

THE BUGLE

BALTDEF COL NEWSLETTER



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A special point of interest in the current Bugle is definitely the exclusive interview on page 6 with Commander of the responsible Combined Air Operation Centre in Uedem, Germany, LtGen Friedrich Wilhelm Ploeger (on the picture in the middle of the 1st row) conducted by LtCol Volker Antonius Engelmann, student of JCGSC (1st row on the right).

In the interview conducted for LtCol Engelmann's individual study paper LtGen Ploeger is talking about the general policies and regulations concerning the policing and securing of the NATO airspace with special

emphasis on the airspace of the three Baltic States. That includes the possible future developments in the region and also possible action in a hypothetical RENEGADE case (using an aircraft as a weapon to perpetrate terrorist attacks).

Also it is worth to draw attention on Dr. Eric Sibul's essay of the role of military history in the professional military education (PME). Dr. Sibul gives an overview of the role social sciences have had in PME from their emergence in the beginning of 20th century and argues that the role of historical case studies can't be underrated.

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Commandant's foreword

DEAR BALTDEFCOL staff and students,

As we are already in spring with our proceedings and make last efforts to successfully graduate the JCGSC 2009/2010 and the CSC 2010 then I would sincerely like to thank the whole staff and students for the great job already done, for successfully carrying through the JCGSC International Study Tour and the SWEDEX, and at the same time wish all the best in conducting the forthcoming Baltic Capitals Study Tour.

It is important to note that the

Baltic Ministers signed on 7 May the Decision Sheet on the Long Term Development Plan 2010-2016 of the BALTDEFCOL as well as confirmed the Plan itself marking a new step in the development of the BALTDEFCOL and expecting the partnership between the College and supporting countries to continue in the future on a mutually beneficial way.

This step could be held as completing the Reform Process of the BALTDEFCOL. The foreseen reforms will be implemented starting the new year 2011 of BALTDEFCOL and will among other issues

pose challenges in respect of large-scale personnel rotation we will face this summer.

I wish all members of the BALTDEFCOL family to have vigour and good energy to face the busy period before the graduation of the courses.

BrigGen Gundars Abols
Commandant

Civil Servants Course (CSC) 2010

LtCol Harri Ints

IN 2000, it was foreseen in the College that a course should be run for civil servants, and in mid-February 2001 the first CSC began at Baltic Defence College with 14 students from Estonia and Latvia. The course is aimed at addressing the needs of the national ministries and other governmental agencies, which are dealing with security issues, in order to prepare civil servants for the work in the international environment and with their military counterparts – and on same side! A particular emphasis is placed on building skills and knowledge necessary for contributing to the international operations, both at the strategic and operational levels.

The Civil Servants Course 2010 started on January 11 with 9 students from Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Montenegro and Ukraine. All students are working in their respective MODs or Defence Staffs.

The course lasts 23 weeks and covers broad area of subjects providing a broad, multi-disciplinary education and the analytical instru-

ments necessary for the civil servants to deal with complexity and volatility of the contemporary environment.

The course is divided into 4 phases and covers 5 learning areas: Military Operations, International Security and Strategy, Defence Planning and Management, Leadership, and Individual Research Pro-

2010 is right now on a six week Distance Learning phase back at their respective organizations. They continue their studies by preparing a Individual Research Project and participating in web-based distance learning and courses on International Law and Leadership. The students will return to Tartu on May 3rd and will continue with



ject (IRP). After passing the first three week Foundation and the second seven week Joint Learning Period with the JCGSC the CSC

the second Joint Learning Period with the JCGSC. The graduation day is June 18 together with the JCGSC.

Contribution to the Seminar on International Humanitarian Law

By Olavi Jänes

BALTDEFCOL contributed to the 5th Tallinn Seminar on International Humanitarian Law: *Laws of War in Action* held in Tallinn and Tartu on 10-14 March 2010. The Seminar was honoured by participation of several well-known professionals, among others International Criminal Court (ICC) judge Erkki Kourula, and former Yugoslav Tribunal prosecutor and ICC defence lawyer Nicholas Kaufmann.

BALTDEFCOL International Law Chair Olavi Jänes developed for the seminar a complex scenario for laser weapons wargame and participated in the following moot court session as a member of professional panel. The wargame scenario took into account several actual incidents of the recent Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and put the participants into a situation similar to the one ISAF troops are currently facing in Afghanistan. The scenario was supported by fictional rules of engagement card (known as soldiers card) and actual United

Nations Security Council regulations and Status of Forces agreement.

