equipment that could be used. This is only possible if the PSO unit is well equipped with modern fire trucks, water pumps, hoses, etc. Hence, the NBC protection is closely linked with the fire-fighting capabilities of the engineering services. In the FINBAT HQ there is one NBC officer in the S7-branch (engineering). The main tasks of this NBC officer are NBC policy, NBC surveillance and preparedness, NBC training, fire prevention policy, fire prevention training, fire and rescue Civil and Military Co-

operation (CIMIC), handling the NBC samples and maintenance of the NBC, firefighting and rescue equipment.

PSOs are usually launched in the areas where fire-fighting services are rudimentary or non-existing. Therefore, significant national and international resources have to be invested into the infrastructure, equipment and vehicles of the PSO units. It is essential that the execution of fire prevention and firefighting by the peacekeepers are done in a way that persons and properties are not imperilled unnecessarily and all local fire prevention codes are met, although for general planning purposes a PSO unit can apply its own local codes and legislation for fire prevention and fire fighting. In general terms, the task of fire fighting is to support the peacekeeping force by providing fire protection to deployed forces throughout the AOO where the relevant infrastructure has collapsed or is in such deterioration that it cannot support these tasks. The number and types of fire-fighting units and equipment needed to protect the unit’s AOO will depend on its
size and the type of facilities in that AOO. In the UN-led operations it should be the responsibility of the organization (the UN) to provide the needed fire-fighting services. In the initial phase of the deployment, however, the PSO units must rely on their own capability. Fire-fighting tools and equipment (such as fire trucks, water tankers, aerial ladders, hoist tools, hose, and pike poles) have been specifically designed for the use in fire-fighting operations. The type of fire station, the primary mission of the fire department, or any requirements of the protection of installations or surrounding community will generally dictate the type of tools and equipment that a fire station should have. Training and practice drills encompassing all facets of fire-fighting operations should be conducted, emphasizing that fire fighters have to gain proficiency in using different tools and equipment available at their particular fire station.

The FINBAT has one fire fighting and rescue squad in the Engineering Platoon in the HQ and Supply Company. This squad has one cross-country fire-fighting truck and is at five minutes 'stand by' readiness. It forms the only capable fire-fighting unit in the FINBAT operational area, because there is no functional local fire department. At the early phase of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission they had one fire-fighting mission every other day on average, but currently they have one fire-fighting mission every third day on average. If the personnel of this squad are not on stand-by or on a fire-fighting mission, they take part in the routine operational work of the HQ and Supply Company. Their main fire-fighting missions have been in support of the local population and they have been able to prevent many small fires from spreading into major disasters. During the year 2001, the fire-fighting and rescue squad had 107 emergency missions: 73 fire extinguishing missions, 13 rescue missions in the car accidents and 21 other missions.

In addition to all this, the ability to execute the operational tasks during the wintertime in the Northern hemisphere requires SNIC capabilities. The basic SNIC equipment are snow ploughs that can be attached to trucks using a special hydraulic controlled rack, special snow screws that throw the snow to the side (these are used mainly in places where snowfall during a short time period is large - for example in Europe in the Alps) and HEE, especially graders. In order to make the conditions more favourable to traffic in general, there are also other measures to counter the slippery surface of roads such as distributing sand, salt or urea on the road surface. For this purpose, some special containers with dispensers must be used on truck beds. The FINBAT has prepared for the SNIC tasks so that each mechanised infantry company has two snowploughs and trucks that are equipped with hydraulic rack where they can be mounted. In the HQ and Supply Company they also have two snowploughs and some HEE is also tasked to participate in snow clearance (for example front-end loaders have special big buckets for lifting snow).

Finally, but not least importantly, the engineering services have to ensure water supplies to the PSO units and make sure the quality of water does not endanger
health of the personnel. In the military, the most common water purification method is Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU). The ROWPU can take raw water from a variety of sources including wells, lakes, seas, lagoons, rivers, and ice holes. Virtually any water source can be purified to make potable (drinking) water. The ROWPU can be operational in a wide range of climatic areas and it is proven reliable system to kill most bacteria. Also, it can be fitted with the NBC filters, so it can purify NBC-contaminated water. To compute the total daily water requirement of the force, one has to multiply the strength (authorized, actual, or subsisted) by the proper consumption factor. The total, expressed as litres per day, includes 10% for waste due to spills and evaporation.49

In the BALTBAT, for instance, the total daily need for pure water would be 16,983 litres, i.e. 17 cubic meters, per day. If there is one purification unit, the minimum capacity it produces should be 850 litres/hour (Purification unit is used 20 hours/day). Capacity should not be based purely on calculations, however. There should always be 15 - 20% of extra capacity. This means that the output of purified water should be 1020 litres/hour. So, the BALTBAT should have one medium ROWPU and one small ROWPU as a backup. The FINBAT does not have any water purification equipment. Drinking water is bottled and delivered by the logistics. Water for washing and other purposes is received from local water pipes. Every two weeks the Battalion Hygienic NCO takes water samples and sends them to Finland for testing.51

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustaining</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Hygiene</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Feeding</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 10% waste/evap</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Consumption of water, basic (litres per person per day)50
Current Engineering Status in the BALTBAT

Engineering assets in the BALTBAT are very limited. Currently there is one engineering officer in the S3 branch in the HQ/BALTBAT to plan the engineering operations. In the HQ Company there is one engineering platoon with basic combat engineering equipment and some heavy engineering equipment (see its composition in Chart 2). When examining the table of equipment one can see that the platoon is geared more for the combat engineering tasks (for example, the platoon has 600 anti-tank mines and two mine laying trailers). Other BALTBAT companies also have some engineering equipment, but it is limited to basic engineering tools (shovels, axes, hammers, pickaxes, etc.). The main tasks for the Engineering Platoon are building minefields and obstacles, EOD, mine clearance in general, obstacle works and fortifications. The HEE squad is used mainly to assist the engineering squads in their tasks, but it can also be used to assist horizontal engineering and fortifications. Currently it is agreed that Lithuania is responsible for engineering in the BALTBAT, so the engineering platoon personnel are the Lithuanians and the basic training is given in Rukla, Lithuania. Training continues in Adazi, Latvia, at the BALTBAT training area. The emphasis of training in Adazi is put on the engineering tasks in the PSOs and on cooperation with other BALTBAT units.

The Engineering Platoon of the BALTBAT HQ Company has only very limited possibilities to conduct construction engineering. For vertical engineer-

Chart 2: Composition of the Engineering Platoon
/HQ Company/BALTBAT

ENGINEERING PLATOON

30 PERSONS TOTAL
1 OFFICER/4 NCO's/25 PRIVATES

1 PLT LDR
1 NCO
3 PVTE
2 4x4 JEPS
1 TRUCK, 5T

1 NCO
7 PVTE
1 4x4 JEEP
1 TRUCK, 5T
1 TRAILER, MINE

1 NCO
7 PVTE
1 4x4 JEEP
1 TRUCK, 5T
1 TRAILER, MINE

1 NCO
8 PVTE
1 WHEEL-LOADER
1 BACKHOE-LOADER
1 EXCAVATOR
3 TRUCKS, 5T
3 TRAILERS, 18 T
ing tasks they have some basic hand tools (hammers, crowbars, axes, etc.) and some sets of tools for specialist construction workers (two sets of tools for carpentry and two sets of tools for plumbing). Persons who are serving in the platoon are quite young (conscripts or contractual soldiers), so they may have some basic education in different construction engineering (carpenter works, plumbing, electric installations, etc.), but their work experience is limited. Work experience is needed in the PSOs, as the personnel have to possess experience adapting to different working conditions and the ability to improvise. There are no standing vertical or horizontal engineering plans in case the battalion is deployed to the PSO, which is a big deficiency. There should be some basic ENGPLAN if the BALTBAT is to be deployed to a PSO, and an essential part of this plan is the vertical engineering plan, i.e. what the concept for accommodation and related facilities is. Also currently there is no training of vertical engineering for the engineering platoon personnel in the BALTBAT. This is, to some extent, understandable because the composition and the tasking of the platoon are based mainly on combat engineering. If the BALTBAT is deployed to a PSO, it will not be able to meet the vertical engineering requirements. There will be a need for an outside vertical engineering assistance during the deployment phase to the operational area. The only vertical engineering works that the heavy engineering equipment in the HEE squad are doing are fortification works, i.e. they are used to digging trenches for personnel and heavy arms (like machine gun positions) and also protected positions for the Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs). Neither is there any special horizontal engineering training in battalion, which is another problematic aspect once the engineering capabilities to support the BALTBAT operations are considered.

Mine clearing and EOD tasks are the main tasks that the Engineering Platoon, especially its engineering squads, are trained in Adazi, Latvia. The platoon has only basic explosive and detonation materiel for the mine clearing and EOD tasks (detonating cord 500 m, detonators 200 ea. and explosive 1,000 kg). This is sufficient to accomplish some basic mine clearing and EOD tasks, but if the object which needs to be neutralised is close to a hazardous facility or there are other reasons for which the object cannot be neutralised by exploding it, there is a need for special EOD equipment. According to the information from the BALTBAT HQ, the Engineering Platoon is capable of doing basic manual mine clearing and EOD tasks, but they do not have any heavy mine clearing equipment. This is a deficiency that should be taken into consideration. Experience from different PSOs has shown that at the initial phase speedy mine clearing and the EOD actions contribute to a higher paste of the operations.

The BALTBAT personnel specialising in the EOD tasks usually go through the special EOD training course in Rukla, Lithuania, and, after having passed rigorous examination, receive an EOD-identification card, which gives an 'official' permission to do the EOD works. These persons are professionals, having served in
the armed forces for a minimum of two years. This ensures that they have good practical experience of the EOD tasks and procedures. In addition to that, the Lithuanian authorities still encounter some old UXOs from the Second World War and they use the military EOD personnel to clear them, which helps to gain more expertise. The standard of the training is problematic though. Despite it being quite extensive, it is not conducted in accordance with the NATO STANAG (Standarisation Agreement) 2389 EOD (rel) ‘Minimum Standards of Proficiency for Trained Explosive Ordnance Disposal Personnel’ (dated December 12, 1987). In addition to that, the EOD personnel are focused too much on their basic operational tasks. This means that they do not have plans and time to conduct any mine awareness training to other BALTBAT personnel prior to the deployment to the operational area, which is necessary in accordance with the commonly accepted principles of preparing for the PSOs.

The BALTBAT has no special units or special tasking for the NBC surveillance or protection and currently they do not have any equipment to counter any kind of the NBC threat (no protective masks, no protective overalls and no special kits to detect the usage of the NBC agents). Although in the PSOs the use of NBC weapons is highly unlikely, there might be some environmental factors that will make it a necessity to have the NBC detection and protection capability. This has been experienced, for example, in Kosovo where the chemical industry has been polluting the environment and the remnants of munitions containing depleted uranium posed some radiation threat. The BALTBAT should have both the means and personnel to detect the use of the NBC agents as well as the means to provide for the basic protection of the personnel against the NBC agents. As the BALTBAT has no unit with special fire-fighting equipment, even the basic decontamination procedures become problematic. As for the fire-fighting capability, the only fire-fighting equipment is fire extinguishers which are in the vehicles and some additional fire extinguishers (usually 4 - 6 per platoon). In terms of training, fire-fighting and fire prevention are not addressed in Adazi, Latvia.

Winters in the Baltic States are quite mild and the amount of snow that falls is low. This is one reason why they have not placed emphasis on the SNIC activities. Also the BALTBAT field exercises are geographically situated so that there is only a limited need for the SNIC tasks. It is stated in the operational documents that SNIC operations are not the responsibility of the Engineering Platoon and these are the other units (companies) which are responsible for the SNIC in their own operational area. Although this is the case, the companies do not have any snow ploughs and installation racks on their vehicles which could be used if there was a need to clear the roads in the operational area. Neither any emphasis has been put on water purification. The BALTBAT does not have any water purification equipment in Adazi, Latvia, and no special personnel in the Baltic States are trained to operate water purification equipment to be placed in the BALTBAT. This is a serious omission, if the battalion is ever to be deployed
to a PSO as it will need fresh water for drinking and cooking. The best and fastest means to deliver that is possessing its own water purification and transportation capability. For electrical power production the Engineer Platoon has one 7.5 kVA generator. This generator would be able to provide electricity to all electrical appliances that the platoon has, but it is mainly used for charging batteries and lighting the platoon’s base.66

**Recommendations**

As it has been mentioned, the engineering support in UN-led PSOs is divided into the General Engineering Support Service (planning, design, construction and maintenance of buildings and also physical infrastructure, operation of utility plants and provision of fire protection, geographic support and environmental protection) and Field Engineering, i.e. ‘combat engineering’. At unit level, these issues can be combined under one heading - engineering tasks. For practical reasons the engineering tasks at this level (company/battalion) can be divided into vertical and horizontal engineering, EOD, NBC protection, fire protection, SNIC and water purification.

The BALTBAT engineering assets consist of one engineering officer in the HQ/BALTBAT S3 branch and the Engineer Platoon in the HQ Company. The main task of the platoon is combat engineering. There should be at least one additional officer who will handle engineering logistical matters. The engineering personnel are Lithuanian and the basic training is given in Rukla, Lithuania. Training continues in the BALTBAT training area in Adazi, Latvia. The emphasis in Adazi is on the engineering tasks in the PSOs and cooperation with other BALTBAT units.

As it has been shown that there are some deficiencies in the BALTBAT’s engineering, and these deficiencies should be addressed. Below are a few recommendations on how to develop engineering matters in the battalion and to enhance the BALTBAT’s capability to cope with the complex and demanding tasks that it would face if the unit were to be deployed to a PSO. These recommendations should not be looked upon as related to the BALTBAT only, but should be placed into a wider perspective. The issues that the recommendations are addressing have applicability to the military forces in general such as the need to develop Command and Control (C2) functions, planning, training, and composition of different units, equipment and individual qualifications.

Speaking of a wider context, more attention should be given to the C2 of engineering in peacekeeping in general, and in the BALTBAT in particular. Engineering is a large topic and covers a wide variety of subjects. Yet the operational success of a PSO unit is highly dependant on well planned and timely executed engineering tasks. It is therefore an imperative that there are enough engineers at the HQ level. In a battalion size (700-1,000 persons) PSO unit the HQ should have five engineers. Firstly, it is the Chief Engineering Officer (CEO) in S3-branch, assisted by the engineering NCO. Also there should be one staff officer (SO) specialised in the NBC tasks as his secondary duty in the S3-branch. In
the S4-branch, there should be two officers - one Engineering Logistics Officer (ELO) and one Construction Officer (CONSTO).

Engineering planning is a very important part of the combined operational planning, because operational factors affect the engineering factors and vice versa. This is why engineering planning should be done in a close co-operation between operational and logistics planners. This is an imperative during the planning phase of a new PSO. The operational leadership should know the capabilities of the engineering personnel and units, and the logistics planners should know the engineering requirements. By the same token, the engineering planners should know the capabilities of the logistical elements to support the engineering units. This planning is an ongoing perpetual process. These requirements for planning give more justification to why there is a need for more engineering personnel in the unit HQ as mentioned above. The outcome of this planning should be a combined ENGPLAN. During the basic peacekeeping training this ENGPLAN will be an engineering contingency plan, which states how engineering training is conducted not only to engineering troops and personnel, but also to all the personnel of the PSO unit. It should also state how the deployment of the unit is planned and how engineers will sustain the unit in the PSO AOO.

To have a comprehensive ENGPLAN before a new mission in place, there is a need for a thorough engineering reconnaissance as a part of the operational reconnaissance. The engineering element of the operational reconnaissance team should have expertise in combat engineering, NBC and especially construction engineering. The engineering team should consist of the following persons: a team leader - the Chief Engineering Officer/S3 and members; SO S3 NBC and Construction Officer/S4. Engineering reconnaissance topics must be revised before the actual reconnaissance so that the engineers could focus on the essential factors during the reconnaissance.