During the wargame the participants were asked to play the roles of ISAF troops, Taliban fighters and protected persons like civilians and medical personnel. Their knowledge on international humanitarian law was challenged by incidents including riots, use of human shields, use of hospital building for military purposes, feigning death by wounded Taliban fighters etc. Making quick decisions based on rules of engagement, rules of IHL and force protection needs proved difficult and explained well the complexity of issues challenging a soldier in the field. However, the violations of IHL gave good ground for the following moot court session.

For the moot court session participants were divided into three groups representing prosecution, defence and the court respectively. First they were asked to analyse legal environment applicable to ISAF troops in Afghanistan,

including jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters. As a next step they were asked to analyse decisions made by the ISAF troops during the intensive wargame and find legal arguments for their prosecution and defence. The arguments were rather sophisticated and sometimes surprising, but the court managed to draw legally adequate conclusions. In the end members of the professional panel issued their extensive comments clarifying several complex legal issues. The event was added special flavour through the participation of a real ICC judge Erkki Kourula in the panel.

During last couple of years **BALTDEFCOL** has developed a nice and appreciated practice of supporting European Law Student Association in introducing legal aspects of warfare. The practice is to continue as the understanding of the legal aspects of warfare and complex choices challenging the troops has to reach wider audience.

In brief

New section on the web

New refreshment to the webpage of **BALTDEFCOL** can be located under the research section titled the Recent Faculty Publications.

As the name describes the section features the recent books and articles by Baltic Defence College faculty. The need to create such a space on the website emerged when it was understood that there is not much information about the research activities of the faculty available, although a number of them have recently had their books, chapters or major articles published.

The idea of the site is to offer a concentrated overview of the publications written by the active faculty members in the last couple

of years. In addition to the basic data each title also has a brief description as a teaser and a link either to the full text or to the publisher for more information.

Promotions

In the first three months of 2010 two Baltic Defence College faculty members received promotions. Artur Lillenuurm from the Estonian Army was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and Sten Sepper from Estonian Navy to the rank of Commander Senior Grade.

White book

In February the **BALTDEFCOL** annual white book was issued. White Book 2009 is available to everybody on Baltic De-

fence College website under the About **BALTDEFCOL** section.

Employee mobility

The beginning of the year has given **BALTDEFCOL** the pleasure to welcome new additions to the staff. The cabinet of the Head of DPS was occupied by College's first Greek staff member Dr. Ilias Iliopoulos, OPD greeted new faculty member Col. (ret.) Daniel Jordan to the post of NATO Air Force and Joint Operations and MSG Risto Kanketer replaced MSG Hannele Tilk to deal with Host Nation Support and Protocol Support.

Baltic Defence College also had to say good bye to a long time staff member the HCSC Course Director Col. Almantas Leika.

Integrating the staff: Birth of another tradition – OPD Challenge Cup

By Aare Tuvike

OPERATIONS Department turns lots of attention to active communication also outside the college's walls. Various events held in a free and friendly environment function well to educate oneself and the others, broaden the mind and just spend a good time to-

Eeden bowling hall the OPD Open Bowling Cup was held. Besides two 5-member teams from OPD participated teams from DMO and Support Staff. The latter also won the competition in the following line-up – Alar Lehesaar, Urmas Rootsi, Risto Kanketer, Paavo Reidla, Marko Must and Oliver Toots as the substitution.

climate within the College.

The Cup can be won by any Directing or Support Staff team, who competes by the rules imposed by the team holding the cup and that are in accordance with the statute of the Cup approved by the Head of OPD. Hence, the winner of the bowling competition and the current holder of the Challenge



Head of OPD Col. Kristian Ekroll giving the Cup over to the Support Staff team (Urmas Rootsi, Paavo Reidla, MSG Risto Kanketer)
(photo by Mr. Taivo Seppa)

gether. These kinds of events are good not only for relaxation and getting to know each other better, but also the unconstrained atmosphere helps to find new and smarter ideas and solutions to improve the study process.

Among other events last autumn OPD organized an internal individual bowling competition (won by the author of this article). While planning new events for the ongoing year, also the bowling competition and ways how to improve it were under discussion. One thing led to another and an idea was born of organizing a competition between teams, and to get more teams to participate, also guests were invited outside of OPD. And so, on March 17th in

Competition, where people from different units were able to come together and compete with each other turned out to be an interesting experience and together it was thought that it would be fun to organize such kind of competitions also in the future. In that way the team who won the Cup could prove their superiority and give a new chance to the others.

And so emerged the idea of establishing the Operations Department Challenge Cup. The intent of the Cup is to encourage and promote informal social activities for the entire staff of BALTDEFCOL in order to promote good internal communications and to contribute to a collegial working

Cup has the honour of suggesting a new challenge to other teams in the College, to give them a chance to get the Cup into their hands. The statute foresees that the next event has to be organized in two months. The Operations Department wishes everybody active participation and luck in the pursuit for the Cup.

By today the Support Staff team has also announced the new challenge. In the beginning of June the teams will compete in go-karting on Põltsamaa circuit. Besides OPD and Support Staff also DPS and DMO are very welcome to challenge the two others. The same expectations go for the rest of the staff to come and cheer for the racers and keep up the spirit!

JCGSC International Study Tour

THE week from 5th to 9th of April JCGSC students spent away from the college on a study trip in Germany, The Netherlands and Belgium. The mission of the study trip was to make the students understand better the role of the components in a joint environment, command and control architecture of the joint level and coordination between the joint and the strategic/political level. For that students spent 5 days visiting different NATO institutions where they received many informative briefings and also had some time to get acquainted with some historical and cultural sights.

The tour started at Allied Force Command Heidelberg, where the students were introduced with how this institution is contributing to ISAF operations. The briefings received covered topics like the development and the concept of the Deployable Joint Staff Element, Joint Logistic Support Group and Pre-deployment training. The day was finished with a nice trip to the surroundings of Heidelberg and the guided tour of the local castle.



Col. Ekroll, LtCol. Engelmann and Capt. Toomse enjoying the view from Koenigstuhl (photo by Maj. Stig Nilsen)

program covered a wide range of topics finishing with future challenges for the power balance in the Northern hemisphere.

On fourth day the caravan rolled on to the Joint Force Command (JFC) in Brunssum, Holland. Again the tight schedule offered a

JFC assessment of the accomplishment of the missions.

The last day the participants got to spend outside in fresh air when they visited Fort Eben-Emael in Belgium. After getting acquainted with the historical defence construction started the way back to Tartu. In general the trip was a success because of the professional briefings that updated the participants' knowledge of the NATO Command Structure, current challenges for the NATO HQs and what future challenges lie ahead within the remit of NATO responsibilities on one hand, and on the other hand getting together outside of the college's walls help a lot creating a good social environment amongst the students and staff.

The full report of the trip by Maj. Stig Nilsen - that introduces more thoroughly the content of the briefings and include topics such as preparing the officers for working at NATO staff; air policing, air planning, ISAF air operations, etc.; and operational planning processes – can be found on the BALTDEFCOL home page together with The Bugle.



Joint Force Command Headquarters in Brunssum (photo: Internet)

The next day brought the tour to Headquarter Air Command Ramstein where the visitors got to know how the military (air) theory is applied in practical work at a NATO Headquarters. The intense

variety of briefings from introducing the activities and structure of JFC to a detailed overview of the ISAF operation including the operational design, the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan and the

Interview with Lieutenant General Friedrich Wilhelm Ploeger

GENERAL Ploeger, you are Commander of the responsible Combined Air Operation Centre in Uedem, Germany. The task of the CAOC is to preserve the Integrity of the NATO Airspace also over the Baltic States. Do you think that the presence in the Baltics with one QRA is sufficient to have an acceptable degree of deterrence along a border with a Non-NATO neighbour?

At, first, I would like to point out that NATO and Russia do not see each other as adversaries. Russia is a member state of the PfP program. Secondly, I think that the continuous availability of a pair of QRA aircraft is sufficient to cover the air space over the 3 BS in the current security environment. The air space volume approximately compares to the air space over half of Germany which is also covered by one pair of QRA aircraft (two pairs for the total German air-space).

Sir, under what circumstances will the QRA be alerted?

We always scramble the QRA following the rules and regulations issued by our parent HQ, i.e. to identify unknown air movements or otherwise suspicious air movements which warrant visual interrogation.