Composition of the engineering units in the peacekeeping battalion should be put together to counter all engineering tasks that the PSO unit will face in the PSO AOO. So, the main task in combat engineering is mine clearing and EOD, and this should be reflected in the composition of the unit. The construction engineering is an important engineering task in any PSO, therefore a peacekeeping battalion should have a unit or units to execute it. Preparations for the NBC protection and fire fighting should also be made, not only in terms of material and equipment but also in training the core personnel for these tasks. So it is proposed that the BALTBAT should have one Engineering Platoon whose main task is the EOD and, in addition, the NBC protection and fire fighting. Moreover, one construction platoon should be added to the Logistics Company/BALTBAT, and all the BALTBAT HEE should be placed in that platoon. The suggested composition and tasks of the personnel of the Engineering Platoon is presented in Chart 3, and the suggested composition and tasks of the personnel of the Construction Platoon is in Chart 4.
If the overall goal of training is interoperability with NATO units, more emphasis should be placed on the substance of training. The basis of a peacekeeper’s profile is usually laid during the conscript training, so the evaluation of the training should begin there. During the basic peacekeeping training, the emphasis should be placed not only on general operational tasks (patrolling, guarding, observer duties, etc.), but also on specific training to enhance the expertise of the areas of specialisation. This training should take six to eight weeks. For example, the combat engineers should be trained how to use specialised EOD equipment in different situations and for co-operation with infantry units. The construction engineers should practice the construction works they would have to do in a PSO. In the training area, there should be at least one training camp (platoon size) where different construction solutions could be tested and which could be used for training of operational tasks.

Skilful personnel are the backbone of any organization, so there should be more

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**Chart 3: Suggested composition of and tasks in the Engineering Platoon**

**COMPOSITION AND TASKING OF PERSONNEL IN THE ENGINEERING PLATOON**

- Platoon leader/EOD trained
- 2IC Platoon/EOD trained
- Platoon Sergeant
- Signal Private
- Dispatcher
- Clerk

* 2 officers
* 8 NCO’s
* 26 privates
* 36 TOTAL

2X

- EOD NCO/Squad leader
- EOD NCO/2IC Squad
- Dispatcher
- EOD Engineer
- EOD Engineer
- APC Driver/EOD Eng
- APC Commander/EOD Eng
- Flail Operator/EOD Eng
- Flail Operator/EOD Eng
- Truck Driver/EOD Eng

- NBC NCO/Squad leader
- Fire NCO/2IC Squad
- Fire NCO
- NBC Private
- NBC Private
- NBC Private/NBC truck driver
- Fire Fighter Private
- Fire Fighter Private
- Fire Fighter Private/Fire truck driver
- Truck Driver/Fire Fighter Private
Chart 4: Suggested composition of and tasks in the Construction Platoon

**COMPOSITION AND TASKING OF PERSONNEL IN THE CONSTRUCTION PLATON**

- Platoon leader/Construction Engineer
- 2IC Platoon/Construction Engineer
- Platoon Sergeant
- Signal Private
- Clerk (construction)
- Clerk (HEE/Purification)

Command and Control element of the platoon

2 officers
9 NCO’s
33 privates
44 TOTAL

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**2X CONSTR**

- Squad ldr/Carpenter
- 2IC Squad/Electrician
- Carpenter/Truck driver
- Carpenter
- Electrician
- Electrician
- Plumber
- Plumber
- Mason
- Mason

**HEE**

- Squad ldr/Excavator drv
- 2IC Squad/Front End ldr drv
- Excavator drv
- Excavator drv
- Front End Loader drv
- Front End Loader drv
- Backhoe Loader drv
- Backhoe Loader drv
- Crane operator
- Crane operator
- Dump Truck drv
- Dump Truck drv

**PURE**

- Squad leader
- 2IC Squad
- Purification Private
- Purification Private/
  Purification truck driver
- Purification Private/
  Purification truck driver
- Purification Private/
  truck driver
emphasis on the requirements for different engineering personnel (basic education, technical school or university, evaluation of conscript duty, experience, etc.), task requirements and personal characteristics. The aim is to get suitable persons to right positions. Because engineering tasks are demanding, the selection process should be strict enough that only suitable personnel are admitted to the peacekeeping basic training.

Special attention should be given to the engineering equipment. The EOD equipment is very sophisticated, specialised and expensive, so it should be thought through very thoroughly what the engineers need, but at the same time the equipment, both in terms of quality and quantity, should be up to the tasks. Although currently the main task of the Engineering Platoon is combat engineering (mine laying and other obstacle works), it should have the equipment needed for a broader variety of tasks. Also, if the peacekeeping battalion has a construction unit special construction tools should be available. Maybe there is no need to have all possible tools, but enough of it should be provided to assign one or two construction teams for the basic training. During the PSOs, there is no need for armoured HEE as the basic civilian types of equipment can cope with the tasks, but the type, size and the amount of the HEE should be identified both for the basic peacekeeping training purposes and for the PSOs. During the basic training some HEE should be available so that not only engineers but other personnel can have an idea of how this equipment can be used during a PSO (especially for the fortification). Due to the financial reasons, the major engineering equipment could be procured in phases (firstly, jeeps and trucks, then heavy equipment and, if the financial situation allows, the mine flails).

Although the Training Assistance Team (foreign training officers) for training the BALTBAT is doing a commendable and valuable work, there is room for enhancing the training of the BALTBAT personnel, especially officers. One method would be including the Baltic States into the Nordic peacekeeping training and management co-operation through the NORDCAPS (Nordic Co-ordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support). Officers from the Baltic States could participate more in the basic peacekeeping training in different Nordic States and send their engineering officers for a week or two to a peacekeeping battalion (for example to FINBAT or SWEBAT in Kosovo). This would give the engineering officers a better understanding of different engineering tasks, challenges and solutions in PSOs.

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Section V

The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe

On 8-9 APR the Baltic Defence College conducted a seminar on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the position of the Baltic States before and potentially after invitation to join NATO. The aim of the seminar was to investigate the possible relationship between NATO membership and accession to the CFE Treaty, analyse national positions on the Treaty with a view to identifying common ground and areas where a bi- or multilateral co-ordination would be relevant and constructive.

The participants were leading experts within the fields of foreign and defence policy from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Baltic Defence College. The two key-note speeches were delivered by Robert Dalsjö and Ari Tasanen. This section contains their manuscripts.

Robert Dalsjö is a Senior Analyst with the European Security Studies Group (Tesla) of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

Ari Tasanen is Counsellor in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Unit for Central and South-Eastern Europe.
A Swedish Perspective on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe

By Robert Dalsjö*

When I was at the Baltic defence College a year and a half ago I had reason to begin my lecture with a remark that is worth repeating in part today.

Swedes have a reputation for trying to be the schoolmasters of the world, travelling about and lecturing others on what to do and how to do it properly. Our international partners do not always appreciate such behaviour. This is especially the case if the matter at hand concerns “hard security” – power, alliances, military forces – an area where decisions might mean life or death. A lecture on membership of NATO and party to the CFE Treaty (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) done by a Swede, might seem a bit like sex education conducted by a nun.

What position to take concerning membership of the CFE-regime – like membership of NATO – is of course a sovereign decision for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. If the decision is to join the CFE Treaty, then the matter of the terms of joining is something to be settled by the Balts, together with the states that are already parties, without interference from the outside. Sweden is not a party to the CFE Treaty, nor is it a member of NATO. This sets certain limits for the extent to which it is proper for Sweden to officially have a position on these issues. Still, as friends of the Baltic States, and as neighbours, it is natural for us to take an interest. Your security affects ours, the more secure you are, the more secure we are. This interest has, concerning the issue of membership in NATO, been expressed in a low-key, but very clear official Swedish support for your desire to join NATO.

If I were to speak here today as an official Swedish representative, my speech would be very short. The official Swedish position on the CFE Treaty is positive to

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the agreement as such, considers it an important part of the security architecture in Europe, providing stability and transparency on military matters, also in our vicinity, with positive effects for Sweden. On the issue of whether Sweden should join the CFE Treaty, the official position is non-committal, saying that the issue is not on the agenda as accession is not possible now, and that Sweden at the present time does not have the intention to accede.²

However, I will not speak here in an official capacity, but in a personal capacity as an analyst, unrestrained by the official policy and propriety. The views expressed are mine, not necessarily reflecting the views of my Agency or of the Government. When I refer to official Swedish policy, I will make that clear.

**The role of the CFE Treaty**

The CFE Treaty is often said to be a cornerstone of European security. Though something of a cliché by now, this statement is still valid. The CFE Treaty helps provide stability and transparency in the military field, and thus makes the political-strategic situation more predictable. It is not just a matter of the obvious value of limitations and of detailed information on the whereabouts of military units and equipment. It is also a matter of an intrusive verification regime, which means that information provided can be trusted. It is a matter of the regime being legally binding, and thus long-termed. And it is the matter of the political usefulness of information obtained through the CFE Treaty. Unlike most other intelligence material, CFE-information can be openly referred to in a political-diplomatic context. In case transgressions occur or are suspected, the CFE Treaty can be an alarm bell, and data obtained through the CFE treaty can be used in a political-diplomatic discussion. The adapted treaty also allows flexibility, for example in the context of peace support operations or exercises.

Still, the CFE Treaty is not very visible on the international political screen. A visit to the websites of the US Department of State or the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office hardly show anything on European security, and less on the CFE Treaty. This is in contrast to the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the CFE Treaty was high politics and very visible.

This change is only natural. It reflects the enormous transformation that has taken place in Europe since the late 1980s, of which the existence of this seminar, at this college, in a free Estonia, is one of the signs and the consequences.

But the diminished visibility of the CFE Treaty also reflects the changing status of the treaty itself. At a building site, a cornerstone attracts a lot of attention when being chiselled out and laid in place. But once in place, secured and built upon, it is seldom noticed. This does not mean that it is less important – the stability of the whole building may depend on it – but rather that its position, form and function is taken for granted. This applies to the CFE Treaty. Negotiations on the treaty’s formulation, implementation and adaptation contained a lot of controversy, which naturally drew attention. But once these issues had been settled,
political and analytical attention turned to other things, leaving the CFE Treaty to the implementers.

It is also possible - if you will bear with me - to look specifically at the changing political-strategic role played by the CFE regime. Arms control agreements or arms control negotiations usually derive a basic, or intrinsic, importance through producing some kind of strategic good. In the case of the CFE Treaty, this is about military stability and transparency, producing a more predictable and benign strategic environment. This is the low-key cornerstone function. But from time to time arms control also becomes a vessel into which the hot strategic issues of the day can be poured. In the late 1980s and very early 1990s, the CFE regime was strategically important because it provided a means for an orderly dismantling of the military aspect of cold war confrontation in Europe. During the first half of the 1990s, the CFE Treaty was strategically important because it provided a framework for the orderly dismantling of the military remains of the Soviet empire.

Once this was accomplished (except in parts of the southern flank), the CFE Treaty had more or less drifted into oblivion, at least among politicians, diplomats and analysts. Now, the treaty framework may again derive importance from being a way to help manage the military aspects of the enlargement of NATO.3

The CFE Treaty and the enlargement of NATO

The CFE Treaty's limitations and transparency measures offer the West an attractive way of reassuring Russia of the non-threatening character of the inclusion of new members in the alliance. This was already, to some degree, the case when the first post-cold war round of enlargement took place in 1997, but it seems even more pertinent in the context of the prospective membership of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It is now generally expected that the alliance will issue invitations to the three Baltic States at its summit in Prague in November. Official Russia and most of Russia's political class has long vehemently opposed allowing the three Baltic States to join the alliance, citing a variety of political and military reasons. These reasons often revealed a lack of mental adjustment to the post-cold war world, a mistrust of NATO, and a lingering Russian view, that the Baltic States were somehow still nasbi [our].

In the face of the success of the Baltic States' campaign to appear as viable candidates, and particularly in the face of the alliance's American-led determination not to halt enlargement at any "red lines" drawn by the Kremlin, Putin has wisely decided to take a more pragmatic stance on the issue. Official Russia still does not like the idea of Baltic membership of NATO, but it is realising that there is no use in trying to stop the inevitable. Throwing a temper tantrum and issuing threats, as Primakov did in the 1990s, would be counterproductive and would diminish Russia's and Putin's prestige without stopping enlargement. The more political capital that was invested in trying to stop enlargement, the more would be lost when enlargement still took place. So Putin is
trying to reduce his losses by downplaying the issue, domestically and internationally.

Russian opposition to Baltic membership of NATO has largely been supported by arguments that are either illegitimate or nonsense. Among the nonsensical is the oft-repeated claim that Baltic membership of NATO would give rise to a military threat to Russia, particularly to the region of St Petersburg. This is political nonsense because it is inconceivable that some twenty democratic states would - under consensus - decide to launch a war of aggression against a country that covers 11 time zones, is a major nuclear power, and defied both Napoleon and Hitler. This is military nonsense, because in the context of a major operation - forward-basing NATO assets to the Baltic States would not yield any measurable advantage in an offensive, but would place those assets within range of Russian short-range ballistic missiles.

There is an indication saying that the top level of the Russian political class realises that such arguments are nonsense, but still uses them for tactical purposes, because of their resonance among common Russians, and among Westerners who empathise with Russia's traditional fear of invasion. But still, some of this sense of threat and encirclement - though unfounded - seems honestly felt.

The decision on accession to NATO and the terms for this is a matter to be decided by the candidates and the present members, without outside interference. Russia has no right to compensation for accepting that others exercise their sovereign right on an issue which is of no more concern to Russia than it is to other members of the OSCE.

Nonetheless, the latest round of enlargement was combined with a set of measures designed to reassure Russia of the non-threatening nature of that change, and to help the Russian leadership to maintain a bit of face. In the present climate of cooperation, it seems reasonable to assume that something similar will apply when the Baltic States join NATO.

Fortuitously, the CFE Treaty provides the means to do this, and - importantly - to do this without accepting any unnecessary political and military limitations and without granting Russia any special privileges, which imply acceptance of Russian claims to a special status vis-a-vis the Baltic States.

The CFE Treaty has made limitations and transparency on military things into a European norm. Even in the absence of any Russian opposition to Baltic membership of NATO, it would have been expected that membership of NATO would lead to accession to the CFE Treaty, and thus to the Baltic States being subject to limitations and transparency measures concerning military equipment and units. Thus - provided the ceilings and other limitations are set at a reasonable level - they are without extra cost to the Baltic States or to NATO. The reciprocal and almost universal nature of the CFE Treaty also means that no special - real or perceived - privileges will be granted to Russia. The concessions that, say, Estonia makes in accepting a ceiling for Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE), in giving information, and in accepting inspections, will be a conces-
sion made to all States Parties, that are signatories, not just to Russia. Russia will have the right to intrusive inspection of military installations in Estonia, but so will Spain, Bulgaria, and Georgia. And Estonia will have similar rights to inspect installations in Russia.

Of course, the CFE Treaty is not open to accession for new states, as more than a handful of the signatories has not yet ratified the adapted treaty. Such ratification will, it has been declared, not take place until Russia fulfils its obligations concerning limitations and transparency on the flanks, and concerning its presence in Moldova and Georgia. As I understand, Russia is close to being in compliance concerning TLE in the Russian flank area and has withdrawn its TLE from Moldova and from one of its bases in Georgia. This makes the verification of units/TLE in and around Chechnya, and Russia’s continued presence at a second base in Georgia – despite a commitment to withdraw – the remaining major outstanding issues.

Hopefully, Russia will soon fulfil its commitment to transparency and to ending its unwanted presence in Georgia, and thus open the CFE Treaty for ratification and accession. However, even if ratification should be delayed and accession not possible for a while, this does not mean that the CFE Treaty could not be used to regulate the military terms of Baltic membership of NATO. If, when, and under which conditions to do this, is of course primarily a choice for the Baltic States to make. But if this is deemed appropriate, it seems entirely possible for the interested parties to seek agreement on Baltic ceilings for TLE and other matters. Even if formal accession to the treaty would have to take place at a later date, the parties could commit themselves to applying the agreement in the meantime. Provided there is a good will from all concerned sides, this could apply not only to ceilings, but also to the exchange of information and to inspections. Estonia and Lithuania already have bilateral Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) agreements with Russia that use the CFE Treaty format.