Assuming a Civil Aircraft not adhering to published Flight Rules, what are the actions to be ordered by NATO?

NATO is restricted – and that is the rule for NATO air policing – to identification, interrogation, and shadowing by QRA Aircraft. Further actions and measures, especially the use of military force

against civil aircraft, are a national responsibility.

A Civil Aircraft presenting an imminent threat against the Population or a strategic target in one of the Baltic States – what can NATO do against this kind of threat?

As said before, we can only shadow and observe because military action against civil aircraft is not allowed for NATO QRA.

Since 9/11 the world has changed. According to some experts terror with civil airliners used as weapons can still endanger peace and security in the world. Do you believe in a threat like this for the Baltic States too?

Yes, and it is not possible for me to further qualify this threat since it is the same for all NATO nations.

The terrorist threat is supposed to be one of the major threats, also for Europe. Isn't NATO encouraging those who are willing to weaken the Alliance to attack those countries who cannot defend them self?

NATO's Article 5 umbrella covers all NATO member states against any threat of military aggression, no matter what the own capabilities are. Thus, small countries like Luxemburg and the Baltic States have the same security guarantee as Germany or Poland. And a terrorist threat or attack will not impact on this principle.

If the RENEGADE scenario cannot be coped with by NATO, isn't this against the NATO doctrine which clearly states to protect the alliance?

As said before, NATO's collective defence is directed against the threat of military aggression. It was, however, decided in NATO that a threat by (civil) RENEGADE aircraft has to be dealt with nationally at first – because NATO is not allowed to take military action against civil aircraft. There might, however, be circumstances, which could lead to the invocation of Article 5 – as was done on the day following the attacks in the USA.

X-Border flights are a matter of minutes with modern jet airplanes. How can Europe solve the threat of a possible RENEGADE in this perspective?

The only solution lies in border x-ing agreements by all nations concerned, at least for interrogation and shadowing. In Europe, France is the only country which has such agreements with all its neighbouring countries.

The minimum we should achieve in NATO is to have border crossing agreements among all Alliance members allowing interrogation and shadowing in NATO air policing missions against non-NATO military aircraft. But this is a matter of national legislation.

Is it ethically acceptable to deny shooting down a confirmed RENEGADE, manned with only terrorists, only because it is a NATO regulation? How can NATO preserve their countries and the respective citizen then?

It is ethically accepted to shoot down aircraft which are only manned with terrorists. However, as said before, it is up to the nations to take respective decisions. NATO preserves the sovereignty

of the airspace against military threats. That means that in the case of the 3BS very complicated legal agreements with all contributing QRA nations would be needed.

If NATO states are in Afghanistan to fight against the terror threatening their countries, why can NATO not fight those terrorist inside NATO territory? Is NATO aware that Terrorist threat cannot be seen as an individual threat against one single country?

NATO supports Afghanistan in its efforts to become a stable state with the UN-mandated ISAF mission. Accordingly, military force by NATO's ISAF forces is only applied against those elements threatening ISAF's mission.

The world economic crisis struck the three Baltic states more than most other countries. The state budgets were cut drastically. Some countries had to cut the salary of their soldiers, civil servants and so on. Do you think it is realistic that the Baltic States can protect their own Airspace after 2018? How could this look like?

As we are already in 2010 it appears to be unrealistic for the 3BS to build up an indigenous air defence capability to include air policing capabilities against the full range of the air breathing threat until 2018, even if the 3BS had the money for it, because no decision has been taken yet and it takes time to build it up. Secondly, even without a crisis, the resources required (money, manpower) would probably go beyond the capabilities of the 3BS. The only realistic option, therefore, appears to be the continuation of the current NATO air policing model, probably modified to reduce the burden of the sending nations. The 3BS could best support this model by taking over and sharing host nation costs to the maximum extent possible.

Assuming that the crisis or other circumstances do not allow the Baltic States to buy or lease own aircraft, is NATO in your personal opinion willing and able to extend the Air Policing?

My firm believe is that NATO will not leave the 3 BS Airspace uncovered.

NATO invests a lot of money in building the Airbases in Latvia and Estonia. What are the future plans for the use of these airbases?