A few years ago there was speculation that Russia would use the CFE Treaty as a tool to block Baltic membership of NATO, either by threatening to withdraw from the CFE Treaty, or by vetoing the Baltic States’ accession to the CFE Treaty. The idea was that as all members of NATO, as a norm, were in the CFE Treaty, by blocking Baltic accession to the CFE Treaty, Russia could also block their membership of NATO. I must admit that even I have at times thought along such lines.

However, it now seems that Moscow – wisely – has given up on such ideas. Statements from early this year indicate that Moscow hopes to use the CFE Treaty as a tool to influence the modalities of NATO’s enlargement to the Baltic States, but realises that it cannot be used to stop Baltic membership. The reasons for this are rather simple, once you discern them. First, the CFE Treaty is an agreement that benefits Russia at least as much as it benefits other parties. Wrecking the CFE Treaty in order to demonstrate displeasure would not serve Russia’s interests. Second, though there is a link between membership of NATO and party to the CFE Treaty, this link is historical and
customary, not legally or politically binding. This link is so weak, that it would break if Moscow tried to use it to bloc Baltic NATO membership.

The situation could - in such a case - develop in a manner analogous to what happened when Russia held up an already agreed settlement on the border issue in order to stop the EU from short-listing Estonia as a candidate. But once it was clear to the EU that the only reason the border issue was not already settled was Russian obstruction, the Commission decided to consider the issue solved, and went ahead and short-listed Estonia.

I feel confident that the North Atlantic Council would react in a similar manner, if the case arose. If the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has decided to invite the Baltic States to join NATO, Russian obstruction on the CFE Treaty would not stop it. As it would hardly be in Russia's interest to have the Balts as members of NATO without the limitations and transparency provided by the CFE Treaty, it is better for Moscow to take a business-like attitude.

**The CFE Treaty and the Baltic States**

This brings us to the matter of the terms that might apply to the Baltic States in the CFE regime. As outlined by Klaus Bolving in his excellent book⁴, these are:
- National and territorial entitlements;
- Rights to extraordinary temporary deployment, or not;
- Flank status or not; and
- If the Balts’ entitlements for TLE are to be new, or to be deducted from existing NATO members’ entitlements.

These issues are, of course, primarily a matter for the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It is not a matter for Sweden, but some personal comments from an analyst may still be allowed.

This will be first time a really new state enters the CFE Treaty. Previous increases in the number of signatories have been a consequence of the dividing up of states, which already were signatories, such as Czechoslovakia. Thus the accession of the Baltic States would set a pattern, at least concerning the process of accession to the CFE Treaty, possibly also concerning matters of substance.

Like Klaus Bolving, I do not foresee formal negotiations on the terms of accession. Such a negotiation would be cumbersome and slow. I would expect the candidate to present to the Joint Consultation Group (JCG) the terms under which it wants to accede, and for these terms to be acceptable to the present signatories. Of course, this presupposes a process of informal soundings before the presentation is made.

The entitlements or ceilings can be calculated in several ways. One can use a military point of departure, or a political one. A military calculation that starts with present holdings of TLE for the Baltic States would be ridiculous and unacceptable. It would discriminate against the Balts because of their status as victims of occupation during the cold war. A military calculation based on existing long-terms plans might be slightly - but only slightly - better. It suffers from same draw-
back. The Baltic States are in the process of building up their national defences from scratch. This has to be done step by step. Even the plans for defence in 12 years time reflect the fact that the Balts started out a few years ago with nothing. So, letting existing plans determine ceilings would not be reasonable. It seems better to look at long-term military potential, in a, say, 20, 25, or 30-year perspective - or at military sufficiency, as Klaus Bolving has done. Such calculations would probably yield figures that are fairly close to those produced by the simplest and most clear-cut method, which is political-geographic in nature. On political grounds, the Baltic States are to be no different from other states parties. This means that they should have ceilings comparable to those of other small states: Denmark, Belgium, Georgia, Moldova, etc.

The CFE Treaty’s accession must confirm the normality of the Baltic States, including on issues of national defence. And setting ceilings that are on or about par with comparable states would help do that. This would be an important confirmation of the normality of the Baltic States, and of the legitimacy of their national defences.

Although there is no formal link, the very act of setting these ceilings or entitlements, combined with membership in NATO, might open up for cascading of TLE. Such transfer of equipment might be useful, especially in the long run. But the possibility of rapidly acquiring large amounts of heavy equipment could be a dangerous temptation, which might create problems. Someone might suggest: “You have room for 250 tanks, Germany has a lot of tanks to spare, why don’t you take a couple of hundred?” The Poles have recently accepted an offer to buy German tanks very cheaply, and so have the Finns.

This is of course a decision for you to take, but I would strongly recommend against trying filling the ceilings up with TLE at an early date, even if the ‘stuff’ (as one old CFE-hand calls TLE) were free. We have said over the years that there is good reason for you to develop your Armed Forces at a pace that your own human and financial resources allow. The fact that you may be given a ceiling of, say 250 tanks and 400 Armoured Combat Vehicles (ACVs), does not mean you should acquire all of these, and certainly not at once. We are talking about very, very long-term prospects here, and there is a need to have the capability and the resources to be able to maintain and to use the equipment, not just to ‘hold’ it.

Flank status, or not? This seems, under the adapted treaty, to be of less importance than under the old treaty. Still, Latvia and Lithuania have no direct border against the flank, as now defined. On the contrary, they border on parts of Russia and Belarus that are outside the flank area. It would thus not seem reasonable to place Latvia and Lithuania in the flank, unless adjoining parts of Russia and Belarus are transferred to the flank, too. As Estonia’s borders both on an oblast of Russia, which is part of the flank, and an oblast which is not, a case can be made for either.

Extended temporary deployment or basic temporary deployment? Provided that national and territorial ceilings are
set a reasonable level, and given the fact that the Baltic States – one way or another – constitute a strategic entity, while still being three separate countries, it would seem that basic temporary deployment ought to go a fairly long way. Because if you can put a division into each country, you would in effect have a corps for all three. And if more than a mechanised corps is needed, then it would seem that the situation in Russia must be such that the CFE treaty is already dead.

Entitlements for TLE – are they to be “new”, or are they to be taken from others? It is possible that it will be suggested by someone that Baltic entitlements are to be deducted from entitlements held by NATO members today, thus keeping the total entitlements for NATO, after enlargement, unchanged. Such an approach seems unwise and unworkable, for a number of reasons. As a matter of principle, it seems reasonable that if you bring in new territory under the treaty, you also get “new” entitlements. A group approach to entitlements also seems incompatible with the new, non-group, structure of the treaty. Furthermore, a group approach would add a zero-sum aspect to security in Europe, just when we are moving away from zero-sum thinking. On a more practical note, the signatories of the CFE Treaty have only recently agreed on a set of entitlements for TLE, which are commensurate with their individual and collective needs, resources and interests. Is this complex web to be torn up and redone just because three small Baltic States accede? And how to handle the matter if/when states who are not members of NATO, and who do not plan to become members, want to accede to the CFE Treaty?

This, of course, brings up the issue of Sweden’s relation to the CFE regime.

**The CFE Treaty and Sweden**

According to the most recent official statement on the issue, policy is as follows:

“Even if Sweden is not a signatory, and at the present time does not have the intention to accede, the treaty is still important to the security of Sweden, through the military limitations and the transparency which it prescribes also in Sweden’s vicinity.”

There have been some other statements saying that Sweden highly values the contribution the CFE treaty makes to security and stability in Europe. The Minister of Defence has said that the CFE Treaty is the first conventional arms control agreement that really has an effect on military capabilities, and praised the fact that countries have foresworn the possibility of unlimited rearment.

This view, however, contrasts with Sweden’s standoffish attitude to Sweden acceding to the CFE Treaty. Though the formula I just read to you is rather more positive than the position was a few years ago, Sweden has long been reluctant to commit itself to the same restrictions it thinks others should observe. This was evident during the early 1990s, when “harmonisation” of the CFE and Vienna Document regimes was on the agenda. Why? If Sweden thinks arms control is so good, why is it not willing to have its own arms controlled?
This seeming contradiction is but a reflection of a deeper split in the personality of Sweden’s security policy. This split is visible also in attitudes to NATO and the EU. Perhaps we should have Ingmar Bergman to make a film on the subject, helping us to understand ourselves better.

In Sweden, two very different mind-sets or world-views on security issues co-exist within the government apparatus. The international security mindset stresses idealism, solidarity, regime building, and international law. The main issue-area for this has been political-diplomatic issues. The national security mindset stresses self-interest, realism, freedom of action, and a combination of reassurance and deterrence. The main issue-area for this has been defence policy and politico-military issues related to our close vicinity.

The issue of whether the CFE Treaty should apply to Sweden brought these issue-areas and mind-sets to a head. A former colleague of mine once remarked that ‘the harmonisation issue pits the big European House against the small mobilisation depot.’ It has been interesting to watch and to participate in the internal debates we have had on this for a number of years. Klaus Bolving writes in his book that there has been no official study of the effect of the application of the CFE Treaty’s rules to Sweden. Although no study has been publicly released, perhaps not even publicly referred to, there have been at least six official studies, and I have dealt with most of them.

I will give you a short run-through on this, in part as comment to what Ari Tasanen said about the Finnish process and position. Perhaps there is something useful to be learnt from the process we went through.

Basically, most individuals and institutions with a national security mindset were very negative - initially even hostile - to the idea of subjecting Sweden’s Armed Forces to the CFE Treaty. During the early years - the harmonisation debate - objections to the CFE Treaty tended to focus on the dangers of transparency. There was fear, just like there still is in Finland, that transparency would reveal our mobilisation and deployment plans.

This, it was claimed, would make storage depots vulnerable to attack or sabotage, and enable an aggressor to figure out where our units were to be placed in case of war, thus revealing our operational plans. Later, objections centred on the danger that ceilings would circumscribe our ability to rearm, if need arose. Some, who wanted to modernise the Armed Forces, also feared that ceilings - if set on the basis of existing holdings - would lock us into an old-style force structure, with too few ACVs and attack helicopters.

Such sentiments were strong in the Armed Forces, and the Ministry of Defence and even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tended to adopt the military’s position on these issues. When the Armed Forces officially said that Swedish application of the CFE Treaty was not acceptable and would jeopardise our ability to mobilise, people tended to treat the statement with greater deference than it deserved.

This was not only out of respect for the military, but also because of the importance of mobilisation to national security. Sweden did not have - and still
does not have any standing combat-units worth mentioning, and thus was entirely dependent on mobilisation in order to be able to defend itself. On call-up, reservists were to travel to pre-assigned sites, where the equipment for their units was stored, configured into a unit-set. These sites were kept small (usually for a battalion) and widely dispersed in order to secure that mobilisation could take place even if an aggressor tried to stop or disrupt it. The significance of this system was not evident to everyone in the government or politics, but to those with a bit of insight, it made the integrity of the mobilisation system seem exceedingly important, and thus lent weight to the Armed Forces’ objections to the CFE Treaty. Most of these people, however, did not have sufficient insight into the mobilisation and storage system to be able to question the validity of Armed Forces’ claims that the system—its then current form—worked, but would be jeopardised by the CFE Treaty.

Some heretical analysts, I was one of them, questioned the validity of the Armed Forces’ position on transparency. We pointed out that—due to the then low degree of mechanisation of the Swedish Army—most units or storage sites actually contained few or no TLE. In many cases the only TLE a unit held were heavy mortars. We also pointed out that the inspection protocol contained a number of clauses which restricted the inspectors’ access to sensitive points, which allowed shrouding of sensitive equipment, or made it possible to deny access to building with doors less than 2 meters wide, etc. This had two implications. First, it ought to be possible to reduce both the number of inspections and the amount of ‘unwarranted’ insight which inspectors could gain through a single inspection by ‘CFE-ising’ the storage system and the storage areas. This would entail minor modifications such as a transfer of mortars, fencing off or demarcating areas of separate units, changing doors etc. Secondly, the fact that maintaining secrecy concerning mobilisation was considered important did not necessarily mean that our efforts to do this had been successful. It was by no way clear that secrecy worked. Those units and storage sites that contained considerable amounts of TLE were few and likely to have been identified by our opponent anyhow. One factor contributing to this was that most storage areas for heavy TLE, such as tanks, had been built to similar patterns by the military building authorities. If one knew what to look for, structures visible on a picture from a satellite would suffice for correct conclusions to be drawn. Furthermore, in most cases the storage sites had held the same type of equipment for forty years. If tanks had been taken out of the same garages for forty years, by forty generations of conscripts, taken to an exercise field or the workshops, and then returned, it was hardly likely that secrecy could have been maintained. And then of course, there had been spies and traitors—of which we knew about some—which had divulged secrets to the Soviet Union.

We also pointed out that there was an ‘up-side’ to transparency. If Sweden became a party to the CFE treaty, Sweden
could conduct intrusive inspections of units and areas of particular interest to us. Such inspections would not only yield “hard” information on the number and type of TLE at the site, but also very valuable “soft” information concerning the status of the unit and its materiel. The ability to launch such an inspection would be particularly valuable if the political-strategic situation was fluid or tense.

Objections such as these were dismissed by the Armed Forces. It seemed as if what the Americans call ‘log-rolling’ between the intelligence and the security services had determined their position on this issue. Our security efforts have worked, it was claimed, and our secrets are safe and not known by the possible adversary. At the same time, our intelligence efforts had worked so well that we already knew all there was to know about the other side, and nothing of value was to be gained by being able to inspect. This position was a bit odd, but maintained for a number of years by the military authorities.

In fairness, it should be said that several of the field-grade action officers that handled and studied CFE-issues at Armed Forces Headquarter had a much more sophisticated and nuanced view of the effects of the treaty’s application to Sweden, than did the organisation they worked for. But if they expressed doubts on the wisdom of a die-hard position, superiors with less insight but higher rank overruled them, and they loyally soldiered on.

The credibility of the Armed Forces on the issue of transparency was not enhanced by an episode that took place during a visit to a storage site, conducted by one of the governmental working groups on Sweden and the CFE Treaty. It turned out that a bright diplomat—who had served in Germany—and an analyst quickly could draw the correct conclusions concerning what was inside the locked sheds, simply by looking at the site from the outside: garage sheds, railway spur, ramp, flatcars, track-marks—it must be armoured vehicles. Furthermore, they pointed out how an intruder at the unguarded site, by use of a simple device, could look into the garages and determine the type and number of armoured vehicles held there.

Though episodes such as this probably helped erode the Armed Forces’ position on transparency, the crucial factor in breaking resistance on this issue was the radical change of the storage system that was being planned in the latter half of the 1990s. With the end of the cold war finally sinking in, and the threat of invasion gone, it was no longer deemed necessary to accept the high cost of maintaining a large organisation and a dispersed storage system in units sets. Many units and much equipment were to be sold or scrapped, and the rest stored at a few large sites where it was easier and cheaper to maintain, as well as more secure.

As transparency became less controversial, the focus of the debate moved to ceilings. Sweden’s Armed Forces were to be downsized and modernised, as a result of the end of the cold war. But the reductions were, particularly during the early years, when they were controversial, linked to having the option of rearming if a
threat of invasion should return. This, claimed the Armed Forces headquarters, meant that non-aligned Sweden could not allow its freedom of action to be restricted by legally binding limits on the number of TLE. Otherwise, we could have a situation where a massive build-up was taking place in the east, and we were forbidden by the CFE Treaty to counter it. Theoretically, it was said, ceilings might be acceptable if they had headroom for a massive rearmament, running into four figures for certain categories of TLE. But as “the politicians” would never accept this, fearing that the Armed Forces would treat such TLE-levels as a promise for the future, this road was effectively closed, it was claimed.