Primarily, we would use them as military alternate airfields for the QRA thus solving the issue of the availability of alternates in this part of the NATO region. Secondly, these air bases could serve secondary QRA bases to either host the QRA if Siauliai is unserviceable for any reason or to rotate the QRA from time to time for a shorter period, e.g. during exercises.

Thirdly, they could be used for air exercises, and finally, they stand ready to accept reinforcements whenever needed.

During the European Football Championships countries protected their airspace against threat from the air by having fighters at high ground alert or even airborne. Estonia has only 1,3 million people. During the song festival in July every year more than 100.000 people, most of them Estonians, are participating in this mega event. A terror attack could kill 10% of the population on one strike. Don't you think it would be necessary to protect such events and if, could it be done with NATO assets?

If the threat assessment of such an event clearly indicates that air cover would be required to prevent attacks it will be the nations' responsibility to ask NATO for additional assets during this critical

time period. Furthermore, as said with respect to RENEGADE scenarios, bilateral agreements will have to be concluded if more than interrogation and shadowing is expected to be necessary (as was done during the 2006 Riga Summit between Latvia and USA).

Germany and other Nations in Europe did a lot to secure aviation. Although one part of the Luftsicherheitsgesetz was claimed illegal by the German Supreme Court – all the other paragraphs remained unchanged. Some of them were heavily criticized. The ZÜP for example, which according to the majority of German Aviators claims them as suspicious Terrorists, requests all Pilots to ask for a strong security check by all available state sources. Without this ZÜP they are not allowed to fly in Germany. A Citizen from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia and so on holding a JAR-FCL license can hire a German registered Airplane and fly in Germany without restriction. What sense do such regulations have in your personal opinion? Is it enough just to think about local security?

The regulations laid down in the LSG are following rules as agreed upon in international fora. With the LSG DEU establishes these rules for people living in Germany (German citizens) trying to obtain pilot licenses. Secondly, you should see these regulations in context with all the other regulations laid down in LSG, e.g. the security checks for personnel having to security areas, baggage checks and other measures: they form a complex security system which aims to ensure that criminal or terrorist use of civil aircraft is not achievable. (vgl. Sicherheitspyramide im Briefing FüZNatLV)

*Interview was conducted by LtCol
Volker Antonius Engelmann*


The Case for Military History in Professional Military Education

By Dr. Eric Sibul

Do late nineteenth century – early twentieth century ideas on educational disciplines still have relevance to professional military education to prepare officers for an increasingly complex and dangerous world? Are the machine age concepts of theoretical social science irrelevant to contemporary officer education or perhaps even dangerous? For military officer to analyze and understand an increasingly complex operating environment, it is perhaps more beneficial to have approach problems using primarily analytic, critical, and speculative methods of the humanities rather the largely empirical approaches social sciences. Perhaps the use of the of humanities in military education, notably history and within the discipline of history, the sub-discipline of military history as perhaps more beneficial than the grabastic social science topics which occupy increasing amounts of time in curricula at staff colleges and other professional military educational institutions.

Rise of Social Sciences

Contemporary social science is largely a product of the machine age. Industrialization created a series of new social, economic, and political problems on a mass scale. These problems and the euphoria for scientific progress gave rise to a number of pseudo – scientific fields applied to human affairs such as political science, sociology and scientific management which attempted to provide a form of decision making that was more “scientific” and thus believed to be easier to manage complex problems. In the United States, in 1899, President McKinley had appointed Elihu Root, a corporate lawyer as the Secretary of War to reform the army by bringing modern business practices to the US War De-



MajGen William Crozier

partment. Root was a devotee of the scientific management theories of Frederick W. Taylor who had greatly improved efficiency at the Midvale Steel Company during his eight year tenure as master mechanic. Taylor established a system for manufacturing enterprises which broke down complex production tasks into a sequence of simple, standardized steps permitting a standardized mass production line supported by a personnel management system that classified work into standard tasks and workers into standard specialties. Workers trained in these standard specialties became interchangeable parts of the manufacturing system to be placed where needed during the process. The management system was based on centralized control from the top and all decisions made in the organization were done with overall efficiency in mind. The scientific management system was first applied to army manufacturing operations at arsenals and ordnance plants through efforts of the Major General William Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, 1901 – 1918 and with the support of Root. He took a brief absence from that post from 1912 to 1913 to serve as president of Army War College. During and after the First

World War, the scientific management practices were more widely applied to other organizations within the army. Due to apparent success of these practices and the influence of General Crozier on senior officer education during his tenure as president of the Army War College, the army became steeped in the theory and practice of scientific management in the interwar years.¹ This passion for a scientific approach lead to attempts to break the complex phenomenon of war into interchangeable parts into where military commanders could make decisions based on standard “scientific” principles.² This passion for the scientific approach led to increasing influence of the social sciences into politico-strategic and military decision making and influence of civilian academics and experts trained in social sciences or scientific management.³ The influence on military education was profound as these topics became increasingly part of curricula. The failures of the social science and scientific management in guiding strategy in the Vietnam gave pause to passion for the scientific approach to strategy. The methodology of the civilian specialists guiding the war effort was the economic conflict model using the assumption that international conflict could be analyzed in terms of rational strategic men. This approach had it limitations as it discounted the often intangible social and cultural motivations of the enemy. Furthermore the success of military operations was measured in terms of statistics which were often flawed in assumption and collection. Pentagon leadership imposed on military operations the ideas of scientific management including, such ideas as the irrelevance of specific social and cultural conditions, centralized decision making and one fixed best approach of doing everything.⁴ An example of irrelevant and arbitrary

success indicators of statistically driven strategy in the war was the experiences of Captain Larry A. Thorne commanding the US Army Special Forces camp at Tinh Bien. Through a successful pacification efforts based on Thorne's extensive war experience and intuitive knowledge, Viet Cong activity dropped in the area and hence the number of Viet Cong killed dropped. However, the drop in the number of Viet Cong dead was viewed by Military Assistance Command Vietnam staff officers in Saigon as negative sign of inefficiency rather than a successful pacification effort.⁵

The soul searching in the US armed forces after the Vietnam War breathed new life into historical studies in military education as renaissance in American military thinking took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁶ The "Young Turks" military reform



Colonel John R. Boyd. A key figure in the Military Reform Movement

movement put emphasis on the art of war while being often highly critical of the ideas of those who had rose prominence when the social sciences and scientific management ruled supreme over the American military establishment in the 1960s. The domestic political and social turmoil of the Vietnam

War era however energized a new challenge to place of history in military education as civilian academics under the sway of the "Frankfurt School" have sought to impose political correctness on the professional military education system.

warped by an authoritarian approach which sanctioned only the "correct" view of civilization past, present and future. Many of the social sciences have been far more affected by political correctness than the discipline of history. Western European academia have largely paralleled the trends of po-

"Western European academia have largely paralleled the trends of political correctness of the United States and even taken them to further extreme. In Eastern Europe, while politically rejecting Marxist ways, the educational systems still feel the hangover of the Soviet Empire."

Political Correctness

These civilian academics have seen the military as subculture with socially unacceptable values and the study of military history as a tool to reinforce the values subculture. The study of history has been mistakenly seen simply as a means of awakening patriotism and loyalty to organization of the devotees of political correctness and hence they believe it should be removed from curriculum or used only to indoctrinate with the correct message. As in civilian universities, military educational institutions have been under the pressure to have politically correct curricula. Political correctness has its roots in the ideas of a group of German Marxists in the 1920s who founded the Institute of Social Research later known as the Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School gained profound influence in American universities after many of its leading figures fled to the United States in the 1930s to escape National Socialism in Germany.⁷ As the influence of the Frankfurt School rose in 1970s and 1980s the teaching of military history became increasingly under attack and entire discipline of history itself was in dangers of being

litical correctness of the United States and even taken them to further extreme. In Eastern Europe, while politically rejecting Marxist ways, the educational systems still feel the hangover of the Soviet Empire. As all disciplines of study under the Communists had to be "scientifically" based there is still a bias toward the theoretical and disciplines that purport to be scientific in basis.