Again, the heretics questioned the validity of the Armed Forces claims. The option of Sweden conducting a massive rearmament on its own was nothing but theoretical, we countered. If not even the tension and the submarine intrusions of the 1980s had prompted an increase in defence spending, which they had not, and then it was likely to take very major changes of a threatening kind for Sweden to rearm. And such changes could hardly take place, while the CFE Treaty remained in force, and vice versa. Thus, the scenario painted by the Armed Forces of a massive Russian rearmament taking place while Sweden was constrained by the CFE Treaty, was not possible. Either the CFE Treaty was in force, and then such a Russian rearmament could not take place, or massive Russian rearmament took place in defiance of the treaty, and then the treaty had effectively been voided and other signatories need not feel bound by it.

Provided that ceilings were set with a headroom that allowed for structural modernisation, we claimed, they ought not to be a problem for Sweden. Furthermore, the so-called Gertrude Stein-principle of the treaty - a tank is a tank is a tank - allowed for considerable modernisation and increases of combat capability with constant numbers of TLE. As both a 120 mm mortar and a Multiple Rocket Launch System (MRLS) count as one piece of artillery under the treaty, replacing the former with the latter allows a tremendous increase in firepower without any increase in TLE. And the trend was, and is, towards fewer but better weapons.

I did not follow this process to the end, as I left arms control to work on other issues. But I know how it ended, and it is possible to highlight some of the reasons why the process of coming to terms with the thought of applying the CFE Treaty to Sweden, was so long and arduous. One of these is particular to time and place. The CFE Treaty issue was strongly linked to the transition from a situation where a national and stand-alone security mindset was paramount, to one where an international security and integrationist mindset was more prominent. It was also linked to the transition from large, low-tech anti-invasion army to a much smaller, better-equipped army, suitable for international tasks. These transitions were painful to many individuals and organisations steeped in the past.

The second reason is that the process required civilians to challenge the verdict of the Armed Forces on an issue tradi-
tionally considered as falling strictly within the purview of the military. That civil servants and politicians should challenge or even dismiss the Armed Forces views, was considered normal as concerned budgets or acquisition of equipment, but was sensitive when it concerned a matter, which had previously not been battled over. The third reason was that making an honest net assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of accession involved weighing disadvantages of a military nature against advantages, which mainly were of a security-policy nature.

As I understand it, the Armed Forces have now dropped most or all of their objections to Swedish accession to the CFE Treaty, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - with the Ministry of Defence reportedly following - have warmed to the thought of the political benefits of accession. The issue is much less controversial than it was a few years ago. The process of dealing with the CFE Treaty may have helped nudging the two different security mind-sets closer to each other, making a more unified view of the world and our position in it. If so, that would be good for Sweden.

But one major and two minor hurdles to Swedish accession – assuming that accession will be possible - reportedly remain. One of the minor hurdles is that the CFE Treaty is still, by some, seen as being linked to alliances and NATO, making it appear suspicious in certain political quarters. The other minor hurdle is the problem of setting ceilings with sufficient headroom, with a measure of mistrust existing between the political side and the military. The major remaining hurdle is the Finland factor.

Finland is still adamantly opposed to accession, using arguments similar to those used by Sweden’s Armed Forces in the mid-1990s. It would, of course, be possible to surmise that these arguments are as unfounded in the case of Finland as they were in the case of Sweden. But it would not be proper for an outsider to say so. And there are a number of differences in the mobilisation and storage system, and in proximity to Russia, which makes it possible that these arguments may be more valid in Finland than they were in Sweden.

Consideration for Finland, and taking account of the effects on Finland before a policy move is made, has a long pedigree in Swedish security policy. There have hiccuped from time to time, such as the decision to join the EU, but this event highlighted the mutual interest to insure against Alleingang by either party, and thus led to the present and close Swedish-Finnish policy coordination. Stockholm is genuinely unwilling to do anything, which would hurt Finland’s security interests, and also wants to avoid any damage to good relations. Depending on one’s assessment of the validity of Finland’s current position on the CFE regime, for Sweden to accede is a matter of both, or only of the latter. Still, even ‘just’ hurting relations is not lightly done. Thus, though the Finland factor appears as the only remaining major obstacle to Swedish accession – proved the treaty is opened for accession - it is not an obstacle easily or lightly passed over.

If and when the treaty is opened for accession, events will show whether the
treaty continues to be a club for current or former members of the two old pacts, or whether others join. If the latter happens, and being party to the CFE Treaty, becomes part of European normality, then the remaining outsiders risk becoming marginalized.

Here, it is possible to see a parallel with another sticky issue facing Sweden and Finland, that of whether to remain non-aligned or to join NATO, where similar arguments about the risk of marginalization are made in the debate. In contrast to the CFE Treaty, this is an issue where official Finland leans forward, albeit cautiously, while official Sweden holds back.

Two months ago, Finland’s Minister of Defence, Jan-Erik Enestam spoke in Stockholm on the issue of Finland and NATO. He highlighted the commonality of Sweden’s and Finland’s views and interests on security policy, and praised bilateral coordination and consultation. But he also served notice that Finland would not necessarily wait forever for Sweden to make up its mind concerning membership in NATO. If membership in NATO became the normal thing for western European democracies, Finland might join, though Sweden remained on the outside, he said.

Well, I would – from my humble position as an analyst - like to return Enestam’s ball. The matrix of Sweden and Finland on one axle, and the CFE Treaty and NATO on the other, holds several combinations that are theoretically possible. But given the closeness of the two countries in many respects, it seems more likely than if one goes, so will the other. This applies both to the CFE regime and to NATO. Perhaps the best way is to combine the issues and solve them both in one context. But if this does not happen, Helsinki should not necessarily count on Sweden being willing to wait forever for Finland to make up its mind concerning the CFE Treaty.

likely to be several years into the future. Even if Sweden is not a signatory, and at the present time does not have the intention to accede, the treaty is still important to the security of Sweden, through the military limitations and the transparency which it prescribes also in Sweden’s vicinity.


1 ‘NATO enlargement’ is really a misnomer, as the term suggests that process is driven by NATO, when in reality is largely driven by the desire of the East and Central Europeans to join NATO. Still, the term is used here because it is convenient.  
2 Klaus Bolving: Baltic CFE Membership, Danish Institute of International Relations 2001
3 Ds 2001:14, p. 41.
A Finnish Perspective on the CFE Treaty

By Ari Tasanen*

The CFE Treaty is like arms control in general basically about military security. Taken the historic background and the purpose of the Treaty it can be said that it is about security in its hardest sense. The raison of the treaty is to regulate numbers and deployment of offensive conventional armaments. In today’s Europe and particularly for States expected to accede to the adapted Treaty it is more about relation between offensive capabilities of others and defensive capabilities of one’s own. It is also about options and flexibility for military crisis management.

All states approach that kind of treaty primarily from the angle of their national security and defence. This is very true for States like Finland, which maintain military non-alliance and have specific security needs owing to that, possess a firm traditional defence concept and are situated in a demanding geopolitical environment.

The CFE Treaty concerns all States in the Euro-Atlantic area whether they are Parties or non-Parties, allied or militarily non-allied. All States also view the Treaty from a broader European- or system-wide perspective. The more narrow national and the broader system angle, are interacting but their mutual weight may vary in each State depending on how national interest in defence issues is determined.

Dynamic security policy developments in Europe, particularly emphasis in crisis management, the military dimension of the EU, NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia relationship, are affecting national interests in defence issues. The role and context of the CFE Treaty and other OSCE-based normative arms control may change in that process. Consequently, it makes it more difficult at the national level to assess to which security needs in Europe of today and tomorrow, the CFE Treaty will specifically respond and which would be the reasons for a militarily non-allied State to accede.