Sir Karl Popper's Warning

In many ways the rise of political correctness, particular in the social sciences, is the natural extension of problems which Sir Karl Popper (1902 – 1994) of the London School of Economics saw in these disciplines beginning in the 1930s and 1940s. Popper believed the social sciences were both theoretically misconceived and socially dangerous. As the principal task of the social sciences, as according to the devotees of these disciplines was to make predictions about the social and political development of man, and that the task of political policy based on these predictions was to hasten and smooth the way for future social and political developments. However, Popper held the view that history does not

evolve in accordance with intrinsic laws or principles and the absence of such laws and principles, made most prediction in the social sciences impossible. Hence grand plans based on a rigid deterministic outlook of the social sciences, was to be, inherently misconceived and inevitably disastrous. Furthermore, a deterministic approach to the future adopted as official government policy, as according to Popper and other critics of social science, leads inevitably to authoritarianism and totalitarianism and the deterministic outlook on history is something that nearly all undemocratic societies have shared.⁸

Argument of Relevance

One of the arguments of the devotees of political and behavioural sciences in the competition for curriculum space in military educational programs is that of timeliness and relevance. They point out that their fields focus on contemporary issues and are useful


such as the 11 September 2001 attacks and the response of Operation Enduring Freedom can happen amidst a relatively short education program, quickly rendering the timeliest topics covered in the course irrelevant. Clearly learning activities should focus on the long term with long term relevance throughout the career of an officer. Clearly the argument can be made for a long term and broad perspective in education.

Case for the Case Method

In many ways, the study of military history through use of the case method can provide broad perspective and with enduring value in military education. Furthermore, the case method has proven to be a highly effective way mode of learning in professional education. According to Bruce I. Gudmundsson who specializes in developing case studies for various courses in US Marine Corps University, "The human mind is not designed to learn from lists of

ples.¹¹ In civilian graduate education, the case method has been extensively used in business programs. Its origins in university education date to 1870 when it was instituted in the Harvard Law School. Harvard's business school founded in 1908, would follow the law school's lead and institute use of the case study in 1920.¹² The Harvard Business School case studies would largely become the model and standard for graduate business programs. In the military education was similar movement took place largely concurrently with the development of various forms of the applicatory method or applicatory system. As early as 1912, use of such methods were well established at institutions such as the US Naval War College.¹³ However, it is only with the military reform movement and the rise of diverse and complex military operational problems in the post Cold War era that military educational institutions the United States and other western military have become interested in business school style case studies and renewed their interest in the applicatory method.

The strength of the historical case method is that it develops the students' assess complex problems from different points of view through tangible examples. It serves develop broader thinking among students and provides them with new insights into how to deal with the untidy uncertainties of the real world. Perhaps different from past use of military history, contemporary historical case studies in places such as the Marine Corps University examine complex situations where multiple belligerent or uncommitted actors are involved rather than the "red forces versus blue forces" approach common to traditional staff rides and campaign studies. Furthermore, the broader social and political context is examined rather than looking at military operations in isolation. Developing feel for military operations in a complex and constantly changing



Sir Karl Popper

in forecasting future events. However, as Antulio J. Echevaria of the US Army War College, points out the greater the current relevance of any particular knowledge, "the shorter the shelf life."⁹ Clearly as we have seen from recent history, as dramatic shift of strategic focus

characteristics, traits, and attributes. Rather, it was designed to learn from experience."¹⁰ Gudmundsson points out that the case study provides condensed experience and thus is a more effective way of learning than classroom lectures on theories and princi-

environment is, of course, the goal. Cautions about using or abusing military history in professional military education, have long been given, most notably by the eminent scholar of military affairs, Sir Michael Howard. The biggest possi-

creasingly complex future. The use of historical case studies develops more how to think rather than what to think. Clearly there should be a strong place for such studies the curriculum of professional military education programs. The

“The value of case studies is lost in myth-making, as there is as much to be learned from what wrong as from what went right.”

ble, perhaps is myth-making, simple terms “cherry picking” facts and biased interpretation of events to further the national patriotic epic or institutional glory.¹⁴ In current times the “politically correct” version of history based again on selective and biased interpretation of events is a similar danger. The value of case studies is lost in myth-making, as there is as much to be learned from what wrong as from what went right. Examining in depth and width original documents and accounts of events is essential to developing good case studies. The strength of the field of history is that strives for free inquiry to what has happened in the past and from this can be drawn conclusions about broad patterns of events, what has changed and what has stayed the same. In regard to the lessons of history, Howard cautions “the statesman, the soldier has to steer between the danger of repeating the errors of the past because he is ignorant that they have been made, and the danger of remaining bound by the theories deduced from past although changes in conditions have rendered these theories obsolete.”¹⁵

Conclusions

Clearly the use of military history through case studies can be an effective method for preparing military officers for complexities of present and future operating environment and an uncertain and in-

question remains for curriculum developers in various institutions how historical case studies can be used best in conjunction with other disciplines and teaching methods.