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General principles for Finland

It is a natural starting point for approaching Finland's thinking on the CFE Treaty, to refer to the Government's Security and Defence Policy Report (white-paper) to Parliament on 13 June 2001. The Report represents a mid-term stock-taking in the process, launched by the 1997 Report, of combining security policy analysis to defence policy considerations to guide long-term planning and restructuring of Finland's defence system in the period 1998-2008, and to adapt it to a changing security landscape of Europe.

The next comprehensive Report, scheduled to 2004, will determine the guidelines for the entire Finnish defence system in the ten years period from 2007-8 and onwards. It is also envisaged that the grounds and basic principles of Finland's security policy and defence system will be thoroughly discussed and assessed in that context.

However, the mid-term Report of 2001, contains no changes in the fundamental issues. It reaffirms the basic components of Finland's security and defence policy in the following manner:

1. Maintenance and development of a credible defence capability
2. Remaining militarily non-allied under the prevailing conditions
3. Participation in international cooperation to promote security and stability within the UN, OSCE, EU and NATO's PfP framework, and emphasising Nordic co-operation.

The Report does not lock Finland's posture to these components but contains an "evolutionary clause" in stating that Finland is constantly re-assessing its military non-alliance and the functioning of crisis management and security co-operation in Europe, taking into consideration the changes in the regional security environment and developments in the European Union. Finland makes its choices independently and aims to have the best means available to ensure its national security in all circumstances.

The Report also describes and analyses newer ingredients of security and defence policy, first of all the rapid developments in international crisis management and also new types of threats to the society.

Arms control and disarmament - as incorporated in the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines (APL), as well in the CFE Treaty - are discussed in the Report as a kind of new demands to the Finnish defence system. The Report formulates the authoritative Finnish position in regard to both these treaty instruments, to which Finland today is a non-Party. The goal and timetable for accession to the Ottawa Convention has been outlined in the Report. In the domestic debate the APL issue has been more prominent whereas the adapted CFE Treaty is not widely known and seldom referred to.

These two treaty instruments go hand in hand in domestic terms in the way that the binding commitments under them, would significantly touch upon two traditional main pillars of the Finnish defence system. These are territorial defence (the present role of APL in that) and mobilisation (risk of an excessive exposure of that capability due to CFE information exchange and verification).
National position in regard to the CFE Treaty

The 2001 Report formulates Finland’s CFE-policy in the following way:

Finland considers the CFE Treaty to be one of the cornerstones of European security and stability. The Treaty provides signatories a channel for obtaining military information and the opportunity to participate in the development of a pan-European system of arms reduction. Finland’s national defence solution strengthens stability in its neighbouring areas and in Europe in general and is in harmony with the principles of the adapted CFE Treaty.

In order to fulfill the adapted CFE Treaty’s requirements on information exchange and verification, Finland would have to make changes in its mobilisation system, which would have a significant effect on the credibility and costs of its defence.

In the current situation, Finland does not deem it necessary or even possible to sign the adapted CFE Treaty, but is following its implementation and effects closely.

The above formulation of pros and cons combines the narrower national perspective with a broader European-wide view. The first one (negative impacts to defence system; need to protect the integrity of mobilisation) weighs more although the Treaty as such is recognised to have positive significance in the European security system and benefits are seen in participation.

The last paragraph maintains an option to accede in the future. It is not possible to accede to the adapted Treaty as long as it is not internationally in force. The entry into force has been delayed much more than could be anticipated upon the signature in November 1999. Finland naturally hopes to see the entry into force of the adapted Treaty soon. As things stand today, Finland cannot have any national position on details of the CFE regulation system.

It is envisaged that the relationship between the narrower and broader view to the CFE issue, as well as between traditional and modern elements of Finnish defence, will receive new inputs when the future guidelines for the entire defence system as a part of Finland’s security policy, will be determined in the upcoming Report in 2004. By that time there will be more information available to assess the implications of the Treaty. The narrow and broad angle are neither contrasts nor alternatives, but rather complementary.

The CFE Treaty in the Baltic Sea region

In stating that “in accordance with the OSCE principles, the Baltic States have the right to choose solutions that are best for their own security. Improving the international position of the Baltic States will support stability in Northern Europe, increasing security and benefiting all the countries concerned in the region”, the 2001 Report outlines the Finnish basic view over NATO enlargement to the Baltic region. It is up to the Baltic States themselves to decide on seeking membership in the Alliance and participation in
the CFE Treaty. Finland supports their right to choose and their pursuit of membership. But freedom of choice also applies to military non-alliance.

It is obvious that in the upcoming NATO enlargement round to be decided in Prague, an arms control “package” will probably have a significant reassuring role, as it had in the 1997-99 round. NATO’s positive attitude to arms control in general and to the CFE Treaty in particular will help to meet Russia’s expectations. It is envisaged that similar fundamental commitments as made five years ago on “no’s” to stationing nuclear weapons in the new member-states and on restraint and flexibility on stationing CFE-regulated equipment (TLE) will be reconfirmed again. The adapted CFE Treaty mechanisms will be needed here.

It means that after the Baltic States’ entry into the Alliance the issue of their relationship to the CFE Treaty will be activated and a prospect of their future participation in the Treaty will be established. Undoubtedly, these negotiations will be of significance to Finland and Sweden, who as things stand today, do not intend to enter NATO through the same door opening as the Baltic States, and most probably will not start discussions on acceding to the CFE Treaty at the same time as the Baltic States.

To some extent, those negotiating results and final terms for the Baltic States’ CFE accession may set a precedent for states outside the Treaty. The end result will probably be a combination of legally and politically binding commitments. It will be a new situation for the “CFE community” to determine positions for such acceding states, whose ceilings and status have to be based on a new logic, for example on a small number of active formations or existing equipment. Decisions, choices and solutions for Baltic and Nordic States do affect each other. There is interaction and mutual dependence to some extent. So it is of key importance that we keep each other informed of intentions and perform regular exchange of views.

The CFE-Treaty Seminar arranged by this College represents an excellent start to the process of mutual information sharing and responsiveness. The participants in this Seminar represent more or less NB 8 - a relatively new regional brand, which embraces a security and interest community. We are security partners, indeed, although our solutions and timetables are not identical in every respect.

By arranging this Seminar and offering a forum for debate BALTDEFCOL demonstrates its functioning as a security policy think-tank in the Baltic States and in a wider Baltic Sea region, and its capacity to tackle topical and emerging security policy issues with a view of contributing to proactive policies by the States concerned. Klaus Bolving earns special thanks for his book “Baltic CFE Membership” (Danish International Relations Institute 2001), which has greatly helped to explain the nature of the complicated Treaty and open up its details.

**The CFE Treaty in a wider context**

Today it seems that the NATO enlargement will proceed without further complications. The ground work has been
done by recreating a new relationship between NATO and Russia through establishing a NATO – Russia Council (NRC). It is a good omen. The space for power politics will be further limited but room for policy-making based on influence will grow. Deepening integration and inclusion of many more new members, both to the EU and NATO may lead to a new balance where national interests and profile-seeking will be enhanced. It is a comprehensive job to aspire for membership and fulfil the criteria. It will be a different but equally tough challenge to work inside those enlarging institutions.

The CFE Treaty represents the strongest element in the OSCE normative system in politico-military field. To maintain and, if possible, to enhance the relevance of the OSCE as a normative actor, (the OSCE as an operative actor is another issue), is in the interest of all and particularly smaller states. To extend the sphere of participation in the legally binding instruments like the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty (which were previously reserved to members of military alliances only) serves that purpose.

The OSCE arms control instruments – both soft (CSBM-type) and hard (CFE-type) – have a useful reassuring role to play in NATO-Russia relations. Many of those instruments are in active use among states in the Baltic Sea region. They help to build a pattern of co-operative security leaning on institutions.

However, the “Vienna-based” security in Europe is more and more “squeezed” by the “Brussels-based” security. The newly established NRC only adds to that effect. It will be a big question whether and how the OSCE-based normative system in the politico-military field, the CFE Treaty included, is able to respond and embrace the new military trends in Europe where the main security actors – the US and NATO/PfP, the EU, and Russia – have shifted their emphasis to mobile, transportable and sophisticated defence and a new forum, NRC, is available for discussions on those issues.