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Tactical Decision Game—nr. 1

By Eric A. Sibul

The Bugle plans to establish Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) as a regular feature in each edition. Origins of TDGs can be traced back to the Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu who was advocating their use 500 years before the birth of Christ. The modern advent of the TDG had its foundations in 19th Century Germany where the trend in military education was to develop leaders who could take initiative and quickly solve problems without direction from higher levels.

The Germans developed *Planübung* (planning exercise) and the *Planspiel* (planning games) that required players to quickly come up with a concept of operations to deal with a given tactical situation. Such TDGs went into professional journals to gain maximum spread among military personnel. A short narrative of the problem was presented along with a map or sketch to illustrate the situation. Readers mailed in their solutions to the problem and in the next issue contained the best solutions with some discussion of points by the scenario's author. Many TDGs were actual occurrences from recent or more distant military history; the publication of suggested solutions was accompanied by a narrative of the actual situation's outcome.

In the 1880s, the idea of TDGs came to the English speaking world and began to appear in British and American military journals. While not exactly a TDG, in 1905, Captain Ernest Swinton published *The Defence of Duffer's Drift* which became required reading for generations of British officers. *The Defence of Duffer's Drift* is a fictional story based on actual tactical scenarios in the Boer War (1899 – 1902). The story is set at a river crossing chokepoint, the story's main character, a British lieutenant, has a series of nightmares in which

he loses battle after battle against his Boer adversaries. After each dream, a series of lessons are highlighted, and incorporated into the next battle, which eventually leads the lieutenant to victory in the final dream. Each dream is a short narrative of a scenario with a terrain sketch much in the same format as a TDG.

In the United States the purpose of the TDG became somewhat lost with the publication of Captain Alfred Bjornstad's book *Small Problems for Infantry* in 1917. The book consisted of a series of TDGs with long detailed solutions. This work was used as a sort of drill book to train infantry officers. The students memorized the solutions and recited them in class when the instructor called out a specific problem.

Around the same period, Estonia had emerged from a difficult but successful independence war against more numerous and better equipped enemies, the Estonian armed forces were intellectually

active and innovative in outlook. The professional publication of the Estonian Army, *Sõdur* regularly contained TDGs in their original German conception. In Finland, where the ambitious young jäger officers brought German military education concepts to their armed forces, the TDGs on original model were a staple of military publications through the 1990s.

After radical reforms in US Marine Corps training, education and doctrine in the 1980s, TDGs became a regular feature in the *Marine Corps Gazette*. The difficult operating in environments of Iraq and Afghanistan, where military leaders on all levels require a great deal of initiative to solve complex problems proved to the US armed forces the enduring value of TDGs. Recently the US Army's Combined Arms and Training Directorate introduced TDGs which recognize that there are many ways to approach a problem and not one "school solution."

Trouble at the Outlet Store -- Lieutenant now what?

Problem

You are a lieutenant in charge of a military police detachment as part of a coalition peace support mission in the city of Bratsly. In Bratsly, lies in a border region where the frontiers of four former warring states come together. Bratsly's principal industry is a spandex mill which specializes in producing high quality leopard – skin pattern miniskirts, bikinis, pants, halters, etc. The mill has a large outlet store attached to it. It is a cool autumn afternoon and the outlet store is holding its annual fall clearance sale. Women from all of the neighbouring states have chartered buses to come to the event. In wild excitement over the bargains and quickly depleting stocks, a huge catfight breaks out in the store between women from the different states. There are about 350 women involved in the brawl and the

two guards at store's front door call the military police barracks for assistance. You respond with your twenty man detachment which is equipped with riot shields, batons, gas masks and CS military riot control agent grenades. Outlet store does have hose and water points for fire protection. You need end the brawl quickly before anyone is seriously hurt—possibly sparking an international incident which could reignite war in the region.

Possible Solution

You should not use CS riot control agent in an enclosed structure as there is danger of fire and excessive exposure to CS may make the brawlers incapable of vacating the area. Use the fire hoses to spray a low pressure mist over the brawlers' heads making them cold and uncomfortable, use your men to channel the brawlers out of the store and into different directions.